
The European Community's Public Communication Policy

1951–1967

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Abstract

From its inception the European Community had a civil aim: the need to stimulate a European civil consciousness. Viewed as a pre-condition for the popular acceptance of increased European integration, this provided the rationale for the Community's public communication policy of 1951–1967. The Community pursued this civil aim through two distinct public communication approaches: populist (1951–1962) and opinion leader led (1963–1967). We contend that the way the Community undertook its public communication policy cannot be understood without considering the Community's civil aim. This leads us to question some of the common views held concerning the significance of European public communication policy from 1951 to 1967.¹

Introduction

The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) marked the first concrete step in the European integration process. The competences of the newly-founded ECSC institutions – the European Court of Justice, the Common Assembly and the High Authority – were limited to the coal and steel industry. However, attendant upon this was the introduction of European citizens' rights for qualified coal and steel workers, namely the right to free movement and establishment, which were themselves combined with certain social provisions which extended to the workers' family. These social provisions included housing projects, holidays, social security and the schooling of the workers' children (among other things). Karlheinz Neunreither² and Espen Olsen argue that these citizens' rights were introduced for pragmatic reasons

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¹ 1967 saw the Merger Treaty ratified and the Common Press and Information Service was renamed DG X, which marked yet another change in public communication policy.

² Karlheinz Neunreither, 'Citizens and the Exercise of Power in the European Union: Towards a New Social Contract?', in Allan Rosas and Esko Antola, eds., *A citizens' Europe: in search of a new order* (London: Sage, 1995), 1–18.

in order to ensure the smooth running of the common coal and steel market and the immediate economic self-interest of the ECSC.³

This view is too narrow and neglects the fact that the ECSC, and later the European Economic Community (EEC), never conceived of European integration as a purely economic undertaking. The Community also had civil aims, and these two sets of aims co-existed in a symbiotic relationship. Walter Hallstein alluded to as much in 1958 when he argued that ‘the danger ... exists ... that what we have been pursuing with so much energy and perseverance since the end of the second world war may be misinterpreted as being no more than a material, or economic, exercise. [These economic aims] are in all truth essential aims, but they are not the only aims’⁴. The ECSC and EEC were consistently concerned with facilitating a European civil consciousness⁵ that would provide the basis for a European way of thinking⁶, European citizenship⁷ and, with that, the acceptance of European citizens’ rights⁸ and a *sui generis* European identity⁹. We argue that the Community¹⁰

³ Espen Olsen, ‘The Origins of European Citizenship in the First Two Decades of European Integration’, *Journal of European Public Policy* 15, 1 (2008), 40–57; Espen Olsen, *Transnational Citizenship in the European Union: Past, Present and Future* (London: Continuum Books, 2012).

⁴ Walter Hallstein, ‘The Unity of European Culture and the Policy of Uniting Europe’ (1958), available at: <http://aei.pitt.edu/14887/>. (Last visited 25 January 2015)

⁵ Other terms used by the ECSC and the EEC included ‘a European consciousness’, ‘a European civil spirit’, a ‘Community conscience’ and a ‘European public spirit’. We use the term ‘European civil consciousness’ as a synonym throughout and mean by it those feelings and values that stress, in this case, an imagined European social solidarity as an ‘us’ or a ‘we’ with all the prerogatives and anxieties of a collective identity and where, as Habermas notes, private people are motivated to come together as a discursive and inclusive public irrespective of status or power. For more on this idea see Jürgen Habermas, *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere* (Cambridge: Polity, 2003). It is also interesting that the Community referred to this in constructivist terms as requiring ‘a European way of thinking’ and a ‘European mentality’. On this see Europäisches Parlament, ‘Bericht im Namen des politischen Ausschusses über die Probleme der Information in den Europäischen Gemeinschaften (Berichterstatter Schuijt)’, Dokument 89, 18 Nov. 1960; Europäisches Parlament, ‘Bericht im Namen des politischen Ausschusses über die Tätigkeit der Informationsdienste der Europäischen Gemeinschaften (Berichterstatter Schuijt)’, Dokument 103, 14 Nov. 1962. Both reports were written in unofficial collaboration with the Commission (Rabier, face-to-face interview, Brussels, 22 Feb. 2012) and as such can be used to support our argument.

⁶ Lise Rye, ‘The origins of Community information policy. Educating Europeans’, in Wolfram Kaiser et al., eds., *The history of the European Union: origins of a trans- and supranational polity 1950–72* (London: Routledge, 2008), 148–166; Daniele Pasquinucci, ‘Faire les Européens. Les origines de la politique d’information communautaire’, in Daniela Preda and Daniele Pasquinucci, eds., *The road Europe travelled along: the evolution of the EEC/EU institutions and policies* (Brussels: Peter Lang, 2010), 253–265.

⁷ Paul Magnette, *La Citoyenneté européenne: droits, politiques, institutions* (Brussels: Editions de l’Université de Bruxelles, 1999); Stefanie Pukallus, *Representations of European Citizenship* (working title) (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming 2015).

⁸ Willem Maas, *Creating European citizens* (Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield, 2007).

⁹ N. Piers Ludlow, ‘Frustrated Ambitions: The European Commission and the Formation of a European Identity 1958–1967’, obtained via personal email communication. Published in Marie-Thérèse Bitsch et al., eds., *Institutions européennes et identités européennes* (Brussels: Bruylant, 1998).

¹⁰ We follow Rye, ‘Educating Europeans’ and her use of the term ‘Community’ to refer to the executive of the ECSC, EEC and Euratom.

realised the importance of a European civil consciousness for European integration and attempted to facilitate its emergence through its early public communication policy. This fact has too often been overlooked, and this analysis attempts to rectify this and, in doing so, correct four distinct but related arguments on the nature of the Community's early public communication policy. These four arguments are:

First, European integration was undertaken by 'proponent[s] of arcane policy'¹¹ or 'spin-doctors'¹² with a purely 'technocratic mindset'¹³ and that the early bureaucrats, such as Monnet, Rabier and Schuman, were primarily concerned with stifling debate.¹⁴ They intended to avoid the reporting of European affairs¹⁵ so that integration could proceed in silence.¹⁶ This started 'a vicious circle of (non-) communication'.¹⁷ Alternately expressed, early European public communication policy was nothing other than an 'information obstruction policy',¹⁸ dominated by a distant anti-democratic technocratic or a hypocritically democratic¹⁹ elite and statements such as '*nous sommes les serviteurs de la grande idée de l'Unité Européen* [sic]'²⁰ were only used as rhetorical flourishes.

