

“The 1960 ‘Anpo’ Struggle in The People’s Daily: Shaping Popular Chinese Perceptions of Japan during the Cold War”


Erik Esselstrom

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The final reading is Erik Esselstrom’s essay “The 1960 ‘Anpo’ Struggle in The People’s Daily: Shaping Popular Chinese Perceptions of Japan during the Cold War.” After World War II and the victory of the Chinese Communists in 1949, the U.S. government enlisted Japan as an important Cold War ally in the effort to “contain” China. While this arrangement was in some ways favorable to Japan, it was extremely unpopular among Japanese citizens who wanted to create a less antagonistic relationship with China.

The renewal of the U.S.-Japan Security Agreement (against the USSR and China) in 1960 caused huge anti-American protests in Japan, and these protests were covered extensively by China’s main official newspaper, the *People’s Daily*. The treaty confirmed Japan’s connection to an American world-system, just as the People’s Republic of China was part of a communist world-system. The Chinese coverage of the treaty, however, emphasized the commonality between the Chinese and Japanese masses. This would have been a recognizable theme for anyone who remembered wartime Chinese propaganda, which often mentioned the sufferings of the Japanese people. During the war both Nationalist and Communist propaganda had emphasized the suffering of ordinary Japanese and their common interests with the Chinese masses. This may have been in part to encourage high morale. Written pieces tended to imply that the Japanese empire was on the verge of collapse from within, and so China was soon to be victorious in the war regardless of what the situation at the front looked like. Others, like the cartoon below from 1939, seem to be influenced by international ideas of pacifism:



This type of humanization of ordinary Japanese would seem utterly out of place in most twenty-first-century Chinese depictions of the war, but it still fit with Communist depictions of ordinary Japanese as late as 1960. While the People’s Republic still considered Japan an imperialist nation, it was less important than the USSR or the USA in Beijing’s representation of China’s relationship with foreigners. Nonetheless, the renewal of the security treaty between the United States and Japan in 1960 finalized a radical political disjuncture between China and Japan. Ironically, since the 1980s the two countries have grown much closer economically and culturally, but popular understanding of their relationship still reflects the radical division of 1960. This has been especially true since the Tiananmen Massacre of 1989, which led the Chinese government to focus more on an identity built around China’s history of national suffering in which Japan took pride of place as the foremost enemy.

Pan-Asianism has not gone away. There has been much discussion in recent years of Asian Values and the things that hold Asia together, although unity is now imagined as taking place under Chinese leadership. The term Pan-Asianism itself, however, and the pre-war Pan-Asian theorists are now held in low esteem, especially in China. The idea of an interconnected Asia has a long history and Asians interested in international interactions are likely to return again and again to the history of Pan-Asianism for inspiration.

The 1960 “Anpo” Struggle in The People’s Daily: Shaping Popular Chinese Perceptions of Japan during the Cold War

Erik Esselstrom



Figure 1.¹ Japanese protester at the left holds a sign that reads ‘Oppose the new security treaty, Down with the Kishi Cabinet! Dissolve the Diet!’ to the enthusiastic approval of the Chinese demonstrator at the right whose sign proclaims ‘Oppose the Japan-U.S. military treaty, Support the struggle of the Japanese people’

Introduction

Rising China-Japan friction in 2012 has centered on territorial claims over the Diaoyu/Senkaku islands. Like many such clashes since the early 1990s, it is bound up with unresolved legacies of the Asia-Pacific War. As much valuable research on the politics of memory in contemporary East Asia has demonstrated, the politicized anger and bitterness that characterize the China-Japan relationship today have a complex archeology in which popular tempers were not always so enflamed.² For example, during the 1950s and 1960s the United States, not Japan, was by far the primary geopolitical and ideological enemy of the PRC. In that context, as the CCP aimed to lure Japan from its American geopolitical embrace, China’s leaders also sought to persuade the Chinese people to “forgive and forget” matters of the Japanese invasion, and ultimately recast

popular Chinese perceptions of Japanese society from those of wartime enemy to regional geopolitical ally.³

