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The Surprising Survival of Constitutionalism in the *Caudillo* Republic of Rio Grande do Sul, Brazil, 1836–1845

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Abstract

The *caudillo* strongman remains emblematic of Latin American authoritarianism, but scholarship has seldom reflected on the semantic shifts that this concept suffered over time and its implications for the history of political thought. Numerous political experiments have been marginalized from historical and state-building narratives as the irrelevant work of *caudillos*, such as the short-lived Rio Grandense Republic in southern Brazil (1836–45). By explaining the Rio Grandense *caudillos'* engagement with constitutionalism, this article argues that '*caudillo*' can be a useful category of analysis if historically contextualized. The article thus reconsiders the history of political thought and state-building in Latin America and beyond in the age of revolutions, suggesting the serious need to scrutinize 'failed' states and revolutions. This argument is pursued in three steps. First, the article describes shifting understandings and usages of '*caudillo*' in nineteenth-century Brazil and neighbouring River Plate states. Second, it analyses the Rio Grandense Republic's 1842–3 constituent assembly and the novel electoral procedures it employed. Third, it examines the never-promulgated constitutional draft produced by its assemblymen. This constitutional draft is then compared to contemporary River Plate and Brazilian constitutions and its rejection is explained through the assemblymen's divergent understandings of constitutionalism and democracy.

Of the influence exercised by Bento Gonçalves over the people, we can get an idea from what [they] said of him: 'If he did not agree to something, who could force him?' These words translated the conviction of those people. For the inhabitants of the hinterland, the colonel was the king of the countryside; no one had the right to give him orders.

José de Alencar, *O gaúcho* (1870)

This was the classic image of the *caudillo*: a powerful proprietor adorned with military commissions and unfettered by political loyalties. The *caudillo* utilized

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charisma and physical feats to cause ‘men to adore him; women to admire him’. And he was ultimately moved by territorial conquest, whether for self-gratification or for rewarding clients and cronies.¹ Bento Gonçalves da Silva, an *estancieiro* (estate-owner) from Rio Grande do Sul, the Brazilian Empire’s southernmost province, perfectly fitted this bill. He held lands and offices in both Brazil and Uruguay, and he alternately fought for monarchists and republicans.² His *pièce de résistance* was the backdrop to Alencar’s historical novel *O gaúcho*: a fiscal-turned-secessionist revolt in Rio Grande do Sul that remains Brazil’s longest armed conflict, the so-called Farroupilha Revolution (1835–45).³

When the *farroupilhas* declared a tentative Rio Grandense Republic in 1836, they elected Gonçalves their president. Combining civil and military authority, he ruled by decree and consolidated the separatists’ hold over the provincial hinterland. But when his own ministers undercut his rule by convening a constituent assembly in 1842, he put up no resistance – why? And why, despite their similarities, did Alencar call foreign revolutionaries *caudillos*, but not Gonçalves and other *farroupilhas*? These questions’ intertwined answers reveal the flexibility of constitutionalism in post-colonial Latin America and the nationalist polemics that have often informed commentary on *caudillos*.

Caudillos remain emblematic of Latin American authoritarianism. John Lynch theorized the ‘caudillo state’ as an early stage of Latin American state-building, wherein *caudillos*’ ‘personal sovereignty subverted constitutions’.⁴

¹ José de Alencar, *O gaúcho* (3rd edn, São Paulo, 1998), p. 7.

² Liana Bach Martins et al., *Perfis parlamentares: Bento Gonçalves da Silva* (Porto Alegre, 2005), pp. 23–9.

³ *Farroupilha* (‘tattered’) initially was an insult for Brazilian radical liberals, but the label ‘Farroupilha Revolution’ became commonplace in the 1930s. While a sizeable lusophone literature on this rebellion exists, the only anglophone monograph published on this conflict remains Spencer L. Leitman, *Socio-economic roots of the Ragamuffin War: a chapter in early Brazilian history* (Austin, TX, 1972).

⁴ John Lynch, *Caudillos in Spanish America, 1800–1850* (Oxford, 1992), pp. 133–9. For similar examples, see Natalio R. Botana, *La tradición republicana: Alberdi, Sarmiento y las ideas políticas de su tiempo* (Buenos Aires, 1984), p. 281; Charles E. Chapman, ‘The age of the caudillos: a chapter in Hispanic American history’, *Hispanic American Historical Review*, 23 (1932), pp. 281–300; John Charles Chasteen, *Heroes on horseback: a life and times of the last gaucho caudillos* (Albuquerque, NM, 1995), pp. 5, 21; Miguel Angel Centeno, *Blood and debt: war and the nation-state in Latin America* (University Park, PA, 2002), pp. 63–4, 156; Paulino Jacques, *A Guerra dos Farrapos (1835–1845)* (Rio de Janeiro, 1969), p. 237; Félix Luna, *Los caudillos* (2nd edn, Buenos Aires, 1967), pp. 22–30; Eric R. Wolf and Edward C. Hansen, ‘Caudillo politics: a structural analysis’, *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, 9 (1967), pp. 168–79; Rubén Zorrilla, *Estructura social y caudillismo (1810–1870)* (Buenos Aires, 1994), pp. 168–78; George Billias, *American constitutionalism heard round the world, 1776–1989: a global perspective* (New York, NY, 2009), p. 108; Robert L. Scheina, *Latin America’s wars, I: The age of the caudillo, 1791–1899* (Washington, DC, 2003), pp. 426–7. For historiographical surveys, see Hernán Camareno, ‘Perspectivas historiográficas en torno al caudillismo argentino del siglo XIX’, *Revista de Historia*, 41 (2000), pp. 9–48; Maristela Svampa, ‘La dialéctica entre el nuevo y lo viejo: sobre los usos y nociones del caudillismo en la Argentina durante el siglo XIX’, in Noemí Goldman and Ricardo Salvatore, eds., *Caudillismos Rioplatenses: nuevas miradas a un viejo problema* (Buenos Aires, 1998), pp. 57–81. For a critique of Lynch, see Noemí Goldman and Ricardo Salvatore, ‘Introducción’, in Goldman and Salvatore, eds., *Caudillismos*, pp. 7–15.

Thomas C. Wright recently reiterated this view: *caudillos* ‘controlled or ignored their country’s legislature and courts...[lacking] ideologies or political principles’.⁵ A *caudillo*-led constituent assembly may therefore sound oxymoronic, but the *farroupilha* constituent assembly deeply disturbs this understanding and points to an older, flexible reading of *caudillo*. The *farroupilhas* were promptly recognized by contemporaries as *caudillos*, but they also sought to protect their interests through constitution-writing and a language of rights. They even came to blows over how ‘democratic’ their republic should be, and it arguably was their failure to agree on a constitution that doomed the Rio Grandense Republic. Their assembly’s internal disagreements and novel electoral proceedings make the historiographical dearth on this episode notable, although the very idea of the *caudillo* may be to blame.⁶

The past thirty years have witnessed increasingly nuanced studies of *caudillos*, but these contributions have been slow to change perceptions of Latin American politics.⁷ Eduardo Posada-Carbó noted that the conceptual shadow of *caudillismo* or *caudillaje* (*caudillo*-rule) still discourages historical research on Latin American representative institutions, so perhaps we ought to move away from studying *caudillos*.⁸ José Carlos Chiaramonte similarly argued that scholars have too eagerly dismissed deviations from liberal constitutionalism as *caudillismo*.⁹ Reducing *caudillos* to popular leaders in post-colonial class struggles, Gabriel Di Meglio recently advised historians to avoid ‘such a loaded term’.¹⁰ More productively, Jorge Myers proposed that *caudillismo* should not be understood ‘as an “active” category of analysis’ but as a historically unstable concept whose deployments must be individually examined.¹¹

⁵ Thomas C. Wright, *Democracy in Latin America: a new history since independence* (Lanham, MD, 2023), paragraphs 10.9–10.10.

⁶ This assembly was recently but briefly discussed in Gabriel Paquette, ‘Demotic and “democratic” languages in post-independence Brazil, 1822–48’, *Journal of Iberian and Latin American Studies*, 26 (2020), pp. 149–58. Other studies have suffered from generalizations or inaccuracies: Ana Luiza Setti Reckziegel and Felipe Cittolin Abal, ‘Experiências constitucionais no Uruguai de 1830 e no Rio Grande do Sul de 1843: um ensaio de liberalismo caudilho’, *Estudios históricos*, 16 (2016), pp. 1–23; Augusto Tanger Jardim, ‘O anteprojeto de Constituição farroupilha: aspectos histórico-culturais e comparativos com a Constituição imperial brasileira’, *Revista da Faculdade de Direito da FMP*, 10 (2015), pp. 33–48.

