

recognition of identity thus brought about. An important emphasis of this paper was the role accorded to language by Hegel in the passage to Absolute Spirit. Bernasconi identified four instances of the speculative proposition 'Language is the existence of Spirit', each with a different significance. Language is the 'element' of human beings for Hegel, 'element' in the sense of natural medium. It is a confidence or agreement which underlies all distrust. Finally, Bernasconi invoked the subtle and radical 'face to face' idea of E. Levinas to complete his explication of this part of the Phenomenology.

C. Arthur (Sussex) read the last paper called 'Hegel, Feuerbach, Marx and Negativity'. This was an examination of the critique of Hegel by Feuerbach, Marx and Lukács. Arthur defended Lukács' contention that the concept of 'Entäußerung' ('alienation', 'externalization') is the central one of the Phenomenology. Hegel, though, made two mistakes; one 'subjective' - the equating of man with self-consciousness - and the other 'objective' - the equating of alienation with objectification. In considering Marx's critique of Hegel Arthur emphasized some aspects of Hegel's thought which Marx found praiseworthy, e.g. the 'dialectic of negativity' and the 'self-creation of man as a process' - man as a result of his own labour. Turning to Feuerbach, Arthur outlined the criticism of 'sense-certainty' as dealing with only a logical and not a real immediacy. The Marxist critique was mainly based on the last section of the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844.

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#### In Memoriam Thomas Hill Green

The commemorative conference on the centenary of the death of Thomas Hill Green took place at Balliol College, Oxford, from the 16th to the 18th September 1982. It followed directly upon the HSGB meeting at Pembroke, in some ways a rather appropriate progression. Strictly speaking it should have taken place on the 26th March to coincide with Green's death, but commemorative piety in this case gave way to practicability. It was made possible by the generous help of the British Academy, Nuffield Foundation and the Master and Fellows of Balliol. A small exhibition of some of Green's papers, letters and manuscripts was kindly provided by the College Library.

Approximately 30 scholars attended, including participants from Japan, New Zealand, France and the U.S.A. The programme consisted of nine papers given over approximately two and a half days. These papers were planned to reflect the diversity of Green's thought in theological, philosophical and political fields, though obviously certain topics were neglected. Not all those attending were Green scholars; however, one of the fruitful offshoots of the current revival of interest in Hegel is that it has stimulated some curiosity about British and Scottish idealism at the turn of the century. All the papers generated wide-ranging discussion.

It is difficult to summarize these discussions adequately, although a number of themes became discernible during the course of the conference. One of the main difficulties to arise was exactly how to approach Green. The perennial issue of whether we study the coherence of Green's thought in the context of the later nineteenth century or try to extract from his writings arguments which we would now consider to be of philosophical worth quickly became evident. The more analytically minded theorists tended to opt for the latter position, which entailed abstracting Green from his metaphysical and theological encumbrances; whereas the more historical tended to seek to understand the writings of Green in the context of the nineteenth century, which entailed taking his metaphysics and theology seriously. Professor Melvin Richter's paper 'T.H. Green in 1982' encapsulated some of the general anxiety. Richter declared that he was neither a partisan of Green's philosophy nor a prophet for any revival of idealism, rather he was approaching Green as an historian of political thought. However, he went on to argue that, given that Green was a professional philosopher, it was possible to raise some questions about his contemporary relevance. The two main subjects of Green's philosophical criticisms - the use of the natural sciences for studying man and utilitarian philosophy are still actively discussed today. Utilitarianism specifically has engaged the serious critical attention of philosophers like Bernard Williams, Stuart Hampshire, Michael Walzer and John Rawls. Although one should not minimize differences from Green's idealism, the grounds for this contemporary criticism are not too dissimilar to Green's, although his critique, oddly, was far more moderate and courteous in tone. Richter's paper ended on the sombre note of a historian remarking that the experiences of the twentieth century make Green's optimism about domestic and international harmony seem anachronistic.