Second, the Community's early public communication policy was dominated by a concern for persuading elites of the benefits of European integration. Kevin Featherstone²¹ argues that Monnet's 'strategy for the ECSC clearly involved setting his attention on persuading elites, rather than the mass publics'. Bo Petersson and Anders Hellström insist that the Community addressed predominantly elite audiences',²² and Ana Lúcia Terra emphasises that the 'sphere of action' of the Press and Information

¹¹ Michael Brüggemann, 'How the EU Constructs the European Public Sphere: Seven Strategies of Information Policy', *Javnost/The Public* 12, 2 (2005), 57–74.

¹² Max Haller, *European Integration as an elite process: the failure of a dream?* (London: Routledge, 2008).

¹³ Kevin Featherstone, 'Jean Monnet and the Democratic Deficit in the European Union', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 32, 2 (1994), 149–70. Featherstone argues that Monnet's elitist and technocratic character weakened the democratic legitimacy of the Community. In *European Integration* Haller notes that Schuman showed 'considerable autocratic tendencies', 59.

¹⁴ Marc Gramberger, *Die Öffentlichkeitsarbeit der Europäischen Kommission 1952–1996: PR zur Legitimation von Integration?* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1997).

¹⁵ Brüggemann, 'How the EU'; Michael Brüggemann, 'Public Relations between Propaganda and the Public Sphere: The Information Policy of the European Commission', in Chiara Valentini and Georgia Nesti, eds., *Public Communication in the European Union: history, perspectives and challenges* (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars, 2010), 67–92.

¹⁶ Gramberger 'Öffentlichkeitsarbeit'.

¹⁷ Brüggemann, 'How the EU', 65.

¹⁸ Gramberger, 'Öffentlichkeitsarbeit'.

¹⁹ Hagen Schulz-Forberg, 'On the historical origins of the EU's current crisis or the hypocritical turn of European integration', in Edoardo Chiti et al., eds., *The European Rescue of the European Union? ARENA Report*, 3,12 (2012), 15–36.

²⁰ Hallstein 16 January 1958 inaugural meeting of the European Commission at Val Duchesse, cited in Ludlow, 'Frustrated Ambitions', 1.

²¹ Featherstone, 'Jean Monnet', 161.

²² Bo Petersson and Anders Hellström, 'The return of the kings Temporality in the construction of EU identity', *European Societies* 5,3 (2003), 235–52, here 34.

Service consisted of ‘disseminating information amongst designated ‘multipliers’ drawn from the political, academic, economic and media elites’.²³

Third, the importance of an effective public communication policy only became recognised by the Community in its response to either the Maastricht crisis (1992/1993) or the Santer Commission resignation crisis (1999). Thus, Michael Brüggemann argues that ‘information policy became really important for the first time with the ratification problems attached to the Maastricht Treaty [1992]’.²⁴ Cristiano Bee notes that the idea of promoting Europe through information and communication campaigns emerged only at the beginning of the 1990s.²⁵ And Chiara Valentini and Giorgia Nesti add that the importance of information and communication policy started with the Maastricht crisis but became ‘a binding institutional priority’²⁶ from 2005. In a similar vein Christoph Meyer²⁷ argues that the disastrous handling of media attention during the resignation crisis of the Santer Commission acted as a ‘wake-up’ call for the Community with regard to the importance of media relations.

Fourth, the Community had, in the first two decades of European integration, neither a systematic or organised public communication policy nor a regard for communicating and explaining itself to a general European public. Nesti argues that in the 1950s and 1960s, ‘no specific act was published, occasional information campaigns were indeed targeted at a selected elite audience . . . while leaving outside the general public’.²⁸ Terra misleadingly claims that ‘information programmes . . . have emphasised the need to transmit “the European message” to the general public in each member state’²⁹ only since the 1970s, whilst Petersson and Hellström³⁰ see the beginning of a public communication policy that addressed a general European public as late as the 1980s.

We argue that all four of these arguments fail to recognise that the Community had a persistent concern from the 1950s onwards for a public communication policy addressed at an inclusive general European public and that this was exemplified in both a populist approach to public communication policy between 1951 and 1962

²³ Ana Lúcia Terra, ‘From Information Policy to Communication Policy: First steps towards reaching European Citizens in the 1970s and 1980s’ in Valentini and Nesti, ‘Public communication’, 49–66, here 50.

²⁴ Brüggemann, ‘How the EU’, 66.

²⁵ Cristiano Bee, ‘The institutionally constructed European identity: public sphere and citizenship narrated by the Commission’, *Perspectives on European Politics and Society* 9, 4 (2008), 431–450.

²⁶ Chiara Valentini and Giorgia Nesti ‘Introduction’, in Valentini and Nesti, ‘Public communication’, 1–20, here 2.

²⁷ Christoph Meyer, ‘Political Legitimacy and the Invisibility of Politics: Exploring the European Union’s Communication Deficit’, *Journal of Common Market Studies* 37, 4 (1999), 617–39.

²⁸ Giorgia Nesti, ‘The Information and Communication Policy of the European Union between Institutionalisation and Legitimation’, in Valentini and Nesti, ‘Public communication’, 23–48, here 39f.

²⁹ Terra, ‘From Information Policy’, 49.

³⁰ Petersson and Hellström, ‘The return of the kings’.

and an opinion leader approach from 1963 to 1967.³¹ Consequently, the Community realised the importance of a public communication policy, including media relations, as a vehicle for its civil aims. A further point of difference from previous work needs to be noted concerning the historiography used in this paper. We rely heavily on primary sources and archive material, and we treat speeches as having, to borrow from J. L. Austin, both an illocutionary (performative) sincerity and a clear perlocutionary (persuasive) intention. For example, Jean Rey believed that Commission officials should speak as prophets, Jacques-René Rabier describes himself as a ‘missionary’ and Olivier Baisnée³² argues that those who worked for the European institutions at the very beginning were ‘militants’ and ‘pioneers’ for the European cause – that is ‘prophets’, ‘missionaries’, ‘militants’ and ‘pioneers’ who, through, in part, the use of speeches, sought to state the benefits of an economically integrated and civil Europe and to persuade a European public of these benefits. Such speeches were taken very seriously, were carefully crafted³³ and consistently deployed the same essential narrative. Indeed, Commissioners ‘should be regarded as prime movers in an identity-construction enterprise’.³⁴ The narratives and representations³⁵ used in the speeches (and other primary sources) are important in understanding the meaning of a civil and integrated Europe. We do not accept the view that these speeches can be disregarded as political rhetoric made insincerely and for ulterior motives.