⁷ For uses of ‘*caudillo*’ regarding twenty-first century politics, see Ernesto Semán, ‘The untranslatable *caudillo*’, *Popula*, 13 Aug. 2018, <https://popula.com/2018/08/13/the-untranslatable-caudillo/>, accessed on 28 May 2023.

⁸ Eduardo Posada-Carbó, ‘Congresses versus *caudillos*: the untold history of democracy in Latin America, with special emphasis on New Granada (Colombia), 1830–60: a new research agenda’, *Parliaments, Estates and Representation*, 37 (2017), pp. 119–29.

⁹ José Carlos Chiaramonte, ‘El antiguo constitucionalismo en la historia hispanoamericana del siglo XIX’, *Nuevo Mundo Mundos Nuevos*, 8 Oct. 2020, <http://journals.openedition.org/nuevomundo/81983>, accessed on 4 Mar. 2023.

¹⁰ Gabriel Di Meglio, ‘The southernmost revolution: the Río de la Plata in the early nineteenth century’, in Wim Klooster, ed., *The Cambridge history of the age of Atlantic revolutions* (3 vols., Cambridge, 2023), III, p. 274.

¹¹ Jorge Myers, ‘Las formas complejas del poder: la problemática del caudillismo a la luz del régimen rosista’, in Goldman and Salvatore, eds., *Caudillismos*, pp. 7, 99.

Constitutionalism has conversely enjoyed a brighter place in Latin American historiography.¹² François-Xavier Guerra, in particular, inspired transnational and comparative studies by asserting that Latin America's first constitutions and relatively broad suffrages signalled a Hispanic 'precocious modernity'.¹³ José Antonio Aguilar Rivera subsequently placed Latin America within a transatlantic 'constitutional moment' (1787–1830), and Joshua Simon similarly compared North and South American constitution-writers. They and other historians saw in early constitutional experiments across the Atlantic world attempts to protect individual liberties while establishing socially exclusionary representative governments.¹⁴ Collaborative projects, moreover, recently spotlighted how local expressions of constitutionalism underscored popular mobilization, territorial reconfigurations, and reconceptualizations of sovereignty across the continent.¹⁵ Global histories of the age of revolutions, meanwhile, have evidenced similar insights. Linda Colley stressed that empires and revolutionaries everywhere effected regime-change through constitution-writing, and Maurizio Isabella analysed southern European revolutions and constitutional compromises bearing similarities and connections to Latin America.¹⁶ Analysing Latin America's constitutional experiments, especially those with transnational links like the *farroupilha*, can therefore explain the global allure of constitutionalism and its relationship to state-building and independence movements in the age of revolutions.

This article seeks to contribute to the history of Latin American political thought by transnationally reconsidering the dichotomy *caudillo*–constitution. It recovers nineteenth-century meanings of *caudillo* in Brazil and neighbouring Argentina and Uruguay (whose politics influenced the *farroupilhas*) before analysing the *farroupilha* constituent assembly and its constitutional draft. The article concludes that '*caudillo*' was then undergoing a major semantic shift, which turned it into a concept used by historical actors to interpret, shape, or challenge political institutions and authorities. The *farroupilha* experiment, meanwhile, proved that constitution-writing was not the preserve of a single party or ideology, attesting the importance of scrutinizing 'failed' states and

¹² Isidro Vanegas, *El constitucionalismo fundacional* (Bogotá, 2012), pp. 18–19.

¹³ François-Xavier Guerra, 'The Spanish-American tradition of representation and its European roots', *Journal of Latin American Studies*, 26 (1994), pp. 1–35, at p. 22; José Antonio Aguilar Rivera and Eduardo Zimmermann, 'Democracy and liberal constitutionalism', in Eduardo Posada-Carbó, Joanna Innes, and Mark Philip, eds., *Re-imagining democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean, 1780–1870* (Oxford, 2023), p. 163; Roberto Breña, 'The emancipation process in new Spain and the Cádiz constitution', in Scott Eastman and Natalia Sobrevilla Perea, eds., *The rise of constitutional government in the Iberian Atlantic world: the impact of the Cádiz constitution of 1812* (Tuscaloosa, AL, 2015), pp. 45–6.

¹⁴ José Antonio Aguilar Rivera, *En pos de la Quimera: reflexiones sobre el experimento constitucional atlántico* (México, 2000), pp. 22–9, 57–8; Joshua Simon, *The ideology of Creole revolution: imperialism and independence in American and Latin American political thought* (Cambridge, 2017), pp. 32–8; Aguilar Rivera and Zimmermann, 'Democracy and liberal constitutionalism', p. 168.

¹⁵ For example, Eastman and Perea, eds., *The rise*; Antonio Annino and Marcela Ternavasio, eds., *El laboratorio constitucional iberoamericano: 1807/1808–1830* (Madrid, 2012).

¹⁶ Linda Colley, *The gun, the ship, and the pen: warfare, constitutions, and the making of the modern world* (Oxford, 2021), pp. 156–63; Maurizio Isabella, *Southern Europe in the age of revolutions* (Princeton, NJ, 2023), pp. 259–62.

revolutions to recover the multiple state-building pathways explored by Latin Americans after independence.

Early nineteenth-century writers knew that *caudillo* was a medieval Castilian term for ‘leader’.¹⁷ Moses was therefore described in 1806 as ‘*caudillo* and legislator of the people of God’.¹⁸ But the Spanish imperial crisis prompted by the Napoleonic Wars encouraged an identification of *caudillos* with informal or demagogic military authority: none was worse than Napoleon Bonaparte, ‘*caudillo* of the French’.¹⁹ The image of the *caudillo* as a demagogue eventually prevailed, but this was a gradual shift.

In Spanish America, metropolitan weakness caused the rise of republican and monarchist ‘*caudillos*’ who created makeshift armies through clientelism and charisma.²⁰ In 1810, for example, Montevideo’s monarchist governor Gaspar de Vigodet rallied his troops by declaring ‘I will be your *caudillo*, a friend, a companion, and not a superior’.²¹ Vigodet was no democrat, but his self-fashioning suggested the *caudillo* as a popular leader – a recurring image that Argentinian President Bartolomé Mitre (1862–8) associated with the emergence of democracy in America.²²

Despite Vigodet’s claims, contemporaries recognized José Artigas as the Uruguayan *caudillo par excellence*. Artigas was a radical republican who championed independence and agrarian reform to foster a smallholding citizenry.²³ Republicans and monarchists alike criticized Artigas’s democratic tendencies and charismatic sway over the ‘vandals’ who ‘blindly followed his ideas’, meaning his army of *gauchos* (peripatetic horsemen), runaway slaves, and Amerindians.²⁴ Even some young landowners joined Artigas, if only to earn

¹⁷ Henry Neuman and Giuseppe Marco Antonio Baretta, *A pocket dictionary of the Spanish and English languages* (London, 1823), p. 60; Juan E. Pivel Devoto, ‘Prologo’, in Manuel Herreara y Obes and Bernardo Prudencio Berro, *El caudillismo y la revolucion americana: polemica* (Montevideo, 1966), pp. x–xiii; Juan Antonio de Iza Zamácola, *Historia de las naciones bascas* (3 vols., Auch, 1818), passim; Henry Richard, Lord Holland, *Some account of the lives and writings of Lope Felix de Vega Carpio and Guillen de Castro* (2 vols., London, 1817), II, p. 72.

¹⁸ José Antonio Conde y García, *Censura crítica del alfabeto primitivo de España* (Madrid, 1806), p. 45.

¹⁹ *Manifiesto del español ciudadano y soldado* (Madrid, 1808), p. 8; Brian R. Hamnett, *The end of Iberian rule on the American continent, 1770–1830* (Cambridge, 2017), p. 9.

²⁰ Anthony McFarlane, *War and independence in Spanish America* (New York, NY, 2014), pp. 130–1, 197–8; Jeremy Adelman, ‘An age of imperial revolutions’, *American Historical Review*, 113 (2008), pp. 319–40, at pp. 320–1.

