

indication of the jump in trade union membership after a decision to admit all collective farm workers. There are also valuable analyses of Soviet economic problems and prospects for Soviet external policies from Cairo to Cape Town to Washington, D.C.

The book also offers Americans a reminder about the strengths of West German Sovietology, the quality and quantity of which often go unnoticed as we strive to cope with masses of Russian and English-language materials. Most chapters in the book, except some dealing with economics, read smoothly in English translation. Unlike some German scholarship, the present work is compact, covering a wide horizon in pithy, nonpedantic language. It is also a valuable source for teachers seeking to introduce recent developments into the classroom or to work up simulation exercises. They could do no better than to use this volume, along with excerpts from the *Current Digest of the Soviet Press*, and thereby present students with a sense of context and primary materials for analysis.

One can only hope that the Cologne Institute is able to continue this worthy endeavor.

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CITIZEN INSPECTORS IN THE SOVIET UNION: THE PEOPLE'S CONTROL COMMITTEE. By *Jan S. Adams*. Foreword by *Jerry Hough*. New York and London: Praeger Publishers, 1977. xviii, 232 pp.

One way of classifying political systems is in terms of their primary mode of "mass participation." Autonomous groups are dominant in polyarchies, while in Soviet-type systems a centrally directed, "participatory subject" pattern prevails. In the developing world, no effective pattern seems to have taken shape, and that fact perhaps explains much of the disintegration and disorder rife in the Third World. In this scholarly study, Jan Adams adds a great deal to our knowledge of the organization of political participation in the post-Stalin USSR. She accounts for the existence of the enormous centrally directed structures, such as the one on which she focuses, namely, the People's Control Committee in terms of Downs's theory, which says that a system lacking market mechanisms, a free press, competing political parties, and so forth, requires vast monitoring agencies to combat the malfunctioning of bureaucracy.

The model for the present-day People's Control Committee dates from Lenin's era; it was revived by Khrushchev in the form of the Party-State Control Committee. During the Stalin period, the dictator relied on professional bureaucrats and police terror to perform the functions now handled by People's Control, which, incidentally, represents a watered-down, less ambitious, less "democratic" version of Khrushchev's Party-State Control Committee. It is staffed mainly by unpaid "volunteers." People's Control is an enormous bureaucracy—or perhaps to some degree, at least in pretension—an enormous counterbureaucracy.

According to Professor Adams, as of January 1976, the citizen inspectors enrolled in the People's Control Committee numbered 9.5 million, "not including the 20 million people annually drawn into ad hoc mass inspections or consulted informally as technical specialists" (pp. 152–53). Little information is provided by Professor Adams on the process of their recruitment or on the state of their morale. She does refer to one conversation with a Soviet emigrant in the United States, who reported that she and fellow inspectors "experienced at least a modest feeling of authority and a great sense of accomplishment in monitoring their enterprise" (p. 183). One would like to know more about the psychological aspects of all this.

What do the people's controllers accomplish? Adams's answers to this difficult question are scattered throughout various parts of her book, but are found mainly in chapter 6 and in the concluding chapter. Most of her efforts to answer questions about effectiveness and impact are more in the form of statements of intent—found in official documents and instructions—than in analysis of specific cases, though she does touch on several interesting examples of the latter. For example, a local branch of the People's Control Committee succeeded in forcing the builders of a Moscow housing complex for one hundred thousand people—which was under construction and already occupied by thirty thousand residents but lacked necessary service facilities, such as stores, laundries, and so forth—to install such services. No mention is made in connection with this or other such examples of action by injured parties in defense of their rights, such as they may be under Soviet law.

Professor Adams does not conceal the fact that all of the "participation" engaged in by citizen inspectors is tightly supervised by the party, which, in fact, has recently intensified its control. Adams asserts that by 1977 People's Control had been "transformed into a party organization," more than four million People's Control members being party members. Adams indicates that Brezhnev trusts the masses less than Khrushchev did (see pp. 150–53).

This is a useful book and it can be used for reference purposes by scholars working in numerous areas of research on Soviet politics. It makes good use of relevant theory, especially the bureaucratic theory of Anthony Downs. Its description of the substitution of new kinds of mobilization for police terror stimulates thought on prospects for change in the relationships between rulers and ruled in the USSR. While I do not reject the occasional hopes expressed by Professor Adams that Soviet citizens will some day enjoy more of the self-management functions they were promised in 1917, I find no convincing evidence or argument to that effect in her study.

I think that Professor Adams might have imparted a greater air of realism by including some data on bureaucratic malfeasance and corruption contained in reports by Western journalists and by Soviet dissidents. Undoubtedly, People's Control accomplishes a great deal, but in view of what is reported in sources other than the official Soviet press, one wonders how fully it is permitted to accomplish its assigned mission, and to what extent its functions are symbolic and psychological, rather than administrative and economic.

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SOVIET POLITICAL ELITES: THE CASE OF TIRASPOL. By *Ronald J. Hill*.  
New York: St. Martin's Press, 1977. x, 226 pp. \$16.95.

This short volume is a splendid example of the contribution to our knowledge of the Soviet political system which an intensive investigation at the local level can make. Through good luck or a sound proposal, in 1967–68, as a member of the British-Soviet academic exchange, Hill was able to study at the Moldavian Academy of Sciences. This unusual assignment enabled him to pursue his investigation of a single medium-sized city, Tiraspol. His candid description of this investigation tells us a great deal about the possibilities for local research in the USSR and the stringent limitations as well. Hill apparently was able to use the Tiraspol newspaper collection in Kishinev without serious restrictions (he seems to have used the Moldavian-language version—which may differ substantially from the Russian in some aspects—only as a supplement). Considering the severe restrictions on *current oblast-level* newspapers (to say nothing of back files for lower administrative levels) in the Lenin Library, this was no slight advantage. Hill was able, moreover, to make an extended field trip to Tiraspol—certainly an unusual experience for an observer from outside