In this paper we wish to show four things. First, that the Community’s public communication policy had an explicit civil aim: it wished to stimulate a European civil consciousness in a public conceived of as European and inclusive. Second, that the Community realised the value of public communication in attempting to achieve this. Third, that this civil aim provided the rationale for the Community’s public communication policy efforts from 1951 to 1967. Fourth, that throughout this

³¹ According to C. Wright Mills elites are derived from the economic, political or military sphere. They operate at what Mills referred to as their ‘coincidence of interests’ and possess social power which they use to achieve their usually corporatist aims. They do not have communicative power nor do they possess any totalising control over the channels of communication. Opinion leaders, however, are invariably connected to the means of communication in some form and interpret messages on behalf of other media users. Katz puts the matter clearly: opinion leaders essentially work through inter-personal relations which are ‘(1) channels of information, (2) sources of social pressure, and (3) sources of social support’. His view coincides with the Community’s definition of opinion leaders as those holding the ‘psychological’ and ‘technical’ keys of communication. In other words, as public figures likely to act as ‘multipliers’ with regard to making Europeans aware of, and of informing them as to, developments in Europe’. See C. Wright Mills, *The Power Elite* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1957), 276; Elihu Katz, ‘The two-step flow of communication: An up-to-date report on an hypothesis’, *Public Opinion Quarterly* 21, 1 (1957), 61–78.

³² Olivier Baisnée, ‘The European Public Sphere Does Not Exist (At Least It’s Worth Wondering...)’, *European Journal of Communication* 22, 4 (2007), 493–503.

³³ Monnet and Hallstein both relied on specific members of their teams to prepare their speeches. Monnet would practice the speeches in front of staff and family to ensure that they were simple and clear.

³⁴ Petersson and Hellstroem, ‘The return of the kings’.

³⁵ William Biebuyck, ‘European Imaginaries and the Intelligibility of Integration’, *Journal of Contemporary European Studies* 18, 2 (2010), 161–180.

period the Community adopted two different approaches – first a popularist approach (1951–1962) and second an opinion leader approach (1963–1967).

A European civil consciousness

The Community's conception of an inclusive European public was grounded in the federal possibilities of the Schuman Declaration (1950), which had unhesitatingly and unambiguously said that the ECSC was the 'first step in the federation of Europe'.³⁶ It was not restricted to economic and corresponding social policy competences, which, if followed literally, would only cover a European public that comprised of workers (and their families), trade unions and employers. On the contrary, the Community was concerned with the idea of an inclusive European public, comprised of all Europeans, not one simply consisting of '*homo oeconomicus and homo faber*'.³⁷

This inclusive conception of the European public was envisioned through press articles, TV, radio, cinema, pamphlets, brochures and most notably in speeches given by the High Authority (1952–1957) and Commission officials (1958–1967). Hallstein, President of the EEC Commission from 1958 to 1967, used terms such as 'a new society',³⁸ a 'Europe of free and equal men',³⁹ 'citizens',⁴⁰ 'men and women',⁴¹ 'every man',⁴² 'citizens of the European Community',⁴³ 'individuals and peoples'.⁴⁴ Specifically, he hoped (many years before 'citizenship' became part of the official EU discourse through the Maastricht Treaty) that one day Europeans would say "Civis Europaeus sum" – "I am a citizen of Europe".⁴⁵ Jean Monnet, President of the High Authority from 1952 to 1955, and his successor René Mayer, President

³⁶ The Schuman Declaration <http://www.eppgroup.eu/Activities/docs/divers/schuman-en.pdf> (last visited May 2012).

³⁷ Walter Hallstein, 'The unity of the drive for Europe', 1964, available at <http://aei.pitt.edu/14252/> (last visited 15 May 2012).

³⁸ Walter Hallstein, 'The European Community, a new path to peaceful union', available at <http://aei.pitt.edu/14277/>, 3 (last visited 15 May 2012).

³⁹ Walter Hallstein, 'Address given at the opening of the Hanover Fair, Hanover', 1965, available at <http://aei.pitt.edu/13533/>, 12 (last visited 15 May 2012).

⁴⁰ Hallstein, 'The unity'; W. Hallstein, 'Speech ceremony of laying the inaugural stone, new building European School, Brussels', 1964, <http://aei.pitt.edu/14219/> (last visited 15 May 2012); W. Hallstein, 'Some of our "faux problèmes"', 1964, available at <http://aei.pitt.edu/14258/> (last visited 15 May 2012).

⁴¹ Walter Hallstein, 'The establishment of European unity', 1962, available at <http://aei.pitt.edu/14810/> (last visited 15 May 2012).

⁴² Walter Hallstein, 'Opening of the Conference of the Member States of the European Economic Community, Stresa', 1958, available at <http://aei.pitt.edu/14407/> (last visited 15 May 2012).

⁴³ Walter Hallstein, 'Speech [on European integration] to the European Luncheon Club, London', 1969, available at <http://aei.pitt.edu/12859/> (last visited 15 May 2012).

⁴⁴ Walter Hallstein, 'Address opening of the European Conference on Social Security', 1962, available at <http://aei.pitt.edu/14866/> (last visited 15 May 2012).

⁴⁵ Hallstein, 'The unity', 26.

of the High Authority from 1955 to 1958, used similar terms including a 'European civilisation',⁴⁶ 'Europeans',⁴⁷ 'citizens',⁴⁸ and 'men and women'.⁴⁹ In other words, the Community envisioned the European Community as a 'human Community'⁵⁰ and a federation 'in progress' and correspondingly imagined the future European public as consisting of citizens who were democratically active, participative in and supportive of a European federation.

The Community also articulated a belief in the need for an active European civil society and distanced itself from being a technocratic and remote entity⁵¹. The Community expressed on several occasions that it hoped to involve European citizens actively in the process of Community building.⁵² In other words, the Community was aware that 'to create a living, breathing [democratic] Community of man it [was] not enough to put words down on paper it is not enough to affix seals'⁵³ and that, in order for a solidary European public to emerge, a specific civil aim needed to be achieved, namely the stimulation of a European civil consciousness.

The Community believed that a European civil consciousness would act as a solidarising force and help develop an understanding of the workings of the Community, its objectives, its values and its commitment to liberal principles.⁵⁴ Moreover, it hoped that a European civil consciousness would lead to new European ways of thinking and acting⁵⁵ based on mutuality of interests, common bonds, collective association and a common heritage. An ideal inclusive European public was perceived of as a 'solidary sphere' that 'unites individuals dispersed by class, race, religion, [or] ethnicity'.⁵⁶ This ideal European public united through a European civil consciousness was envisaged as being able to reconcile both national and European interests in a non-contradictory manner. This view was expressed particularly clearly in speeches given by High Authority and Commission officials. For example,

⁴⁶ Jean Monnet, 'A living reality', speech, 1954, available at <http://aei.pitt.edu/14365/> (last visited 15 May 2012).