²¹ Gaspar de Vigodet, 19 Oct. 1810, Montevideo, cited in Juan E. Pivel Devoto, ‘Advertencia’, in *Archivo Artigas* (AA) (36 vols., Montevideo, 1950–2006), XXVIII, p. xv.

²² Goldman and Salvatore, ‘Introducción’, p. 9; Bartolomé Mitre, *Historia de Belgrano y de la independencia argentina* (3 vols., Buenos Aires, 1887), I, p. 143.

²³ José Gervasio Artigas, ‘Reglamento’, 15 Sept. 1815, in *Contribución documental para la historia del Río de la Plata* (5 vols., Buenos Aires, 1913), III, pp. 335–6; John Street, *Artigas and the emancipation of Uruguay* (Cambridge, 1959), p. 226; Meglio, ‘The southernmost revolution’, pp. 265–6.

²⁴ Carlos Alvear, 4 Apr. 1815, Buenos Aires; Buenos Aires Ayuntamiento proclamation, 5 Apr. 1815, in *Contribución documental*, III, pp. 219–22, 225–6; San Carlos to Casa-Irujo, 22 Jun. 1819, London, in AA, XXXVI, p. 121.

their spurs alongside a feared warlord.²⁵ Among them was Bento Gonçalves, then a junior magistrate, who volunteered under Artigas in 1811–12.²⁶

At the municipal level, historians have also identified ‘aspiring *caudillos*’.²⁷ One was Pedro José Vieira, a Rio Grandense foreman in Uruguay and later a *farroupilha* colonel. He raised 400 militiamen in 1811 and offered his services to Buenos Aires’s revolutionary junta in exchange for the title of *caudillo* of the village of Mercedes.²⁸ It is unclear how his request was answered, but it showed that self-styled *caudillos* attempted to legitimize their authority by collaborating with emergent representative institutions.²⁹ For Vieira, there was no contradiction between being a *caudillo* and supporting a junta that championed popular sovereignty and constitutionalism.³⁰ His rise also illustrated how ‘new men’ could enter politics amidst revolutionary wars.³¹ Artigas embraced similar ideas, although he had enough influence to dominate regional politics and to advance his own constitutional experiments.³² Within a context of extreme political uncertainty, *caudillos* thus sought the protection or the leadership of new regimes.

Argentina observed similar developments. After independence in 1816, powerful, landowning provincial governors (often dubbed *caudillos*) jealously guarded their autonomy and opposed centralizing ‘national’ constitutions.³³ The 1820 Treaty of Pilar, for instance, was an inter-provincial agreement that allowed each province to promulgate their own constitution in lieu of a stricter union. A decade of instability followed, but the *caudillos* who battled over this period did so at the head of ‘province-states’ – increasingly complex polities equipped with constitutions, banks, semi-professional armies, and

²⁵ On Artigas’s society-wide appeal, see Ana Frega, ‘La virtud y el poder. La soberanía particular de los pueblos en el proyecto artiguista’, in Goldman and Salvatore, eds., *Caudillismos*, pp. 101–3.

²⁶ Leitman, *Socio-economic roots*, p. 14.

²⁷ Raúl Fradkin, *La historia de una montonera: bandolerismo y caudillismo en Buenos Aires, 1826* (Buenos Aires, 2006), p. 197.

²⁸ Pedro José Vieira to Buenos Aires Junta, Mercedes, Mar. 1811, in AA, IV, pp. 253–5; Helen Osório, ‘A revolução artiguista e o Rio Grande do Sul: alguns entrelaçamentos’, *Cadernos do CHDD*, 6 (2007), pp. 3–32, at p. 25.

²⁹ Walter Rela, ‘Pedro José Vieira, un Riograndense del Sur en el Inicio de la Admirable Alarma en la Campaña Oriental’, *Revista do Instituto Histórico e Geográfico do RS*, 146 (2012), pp. 141–56, at p. 155; ‘Relación formulada por D. Justo Correa’, Mar. 1811, Mercedes, in AA, IV, p. 260.

³⁰ Noemí Goldman, ‘Argentina/Río de la Plata’, in Noemí Goldman, ed., *Iberconcepts II. Soberanía* (Madrid, 2014), p. 46; John Lynch, *The Spanish American revolutions, 1808–1826* (London, 1973), p. 53; Tulio Halperín-Donghi, *Politics, economics and society in Argentina in the revolutionary period*, trans. Richard Southern (Cambridge, 1975), p. 158.

³¹ Anthony McFarlane, ‘Iberian legacies’, in Posada-Carbó, Innes, and Philp, eds., *Re-imagining democracy*, p. 72.

³² José Artigas et al. to Buenos Aires Cabildo, 27 Aug. 1812, Barra del Ayuí, in AA, IX, pp. 47–9; Jeremy Adelman, *Sovereignty and revolution in the Iberian Atlantic* (Princeton, NJ, 2006), p. 281; Marcela Ternavasio, *Gobernar la revolución: poderes en disputa en el Río de la Plata, 1810–1816* (Buenos Aires, 2007), pp. 167–9; Frega, ‘La virtud’, pp. 106–8, 118–20.

³³ Marcela Ternavasio, *Historia de la Argentina, 1806–1852* (Buenos Aires, 2013), pp. 94–5; Noemí Goldman and Marcela Ternavasio, ‘La vida política’, in Jorge Gelman, ed., *Argentina: crisis imperial e independencia* (Madrid, 2010), p. 81.

legislatures directly elected by broad franchises.³⁴ Buenos Aires notoriously allowed all 'free men' to vote from 1821, leading to unprecedented levels of political mobilization and campaigning.³⁵ *Caudillos* certainly rigged elections and strong-armed assemblymen, but provincial assemblies successfully imposed themselves as consultative and legitimizing bodies.³⁶ After civil wars between centralizing *unitarios* and decentralizing *federales*, Buenos Aires's *federal* dictator Juan Manuel de Rosas inaugurated a new arrangement. Under his 'Argentinian Confederation' (1831–52), a mixture of bilateral treaties and coercion held the nation's provinces together, while Rosas manipulated elections and legislators to legitimize his 'extraordinary faculties'.³⁷ Rosas and other *caudillos* arguably contributed to a tradition of authoritarian personalism in countries like Argentina.³⁸ But their success depended on meeting the expectations of heterogeneous social groups, not on their embodiment of peculiarly 'Hispanic' or 'pre-modern' politics.³⁹ Even Rosas's brutal, constitution-less dictatorship relied on negotiations with Buenos Aires's merchant community, and some critics blamed his rise as a demagogue on the city's 'democratic' tradition.⁴⁰

The *federales*' victory inspired the earliest debates on *caudillismo*, beginning with Domingo Faustino Sarmiento's *Facundo: civilización y barbarie* (1845). For Sarmiento, violent *caudillos* like Rosas emerged in Argentina because 'civilized' urban society had failed to check 'barbarian' rural impulses after independence.⁴¹ Sarmiento thought little of provincial constitutions and contrasted 'barbarous, arbitrary, American' *caudillos* to 'civilized, constitutional, European' *unitarios*.⁴² *Facundo* proved influential beyond Argentina, beginning with an 1847 Uruguayan polemic amidst a civil war between Montevideo's

³⁴ David Bushnell, *Reform and reaction in the Platine provinces, 1810–1852* (Gainesville, FL, 1983), p. 36; Noemí Goldman and Sonia Tedeschi, 'Los tejidos formales del poder. Caudillos en el Interior y el Litoral Rioplatenses durante la primera mitad del siglo XIX', in Goldman and Salvatore, eds., *Caudillismos*, pp. 139–55.

³⁵ Paula Alonso and Marcela Ternavasio, 'Political cultures and practices in Spanish South American cities', in Posada-Carbó, Innes, and Philp, eds., *Re-imagining democracy*, pp. 196–7.

³⁶ Goldman and Tedeschi, 'Los tejidos', pp. 139–40.

³⁷ Goldman and Ternavasio, 'La vida política', p. 98; Marcela Ternavasio, 'Del Federalismo condenado al Federalismo en disputa (1810–1835)', in Ricardo J. de Titto, ed., *El pensamiento de los Federales* (Buenos Aires, 2009), p. 16; John Lynch, *Argentine dictator: Juan Manuel de Rosas, 1829–1852* (Oxford, 1981), pp. 50, 157; Jorge Myers, *Orden y virtud: el discurso republicano en el régimen rosista* (Buenos Aires, 1995), p. 27; José Carlos Chiamonte, 'Provincias ou estados? As origens do federalismo Platino', *Cadernos do Programa de Pós-Graduação em Direito*, 12 (2017), pp. 73–114, at p. 85; Goldman and Salvatore, 'Introducción', p. 22.