This essay takes as its subject one example of this re-conceptualization of Japanese society in Chinese political ideology—editorial cartoon representations of the 1960 protests against the renewal of the U.S.-Japan Security Agreement (“anpo jōyaku” 安保条約).⁴ Widely recognized as the largest popular anti-government demonstrations in postwar Japanese history, the Anpo protests are most often analyzed strictly within the context of U.S.-Japan relations.⁵ Looking at these events from a Chinese perspective opens up a number of useful interpretive vantage points. While the core editorial attack launched in these cartoons is aimed squarely and primarily at the United States, particularly striking is the manner in which the CCP employed these images to transform popular Chinese perceptions of Japan in ways that reflect the altered geopolitical environment of the early postwar era in East Asia.⁶

Scholars such as Chang-Tai Hung have produced excellent work on both individual cartoonists and the broader function of political cartoons in wartime Chinese society, and certainly these examples from *The People’s Daily* in 1960, some sketched by well-known artists such as Fang Cheng 方成, are worthy of the same level of deep analysis.⁷ Such treatment, however, rests beyond the scope of this essay. The aim here is to provide a specific case in point of how the Chinese Communist Party employed editorial cartoons during the summer of 1960 to shape popular opinion concerning the U.S.-Japan relationship. As Kevin McKenna has noted in his study of editorial images of the United States in *Pravda*, Moscow’s primary media outlet during the Cold War, political cartoons “became particularly powerful tools of persuasion in a totalitarian society where the state controlled and coordinated the entire communication system.”⁸ While the political and social environments of the PRC and the Soviet Union in 1960 defy simple comparison, *The People’s Daily* can be examined in a similar manner as *Pravda*, namely in that both were critical tools through which leadership in Beijing and Moscow delivered party-approved messages to the general public. While how those messages were received by the reading public is difficult (if not impossible) to determine, analyzing the content of the messages nonetheless sheds light on the political and social objectives of the authorities projecting them.

The series of editorial cartoon examples from the summer of 1960 featured here illustrate three main themes, all of which are inherent in Chinese political and social rhetoric of the era: the inevitable failure of American geopolitical strategy, the advance of a revolutionary future that will tear down the feudal past, and the irrepressible power of mass movements. The CCP employed these thematic visual representations of anti-U.S. and anti-government protests in Japan for two primary reasons: 1) to legitimize its leadership in both domestic and international spheres in the eyes of popular Chinese society; and 2) to cultivate of a perception of postwar Japanese society among the Chinese public that differentiated conservative, U.S.-backed political elites from the Japanese masses, whose interests were ideologically similar, if not identical, to those of the Chinese people.⁹

The CCP’s emphasis in this manner on a positive relationship with popular Japanese society during the early 1960s is strikingly different from what one finds in China since the early 1990s. More precisely, whereas the party relies upon the power of popular memories of victimization during the war against Japan to bolster nationalism in the contemporary PRC, during the early 1960s memories of the Japanese invasion did not need to serve the same political purpose.¹⁰ That

is not to say, of course, that the war against Japan was entirely ignored before the 1990s. For example, the CCP routinely employed historical representations of the war throughout the early Cold War era, for example, in which the Communist party played a more significant role than the Guomindang in defeating Japan in order to discredit the Nationalist regime on Taiwan. The position of the United States as China's main ideological opponent during the summer of 1960, however, made it possible for the CCP to depict Japanese society in a more complex and multi-dimensional light than is the case today. As one recent study suggests, "a willingness to downplay contentious memories of the wartime past in order to maximize the economic and strategic benefits of closer relations" is a recurring pattern of behavior in China's postwar foreign policy concerning Japan.¹¹ This essay is one exploration of that pattern.

The Inevitable Fall of American Puppet Regimes

One of the most common themes at work in these images is that of Japanese Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke (岸信介) facing the identical fate of South Korean President Syngman Rhee (李承晩). Rhee had ruled South Korea with an iron (and fiercely anti-Communist) fist after being installed as President by the United States in 1948. After widespread popular protests against the elections that had reaffirmed his position in the spring of 1960, Rhee fled into Hawaiian exile in late April. Chinese cartoonists made quick use of this episode in characterizing events that began to unfold in Japan in May.



