

of the history of literary movements and the interrelation of the historical and cultural spheres.

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YUGOSLAV COMMUNISM AND THE MACEDONIAN QUESTION. By Stephen E. Palmer, Jr., and Robert R. King. Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books (Shoe String Press), 1971. x, 247 pp. \$10.00.

This monograph is a study of the attitudes of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (CPY) and its supporters in Yugoslav Macedonia toward the Macedonian Question before, during, and after the Second World War. It is based on Communist sources interspersed with works by Western scholars and journalists. Most of the nameless Macedonians interviewed by the coauthors appear to belong to a group of pro-Bulgarian anti-Communist exiles associated with Ivan Mihailov. Palmer and King stress that the "crucial element of the CPY policy on Macedonia was its decision to recognize the existence of a Macedonian nationality." The stand the party adopted did not pay immediate dividends in Macedonia nor lead to more cordial relations with other Balkan Communist parties. The controversies that divided the Yugoslav and Bulgarian Communist leaders are discussed at some length, and force the authors to conclude that "without doubt, Macedonia will continue to be a complex focal point of conflict in Balkan politics."

The usefulness of this pioneering work is seriously reduced by three major weaknesses. No convincing evidence is provided to support the authors' contention that before the outbreak of the Second World War the "vast majority of the Slavo-Macedonians considered themselves" Bulgarians. The tribulations of the inhabitants of Macedonia and the blood feuds among them would have been far less widespread had they been quasi-unanimous about their national allegiance. Palmer's and King's espousal of what is essentially the Bulgarian thesis about the nationality of the Slavo-Macedonians makes them emphasize differences of opinion and clashes between Serbs and non-Serbs, while playing down those between Bulgarians and non-Bulgarians in Macedonia. Thus we read of the "Serbian terror" in Macedonia in 1912-14, but there is no mention of the brutal treatment by Bulgarians during 1915-18 of those they considered as Serbs in Macedonia.

Second, the authors ignore important source material, such as the seventh series of the *Zbornik dokumenata i podataka o narodno-oslobodilačkom ratu jugoslovenskih naroda* and the contributions to the leading Macedonian historical journal, *Glasnik na institutot za nacionalna istorija*. Third, there are many inaccurate statements, most of which could easily have been avoided if the authors had read more carefully the books listed in their bibliography. "All the Serbian parties" did not vote for the Yugoslav Constitution in 1921 (p. 19). Several, including the Agrarians, voted against it. The Yugoslav Communists were not the "first outside party" to join the Comintern (p. 20). The Yugoslav Communist leaders in 1919-20 did not take the position that Macedonians "were Serbs" (p. 21). They argued that no single nationality had an absolute majority in Macedonia. *Općinski* does not mean "county" (p. 21) but "municipal." A non-Communist opposition party, the Republicans, did contest the 1920 general elections in Macedonia (p. 23). The *Obznana* was decreed in December 1920 and not in August 1921 (p. 25). Sima Marković did not lead a delegation to Moscow in December 1920 (p. 24). He was

not secretary-general of the CPY in 1923–25 (p. 28). It is misleading to associate him with “Greater Serbian leanings in the Party” (p. 46), since he advocated autonomy for Macedonia, and vigorously opposed in and out of Parliament his compatriots’ policies in that province. The “rash of assassinations” that the IMRO organized in Bulgaria did not begin in 1924 (p. 38) but, as many an Agrarian and Communist discovered to his cost, in 1923.

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STRANI KAPITAL U RUDARSTVU SRBIJE DO 1918. By *Danica Milić*. Istorijski institut u Beogradu. Jugoslovenske zemlje u XX veku, vol. 4. Belgrade: Izdanje istorijskog instituta, 1970. 579 pp.

Dr. Milić’s book is the latest in a series of well-documented if mapless works published by her own Historical Institute of the Serbian Academy on independent Serbia’s relations with the Great Powers early in the twentieth century. Dimitrije Djordjević, now professor of history at the University of California, Santa Barbara, set a high standard in the first of these volumes, his *Carinski rat Austro-Ugarske i Srbije, 1906–1911* (Belgrade, 1962, 733 pp.). In her study of foreign capital in Serbian mining, principally French and Belgian investment after 1900 in copper and coal, Dr. Milić pays the same thorough attention to all relevant European archives as Professor Djordjević did. Useful insights into the economic history of Great Power penetration of the Balkans therefore emerge from an apparently narrow topic.

Dr. Milić conducts her investigation from Marxist first principles. But like a number of postwar Yugoslav scholars, she is careful to avoid dogmatic conclusions. She identifies doubtful or scanty data as such, rather than relying on it. Private European investors emerge as cautious types. Their profits in Serbia are not puffed up to explain the survival of European capitalism or the limitations of native industry. Their activities are described by quantities of capital committed and copper or coal exported, not by quotations from their promotional polemics in the fashion of some current revisionist writers of American economic history. Dr. Milić acknowledges benefits as well as costs to Serbia from an increasing but still limited amount of European mining investment after 1900. There is valuable experience in playing off the interests of one Great Power against another. Most important, she argues, is the access to European technology and training that Serbian merchants and bankers would not have financed. It is this gain that made foreign mining investment a “necessary evil,” in Dr. Milić’s phrase, during these last prewar decades.

The principal shortcomings of the book are omissions for which the author cannot be blamed. If the chapter on working conditions in these mines is regrettably brief, it is because most material on wages and prices was lost in the two world wars. Dr. Milić can collect a representative sample of consumer prices only for Belgrade. The cost of living at mining sites was probably much higher. This constituted a special burden for the large number of foreign workers, mainly Czechs, who had no recourse to their native villages in hard times, as Serbian labor did. The author admits a relative lack of records from the private mines that were the center of increasing foreign investment after 1900. She apologizes for her greater reference to state mines and refuses to exaggerate their importance.

One final regret is Dr. Milić’s failure to carry the account into the interwar