³⁸ Svampa, 'La dialéctica entre el nuevo y lo viejo', p. 79.

³⁹ Goldman and Salvatore, 'Introducción', p. 29; Myers, 'Las formas'; and Marcela Ternavasio, 'Entre la deliberación y la autorización. El régimen rosista frente al dilema de la inestabilidad política', in Goldman and Salvatore, eds., *Caudillismos*, pp. 89–93, 220–1.

⁴⁰ Jeremy Adelman, *Republic of capital: Buenos Aires and the legal transformation of the Atlantic world* (Stanford, CA, 1999), p. 140; Alonso and Ternavasio, 'Political cultures', p. 200.

⁴¹ Domingo Faustino Sarmiento, *Facundo: civilización y barbarie*, ed. Roberto Yahni (11th edn, Madrid, 2016), pp. 70–6; Camareno, 'Perspectivas historiográficas en torno al caudillismo argentino', pp. 11–12; Lynch, *Caudillos in Spanish America*, p. 412.

⁴² Sarmiento, *Facundo*, p. 186.

liberal *colorados* and Rosas-backed rural *blancos*.⁴³ Following Sarmiento, the *colorado* Manuel Herrera y Obes argued that *caudillos* were a colonial hangover who exploited uneducated *gauchos* and opposed ‘the empire of intelligence and law’.⁴⁴ To remedy this situation, Americans should ‘[import] European civilization [through] its men, its books, its industry’, as the *colorados* had done by recruiting adventurers like Giuseppe Garibaldi to their cause.⁴⁵ In response, the *blanco* Bernardo Prudencio Berro dismissed Sarmiento’s civilization–barbarism dichotomy. The real struggle was between European oligarchy, represented by Montevideo’s merchant elite, and American democracy, located in the virtuous rural masses whose ‘unanimous’ will was upheld by Rosas and his allies.⁴⁶ Berro agreed that ‘*caudillaje* [respected] no law other than [the *caudillo*’s] arbitrary caprices’, but he denied that Rosas was a *caudillo*.⁴⁷ These three authors wrote within fractious domestic contexts, but they anticipated subsequent scholarship (including anglophone debates) by theorizing *caudillaje* as a hemispheric ailment.⁴⁸

In Brazil, the *farroupilhas* were accused of *caudillismo* because they attempted to ally neighbouring republics and because of River Plate–Rio Grandense societal connections.⁴⁹ Brazilian republicans so rebuked *farroupilha* separatism, while a Rio Grandense monarchist senator lamented that ‘the likes of Bento Gonçalves...abused the people like the *caudillos* of Spanish America’.⁵⁰ In 1881, the first historian of the Farroupilha Revolution, Tristão de Alencar Araripe, described the Rio Grandense Republic as a Spanish American ‘republic of *caudillos*’.⁵¹ Besides condemning a rebellion, these assertions were part of a Brazilian nation-building discourse that contrasted ‘fragmented’ Spanish America to ‘united’ Brazil.⁵² In 1857, the prominent historian Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagen triumphantly wrote that ‘Sensible Brazilians’ were monarchists because they ‘[feared] the anarchy [of] neighbouring republican

⁴³ Peter Morgan, ‘Reading *Facundo* transnationally, at last’, *Global Intellectual History*, 7 (2022), pp. 882–908; Myers, ‘Las formas’, pp. 84–7.

⁴⁴ Manuel Herreara y Obes, ‘Estudio sobre la situación’, in Obes and Berro, *El caudillismo*, pp. 9, 34–6.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

⁴⁶ Bernardo Prudencio Berro, ‘Replica’, in Obes and Berro, *El caudillismo*, pp. 71–2; Myers, ‘Las formas’, pp. 90–1.

⁴⁷ Berro, ‘Replica’, p. 105.

⁴⁸ Iván Jaksčić, *The Hispanic world and American intellectual life, 1820–1880* (New York, NY, 2007), p. 123.

⁴⁹ For anglophone discussions of this ‘borderland’ contact, see Fabrício Prado, *Edge of empire: Atlantic networks and revolution in Bourbon Río de la Plata* (Oakland, CA, 2012); and Lauren Benton, *Law and colonial cultures: legal regimes in world history, 1400–1900* (Cambridge, 2001), pp. 210–52.

⁵⁰ *Diário Novo*, 18 Feb. 1843, p. 1; *Diário Novo*, 10 Sept. 1844, p. 2; José Martins da Cruz Jobim to Vicente Vieira Braga, 6 Aug. 1851, Rio de Janeiro, in *Anais do Arquivo Histórico do Rio Grande do Sul (AAHRGS)* (24 vols., Porto Alegre, 1977–2020), IX, p. 372.

⁵¹ Tristão de Alencar Araripe, *Guerra civil no Rio Grande do Sul* (Rio de Janeiro, 1881), p. 5.

⁵² Ori Preuss, *Transnational South America: experiences, ideas, and identities, 1860–1920* (London, 2015), paragraph 15.9; for a republican example: Teófilo Ottoni, *Circular dedicada aos Srs. eleitores de senadores pela provincia de Minas Gerais* (Rio de Janeiro, 1860), p. 20.

states'.⁵³ This explained Alencar's avoidance of the term *caudillo* to describe Bento Gonçalves. He wished to emphasize the Brazilian-ness of Rio Grandense borderlanders by downplaying their past separatism and foreign connections.⁵⁴

The *farroupilhas* were well aware of contemporary accusations of *caudillismo* and comparisons with Spanish America, and their responses trod a fine line around these issues. They agreed that 'caudillo' was an insult associated with dictators like Rosas, but they wished to rebuke caricatures of neighbouring republics. In 1839, they criticized Brazilian writers for resorting to a foreign word, *caudillo*, to describe them (even though they occasionally labelled their enemies so).⁵⁵ Bento Gonçalves also condemned the 'despot' Rosas and praised the 'enlightened' *unitarios*, but only after Rosas refused to secretly aid the *farroupilhas*.⁵⁶ In 1840, Gonçalves dismissed Brazilian critiques of 'our republican neighbours [as] an often cited and successfully refuted commonplace'. He argued that Brazilian monarchists cherry-picked Spanish American problems (and ignored their own) to tarnish republicans everywhere.⁵⁷

The term *caudillo* had thus acquired its negative connotation by 1840. This was the result of decades of polemics: from Vigodet's self-fashioning as a royalist *caudillo*, to Sarmiento's pessimistic *Facundo*. This label, however, did not nullify Artigas's republican experiment or stop Argentinian provincial state-building – examples of alternative territorial and institutional configurations explored by Latin Americans. In Brazil, accusations of *caudillismo* were inexorably tied to a nationalist monarchical discourse, although *farroupilha* refutations highlighted their duplicity towards Rosas. As the following sections explain, the *farroupilhas* were engaged in their own state-building enterprise, which culminated in their ill-fated constituent assembly.

II

On 20 September 1835, tax-weary *estancieros* led by Bento Gonçalves overthrew Rio Grande do Sul's provincial governor and demanded greater provincial autonomy. The rebels' federalist demands were not unusual for 1830s Brazil, but the ensuing civil war pushed them to declare their independence on 11 September 1836.⁵⁸ Gonçalves was elected interim president of a new 'Rio

⁵³ Francisco Adolfo de Varnhagen, *Historia geral do Brazil, antes da sua separação e independência de Portugal* (2 vols., Rio de Janeiro, 1857), II, p. 418; Manuel Luis Salgado Guimarães, 'Nação e civilização nos trópicos: o Instituto Histórico e Geográfico Brasileiro e o projeto de uma história nacional', *Estudos Históricos*, 1 (1988), pp. 5–27, at p. 23.

⁵⁴ Alencar, *O gaúcho*, p. 62; Assis Brasil, *História da República Rio-Grandense* (Rio de Janeiro, 1882).

⁵⁵ *Povo*, 23 Mar. 1839, p. 2; *Povo*, 11 Dec. 1839, p. 1.

⁵⁶ Bento Gonçalves to anon., 16 Sept. 1839, in Bento Gonçalves, *Coletânea de documentos de Bento Gonçalves da Silva, 1835–1845*, ed. Denise Zullo Castro (Porto Alegre, 1985), letter 181; José Maria Rosa, *Historia Argentina* (17 vols., Granada, 1964–93), IV, pp. 268–70.