Figure 2.¹²





Figure 3.¹³

Figure 2 shows Prime Minister Kishi walking the plank, so to speak, of police brutality (警察暴力), pistol in one hand, club in the other. Kishi steps in line with the bloody footprints of one

who has already walked this path, Syngman Rhee, who is shown falling headfirst into the abyss. Kishi blindly follows, seemingly oblivious to the dangerous fate that awaits him. In a more gruesome depiction of the same notion, Figure 3 shows the interior of a burial tomb where Rhee has already been laid to rest (the captions reads—‘to be buried with those who came before’ 陪葬的先来). Kishi is being brought inside by a masked mortician to take his place next to the largest sarcophagus in the center of the tomb—the one waiting empty for the leader of the American empire (美帝国主文). The figure to the left is Prime Minister Adnan Menderes (曼德列斯) of Turkey, an association to be explained momentarily.

Figure 4.¹⁴Figure 5.¹⁵

Other examples build on the comparisons to Syngman Rhee and link events in Japan to revolutionary actions in numerous parts of the world. Figure 4 depicts a row of pillars, with American capitalists hiding behind them, being knocked down by the battering rams of popular action. The faces visible on the pillars are those of Syngman Rhee and Kishi Nobusuke, and corresponding teams of anti-Rhee South Korean (南朝鲜人民反对美李集团的斗争) and anti-Kishi Japanese (日本人民反对岸信介政府的斗争) protesters can be found below along with the caption that reads - “an unstoppable force” (势不可当). The image also includes sombrero-wearing revolutionaries from South America (南美人民反独裁政府的斗争), a team of dark-toned Africans in the distance, and anti-Menderes Turks (土耳其人民反对曼德列斯政府) in the center. Similarly, Figure 5 depicts a collapsing human pyramid of puppet regimes supporting the U.S. capitalist at its apex. Kishi is positioned at the center with “South American bases 南美基地” on his shoulders and South Korea (the U.S.-Rhee bloc 美李集团) and Turkey (again labeled specifically as Menderes 曼德列斯) under his feet. A kick from the South Korean people sets the tower shaking.

While the South Korean connection has been explained, the link with Turkey is less obvious. The Turkish Prime Minister, Adnan Menderes, had come under fierce pressure from the

country's military establishment in early May 1960 in the form of demands for political reforms and an end to corruption. While the coup d'état that later drove Menderes from power was hardly a popular revolution, Menderes was considered to be pro-American by his political opponents in Turkey, thus resistance to his administration could be employed in China as an example of widespread dissatisfaction around the world with U.S.-backed governments. It is not unreasonable to assume that memories of Turkey's involvement in the Korean War a decade earlier might also have given the Chinese reason to celebrate any opposition to the government of President Celâl Bayar and his Prime Minister Menderes.¹⁶ Figure 6 reflects this by suggesting the volcano of popular energy then erupting in Japan was one part of a worldwide seismic event that included eruptions in South Korea and Turkey (the caption reads: "in the days when the world is turned upside down 在天翻地复的日子里"). The cartoon also references the recently publicized U-2 incident, in which a secret American reconnaissance plane had been shot down over the Soviet Union on May 1, 1960. That pilot Francis G. Powers' aircraft was permanently based in Turkey perhaps adds to the logic of including Turkey within this group of U.S. satrap regimes around the world. The United States, represented by a hapless Eisenhower, is being blown sky high by these volcanic explosions of popular resistance to American-backed puppet leaders.¹⁷

After a military coup drove Menderes from power in late May, it seemed that prognostications of anti-American movements around the world were proving true. Figure 7, published after the coup in Turkey, reflects this by showing a cowering Eisenhower, labeled again as the 'leader of the American empire' (美帝国主文), having the teeth of his puppets Rhee in Korea and Menderes in Turkey pulled out by the calipers of the people in both nations, with Japan in the center to follow. In fact, the comic in Figure 3 (published before the coup), which depicts Menderes lying dead in a tomb, proved eerily prescient—Menderes was later executed in September 1961 after a trial by the military junta that unseated him.

Figure 6.¹⁸Figure 7.¹⁹

What all these examples share is an emphasis on the notion that U.S.-backed regimes around the world will not—indeed, cannot—survive, because they stand in opposition to popular will. Linking events in South Korea, Turkey and Japan to this general principle of Maoist revolutionary thinking was a useful tool for illustrating the universality of the CCP’s strategic vision. Moreover, it encouraged the viewer to see the fate of popular resistance to U.S. aggression in Japan as linked to that of China’s own popular struggle against foreign imperialism.