⁴⁷ Jean Monnet, 'Speech at the National press club', 1952, available at <http://aei.pitt.edu/14364/> (last visited 15 May 2012).

⁴⁸ Jean Monnet, 'A Ferment of Change', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 3, 1 (1962), 203–211.

⁴⁹ René Mayer, 'Address to the Common Assembly', 1957, available at <http://aei.pitt.edu/14394/> (last visited 15 May 2012).

⁵⁰ Lionello Levi Sandri, 'Address [on social security]', 1964, available at <http://aei.pitt.edu/13523/> (last visited 15 May 2012).

⁵¹ Walter Hallstein, 'Economic integration as a factor of political unification', 1961, available at <http://aei.pitt.edu/14775/>; W. Hallstein, 'The history of European integration', 1962, available at <http://aei.pitt.edu/14813/1/S75.pdf> (last visited 15 May 2012).

⁵² Mayer, 'Address', Walter Hallstein, 'Europe is on the move: political and economic policies', 1959, <http://aei.pitt.edu/14932/> (last visited 15 May 2012); Levi Sandri, 'Address [on social security]'.

⁵³ Cf. quotations in Petitfabelle, 'Dispelling a Myth? The Fathers of Europe and the Construction of a Euro-Identity', *European Law Journal*, 12, 5 (2006), 661–79.

⁵⁴ Hallstein 'Europe is on the move'.

⁵⁵ Europäisches Parlament, 'Dokument 89' and 'Dokument 103'.

⁵⁶ Jeffrey Alexander, *The Civil Sphere* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 43.

Mayer,⁵⁷ in an address at the New York Council on Foreign Relations, said: ‘Tonight I address you as a European. It is not to say that I have ceased being a Frenchman – indeed that would be quite impossible – but rather I am a Frenchman and something more’. This was a point endorsed by Hallstein, who argued that ‘no one is asked to disown his country’ but rather that ‘a double allegiance is required of our citizens, so that the new Europe may be built with the nations for its foundation’.⁵⁸ European civil consciousness could and should be comfortable with the multiple attachments and loyalties associated with having both national and European citizenship. In other words, the European public would ‘think and act as multiply situated selves’.⁵⁹ A self-aware European public capable of understanding itself would ultimately bestow political legitimacy on a federal Europe. The Community understood European civil consciousness as an aim that was symbiotically linked to the Community’s economic and political ambitions.

However, the Community’s ‘ideal’ inclusive European public and the actual European public were poles apart. While the Community had hoped (and believed) that a European consciousness would spread quickly among the public,⁶⁰ Rabier admitted that it had been naïve to think this could be achieved quickly and to not realise how difficult it was for Europeans to see the benefits of the Community in their daily lives.⁶¹ The reason, they thought, for this lay mainly in the Community’s predominant technical and economic characteristics. Hallstein, for example, believed that ‘the average citizen . . . feels somewhat lost when confronted with an edifice whose structure appears to him complicated; he easily imagines that Europe is a matter exclusively for technicians, economists and a few political figures upon whom it is difficult for him to exercise any influence. This opinion is obviously erroneous, but it has the advantage of showing us where we must apply our effort’.⁶² Because of the Community’s apparent irrelevance for the ‘man on the street’, the European public lacked curiosity about the European project and did not seem keen on learning more.⁶³

The challenge was to bring the Community closer to the European public, to show its relevance and to demonstrate that Europe was not just an ‘abstract idea’ or a merely technical and economic entity. In the hope of achieving this, the Community turned to public communication policy.

⁵⁷ R. Mayer, ‘Address at the New York Council on Foreign Relations’, 1956, available at <http://aei.pitt.edu/14385/>, 1 (last visited 15 May 2012).

⁵⁸ Hallstein, ‘Faux problèmes’, 7.

⁵⁹ Michael Sandel, *Public Philosophy: Essays on Morality and Politics* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2005), 34.

⁶⁰ Michel Dumoulin, ed., *The European Commission, 1958–72: History and Memories* (Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007), 16.

⁶¹ Rabier, personal communication via e-mail, 26 May 2013.

⁶² Hallstein, ‘Europe is on the move’, 200.

⁶³ Jacques-René Rabier, *L’Opinion Publique et l’Europe* (Brussels: Institute of Sociology, 1966); Jacques-René Rabier, ‘L’opinion publique et l’intégration de l’Europe dans les années ‘50’, in Enrico Serra, ed., *Il Relancio dell’Europa E I Trattati Di Roma* (Brussels: Bruylant, 1989), 84–98.

Stimulating a European civil consciousness through a public communication policy

Public communication policy

The Community believed that it ‘will only come to true realization [i.e. fulfil its federal aims]⁶⁴ if the actions it takes are made public, and explained publicly . . . to the people of our Community’.⁶⁵ In conforming to this belief, it developed its own public communication policy, in order to inform the European public about the benefits (material and affective) that it could gain, and thereby evoke interest in the Community’s objectives and workings. Public communication was understood as helping to build a relationship between the Community and the European public, and as essential to successful integration.

Institutionally it was the Information Service of the High Authority (which became the Press and Information Service in 1955 and eventually the Common Press and Information Service of the European Communities in 1958) which publicly communicated on behalf of the Community. However, the ECSC had no explicit public communication policy mandate. Article 5 of the Treaty of Paris (1951), which refers to informing the public, reads: ‘The Community shall accomplish its mission, under the conditions provided for in the present Treaty To this end, the Community will . . . enlighten and facilitate the action of the interested parties by collecting information, organising consultations and defining general objectives.’ Such a wide-ranging and ambiguous ‘brief’ gave the High Authority sufficient scope so that its public communication policy efforts were effectively unrestrained. According to Rabier, Director of the Press and Information Service from 1955 to 1973, Jacqueline Lastenouse, founder of the Jean Monnet programmes in the university sector and Paul Collowald, a senior official in the Commission’s spokesperson’s group from 1959 to 1972, the Community frequently tried to take a wider approach than that prescribed in the Treaties in order to reach a wider public⁶⁶.