⁵⁷ Bento Gonçalves to Gaspar Francisco Menna Barreto, 15 Mar. 1840, Setembrina, in Gonçalves, *Coletânea*, letter 224.

⁵⁸ Bento Manoel Ribeiro to Marciano Pereira Araújo, 27 Jan. 1836, in AAHRGS, XVIII, p. 18; Manuel Alves da Silva Caldeira to Alfredo Varela, 1 Dec. 1898, AAHRGS, V, pp. 378–9.

Grandense Republic' and was extolled 'to arrange a date for the election of deputies for the Constituent Assembly'.⁵⁹ Right from their separatist turn, the *farroupilhas* envisioned a constituent assembly to shape their tentative republic. Why, then, did this assembly only convene in December 1842?

War was a key factor, bitterly dividing the province. While ideological fissures should not be overstated (federalism, for instance, had adherents across the province), republicanism more readily appealed to *estancieiros* with River Plate connections like Gonçalves.⁶⁰ The *farroupilhas* thus became concentrated in the rural hinterland, whose sparsely populated municipalities were dominated by *estancieiros*. But the more populous coastal towns, closely linked to Rio de Janeiro and whose powerful beef jerky manufacturers (*charqueadores*) enjoyed fiscal protections, remained monarchist.⁶¹

Military setbacks, moreover, kept the *farroupilha* leadership on the run and reliant on draconian expropriations and drafts to pursue the war effort.⁶² In 1837, they attempted to introduce 'military chiefs of police' to republican municipalities, armed with impressment powers outside the jurisdiction of elected local authorities. Municipal protests prevented this measure, but violent repression met anti-draft demonstrations.⁶³ This highlighted the absence of a forum to debate 'national' questions, as Gonçalves created but never met a Council of Municipal Attorneys in 1838.⁶⁴ His actions were justified by *O Povo*, the republican government's newspaper, whose Italian editor Luigi Rossetti defended Gonçalves's undisputed 'Power [to direct] the revolution'.⁶⁵ But the patience of many *farroupilhas* was wearing thin, as evidenced by municipal complaints and Rossetti's dismissal in 1839.⁶⁶

That same year, two of Gonçalves's ministers, José Marianno de Mattos and Domingos José de Almeida, took upon themselves to schedule elections for a constituent assembly for March 1840. They did so while Gonçalves was on

⁵⁹ Domingos Pereira et al., 'Sessão extraordinária [Copy]', 1838, Piratini, in *AAHRGS*, VI, p. 23; Vicente Lucas de Oliveira et al., 'Sessão extraordinária [Copy]', 1838, Piratini, in *AAHRGS*, VI, pp. 25–6.

⁶⁰ Maria Medianeira Padoin, 'República, federalismo e fronteira', *História Unisinos*, 14 (2010), pp. 49–54.

⁶¹ Adriano Commissoli, 'Povoamento e governança pública: elites locais e Câmaras municipais no sul da América portuguesa (1693c.–1810c.)', in José Martinho Rodrigues Remedi, ed., *Na fronteira do Império: política e sociedade na Rio Pardo oitocentista* (Santa Cruz do Sul, 2018), p. 48; Alessandro de Almeida Pereira, 'O poder local e a institucionalização da República Rio-Grandense (1836–1845)' (Masters dissertation, UFSM, 2015), pp. 40–6.

⁶² Moacyr Flores, *A Revolução Farroupilha* (Porto Alegre, 1990), p. 59.

⁶³ Alessandro de Almeida Pereira and Michele de Oliveira Casali, 'As instituições locais no processo de construção dos Estados Nacionais modernos: a República Riograndense na vila de Alegrete (1837–1843), no sul do Brasil', *Estudios Históricos*, 6 (2014), pp. 1–18, at pp. 13–14; Bento Gonçalves, Piratini, 18 Oct. 1838, in Gonçalves, *Coletânea*, letter 98.

⁶⁴ Pereira and Casali, 'As instituições', p. 12.

⁶⁵ *Povo*, 1 Sept. 1838.

⁶⁶ Laura de Leão Dornelles, 'Risorgimento e Revolução: Luigi Rossetti e os ideais de Giuseppe Mazzini no movimento farroupilha' (Masters dissertation, PUCRS, 2010), p. 122; Lindolfo Collor, *Garibaldi e a Guerra dos Farrapos* (Rio de Janeiro, 1977), pp. 20–2; Gianni Carta, *Garibaldi na América do Sul: o mito do gaúcho*, trans. Flávio Aguiar and Magda Lopes (São Paulo, 2013), pp. 96–7.

campaign, during the municipal attorneys' only ever meeting, in December 1839.⁶⁷ They agreed the assembly's deputies would be indirectly elected after Brazilian electoral law and that their powers would be 'constituent and Legislative', ending Gonçalves's rule by decree.⁶⁸

Electoral returns, however, showed that the 1840 proceedings broke with tradition by allowing thousands (rather than hundreds) to participate in direct elections. This followed a major discrepancy between electoral instructions issued by *O Povo* in December 1839 and February 1840. Whereas in December it announced that elections would be indirect, the February instructions stated that deputies would be elected 'directly by the People in primary Assemblies', like municipal councilmen and justices of the peace.⁶⁹ Over 3,600 ballots were cast, against the less than 200 of the 1834 provincial elections (which included the more populous coastline).⁷⁰

This novelty has surprisingly attracted little scholarly attention. The only attempt to explain it unsatisfactorily suggested that this was an anticipation of the 1843 constitutional draft, and that direct elections had always been one of the *farroupilhas*' goals because they '[intended to] bring Rio Grandense citizens closer to central political decisions'.⁷¹ This argument disregarded the fact that the 1843 draft was divisive to the point it was never promulgated, and it ignored the strictly hierarchized society envisioned by leading *farroupilhas*. Almeida made this belief clear in his plans for public education: 'universal, but not uniform [because] the Labourer [must be] educated to be a Citizen Labourer, and not to be a Magistrate or a General'.⁷² Mattos arguably was more radical, but also less influential.⁷³ His egalitarianism was described as 'bizarro' and his proposal to fully enfranchise formerly enslaved soldiers was quickly rejected.⁷⁴ We can more reasonably compare the 1840 elections to River Plate practices. Some Argentinian provinces had enfranchised rural smallholders through direct elections, and even Rosas found them an expedient way to galvanize his rule.⁷⁵ As explained below, the *farroupilhas* clearly saw

⁶⁷ Simone Maria Zago, 'A República Rio-Grandense e a formação do estado nacional: uma análise teórica', *Revista Sociais e Humanas*, 18 (2005), pp. 109–20, at p. 115; José Marianno de Mattos and Domingos José de Almeida, 10 Feb. 1840, Caçapava, in *AAHRGS*, XV, pp. 250–1.

⁶⁸ *Povo*, 25 Dec. 1839.

⁶⁹ *Povo*, 25 Dec. 1839, p. 2; *Povo*, 12 Feb. 1840, p. 1.

⁷⁰ Sérgio da Costa Franco, 'Os farroupilhas na assembléa', in Martins et al., *Bento Gonçalves*, pp. 343–4; *Americano*, 5 Oct. 1842, p. 3; *Povo*, 11 Apr. 1840, p. 1.

⁷¹ Jardim, 'O anteprojecto', p. 42.

⁷² *Povo*, 16 May 1840, p. 3.

⁷³ Letícia Rosa Marques, 'José Marianno de Mattos: conquistas e desafios de um mulato carioca na Revolução Farroupilha (1835–1845)' (Masters dissertation, PUCRS, 2013), p. 74.

⁷⁴ Francisco de Sá Brito, *Memória da Guerra dos Farrapos*, ed. Paulino Jacques (Rio de Janeiro, 1950), p. 153; Hendrik Kraay, 'Arming slaves in Brazil from the seventeenth century to the nineteenth century', in Christopher Leslie Brown and Philip D. Morgan, eds., *Arming slaves: from classical times to the modern age* (London, 2006), p. 162; Antônio Vicente da Fontoura, *Diário: de 1º de janeiro de 1844 a 22 de março de 1845* (Porto Alegre, 1984), p. 42.