Kishi as Fascist Thug and Feudal Clown

Prime Minister Kishi Nobusuke provided the emblematic comic depiction of Japan during the summer of 1960. Not only was Kishi Japan’s top leader, but he had been jailed as a war criminal during the U.S. occupation period because of his influential position within Japan’s imperial administrative machinery of control in Manchuria. Having been released in 1948, however, Kishi was soon politically rehabilitated, like many other previously jailed war criminals, with the end of the US occupation in 1952.²⁰ Kishi was thus known in China for having played a key role in Japan’s brutal wartime occupation, making him a particularly inviting target for ridicule. Moreover, Kishi had personally spearheaded the effort to renew the US-Japan Security Treaty in 1960, making him the primary domestic target of most Anpo-related protests in Japan. By focusing on Kishi, the CCP could thus draw a clear distinction between Japan’s conservative political elites and the Japanese people as a whole. Doing so made it possible to condemn the Japanese government and its American backers while simultaneously cultivating sympathetic support for the Japanese people.

There are two common themes in these depictions of Prime Minister Kishi—fascist thug and feudal clown. Returning to the image in Figure 2, Kishi is donning garb that looks remarkably similar to that of a Nazi SS officer (complete with a German luger-style pistol), with his high-stepping march in black boots perhaps reinforcing the same impression. More explicitly, in Figure 8 Kishi presides grandly over the Diet session in which the U.S.-Japan Security Agreement has been successfully ratified, but the hall is emptied by Kishi’s club-wielding police goons driving the last remnants of opposition out of the room. The caption reads sarcastically, “‘unanimously’ passed” (‘一致’通过). Moreover, Kishi’s kimono is lined with swastika trim, making the Nazi reference less than subtle. In short, the message is that Kishi has employed fascist violence to crush popular will and ram through his pro-U.S. agenda, depicted here as the Anpo treaty wrapped around a missile.

Figure 8.²¹Figure 8.²¹

With equal consistency, however, Kishi is also depicted as a kimono-clad, *geta*-wearing relic of Japan's feudal past, as seen in the images below. In part, of course, this is meant to make Kishi look foolish, weak and incompetent. The consistency with which Kishi is shown in 'traditional' Japanese garments and footwear, however, also suggests that he represents a feudal

Figure 9.²²Figure 10.²³Figure 11.²⁴Figure 12.²⁵

past that will soon be overcome by a revolutionary future. Such a feeling is reflected well in Figure 13, which juxtaposes a kimono-clad Kishi against the more 'modern' looking six hundred million Chinese workers whose advance compels him to scamper away in his wooden sandals alongside Eisenhower in his suit and tie. In Figure 14, while Kishi appears in a Western suit, the seal with which he is trying to ratify the security agreement is topped with a sword-wielding Japanese militarist of the 1940s, again implying that Kishi represents the continuation of prewar militarism in postwar Japanese society, as the caption reads—"catch the hand of evil 抓住罪惡的手."

Figure 13.²⁶Figure 14.²⁷

In each of these examples, there is a unifying concept. The popular Japanese struggle against renewal of the security treaty is more than just a contemporary political confrontation; it is also a battle between the progressive revolutionary vanguard that will determine Japan’s future and the reactionary elements of Japan’s feudal tradition that desperately cling to power in opposition to it. Such dramatic depictions of the danger posed by the insidious persistence of conservative, counter-revolutionary elements in society would have likely resonated powerfully within a Chinese social environment so recently wracked by the anti-Rightist campaigns of the late 1950s.