Correspondingly, the ECSC⁶⁷ noted that the Community’s public communication policy efforts ‘had long ceased to be confined to the admittedly most important fields of economic and social information work and of daily press releases and instead was bringing all appropriate technical sources to bear in an endeavour to reach the various

⁶⁴ Jacques-René Rabier, ‘L’évolution des Institutions Européennes. Bilan de la C.E.C.A. – Promesse du Marché. Commun et de l’Euratom’, Doc no. 7643/58, 27 Octobre 1958, 1. Europäisches Parlament, ‘Dokument 89’; Commission des Communautés Européennes (CCE), ‘Mémorandum sur la politique des Communautés en matière d’information à l’attention des Conseils’, COM (63)242, 26 Juin 1963; CCE ‘Programme d’activité pour 1964’, no. 1383/PI/64-F, 3 Février 1964; CCE ‘Document de travail sur les activités prioritaires d’information à développer en 1965–1966’, no. 5044/PI/65-F, 9 Avril 1965; CCE, ‘Mémorandum sur la politique d’information de la Commission’, 1 Juin 1967. CCE ‘Document sur la politique d’information de la Commission’, no. 4279/1/PI/68 F, 1968.

⁶⁵ Cf. Petit, ‘Dispelling a myth’ 664.

⁶⁶ Face-to-face interview with Jacques-René Rabier, Jacqueline Lastenouse and Paul Collowald, Brussels, 22 Feb. 2012.

⁶⁷ ECSC, ‘6th General Report on the Activities of the Community’, 13 April 1958, 96.

circles which make up European public opinion'.⁶⁸ Indeed Monnet thought that in order for the High Authority to fulfil its legal obligation of consulting with interested parties it needed to develop a public communication policy directed at all interested parties⁶⁹ – and that meant in practice a European public of 160 million people⁷⁰ – and to target 'all levels of the population'.⁷¹ He believed that if the European public was informed a European civil consciousness could emerge. In order to meet the challenges of adequately addressing such a large European public the Community adopted two distinct approaches.

The popularist approach 1951–1962

The Information Service of the High Authority was created in 1952 and became the Press and Information Service in 1955. It was divided into two divisions, with the first responsible for public communication policy addressed at the trade union sector (as requested by the trade union sector itself⁷²), and the second concerned with providing information to the European public 'in its widest extension'.⁷³

The popularist approach (1951–1962) had three characteristics: first having the general public as a target and using the popular media to reach them; second, ensuring that the information disseminated was straightforward and widely comprehensible through the deliberate use of simple language; and, third, fostering direct relationships between the Community and the European public through visits to Community institutions and offices in member states.

The Community defined its target as all Europeans, meaning all citizens of member states, youth and, to some extent, children.⁷⁴ Accordingly, the budget allocated to the second division of the Information Service was consistently larger than the budget for the first division, which specialised in communication addressed to trade unions.

It was this budgetary priority that enabled the Community to build what would today be called a multi-platform approach. It developed a routinised and consistent use of the mass media (as well as its own publications) based upon the Community's

⁶⁸ Also see Baisnée, 'The European Public Sphere'.

⁶⁹ Haute Autorité, 'Les moyens de l'action de la Haute Autorité dans le domaine de l'information', 19 Janvier 1956, 1 emphasis in the original.

⁷⁰ Haute Autorité, 'Note sur l'organisation du Service de Presse et d'Information', no. 7661/55f, 19 Octobre 1955.

⁷¹ ECSC 1958, 101; ECSC, '5th General Report on the Activities of the Community (9 April 1956 – 13 April 1957)', 13 April 1957.

⁷² Haute Autorité, 'Note sur l'organisation du Service d'Information de la Haute Autorité', no. 3903/54f, 10 Juin 1954.

⁷³ Haute Autorité, 'Note sur l'organisation du Service d'Information'; Haute Autorité, 'Note sur l'organisation du Service de Presse', Jacques-René Rabier, 'La naissance d'une politique d'information sur la Communauté européenne (1952–1967)', in Felice Dassetto and Michel Dumoulin, eds., *Naissance et développement de l'information européenne* (Bern: Peter Lang, 1993), 21–32; Jacques-René Rabier, 'Les origines de la politique d'information européenne (1953–1973)', in Maria Grazia Melchionni, ed., *Fondi e luoghi della documentazione europea. Istruzioni per l'uso* (Rome: Università de la Sapienza, 2000); Pasquinucci 'Faire les Européens'.

⁷⁴ See J. L. Henderson, 'The schools of the six', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, 4, 2 (1965), 178–190; Petit, 'Dispelling a myth'.

Table 1. *The Commission's Information Policy Budget for 1955–60.*

	General Public	Workers and Trade Unions
1955/56	2.75m FB	1m FB
1956/57	4.64m FB	2.2m FB
1957/58	5.1m FB	2.3m FB
1958/59	n/a	n/a
1959/60	5.0m FB	3.0 FB

Source: Gustave Amorin-Fulle, 'Mádias et construction européenne, g n alologie d'une dynamique', BA Dissertation, Universit  Catholique de Louvant-La-Neuve (1995), 133–136.

belief that 'public opinion [needed to be] kept informed of the political significance of the Community'⁷⁵ via all outlets – Press, TV, radio and cinema'.⁷⁶ It was Monnet in particular who argued that it was important to develop relationships with news agencies and journalists in order to manipulate their views⁷⁷. Monnet was not secretive about this⁷⁸ – he wanted positive publicity for European integration. It is incorrect to say that he wanted to avoid the press reporting on Community affairs, but he did fear that reports in the press could misrepresent decision-making and could risk the success of European integration. Consequently he used to invite journalists to the High Authority in an attempt to explain why decisions had been taken. According to Rabier, Monnet wished to establish a relationship of trust between himself and the journalists.⁷⁹

How successful he was is difficult to determine; nevertheless press relations developed steadily. In 1955 the first association of the Community's accredited journalists was formed. The number of accredited journalists increased from twenty-three in 1956 to about 100 in the 1960s and to 813 in 1999. With the creation of the Joint Press and Information Service in 1958, the Community believed it was necessary to create the post of a spokesperson. This spokesperson (Giorgia Smoquina from 1959 to 1961 and Beniamino Olivi from 1961 to 1968) was to explain the Community's positions and its decisions to the press. Weekly midday meetings on Thursdays with journalists were introduced. According to Bastin the Thursday press briefing became very important as they ensured a continuous exchange of information with reporters.⁸⁰ Journalists who attended these press briefings had office space at their disposal complete with phones, fax and stationary. Attendance at the midday briefing

⁷⁵ Haute Autorit , 'Note sur l'organisation du Service d'Information'.

⁷⁶ ECSC, '5th General Report', 49.

⁷⁷ Rabier, 'La naissance d'une politique d'information'; Rabier, 'Les origines'; Guichaoua E., 'Jean Monnet, l'information et l'opinion publique', in Elisabeth du R au, ed., *Europe des Elites, Europe des peuples? La construction de l'espace europ en 1945–1960*, (Paris: Presses de la Sorbonne Nouvelle, 1998); Pasquucci, 'Faire les Europ ens'.