⁷⁵ Goldman and Tedeschi, 'Los tejidos', pp. 139–40; José Antonio Aguilar Rivera, Eduardo Posada-Carbó, and Eduardo Zimmermann, 'Democracy in Spanish America: the early adoption of universal male suffrage, 1810–1853', *Past & Present*, 256 (2022), pp. 165–202, at p. 181.

direct elections as tools of political legitimation and reflected on Argentinian provincial constitutions.

Fraud was also an unlikely cause of this electoral oddity, since *farroupilhas* discussed and even criticized aspects of the election, but not the number of ballots and voters. The February 1840 electoral instructions did not explain how one could stand to be a candidate in the first place – similarly to existing Brazilian electoral laws. Well-connected republicans nevertheless circulated slates of preferred candidates, as in prior elections.⁷⁶ Almeida wrote one such slate in February 1840. It sadly has not survived, but his justification for writing it does: ‘so our co-citizens will have something to go by’, adding that ‘no one [should be able to] say that the Government restricted the freedom to vote’.⁷⁷ Making no mention of an unusually high franchise, Almeida was more concerned with the embattled republican government’s image. The *farroupilha* diplomat Antônio Manuel Correia da Câmara expressed similar concerns. Many citizens, he noted, feared police chiefs’ oversight over electoral proceedings in the eventual absence of an elected justice of the peace (traditional election overseers), which could facilitate the intimidation of voters. Câmara pleaded with ministers to adopt a ‘more constitutional and less military’ policy, reserving electoral oversight to ‘popular magistrates’.⁷⁸

Across Brazil, to be sure, armed threats and intimidation were common occurrences during elections. But contrary to Câmara’s assessment, elected authorities were just as likely to condone or partake in fraud and coercion as police officers.⁷⁹ Studies of Brazilian municipal politics have pointed to the 1840s as the moment from which electoral violence and corruption truly became ‘endemic’ thanks to better organized political parties, and Rio Grande do Sul’s ongoing civil war made its situation all the more delicate.⁸⁰ The *farroupilhas*, moreover, were struggling to build and legitimize a state, having so far failed to gain the recognition of neighbouring republics.⁸¹ Câmara and Almeida might therefore have been more concerned with the smooth running of proceedings than with the actual integrity of elections – what Richard Graham dubbed ‘the appearance of fairness’.⁸² Similar considerations may have also swayed Gonçalves against blocking his ministers’ initiative to convene elections, as he and associates like Rossetti were already under heavy criticism.

⁷⁶ For instance, *Noticiador*, 23 Oct. 1834, p. 4.

⁷⁷ Domingos José de Almeida to Bento Manoel Ribeiro, 22 Feb. 1840, Caçapava, in *AAHRGS*, III, p. 363.

⁷⁸ Antônio Manuel Correia da Câmara to anon., 22 Feb. 1840, São Pedro, in *AAHRGS*, VI, p. 103.

⁷⁹ Thomas Flory, *Judge and jury in imperial Brazil, 1808–1871: social control and political stability in the new state* (Austin, TX; orig. edn 1981), pp. 102–3; Judy Bieber, *Power, patronage and political violence: state building on a Brazilian frontier, 1822–1889* (London, 1999), pp. 88, 98.

⁸⁰ Bieber, *Power*, p. 88.

⁸¹ They collaborated with authorities in Uruguay and Corrientes in 1838–42, but these arrangements hardly constituted acts of diplomatic recognition. Moacyr Flores, ‘O tratado de canguê’, *Estudos Ibero-Americanos*, 4 (1978), pp. 145–50; Isidoro J. Ruiz Moreno, *Alianza contra Rosas. Paz, Ferré, Rivera, López* (2nd edn, Buenos Aires, 2004), p. 94.

⁸² Richard Graham, *Patronage and politics in nineteenth-century Brazil* (Stanford, CA, 1994), p. 141.

The elections saw leading *farroupilhas* chosen for the constituent assembly. *O Americano* (*O Povo's* successor) published a list of deputies-elect and their occupations, attesting the election of ministers like Mattos and Almeida alongside a plurality of military officers.⁸³ These results were announced in October 1840, yet the assembly was only convened on 1 December 1842. This delay was probably due to the *farroupilha* capital moving from Caçapava to Alegrete in May 1840, as they were driven further inland by monarchist forces.⁸⁴ Opening the assembly, President Gonçalves reiterated Rio Grandenses's right to self-determination and downplayed chances of reconciliation with the Brazilian 'monarchy' though not with the Brazilian 'nation'. 'Royalty', he imagined, would one day be 'banished' from Brazil, and so Rio Grande do Sul would again 'unite [itself] by strong ties of federation to the magnanimous Brazilian Nation'. Until then, 'the first necessity of the State is a political Constitution [to guarantee] internal political stability'.⁸⁵ While the *farroupilhas* had not all been avowed republicans since 1835, the possibility of a federal reconciliation with Brazil had always been contemplated as a solution to the conflict. Gonçalves and other *estancieiros* imagined this would protect their interests from metropolitan fiscal impositions.⁸⁶

The assembled deputies, however, seemed more preoccupied with routine government tasks than with constitutional debate. General João Antônio da Silveira, for instance, complained that he was given the 'frivolous' task of creating an 'Army Archive' to record pensions and promotions. He was also concerned that the assembly was moving to form an unaccountable Council of State (similar to Brazil's) to oversee Executive matters, which could discredit the assembly in the eyes of 'the sensible mass of the Rio Grandense People'.⁸⁷ Despite these issues, what most preoccupied Silveira was the emergence of a 'minority' party within the assembly, which held 'fierce opinions' and was just large enough to paralyse legislative proceedings. While he did not specify what these 'fierce opinions' were, he denounced their preferred *modus operandi*: to abstain from sessions while blocking the admittance of elected substitutes, preventing the chamber from reaching quorum. Silveira advised Gonçalves to dismiss naysayers from the assembly '[to deny] the minority the right to complain of the majority'.⁸⁸ While Gonçalves refused to do so, he shared the general's dissatisfaction that the assembly had failed to promulgate a constitution after two months. He believed that this was done out of spite for himself, and he lamented that personal ambitions '[made] us look incapable of independence'.⁸⁹ But Gonçalves's and Silveira's

⁸³ *Americano*, 5 Oct. 1842, p. 3.

⁸⁴ Jardim, 'O anteprojeto', p. 37.

⁸⁵ *Americano*, 10 Dec. 1842, p. 2.

⁸⁶ Bento Gonçalves to Gaspar Francisco Menna Barreto, 15 Mar. 1840, Setembrina, in Gonçalves, *Coletânea*, letter 224.

⁸⁷ João Antônio da Silveira to Luiz Joze Ribeiro Barreto, 18 Jan. 1843, Cacequi, in AAHRGS, XXIII, p. 100. João Antônio da Silveira to Bento Gonçalves, 16 Feb. 1843, Cacequi, in AAHRGS, XXIII, pp. 101–3.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 104.

⁸⁹ Bento Gonçalves to João Antônio da Silveira, 4 Mar. 1843, Alegrete, in Gonçalves, *Coletânea*, letter 335.

disagreements were equally revealing of *farroupilha* internal divisions. The Council of State berated by Silveira as an imitation of the Brazilian monarchy, for instance, was in fact suggested by Gonçalves's supporters, as explained below. Gonçalves, conversely, had long avoided as much as summoning elections for the assembly, angering many republicans.

Gonçalves's exchange with Silveira reflected, too, that global preoccupation with constitutions identified by Colley and other historians: between the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, state-building and regime-change required constitution-writing. Rosas's constitution-less Confederation was an anomaly. Far more common was Brazil, where a constitution had been a popular argument for independence in 1822: the authoritarian 'Charter' promulgated by Dom Pedro I in 1824 indeed endured until 1889, even though it followed his violent dissolution of a liberal-leaning constituent assembly.⁹⁰ His constitution protected royal prerogatives (exercised through the Council of State), but by enshrining individual freedoms and parliamentary representation it tied his regime to what Andréa Slemian called a 'new constitutional legitimacy'. This meant the contemporary transformation of 'constitution' from a description of 'dominium' into an 'objective-concept': an expression of expectations and rules for government and society.⁹¹ Isidoro Vanegas added that Latin American revolutionaries especially clung to written constitutions as challenges to the colonial order. That is, a written constitution proved a society's capacity to exercise 'free will' and explained how the absence of colonial law would be addressed.⁹²

The Rio Grandense Republic's leaders were similarly concerned with differentiating themselves from the Brazilian Empire, but they lacked the legitimacy to be recognized abroad and had failed to protect individual rights through their wartime policies. The direct elections of 1840 perhaps were a first step towards assuaging fears of despotism. But as Silveira's complaints demonstrated, a constitution was required to convince their citizenry and neighbouring republics that their state would last.