Popular Protest as a Force of Nature

In many of these cartoons Japan’s physical geography is appropriated to depict popular anger toward the Kishi cabinet in dramatic and recognizable ways, such as in these uses of Mt. Fuji imagery.²⁸ The scene featured previously in Figure 6, for example, shows President Eisenhower being blasted skyward by an eruption of Fuji, with volcanic explosions in South Korea, Turkey and several other unidentified locales in the distance. Figure 15 takes a different approach, focusing on Kishi instead of the U.S. President, but the underlying message is identical. Kishi is perched atop a Japan (represented figuratively by Mt. Fuji) that is simmering with popular anti-American struggle (日本人民反美斗争) sure to explode at any moment, burying Kishi and the Anpo treaty with it. Similarly, in Figure 16 Kishi vainly attempts to cap the explosive power of the Japanese people (again represented by Mt. Fuji) with his club of ‘police brutality’ (警察暴力) in the service of the Anpo treaty carried upon his back. The caption reads: “What a pathetic

pillar of support” (可怜的支柱). In all three examples, the volcano embodies popular revolutionary energy that cannot be suppressed.



Figure 15.²⁹



Figure 16.³⁰

A different use of Mt. Fuji is employed in Figure 17. Here the mountain is shown in the distance behind the peace memorial statue in Nagasaki commemorating those who perished there in the atomic attack of August 9, 1945. The mountain serves as a metonymic symbol of Japan (as Mt. Fuji is, in fact, not visible from Nagasaki), complete with cherry blossoms, while the ominous American bomber flying overhead carries a massive bomb labeled 'U.S.-Japan military alliance' (日美军事同盟). The caption at the right can be read as 'Here we go again' (又来了), an unambiguous suggestion that the U.S.-Japan alliance will likely bring nuclear disaster to Japan a third time.

Figure 17.³¹

Even more striking is the use of tsunami imagery to represent the unstoppable energy of popular action against the Kishi regime and its American backers. More than just a general sense of the power unleashed by tidal waves, the images referenced a specific event. In early May 1960, a massive surge triggered by a high magnitude earthquake in Chile slammed upon Japan’s northeastern coast, the same region devastated by the March 11, 2011 tsunami, leaving dozens dead and thousands more homeless. Soon thereafter, cartoonists in *The People’s Daily* appropriated imagery of the disaster to dramatize the political and social disturbances then taking place in Japan. Figure 18, for example, shows crowds of Japanese protesters standing on the coast, fists raised high and banners flying, as giant waves sweep the United States (and its weapons) from the islands, and a massive hand plucks Kishi (in kimono and wooden clogs) from the swirling foam below. The caption reads: ‘The Security Treaty’ provides no security (‘安全条約’ 不安全). In Figure 19, enormous fist-shaped swells emblazoned with the moniker

Figure 18.³²Figure 19.³³

‘Japanese People’ (日本人民) lift Kishi up ever higher as he desperately tries to ride the waves on his flimsy wooden club/canoe of ‘police brutality’. Like a volcano, a tsunami possesses unfathomable power, but the tidal wave also carries with it an association of relentless forward movement, making it an especially effective visual metaphor of revolutionary action in 1960.

Broader Significance

A brief comparison with several images from contemporary American sources highlights the deeper meanings behind the many examples from *The People's Daily* explored here. First, Figure 20 makes clear from a U.S. perspective that the greatest threat facing Japan is expansive

Figure 20.³⁴Figure 21.³⁵


Soviet communism, represented by ferocious bear claws grasping the hammer and sickle, and the U.S.-Japan security agreement makes it possible for a towering Uncle Sam to protect Japanese society from that danger. For the Japanese to think they can do it without American help, is made to seem a laughable proposition. Figure 21 goes even further by suggesting that Japanese society will commit national suicide, depicted here by the act of *seppuku* (ritual death by disembowelment) using a Soviet-style hammer and sickle, if the security treaty is abandoned. In fact, in this comic Kishi is cast in the heroic role of preventing the fatal swipe of the blade.

In Figure 22, as in the previous example, the hammer and sickle of the Soviet Union is the primary instigator behind the protests in Japan, as the hapless protester is spurred to action solely by the prick of the blade, while the caption sarcastically labels it a “spontaneous uprising.” Also worth noting, however, is that the wooden clogs (*geta*) worn by the protester in this case, here shown to be the Socialist Party, represent his backwardness and incompetence much as such footwear was used in *People’s Daily* depictions of Prime Minister Kishi. For the American audience, then, Japanese demonstrators are an unruly and un-’civilized’ mob, while for the Chinese audience Japan’s political leadership represents feudal remnants of the past.