The second major theme of the conference addressed the influences on Green's thought. Professor Raymond Plant opened this topic with his paper on 'Green and Hegel'. It was continued in my own paper on 'T.H. Green and the Religion of citizenship', and Dr. Reardon's paper on 'Green as a theologian'. Plant argued that it was Hegel's views on religion which were a primary influence on Green. This vision of Christianity was adapted by Green from the writings of the Hegelian theologian F.C. Baur. Hegelianised Christianity acted as a link between Green's political philosophy and his social practice. Christ became the symbol, via the doctrine of the Incarnation, of God's involvement in the world. Political institutions were the epiphany of the divine on earth. In this context Hegelian idealism transformed ordinary religious consciousness. Hegel's influence on Green was also emphasized in my own paper. I argued that Green's idea of the protestant Christian citizen, which is the lynch-pin of his philosophy, is essentially the same as Hegel's idea of the free subject in the Protestant state. The later sections of Hegel's *Philosophy of Mind* were used to demonstrate this. During the debates on these papers, and in Dr. Reardon's paper, it was argued that Hegel had been given too prominent a role. Although admitting that Green adopted some form of Hegelian immanentism, Reardon argued that it was overshadowed by his Kantianism, specifically the doctrines

of Religion Within the Limits of Reason Alone. It was further argued that whereas Green wanted to transform all Christian dogma, Hegel was an admirer of positive dogmatics. It was contended that some of Hegel's early writings, like 'The Positivity of the Christian Religion', threw a different light on Hegel's attitude to dogma. Reardon maintained that the emphasis on Hegel led to a neglect of Green's evangelical upbringing and beliefs. Reardon carefully situated Green's evangelical Christianity in the context of nineteenth century intellectual life. This thesis is close to that of Melvin Richter's book of the 1960's, The Politics of Conscience: T.H. Green and his Age. A point which was not discussed in any detail, but which participants considered to be of importance in Green's thought, was the role of Greek thought, specifically that of Aristotle. Professor Rex Martin also opened an interesting perspective in his paper, 'T.H. Green on natural rights in Hobbes, Spinoza and Locke', which placed Green's theory of rights within the natural rights tradition, as a critical transformation, specifically of Locke, thus minimizing the Hegelian emphasis on rights.

As regards the role of theology in Green's thought, some argued that this was too much emphasized. Certainly for the contemporary commentator it is more congenial to minimize this side of Green. The straightforward theme was Green's influence on nineteenth century theology. This was covered by Reardon who dealt in erudite detail with the Lux Mundi writers. He concluded that Green's most enduring importance was in the social concern of the Church of England as manifested in, for example, the Christian Social Union. The stronger claims on theology arose in my own and Raymond Plant's paper. Both broadly argued that Green's philosophical theology was closely intertwined with his political philosophy. In debate, the view that the emphasis on theology detracted from the force and impact of the political and moral concerns was contested on the grounds that the theological aspect enriched our understanding of Green's social and political thought.

A theme which arose in connection with the theology was the status of Green's metaphysics and his theory of the eternal consciousness (similar to Hegel's idea of Geist). My own and Plant's paper assumed a close connection between metaphysics and politics. W.H. Walsh in his paper 'Green's criticism of Hume' emphasized the epistemological functions served by Green's metaphysics, specifically in accounting for intersubjectivity. Green's critical appraisal of Hume and Locke, and his replacement of the 'feeling consciousness' with the thinking and judging consciousness, would make little sense without the metaphysical presuppositions. However, as Walsh pointed out in his paper, Green's presuppositions are often kept in the background in his detailed criticism of Hume. Walsh maintained that Green's introduction to Hume's Treatise was really one of the first 'modern' studies of the philosophy of Hume, and despite the somewhat heavy style in which it is written, is still of considerable philosophical merit. However, a general puzzlement was felt about what exactly Green meant by the eternal consciousness. Was it an epistemological device, a pantheistic spirit or a deistic God?

The metaphysics and the eternal consciousness was linked in Professor Milne's paper 'The common good and rights in