⁷⁸ Rabier, 1998 in an interview with Bossuat and personal communication via e-mail 9 Dec. 2011.

⁷⁹ Rabier, personal communication via e-mail, 12 Dec. 2011.

⁸⁰ Gilles Bastin, 'Une politique de l'information ? Le n  syst me Olivi   ou l'invention des relations de presse   la Commission europ enne', *La communication sur l'Europe, regards crois s*, (2007).

increased from about 400 in the 1960s to 1400 in 1995.⁸¹ Further, the Community ensured that relevant information was given to the press agencies in the form of press releases, statements, press kits and press conferences, monthly newsletters, special issues or pages dedicated to the European Community in national newspapers such as *Le Monde* or *Süddeutsche Zeitung* and in magazines such as *Ihre Freundin* (300,000 ex.) and *Heimat und Familie* (100,000 ex.). The representation offices in the member states were also used to foster contacts with local media.

For TV, radio and cinema, the Community released its own productions: the documentary *'Histoire d'un Traité'* (1954) which was translated into several languages. In France, it was shown in approximately 500 cinemas reaching an audience of two million. According to the ECSC⁸² three further documentaries were produced in 1956, two more in 1958 and between 1958 and 1963 at least five short films were produced.⁸³ High Authority and Commission officials, such as Monnet and Hallstein, regularly gave interviews on national and regional TV shows and radio programmes.⁸⁴ In addition to the use of mass media, the Community also released its own publications mainly in the form of brochures addressed to the general European public.⁸⁵ These brochures had a two-fold purpose: To inform the European public about the Community and its workings and to show the European public where the Community was heading, its (federal) aspirations, its efforts to increase living standards and its commitment to secure peace. Only if, Monnet believed, information was not confined to technicalities would the public feel part of a common destiny and develop a European consciousness.

The second characteristic of the Community's popularist approach of this time was the deployment and systematic use of a simple, straightforward and readily comprehensible language in publications. For example brochures utilised a pithy style of writing, cartoons, information boxes, simple and clear statistics, diagrams to illustrate historical developments and photographs.⁸⁶

Photographs and the widespread use of pictorial representations of Europe in pamphlets and brochures were especially important since, as Foret says, they 'painted a political panorama within which each player has a given place and is provided with an understanding of the world which shows the necessity and importance of

⁸¹ All figures from Bastin, 'Une politique de l'information'.

⁸² ECSC, 5th General Report'.

⁸³ ECSC, 6th General Report'.

⁸⁴ Haute Autorité, 'Rapport d'activité du Service d'Information pour la période du 15 février au 30 juin 1955', Doc no. 5352/55f, 11 Juillet 1955.

⁸⁵ According to M. Giuseppe Caron, 'Comment informer l'Europe des problèmes du marché commun?', 1963, available at <http://aei.pitt.edu/14287/> (last visited 26 June 2013). As of 1962 the circulation figure of publications such as brochures and leaflets was 3,125,000 ex., for other publication and circulation figures see also ECSC '5th General Report'; ECSC, 6th General Report'; CCE, 'Mémorandum sur la politique des Communautés'; CCE, 'Programme d'activité pour 1964'.

⁸⁶ See, for example, the brochures Communauté européenne, *Le marché commun* (Bruxelles: CEE, 1959), Communauté européenne, *L'Europe a dix ans*, Les Cahiers de Communauté Européenne (Paris: Service d'information des Communautés européennes, 1960), The European Community, *The European Community 1950–1960: ten years' progress towards unity* (London: Press and Information Services of the European Communities, 1961).

Qu'est-ce que la communauté européenne?

La Communauté Européenne rassemble en une seule unité économique les six pays suivants :

Allemagne
Belgique
France
Italie
Luxembourg
Pays-Bas

Elle est le début d'une union politique plus étroite entre ces nations.

POURQUOI ?

- Pour améliorer le niveau de vie de 170 millions d'Européens;
- pour créer, grâce à un marché élargi, sans frontières intérieures, les conditions les plus favorables à l'utilisation du progrès technique et à l'expansion économique;
- pour mettre un terme définitif aux conflits qui ont si longtemps déchiré les pays d'Europe;
- pour donner à l'Europe face au dynamisme des « Grands », face aux continents qui s'éveillent, la place qui lui revient dans les affaires du monde;
- pour créer les assises des futurs États-Unis d'Europe.

COMMENT ?

En remplaçant les marchés nationaux de nos six pays par une seule et puissante unité économique :

- La C.E.C.A. (Communauté Européenne du Charbon et de l'Acier), créée en 1952, a montré la voie en mettant en commun les ressources de charbon et d'acier des « Six » dans un marché unique sans barrières douanières internes;
- LE MARCHÉ COMMUN (Communauté Économique Européenne), créé en 1958, étend progressivement le marché européen à toutes les marchandises, services, capitaux, et met en œuvre une politique économique et sociale commune aux « Six »;
- EURATOM (Communauté Européenne de l'énergie atomique), créé en 1958, contribue à donner à l'Europe une industrie atomique, consacrée aux utilisations pacifiques de l'énergie nucléaire.

En dotant l'Europe d'Institutions communes :

Pour mettre en valeur au profit de l'ensemble des Européens les ressources de nos six pays, l'Europe s'est donné des Institutions communes qui ont le pouvoir d'agir et de décider dans l'intérêt commun.

Figure 1. (Colour online) 'Pourquoi et comment' section from the EC's brochure 'La Communauté Européenne – les faits, les chiffres' (1964).

Source: © European Union.

Better conditions for Labour

One of the results of free movement of labour within the Common Market will undoubtedly be a gradual levelling-up of wages and working conditions throughout the six countries. To this end, the European Commission must promote close collaboration in the fields of:

- employment
- labour legislation and working conditions
- vocational training
- social security
- occupational diseases and accidents
- industrial hygiene
- laws on trade unions and collective bargaining.

By the end of the first four-year stage of the Common Market's transition period, moreover, there will be equal pay for men and women doing equal work. In most of these fields, with the exception of social security (see above), the work of the European Commission is still in the planning stage. But it has already embarked on the comprehensive studies of the terrain that are necessary to any effective action on a six-nation scale. The subjects now under study include:

- employment levels
- wages
- paid holidays
- hours of work
- overtime
- equal pay
- conditions of work
- vocational training
- industrial diseases



Figure 2 Picture from the EC's brochure 'The Common Market at work (1960)'.

Source: © European Union.

integration'.⁸⁷ Overall these popularist publications constantly emphasised a 'United Europe,' 'Europe to unite its strengths,' 'Uniting of Europe,' 'an ever closer union,' 'closer union of the people,' 'benefits,' 'confidence,' 'peace,' 'reconciliation' and even the Community's contribution to a 'new European way of thinking.'