Figure 22³⁶

The notion that popular Japanese anger over the security agreement and its autocratic ratification has a legitimate foundation is dismissed out of hand in all three of these representations. Interestingly, China is also largely irrelevant in these depictions from the U.S. side; American cartoonists depicted Anpo protesters as stooges and dupes of Soviet agitation. Moreover, the dimension of class struggle so dominant in Chinese depictions is entirely absent from the American examples. While these comics cannot be taken as a direct statement of U.S. policy in East Asia, they nonetheless reflect a fairly common sentiment in American political and public opinion at the time—sinister Soviet intrigue lay behind most, if not all, anti-American movements in East Asia and around the globe.³⁷

PRC cartoonists, by contrast, depict the real aggressor in East Asia in 1960 as the United States, as in the following two cartoons. Both embrace a critique of police brutality as it was widely employed against popular demonstrations during the summer of 1960 in Tokyo. Figure 23 shows Prime Minister Kishi's face on the head of a police Billy club being snapped in half by

Figure 23³⁸Figure 24³⁹

the power of popular struggle against his government in the form of the righteous fist of the Japanese people delivering a blow to the Anpo Treaty. Notably, U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower is gently pushing Kishi under the fist with a caption reading: “Hold out as long as you can!” In Figure 24, Kishi and Eisenhower merge into one as they stand together under a military helmet labeled ‘anpo’ (安保), while clubs reign blows upon them with the caption reading ‘neither safe 不安, nor secure 不保’, a clever play on the term *anpo* by making both of its component parts negative. In both, the United States, of course, is the main target of criticism, with Japanese society at large portrayed as the weak victim of American manipulation.

To understand why this was such a dominant theme in the sources explored here, we must remember that images in *The People’s Daily* were intended primarily for domestic consumption. Why then did the CCP devote so much space in its flagship newspaper to the celebration of these seemingly revolutionary events in Japan during the summer of 1960? Indeed, front page headlines such as this one—“The Chinese and Japanese People Rise Up Together, Down with American Imperialism!”—were quite common for several weeks in May and June of that year.

Figure 25⁴⁰

The CCP anchored its legitimacy as the ruling party of China in part in its role as a leader of revolutionary movements in Asia and beyond. Perhaps then, by illustrating to the Chinese people that anti-American movements were breaking out around the world in 1960, a trend made possible by PRC leadership, the success of the party in both transforming China and inspiring popular resistance in neighboring societies such as South Korea and Japan could be reinforced. Such a message was important at a time when the disasters of the Great Leap Forward were evident to many (although not discussed openly), since one of the core goals of the GLF had been to rocket China forward to a position of leadership in global affairs. Moreover, 1960 saw the further deterioration and ultimate collapse of relations between the PRC and the Soviet Union. The image of a united Asia, under ostensible Chinese leadership, standing up to defeat American-backed authoritarian regimes could provide a weapon in ideological polemics against the Soviet Union. Through these cartoons the reader could see that the USSR was no longer the vanguard of world revolution—that role now belonged to the PRC.

The most striking of these cartoons, however, is the visual representation of domestic strife in Japan using revolutionary imagery that was easily accessible and understandable to the general Chinese audience—inevitable success of revolutionary forces, bitter conflict between progressive and reactionary elements, and the irrepressible force of mass movements. Since the Korean War, the CCP had sought to drive a wedge between Japan's political elites under the thumb of American power and the Japanese 'masses' who could be seen as victims of America's Cold War strategy of remilitarizing Japan.⁴¹ By dramatically depicting the mass uprising of Japanese citizens in a bitter struggle to free themselves from American dominance during the summer of 1960, the CCP could continue this redirection of popular anger away from Japan and toward the U.S., and even cultivate a feeling of popular unity between the peoples of China and Japan. While this general strategy of "people's diplomacy" as articulated by key party leaders such as Zhou Enlai has long been recognized by historians of the era, these cartoons from *The People's Daily* provide a specific and highly illustrative example of precisely how this message was communicated to the Chinese people. Furthermore, while it was only a brief episode in the long term reconstruction of postwar China-Japan relations, these sources remind us nonetheless that the Anpo crisis of 1960 was an event of import in East Asian international affairs beyond just the U.S.-Japan relationship.

