

state and church with Orthodox populations abroad. He was a driving force behind the Russian Compound that was constructed outside Jerusalem's old town during the 1860s.

Mansurov's children continued his path of promoting Russian Orthodoxy. His son Pavel (1860–1932) was a diplomat in Constantinople and established the Russian Archaeological Institute there. A proponent of Byzantine studies in an Orthodox and imperial spirit, he saw scholarship as an instrument to assert Russia's primacy among the Orthodox nations. His sisters Ekaterina (1861–1926) and Natalia (1868–1934) were perhaps the most dedicated Christians in the family: beginning in 1889, they sponsored the construction of a convent in Riga, which they soon entered as nuns themselves, defying the will of their beloved father. More than a testament to the sisters' devotion, the convent and the adjacent Holy Trinity Cathedral also served as visual reminders of Russia's imperial might in its borderlands.

All imperialists have their particular vision of the empire. The Mansurovs imagined Russia first and foremost as an Orthodox great power, a state that would use religion both to claim the loyalty of co-religionists abroad and to assert supremacy in its own territory. After 1905, Pavel Mansurov joined Moscow's Neo-Slavophile milieu that dreamed of remaking the empire in a traditionalist vein, based on estates rather than party democracy or bureaucracy. Needless to say, there was no place for such a vision after the Bolshevik revolution. The last generation of Mansurovs was left to fight for survival in a society that considered both religious believers and nobles to be "former people."

Von Winning's decision to trace the entanglements between religion and empire through the lens of the Mansurov family was fortuitous. Not only does it allow her to tease out the substantial but hidden political agency of noble women, it also casts new light on elite men as emotional actors who were just as invested in the ideal of domestic intimacy as their wives and sisters. According to von Winning, the noble family and organized religion "could both empower and restrict female agency" (105); as noble daughters and as nuns in their Riga convent, the Mansurova sisters wielded considerable power; yet they always depended on the financial and emotional support of male mentors—the goodwill of fathers both in the genetic and the spiritual sense.

A microhistorical approach to a broad historical topic obviously leads to certain silences on issues not covered by the sources. While von Winning provides copious material on the religious and foreign-policy dimensions of empire-building, she says less about the effects of the empire's internal ethnic diversity. In her telling, imperial power was spiritual as much as political, with the church and the nobility as partners, not as handmaidens of the state. Her beautifully written and remarkably concise book offers deep insights into this complex and often conflicted relationship.

FABIAN BAUMANN
University of Vienna

The Catacazy Affair and the Uneasy Path of Russian-American Relations.

By Lee A. Farrow. London/New York: Bloomsbury Academic Press, 2022. ix, 202 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. \$115.00, hard bound.

doi: 10.1017/slr.2023.209

Accusations of Russian meddling in American domestic affairs. Russian denials. Disinformation and manipulation of the American media. Sanctions against prominent Russians. Stories of corruption and cover-up. Mutual mistrust. The year is 1871, and the American government has just asked the Russian government to recall Constantin Gavrilovich Catacazy, its minister to Washington, 1869–1871. A descendant of Greeks who had fled the Ottoman empire in the eighteenth century, Catacazy in his

brief tour as minister managed to alienate President Ulysses Grant and Secretary of State Hamilton Fish, whose good offices Catacazy needed to represent Russian interests in Washington. Catacazy tried to drive a wedge between the United States and Great Britain, made his grievances public in the American press, accused President Grant of potentially benefitting from a claim against the Russian government for breaking an agreement with a private American citizen to provide arms during the Crimean War, and was a gossip monger. His testy relationship with Fish prompted Fish to call him a “first-class scamp” (93). According to Lee Farrow, Catacazy had more detractors than sympathizers (90), even in St. Petersburg. Moreover, his wife’s alleged “past,” an adulterous affair with Catacazy long before he became minister to the United States, caused her to be ostracized by the Washington “arbiters of etiquette” (66), thus hobbling the couple’s efforts to become a presence in Washington polite society.

Farrow’s book will no doubt be the definitive study of the diplomatic imbroglio caused by Catacazy, about whom it may be said, as Winston Churchill remarked of John Foster Dulles, that he was a bull who brought his own china shop with him. Farrow suggests that her study demonstrates the importance of the individual in diplomacy. This is accentuated by her use of diplomatic correspondence in Russian and American archives and, even more so, by her extensive use of stories, many of them gossipy, from newspapers all over the United States. At the same time, her study raises an important question of when and how is it appropriate for one country to request the recall of another country’s diplomatic representative. Given Farrow’s emphasis on the importance of the individual, it may not be possible to settle this question except on a case-by-case basis.

Farrow’s thesis that the Catacazy affair was “the beginning of the slow decline in Russian-American relations from friend to foe” (142) is not convincing. To do so would require greater contextualization than Farrow provides. She ignores many other studies of American-Russian relations in mid-nineteenth century—economic, cultural, and military relations, as well as technology transfer. Not only did the visit in 1871–72 of Grand Duke Alexis proceed successfully, but Russian displays were prominent at the 1876 Centennial Exhibition in Philadelphia; American firearms and production technology aided the modernization of the Russian Army under Minister of War Dmitrii Miliutin; Americans provided significant famine relief in 1891–92; and the commercial treaty of 1832 remained in force until 1911. To be sure, toward the end of the century, George Kennan’s articles on Siberia and the exile system, published in the 1880s in *Century* magazine, transformed the Russian government in the American imagination into a model of despotism. Young Russian revolutionaries persecuted by the government aroused American sympathy (though this was often countered by American antipathy to political assassination). In the 1880s pogroms darkened the image of Russia; in addition, naturalized American Jews born in the Russian empire found discriminatory practices when they returned. But, until then, the diplomatic china broken by the bullish Catacazy was seemingly repaired.

JOSEPH BRADLEY
University of Tulsa

Russian Peasant Bride Theft. By John Bushnell. Routledge Studies in the History of Russia and Eastern Europe. New York: Routledge, 2021. Xii, 217 pp. Notes. Bibliography. Index. Maps. \$160.00, hard bound.
doi: 10.1017/slr.2023.210

John Bushnell’s *Russian Peasant Bride Theft* explores the phenomenon of “bride theft” and the practice’s role within peasant communities culturally, socially, economically,