The third characteristic of the popularist approach to public communication (1951–1962) was the attempt to foster a direct relationship between the European public and Community institutions through fairs, exhibitions, workshops and visits. The fairs and exhibitions included the Parisian book fair (1958), the Universal Exhibition in Brussels (1958) and the 'Grüne Woche' in Berlin (1960) among many others. The Community organised travelling exhibitions, one of which toured for a year in

⁸⁷ François Foret, 'Dire l'Europe. Les publications grand public de la Commission européenne: entre rhétoriques politique et bureaucratique', *Pôle Sud*, 15 (2001), 77–92, here 78 (our translation).

Germany. Fairs and exhibitions were seen as occasions which made 'it possible to reach a large number of people, often from the least informed sections of public opinion . . .'.⁸⁸ Public visits to European institutions, as well as seminars and conferences, were also encouraged, all of which were seen as occasions to inform the public.⁸⁹ According to the EEC in 1960 about 150 groups comprising over 5000 people were received in Brussels, Luxembourg and Strasbourg.⁹⁰ In addition, the importance of representation offices in the member states (in West Germany, Italy and France at first) was increasingly acknowledged in helping to 'decentralize the information system and to maintain [direct] contacts with the public at large'.⁹¹

From the populist approach to opinion leaders (1962/1963)

In the year 1962 the Gallup Institute undertook the first Community-wide opinion poll.⁹² It revealed that public levels of information about Europe were low.⁹³ Three survey questions were concerned with the level of information the public had. The first asked people to name a European institution, the second to name a topic of current debate and the third to name an achievement of the European Community. On average eighteen per cent of those polled were able to answer all three questions, twenty-four per cent were able to answer two of the three questions, twenty-four per cent provided an answer to one of the questions, and thirty-two per cent could not answer any (two per cent gave an inexact or vague answer). The same survey revealed that only eleven per cent of those surveyed thought often about the problems of European unification, against twenty-nine per cent who answered 'rarely' and twenty-seven per cent who answered 'never'.⁹⁴ Such figures revealed Albert Coppé's⁹⁵ prescience when he said: 'The first obstacle lies in the indifference of public opinion' to which the Commission some years later added that the 'European public shows little passion and little curiosity for the European project',⁹⁶ although information was widely disseminated.

The results of the poll were taken as evidence that the populist approach had been largely ineffective, and the Community's public communication structures lacked adequate financial and human resources⁹⁷ to satisfy the increasing demand for information from specialised groups, such as academics, teachers' associations,

⁸⁸ ECSC, 5th General Report', 50; EEC, '4th General Report on the Activities of the Community (16 May 1960 – 30 April 1961)', May 1961.

⁸⁹ Haute Autorité, 'Note sur l'organisation du Service d'Information'.

⁹⁰ EEC, '4th General Report'.

⁹¹ ECSC, 6th General Report', 98.

⁹² Published in *Sondages; revue française de l'opinion publique*, 1 (1963). It should be noted that the High Authority's use of public opinion polls began as early as 1955. See Rabier, 'L'Opinion Publique et l'Europe'.

⁹³ Ludlow, 'Frustrated Ambitions'.

⁹⁴ See endnote 91.

⁹⁵ Albert Coppé, 'ECSC on efforts toward European unity', speech, 1956, available at <http://aei.pitt.edu/14381/1/S52.pdf> (last visited 13 May 2012).

⁹⁶ CCE, 'Mémorandum sur la politique des Communautés', 3.

⁹⁷ See Ludlow, 'Frustrated Ambitions'.

journalists, trade unionists, industrialists, leading farmers, agricultural associations and the third sector.⁹⁸ The combination of the disappointing results and the lack of resources led to a change in the approach to public communication, with a move towards one which prioritised a public communication policy that targeted opinion leaders. Or, as the EEC put it: '[opinion leaders] could take over part of the load which the information officials of the Community can no longer carry alone'.⁹⁹ The Commission added that, because it is not possible to address 185 million people directly, it is necessary to target the most influential – not exclusively but primarily.¹⁰⁰ However, it is important to note that turning to opinion leaders was still seen as a way to address the public at large and to continue efforts to stimulate a European civil consciousness.

Opinion leader approach (1963–1967)

From 1963 onwards the Community turned to opinion leaders with the objective of using them as multipliers. Opinion leaders included those who had a direct relationship with or interest in the Community and those who in many cases identified themselves (especially academics and teachers) when asking for information about institutions as well as specific policies.¹⁰¹ Others were identified through active searches for people who had a cultural or political vocation: politicians, CEOs, trade unionists, professors,¹⁰² public and private managers of large-scale information media organisations,¹⁰³ national governments and big private organisations,¹⁰⁴ 'influential persons'.¹⁰⁵ Primary and secondary schools were particularly important and provided an opportunity for teachers to hand out material on European integration.¹⁰⁶ Finally, journalists and pro-European civil society associations such as the European Movement were understood as channels through which to get 'the European message' out. In short opinion leaders consisted of all those who were regarded as having the most direct influence on the public when it came to disseminating information and influencing behaviour and attitudes. They held the 'psychological' and 'technical' keys of communication,¹⁰⁷ and were public figures likely to act as 'multipliers' in the intense task of making Europeans aware of and of informing them about developments

⁹⁸ CCE, 'Programme d'activité pour 1962', no. x/108/62-f, 5 Janvier 1962; CCE, 'Note à l'attention de messieurs les membres du Conseil d'administration "presse-information". Objet: Commission Avant-projet de budget pour 1963', no. 4810/PI/62-F, 1962.

⁹⁹ EEC (1964) '7th General Report on the Activities of the Community (1 April 1963 – 31 March 1964)', June, 357–58.

¹⁰⁰ CCE, 'Document sur la politique d'information'.

¹⁰¹ CCE, 'Programme d'activité pour 1962'.

¹⁰² CCE, 'Programme d'activité pour 1962'; CCE, 'Avant-projet de budget pour 1963'; CCE 'Mémorandum sur la politique des Communautés'.

¹⁰³ EEC, '6th General report on the Activities of the Community (1 May 1962 – 31 March 1963)', June 1963.

¹⁰⁴ CCE, 'Programme d'activité pour 1964', no. 1383/PI/64-F, 3 Février 1964.

¹⁰⁵ CCE, 'Programme d'activité pour 1965', no. 13778/PI64 – F, 8 Février 1965'.

¹⁰⁶ Petit, 'Dispelling a myth'.

¹⁰⁷ CCE, 'Programme d'activité pour 1965'.