It is also worth noting that many of the images and themes prevalent in Chinese editorial cartoons concerning the 1960 Anpo struggle can be found in Japanese editorial cartoons of the same time. In fact, at times they were identical, as in the case below of a *People's Daily* cartoon that was reprinted from an original drawn by Nasu Ryōsuke 那須良輔 for the *Asahi Shinbun* 朝日新聞. The cartoon shows a dark-suited American spy, complete with cowboy hat and holstered revolver (and labeled as a U-2 spy plane) being helped over a wall by Prime Minister Kishi in order to carry out his espionage missions in China and the Soviet Union. Such a critique of Japanese state duplicity with aggressive American interference in Asian affairs was

Figure 26.⁴²Figure 27.⁴³

something shared quite comfortably by the Chinese Communist Party and many progressive intellectuals, writers, politicians, artists and cartoonists in Japan in 1960.

Indeed, during the late 1950s and early 1960s, many people in China and Japan hoped to embark on a path toward reconciliation to protect their shared national interests against a powerful U.S. aggressor. That these commonalities served to bind together certain elements of both societies during the early Cold War is worth remembering, especially at a time when political and territorial disputes pitting China against Japan over the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands threaten to destabilize the entire region. While political elites in both societies continue to perpetuate negative popular images of the other for the sake of placating certain domestic constituencies, these examples from the summer of 1960 remind us that the content and aims of such manipulation can change quickly in response to altered geopolitical conditions.

Erik Esselstrom is Associate Professor in the Department of History and Director of the Asian Studies Program at the University of Vermont. He is the author of [Crossing Empire's Edge: Foreign Ministry Police and Japanese Expansionism in Northeast Asia](#) (University of Hawai'i Press, 2009).

Notes

¹ *Renmin ribao* 人民日报, June 15, 1960. All visual materials from *The People's Daily* provided in this essay were scanned from original issues of the paper held in the central library of Hitotsubashi University in Tokyo. I thank Professor Aono Toshihiko and his colleagues at Hitotsubashi for sponsoring my appointment there as Visiting Associate Professor.

² The literature is too vast to summarize here, but one excellent example that includes analysis of historical memory in numerous Asian societies is Sheila Miyoshi Jager and Rana Mitter, eds.,

Ruptured Histories: War, Memory and the Post-Cold War in Asia (Harvard University Press, 2007).

³ See Rana Mitter, “Old Ghosts, New Memories: China’s Changing War History in the Era of Post-Mao Politics” *Journal of Contemporary History* 38:1 (January 2003): 117-131; James Reilly, “Remember History, Not Hatred: Collective Remembrance of China’s War of Resistance to Japan” *Modern Asian Studies* 45:2 (2011): 463-490.

⁴ A useful recent study of the general history of Chinese political cartoons is Tao Ye 陶冶, *Chūgoku no fūshi manga 中国の風刺漫画* (Hakuteisha 白帝社, 2007).

⁵ The classic work on the Anpo protests is George R. Packard, *Protest in Tokyo: The Security Treaty Crisis of 1960* (Princeton University Press, 1966). A recent study is Linda Hoaglund’s film, *ANPO: Art X War* - [here](#).

⁶ A valuable discussion of how popular Chinese perceptions of the United States changed during the immediate postwar years is Hong Zhang, *America Perceived: The Making of Chinese Images of the United States, 1945–1953* (Westport: Greenwood, 2002).

⁷ See Chang-Tai Hung, “The Fuming Image: Cartoons and Public Opinion in Late Republican China, 1945 to 1949” *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 36:1 (January 1994): 122-145, “War and Peace in Feng Zikai’s Wartime Cartoons” *Modern China* 16:1 (January 1990): 39-83, and *War and Popular Culture: Resistance in Modern China, 1937-1945* (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1994).

⁸ Kevin McKenna, *All the Views Fit to Print: Changing Images of the U.S. in Pravda Political Cartoons, 1917-1991* (New York: Peter Lang, 2001), 15. An older but highly useful study on Soviet era political cartoons is Michael Milenkovitch, *The View From Red Square: A Critique of Cartoons from Pravda and Izvestia, 1947-1964* (New York: Hobbes, Dorman and Co., 1966).