T.H. Green's ethical and political theory' with the political philosophy, specifically the concept of the common good. Milne adumbrated two theories of the 'good' in Green's thought: 1) a dominant theory which was metaphysical in character; and 1i) a recessive theory which abandons the metaphysical and resolves upon a 'humanistic social ethics'. Green's dominant theory of the common good, apart from its philosophical untenability for Milne, obscured the finiteness and competitiveness of social existence. The common good is not automatically the individual's good. In fact the two quite often conflict. Milne attempted a formulation of the recessive theory to accommodate the fact of finiteness. This realistic reformulation entailed ultimately some form of welfare state, mediating between individuals. This particular formulation of the concept of the common good was denied in Peter Nicholson's paper, 'T.H. Green and state action'. He contended that the concept 'common' meant one and the same for all, a spiritual principle present equally in all. The common good was therefore one and the same 'good' for all, a perfection of each individual-character which did not admit of competition. As Green put it in the Prolegomena to Ethics (sec. 283), it is a 'good in the effort after which there can be no competition between man and man; of which the pursuit of any individual is an equal service to others and to himself'. It was not located in material things, which, through scarcity, tend to divide individuals, but rather was a moral criterion which organizes and guides the individual's action, essentially it is the good will. Nicholson argued that the common good was a powerful tool of political argument which Green managed to conjoin successfully with detailed empirical investigation, for example in his work on temperance legislation. It was argued during the debates on these papers that Green's theory would require some account of justice; the common good alone was not enough. A commonly perceived problem was that despite the fact that Green desired some form of equal opportunity for self-realization, he could not guarantee it, since this would entail unacceptable paternalistic government. It was further argued that individual liberty was too important a value to be sacrificed to the common good. Green's moral strategy had potentially dangerous consequences.

The theory of the common good was tied in with a final theme on rights and obligations in Rex Martin's paper and Dr. Harris' on 'Obligation and disobedience'. Martin interpreted Green's theory of the common good as essentially bound up with the idea of social recognition. The social recognition of rights in turn involved a transformation of the Lockean idea of consent. The common good emphasized socialized consent. Green thus did not utterly repudiate natural right theory, but built on the natural right tradition and brought it to fulfilment. Martin frankly confessed in his opening remarks that he regarded Green's Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation as 'perhaps the finest book in the philosophy of Rights written to date'. Harris' paper approached the question of rights from a different direction. After a detailed explication of Green's theory of obligation, it dealt with the question as to whether Green's argument on the impossibility of having a right against the state, prohibited all accounts of disobedience. When the citizen acts for the common good, from

right motives, does this automatically coincide with the law of the state? Green does maintain that there are rights that a state 'ought' to maintain, yet he seems to come down at some points to the duty of compliance with bad laws. He oscillates between a concern for stability on the one hand and human moral perfection on the other. Green's citizen, unlike Hegel's, is confronted by the problem of obligation. It was argued, during debate, that Green's account of disobedience was confusing and contradictory.

The general consensus of the conference was that Green had been too long ignored and that more attention should now be paid to his philosophy.

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Seventh Biennial Meeting of the Hegel Society of America,  
Clemson, South Carolina, October 7-9, 1982

The 1982 meeting of the HSA took place at Clemson University, normally basking in glorious sunshine in October but this time unfortunately blanketed by low clouds and heavy rain. This did not prevent the meeting from being rather successful for which major credits must go to William Maker, the local arrangements chairman, and Robert L. Perkins, the program chairman. The generally impressive quality of papers and comments showed that there was much talent in the younger generation of American Hegelian scholars.

The theme of the meeting was 'Hegel's Philosophy of History'. The first paper on 'Hegel and the Reformation' by Merold Westphal (Hope College) raised a number of central issues on Hegel's philosophy of history and political philosophy. Westphal examined the meaning and significance of 'the Protestant principle' which the mature Hegel regarded as the great contribution of the Lutheran Reformation to the development of modern European culture and society. His thorough analysis led him to the conclusion that under the term Hegel conflated two separate principles, subjectivity and autonomy. The former implies a qualified freedom of conscience which exempts man from human authority but not the divine authority of the Scripture; the latter amounts to a total rejection of external authority and to a claim of reason to be the sole standard of truth. The practical historical consequence of the latter was the French Revolution and Terror. In a comment David Duquette (Kansas University) offered an alternative interpretation of Hegel's 'Protestant principle', which stressed the incomplete character of Lutheran subjectivity and the fact of its overcoming in the secular world through a rational social and political order.

The paper by Shlomo Avineri on 'The Fossil and the Phoenix: Hegel and Krochmal on the Jewish Volksgeist' was read for him as the author was unable to attend the meeting. Avineri showed how Krochmal, an early 19th Galician Jewish thinker, explained the survival of Judaism and thus solved a problem which this