III

Bento Gonçalves's son, Joaquim Gonçalves da Silva, served as a substitute in the *farroupilha* constituent assembly. He reminisced that the assembly 'was dissolved just as it discussed the Constitution project' because of an approaching monarchist army, and he claimed that 'the behaviour of the oppositionist minority' was far less disruptive than Silveira had argued.⁹³ He also defended his father from accusations of despotism, an allegation that gained traction after December 1842, when the constituent assembly discussed suspending

⁹⁰ Andréa Slemian, '¿Un imperio entre repúblicas? Independencia y construcción de una legitimidad para la monarquía constitucional en el Brasil (1822–1834)', *Espacio, Tiempo y Forma*, 5 (2010), pp. 43–66, at pp. 44–6.

⁹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 48–50.

⁹² Vanegas, *El constitucionalismo*, p. 41.

⁹³ Joaquim Gonçalves da Silva to Alfredo Varela, 1895, in *AAHRGS*, XXI, pp. 41–2.

individual guarantees to help the government requisition military supplies and arrest 'dissidents'.⁹⁴ He claimed ignorance of who defended the suspension, although *O Americano* identified the lawyer Serafim dos Anjos França as its author, supported by Almeida and Mattos (then reconciled with Gonçalves), among others.⁹⁵ This was the cornerstone of the Council of State described by Silveira, which was meant to step in once Gonçalves's rule by decree officially ended.⁹⁶ The suspension was approved by the assembly on 8 February 1843, although how many deputies voted for or against it was not reported.⁹⁷

Another episode that solidified Gonçalves's image as a tyrant was the murder of Vice-President Antônio Paulo da Fontoura, whose recurring absences from the constituent assembly suggested that he was a member of the abstaining opposition.⁹⁸ Due to a lack of sources, Fontoura's murder has not been further examined by scholars, but rumours implicated him in a plot to overthrow Gonçalves.⁹⁹ Fatefully, Gonçalves himself believed and was vocal about those rumours, which, for many, implicated him in the vice-president's death.¹⁰⁰

Against this divided backdrop, the assembly nevertheless named a commission to draft a constitution – although their draft proved a non-starter. Among its authors were the main advocates for the suspension of individual guarantees: in signature order, José Pinheiro de Ulhôa Cintra, Francisco de Sá Brito, José Marianno de Mattos, Serafim dos Anjos França, and Domingos José de Almeida. Sá Brito and França were the only ones who had never been government ministers under Gonçalves. Their draft mixed Brazilian and River Plate constitutions, both in terms of its prescribed institutions and language. It particularly paraphrased the constitution of Corrientes, an Argentinian province with which the *farrroupilhas* had attempted an alliance.¹⁰¹ Its preamble, for instance, closely followed Corrientes's 1838 constitution by promising '[To protect] with all efficacy life, honour, liberty, individual security, property and equality, [the] essential bases of the rights of man...[and to] secure justice, promote public happiness and safeguard the enjoyment of all these goods for us and our posterity.'¹⁰²

The draft defined Rio Grande do Sul as a 'free and independent nation [with a] republican, constitutional, and representative [government]'.¹⁰³ And

⁹⁴ *Americano*, 10 Dec. 1842, p. 3; *Americano*, 14 Jan. 1843, p. 3.

⁹⁵ *Americano*, 14 Jan. 1843, p. 3.

⁹⁶ Joaquim Gonçalves da Silva to Alfredo Varela, 1895, in AAHRGS, XXI, p. 41; Moacyr Flores, *República Rio-Grandense: realidade e utopia* (Porto Alegre, 2002), p. 425.

⁹⁷ *Americano*, 9 Feb. 1843, p. 4; *Americano*, 11 Feb. 1843, p. 3.

⁹⁸ *Americano*, 9 Feb. 1843, p. 3.

⁹⁹ Cláudio Moreira Bento, *O exército farrapo e os seus chefes* (2 vols., Porto Alegre, 1992), I, p. 71; Araripe, *Guerra civil*, p. 161; Joaquim Gonçalves da Silva to Alfredo Varela, undated, in AAHRGS, XXI, p. 60.

¹⁰⁰ Bento Gonçalves to João Antônio da Silveira, 22 Oct. 1841, Bagé, in Gonçalves, *Coletânea*, letter 284.

¹⁰¹ César Augusto Barcellos Guazzelli, *O horizonte da província: a República Rio-Grandense e os caudilhos do Rio da Prata* (Porto Alegre, 2013), pp. 175–80.

¹⁰² José Pinheiro de Ulhôa Cintra et al., 'Projeto de Constituição da Republica Rio-Grandense' (Alegrete, 1843), in Sá Brito, *Memória*, preamble; *Constitución de la Provincia* (Corrientes, 1838), sect. I, ch. I.

¹⁰³ Cintra et al., 'Projeto de Constituição', arts. 1–2, 4.

it further departed from the Brazilian monarchical constitution by embracing ‘popular sovereignty’ instead of ‘national sovereignty’.¹⁰⁴ Rather than a rejection of the idea of ‘nation’, this word choice could again refer to the Correntino document, which mapped sovereignty onto ‘the universality of Correntino Citizens’.¹⁰⁵

O Americano clarified the *farroupilha* understanding of popular sovereignty. It lambasted followers of Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s interpretation of popular sovereignty because, although they had used his ideas to ‘victoriously oppose the pretend legitimacy of kings, proving that sovereignty resided in the peoples, [and] that all legislative power emanated from the general will’, they had committed a ‘grave error’ when they ‘put [the exercise of] sovereignty in the hands of the peoples’. *O Americano* preferred Benjamin Constant’s and Montesquieu’s emphasis on the rule of law and individual liberties, embodied in a representative government wherein ‘the power of a small number was sanctioned by the consent of all, [this] is the general will’.¹⁰⁶ This argumentation resembled Rousseau’s reception across the River Plate. In post-1810 Buenos Aires, as explained by Gabriel Entin, there were attempts to employ Rousseau to simultaneously ‘legitimize revolution’ (challenging royal authority) and to establish ‘social order’ (through a new social contract). These ‘contradictory’ objectives were meant to be reconciled through a constitution that acknowledged ‘the sovereign people’ as its ‘constituent power’.¹⁰⁷ Artigas had likewise stated that Uruguayans could only protect their ‘primitive freedoms’ by exercising their ‘inalienable sovereignty’ to adopt a new ‘social constitution’.¹⁰⁸ In Brazil, debates on national sovereignty had evolved differently, highlighting the crown’s unifying power over a large and diverse empire.¹⁰⁹

Defining the three branches of government, the *farroupilha* draft gave most power to the Legislative, composed of a bicameral General Assembly (with an upper Senate and a lower Chamber of Deputies). The General Assembly’s authority encompassed military affairs, commerce, and foreign relations, including ‘treaties [of] federation’.¹¹⁰ Its bicameral structure contrasted with Corrientes’s unicameral system, but while it superficially resembled Brazil’s, it was most likely influenced by Uruguay’s Legislative.¹¹¹ Deputies were to be directly elected every four years but, as in Uruguay, wealthy ‘electors’ voted for senators every twelve years. Senators were then divided into three ‘classes’: one serving for twelve years, another for eight years, and the third for four years. Until the twelve-year limit was reached, vacant seats were filled

¹⁰⁴ *Ibid.*, art. 9.

¹⁰⁵ *Constitución de la Provincia*, sect. IV, ch. 1.

¹⁰⁶ *Americano*, 28 Sept. 1842, pp. 1–2.

¹⁰⁷ Gabriel Entin, ‘Rousseau, Mariano Moreno y la institución del pueblo en la revolución del Río de la Plata’, in Gabriel Entin, ed., *Rousseau en Iberoamérica* (Buenos Aires, 2018), pp. 193–6.

¹⁰⁸ José Artigas et al. to Cabildo of Buenos Aires, 27 Aug. 1812, Barra del Ayuí, in AA, IX, p. 48.

¹⁰⁹ Luisa Pereira Rauter, ‘Brasil’, in Goldman, ed., *Soberanía*, pp. 64–7.