⁹ Both of these points are consistent with the basic principles of China’s ‘people’s diplomacy’ strategy concerning Japan in the 1950s. See He Yinan, “Remembering and Forgetting the War: Elite Mythmaking, Mass Reaction, and Sino-Japanese Relations, 1950-2006” *History & Memory* 19:2 (Fall/Winter 2007): 43-74.

¹⁰ See Parks M. Coble, “China’s ‘New Remembering’ of the Anti-Japanese War of Resistance” *The China Quarterly* 190 (June 2007): 394-410.

¹¹ James Reilly, *Strong Society, Smart State: The Rise of Public Opinion in China’s Japan Policy* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2012), 55.

¹² *Renmin ribao*, May 23, 1960.

¹³ *Renmin ribao*, June 24, 1960.

¹⁴ *Renmin ribao*, May 5, 1960.

¹⁵ *Renmin ribao*, May 6, 1960.

¹⁶ John M. Wander Lippe, “Forgotten Brigade of the Forgotten War: Turkey’s Participation in the Korean War” *Middle Eastern Studies* 36:1 (January 2000): 92-102.

¹⁷ For a contemporary discussion of the incident, see Qunicy Wright, “Legal Aspects of the U-2 Incident” *The American Journal of International Law* 54:4 (October 1960): 836-854.

¹⁸ *Renmin ribao*, May 22, 1960.

¹⁹ *Renmin ribao*, May 30, 1960.

²⁰ Mark Driscoll provides an especially damning portrait of Kishi’s role in overseeing Japanese exploitation of Chinese labor in Manchukuo in Chapter Eight of his *Absolute Erotic, Absolute Grotesque: The Living, Dead and Undead in Japan’s Imperialism, 1895-1945* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2010).

²¹ *Renmin ribao*, May 17, 1960.

²² Close-up from Figure 17. *Renmin ribao*, May 22, 1960.

²³ Close-up from Figure 5. *Renmin ribao*, May 6, 1960.

²⁴ Close-up from Figure 16. *Renmin ribao*, May 30, 1960.

²⁵ Close-up from Figure 19. *Renmin ribao*, May 25, 1960.

²⁶ *Renmin ribao*, June 23, 1960.

²⁷ *Renmin ribao*, May 17, 1960.

²⁸ For additional discussion of Mt. Fuji imagery in wartime Japan and beyond, see H. Byron Earhart, “Mt. Fuji: Shield of War, Badge of Peace” in *The Asia-Pacific Journal Vol 9, Issue 20 No 1, May 16, 2011* ([here](#)), as well as Earhart’s book, *Mt. Fuji: Icon of Japan* (University of South Carolina Press, 2011).

²⁹ *Renmin ribao*, May 25, 1960.

³⁰ *Renmin ribao*, May 22, 1960.

³¹ *Renmin ribao*, May 29, 1960.

³² *Renmin ribao*, May 15, 1960.

³³ *Renmin ribao*, June 3, 1960.

³⁴ *The Japan Times*, June 15, 1960.

³⁵ *The Japan Times*, July 8, 1960.

³⁶ *The New York Times*, June 12, 1960 (reprinted from the original cartoon in the *The Greensboro Daily News*)

³⁷ In considering other comparative possibilities, it might prove fruitful to examine editorial cartoons in *Pravda* during the late 1950s when popular protests against U.S. missile deployments in West Germany were fairly widespread. While I have not examined those sources (and specifically relevant examples are not discussed in McKenna’s *All the Views Fit to Print*), I would not be surprised to find the CPSU making similar use of those West German protests for domestic propaganda value just as the CCP was doing with protests in Japan in 1960. I thank my

colleagues Susanna Schrafstetter and Alan Steinweis for suggesting this possibility to me after reading an early draft of this paper.

³⁸ *Renmin ribao*, June 10, 1960.

³⁹ *Renmin ribao*, May 14, 1960.

⁴⁰ Front page of *Renmin ribao*, May 12, 1960.

⁴¹ He, “Remembering and Forgetting the War,” 47.

⁴² *Renmin ribao*, May 13, 1960.

⁴³ *Asahi Shinbun*, May 9, 1960.