

At bottom Nietzsche was very vulnerable indeed; otherwise, whatever the physical cause of his disease may have been, he would scarcely have ended in the kind of madness that in fact defeated him. His was not the complacent self-sufficiency of the Hyde Park atheist, nor can his chequered relations with Rohde, with Wagner, with Lou Salomé, be interpreted except as manifestations of his frustrated need to find someone whom he could wholeheartedly admire. From one point of view his whole philosophy is a gigantic bluff to hide from himself the emptiness of a life without God and the solitude of a life without friends who could fully understand him. The philosophy is interesting precisely because it is constantly on the verge of breaking down and because, when it attained its most strident note, it collapsed finally and for ever. Even in this bluff Nietzsche maintains a fundamental intellectual integrity; it was the kind of bluff which was necessary to give meaning to life in the universe as Nietzsche supposed it to be, and he could not be content with any conventional substitute for meaningful existence. An adequate appraisal of Nietzsche demands more sympathy than Dr Lannoy brings to the task; his book can be recommended as a careful study of the facts, but it lacks pity.

D. J. B. HAWKINS

LOGIC AND LANGUAGE; Second Series. Edited by A. G. N. Flew. (Basil Blackwell, Oxford; 21s.)

THINKING AND EXPERIENCE. By H. H. Price. (Hutchinsons University Library; 25s.)

From the outside, philosophy, by that I mean the talk of philosophers, often appears bewildering. It is rather like arriving late at a party and finding our hosts playing a complicated family word-game; we miss all the allusions, and it appears to be sheer absurdity. A little attention and reflection can show us that the game has a pattern and if we follow closely we shall soon be able to form a plausible hypothesis as to what it is all about. The difficulty about the complication of language and long-windedness of philosophers is not really serious, because philosophy, like every other human activity, has the right to its own conventions, its own technical language. Further, philosophers, like lawyers, have to be long-winded for their task is to discriminate between all the fine shades of meaning latent in our ordinary use of terms and to indicate the assumptions which underlie our normal attitudes; to do this, with clarity and accuracy, an immense amount of analysis and restatement is necessary. Nor is philosophy just a game, for it is seriously concerned with the truth or falsity, the importance or triviality, of any and every statement.

Both the works reviewed have their characteristic difficulty, but both of them are of great interest. The second series on 'Logic and Language'

maintains the standards of the first. The essays, for the most part, deal with problems which, it is contended, arise from verbal muddles. Examples of this are Dr Wills' discussion of Hume's difficulties in terms of an ambiguity in the use of the word 'future', and Professor Austin's distinction between the questions 'How do I know that Tom is happy?' and 'How do I introspect Tom's feelings?' The essay by Dr Waismann is of fundamental importance by reason of his clear exposition of the distinction between statements of different orders. The essays as a whole illustrate the contribution that the linguistic movement has made in blowing away transcendental fog, and the growing concern of its exponents with traditional problems, while the tone of the essays is very different from the narrow dogmatism of the early Vienna school.

Professor Price's full-dress discussion of what we mean by sign and symbol, image and concept, is, as one would expect, clear, reasonable and laborious. Like his volume on 'Perception' it is a book that all philosophers will have to take seriously, but the issues it raises are too technical for more than a general recognition in this journal.

IAN HISLOP, O.P.

ST PROSPER OF AQUITAINE: *THE CALL OF ALL NATIONS*. Translated by P. Deletter, S.J.

ST AUGUSTINE: *SERMONS FOR CHRISTMAS AND EPIPHANY*. Translated by T. C. Lawler.

Ancient Christian Writers series, XIV and XV (Longmans; 25s. each.)

*The Call of All Nations* is a treatise on the mysteries of election and grace by a disciple of St Augustine's who was involved in controversy with the Semi-Pelagians. St Prosper follows his master even in the way he works out his theme in terms of sacred history. The calling of Israel alone among all nations is an example, or perhaps a type, of God's choosing of the elect out of the mass of all mankind. The bringing in of the Gentiles under the New Testament dispensation shows that Christ is the Saviour of all men, and that 'God will have all men to be saved' (1 Tim. 2, 4). Election of some, and salvation for all—that is the problem which the author confesses, with the apostle, cannot be fathomed. His treatise in fact is the statement of a mystery, not the solution of a problem.

The translator, however, in his introduction and notes gives the impression that for him the matters treated of are like a quadratic equation, which Augustine had set, under provocation from Pelagius, and which Prosper did something—not much—to solve. 'Augustine stated free-will and grace without attempting to reconcile the two as in later times theology would do' (p. 4). And how has theology done so? 'All men