Table 2. *The Commission's Information Policy Budget 1963.*

Unit	Budget General Public (GP)	Budget Opinion Leaders (OL)
General Affairs	0.6m FB	9m FB
Fairs and exhibitions	4.1m FB	/
Publications	3.6m FB	20m FB
Radio, TV, cinema	7.1m FB	/
Trade union	/	5.7m FB
Agriculture	/	2.7m FB
University information, youth and popular education	/	16.3m FB
Third countries	/	3.6m FB
Divers	1.1m FB	1.2m FB
	16.5m FB	58.5m FB

Source: COM(63)242 final, p. 30.

in Europe'.¹⁰⁸ These opinion leaders were regarded as constituting part of what was known as a 'eurosphere'¹⁰⁹ of influential people occupying significant positions.

From 1961 onward the Joint 'Press and Information' Service (first created in 1958) was subdivided into eight units: General Affairs, Fairs and Exhibitions, Publications, Radio TV and Cinema, Trade Union, Agriculture, University information, youth and popular education and Third Countries. The budget was rebalanced away from general public activity to opinion leader activity. In 1963, seventy-eight per cent of the public communication policy budget was allocated to activities addressed at opinion leaders with the rest aimed at the European public at large.¹¹⁰ We do not have corresponding figures for 1964 to 1967;¹¹¹ however, the Commission did state that an opinion leader approach was financially prioritised because there were insufficient financial resources to target 185 million people.¹¹²

What we can see from the above table is that specific public communication tools were almost exclusively used to target opinion leaders. They were based in the administrative units: 'General Affairs' publications and the University information, youth and popular education sector. The 'General Affairs' Unit was responsible for the organisation of conferences, visits to the Community institutions, workshops and study trips. However, following scrutiny and concern for cost effectiveness,

¹⁰⁸ European Community (EC), '1st General Report on the Activities of the Community 1967', February 1968, 456.

¹⁰⁹ It was envisioned the eurosphere would become a communicative space whereby opinion leaders could come together through a network of specialist publications, colloquia, seminars and conferences. These communicative relationships were supposed to produce a 'ripple effect' of wider influence. See Dusan Sidjanski, 'Eurosphère – Dirigeants et groupes européens', in François D'Arcy and Luc Rouban, eds., *De la V^e République à l'Europe. Hommage à Jean-Louis Quermonne* (Paris: Presse de la fondation nationale des sciences politiques, 1996), 279–298.

¹¹⁰ CCE, 'Mémorandum sur la politique des Communautés'.

¹¹¹ The financial reports 1964–1967 do not explicitly disaggregate the general public and opinion leader budget in any detail, rather they show high level financial allocations.

¹¹² CCE, 'Document sur la politique d'information'.

the EEC¹¹³ stated that ‘funds were too limited to allow spectacular operations’ and so they became almost exclusively reserved for opinion leaders, notably from the University sector with sixty per cent of the people on study visits to Luxembourg and Brussels in 1964 coming from this sector.¹¹⁴ Indeed, in the previous year the EEC had prioritised training lecturers in the various milieux on the occasion of their visits (opportunities which extended to ‘several hundred sessions a year’).¹¹⁵ However, the Commission limited the reimbursement of travel expenses to those visitors who showed ‘a direct relationship with/interest in the Community and could be considered opinion leaders’¹¹⁶ and who had directly been invited by the Porte-Parole group, the external Community office or the ‘*Direction du Service*’.

With regard to publications, the Commission restricted (again for financial reasons) the dissemination of brochures and folders to institutions, governmental organisations and key multipliers like libraries in Universities, professors or the media. The EEC gave the example of collaboration with ‘the European Association of Producers of Publications for youth (Europressjunior), which represents 240 publications reaching some thirty million readers monthly’.¹¹⁷ With regard to the European public at large, the mass media, fairs and exhibitions were the main public communication tools used.

The new financial priorities and the re-prioritisation of information tools provided the template for information activities until 1967. After this, and following the guidelines laid down by Merger Treaty (1967), the public communication policy budget was to be increased and the service reorganised.¹¹⁸

Conclusion

We have attempted to show four things. First, the Community had an explicit civil aim of trying to stimulate a European civil consciousness consistently through 1951 to 1967. Therefore, judgements such as ‘no political or bureaucratic institution could be further away from the citizens than one dealing with regulations on the production and distribution, including prices, of steel and coal and their derivatives’ are misrepresentative.¹¹⁹ Second, the Community realised the value of public communication for the achievement of this aim, which, third, provided the rationale for the Community’s public communication policy efforts in the period. Fourth, two different and consecutive approaches to public communication are discernible: first a popularist approach (1951–1962) and then an opinion leader approach (1963–1967), both attempting to stimulate a European civil consciousness.

¹¹³ EEC ‘7th General Report’, 353.

¹¹⁴ EEC, ‘8th General Report on the Activities of the Community (1 April 1964 – 31 March 1965)’, June 1965.

¹¹⁵ EEC ‘7th General Report’, 357–58.

¹¹⁶ CCE, ‘Programme d’activité pour 1962’, 19.

¹¹⁷ EEC ‘7th General Report’, 304.

¹¹⁸ See Gramberger, ‘Öffentlichkeitsarbeit’; Rye, ‘Educating Europeans’.

¹¹⁹ Neunreither, ‘Citizens’, 5.

Those who persist in describing this period of European integration in terms of a secretive elite or elitist bureaucrats who had little regard for the general public, no interest in diverse forms of outputs and content and little time for public communication outside marketing or public relations strategies in times of crisis are somewhat naïve. These arguments ignore the Community's civil intentions. This is not to suggest that the Commission was successful in stimulating a European civil consciousness – countless Eurobarometer findings record its failure. Nor is it to suggest that the Community spent its time, effort and resources wisely. Perhaps it overestimated the European public's desire for a civil Europe, and perhaps it was beyond its ability to facilitate a European civil consciousness. It is possible to see public communication as a compensatory activity, which attempts to redress the European public's lack of interest in European integration.¹²⁰ Nevertheless, it was meant to inform, inspire and persuade. It is *what* was said and intended rather than its success that is important.

Simply put: European integration needs to be understood as a project that was from the start intended to go forward with the European people and not without them, or in spite of them. The scale of the public communication effort and what was affirmed and promised testify to this. These public communication efforts have continued and have involved more and more members of staff, from a handful of High Authority officials to currently about 1200 in the Commission's Directorate General for Communication. Civil Europe has its own history, albeit a little appreciated history. Yet it has, we would suggest, the same importance as the purely economic and political histories of European integration. It is a history that merits looking at in its own right.

¹²⁰ Haller, 'European integration'.