¹¹⁰ Cintra et al., ‘Projeto de Constituição’, arts. 11–14.

¹¹¹ *Constitución de la República* (Montevideo, 1830), arts. 27–30, 54; *Constitución de la Provincia*, sect. V, ch. III.

by the president, picking candidates from a list drafted by the deputies.¹¹² As in both Brazil and neighbouring republics, the draft stipulated high property requirements for deputies and electors, and higher still for senators and presidents, benefitting *estancieros* and the few *charqueadores* who turned republican (like Almeida).¹¹³ The draft also barred the illiterate from voting, a restriction then only present in Uruguay, where the 1830 constitution stipulated literacy as a requirement for those [entering] the exercise of citizenship from the year 1840.¹¹⁴ This system aimed at making the Senate not only an elite-controlled institution, but also a 'permanent' one, which could fulfil Legislative functions year-round (unlike the deputies).¹¹⁵ The Rio Grandense Senate, like its Uruguayan counterpart, would thus constantly check the Executive, summoning the deputies if the president failed to regularly do so, and would assume the attributions of both deputies and the Supreme Court when required.¹¹⁶ This arrangement resembled Corrientes's 'permanent commission' of legislators, which oversaw the everyday governance of the province during parliamentary recesses.¹¹⁷

The Executive was thoroughly dependent on the Legislative. The draft indeed suggested a Council of State, but this was a consultative body whose members were indirectly elected by voters.¹¹⁸ The president, following the Uruguayan precedent, was elected by the General Assembly every four years, and while he could nominate ministers, they were held individually responsible before the assembly.¹¹⁹ He did not hold veto powers and was only able 'to make observations on legislative drafts'.¹²⁰ The president also presented nominees for the Supreme Court and other tribunals to be approved by the Senate (a power his Uruguayan counterpart lacked).¹²¹ Most of the Judiciary thus depended on the other two branches, but popularly elected justices of the peace were maintained in accordance with Brazil's outgoing liberal model (Brazil moved in 1842 to disempower elected justices and to centralize law enforcement).¹²² On municipal administration, however, the draft dithered on its liberal commitments. It established municipal 'directors' and 'intendants' to preside over municipal assemblies as 'immediate [agents] of the Executive Power', somewhat resembling the controversial military chiefs of police of 1837.¹²³ Uruguay again possessed analogous offices: *jefes políticos*

¹¹² Cintra et al., 'Projeto de Constituição', arts. 17, 29–33, 89.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, arts. 39, 94; *Constituição Política do Imperio do Brazil*, arts. 45, 92–4.

¹¹⁴ Cintra et al., 'Projeto de Constituição', art. 91; *Constitución de la República*, art. 11; Hilda Sabato, *The many and the few: political participation in republican Buenos Aires* (Stanford, CA, 2001), pp. 110–11; José Murilo de Carvalho, 'O papel e a complexidade do liberalismo no Brasil', *Estudos Avançados*, 26 (2012), pp. 391–4.

¹¹⁵ Cintra et al., 'Projeto de Constituição', art. 27.

¹¹⁶ *Ibid.*, arts. 39–40, 111.

¹¹⁷ *Constitución de la Provincia*, sect. V, ch. III.

¹¹⁸ Cintra et al., 'Projeto de Constituição', arts. 122, 125.

¹¹⁹ *Ibid.*, arts. 99, 115; *Constitución de la República*, art. 73.

¹²⁰ Cintra et al., 'Projeto de Constituição', art. 110.

¹²¹ *Ibid.*, art. 151; *Constitución de la República*, art. 95.

¹²² Cintra et al., 'Projeto de Constituição', arts. 164–6; Flores, *República*, p. 416.

¹²³ Cintra et al., 'Projeto de Constituição', arts. 182–5.

(‘political bosses’), centrally appointed police chiefs who enforced electoral regulations.¹²⁴

Joaquim Gonçalves’s claim that the constituent assembly never officially debated the constitutional project appears to have been true. On 11 February 1843, *O Americano* announced its publication would be put on hold so the government press might be used for printing the ‘Constitution Project’, but once it resumed publication on 1 March (its last ever issue) there was no reference to the constitution.¹²⁵ There is no evidence that the draft circulated publicly or privately, although at least one copy was printed in Alegrete in 1843 and survives at the Brazilian National Library.¹²⁶ The draft’s circulation notwithstanding, there was visible confusion among *farroupilhas* on what happened during the assembly’s final days. On 7 March, a friend of Almeida enquired of him what had become of the assembly and if the constitution had been ‘completed’.¹²⁷ At the same time, Gonçalves wrote to Silveira complaining that he could not find enough deputies to keep the assembly open.¹²⁸ Moacyr Flores conjectured that many deputies simply left Alegrete in opposition to Gonçalves’s continuing rule. The president had become associated with dictatorial measures such as the suspension of individual guarantees, and the constitution drafted by his allies offered no assurance that Gonçalves would not find his way back to the presidency after its promulgation.¹²⁹

Few historians have commented on the constituent assembly or the 1843 constitutional draft. Writing from a monarchist perspective, Araripe considered the *farroupilha* constitutional experiment a performance, since mounting military defeats meant its drafters ‘held the conviction that [the constitution] would never become a reality’.¹³⁰ As a statement of intent, Araripe saw in the *farroupilha* draft an attempt to ‘[combine] the dispositions of [the Brazilian] constitutional code with the republican constitutions of America’, the result being ‘a kind of Roman Senate’ fated to ‘degrade’ into despotism or oligarchy.¹³¹ More recently, Setti Reckziegel and Cittolin Abal attempted a comparative study of the Rio Grandense and Uruguayan constitutions. They argued that both texts upheld ‘*caudillo* liberalism’, by which they meant an ‘elitist’ understanding of individual rights and representative government characteristic of the ‘Uruguayan-Rio Grandense frontier’.¹³² While they contrasted this

¹²⁴ Reckziegel and Abal, ‘Experiências constitucionais’, p. 19; *Constitución de la República*, arts. 118–21; Pablo Rodríguez Almada, ‘Los pactos de coparticipación en el gobierno ocurridos en la segunda mitad del siglo XIX y principio del siglo XX en Uruguay: mutaciones constitucionales orgales y proceso constituyente’, *Revista de Derecho*, 22 (2020), pp. 1–18, at p. 4.

¹²⁵ *Americano*, 11 Feb. 1843, p. 4; *Americano*, 1 Mar. 1843.

¹²⁶ *Projecto de Constituição da Republica Rio-Grandense*, 1843, Alegrete, BN/PR-SOR/02205.

¹²⁷ Manoel José Santa Isabel to Domingos José de Almeida, 7 Mar. 1843, Piratini, in *AAHRGS*, XX, p. 61.

¹²⁸ Bento Gonçalves to João Antônio da Silveira, Alegrete, 4 Mar. 1843, in Gonçalves, *Coletânea*, letter 335.

¹²⁹ Flores, *República*, p. 425.

¹³⁰ Araripe, *Guerra civil*, p. 155.

¹³¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 156, 160.

¹³² Reckziegel and Abal, ‘Experiências constitucionais’, p. 20.

liberal tradition to Brazil's 'caboclo [Euro-Amerindian] liberalism' (distinct for the emperor's powers), it was unclear what made *caudillo* liberalism uniquely 'caudillo', especially as they conflated other constitutional experiences into a broad 'European and North American' tradition.¹³³ Tanger Jardim conversely noted the similarities between the Rio Grandense and Brazilian constitutions: the 1843 text was a 'possible' constitution because it was based on legal practices already observed by Rio Grandenses.¹³⁴ But he inexplicably believed that the *farroupilha* draft was an abolitionist text.¹³⁵ As Reckziegel and Abal correctly noted, the document was completely silent on slavery, diverging from its Uruguayan counterpart that stated 'in the territory of the State, no one shall be born a slave'.¹³⁶ Most *farroupilhas* indeed supported slavery; Almeida even protested Uruguay's 1842 abolition of slavery because his captives held there were freed.¹³⁷ The draft was similarly silent on indigenous rights, although this was unsurprising: in neighbouring Corrientes, liberal constitutionalism had justified communal expropriations, but most Rio Grandense indigenous communities had been violently destroyed in 1754–9.¹³⁸

A more perceptive interpretation of the draft emphasizing its Brazilian links was Gabriel Paquette's. He described the *farroupilhas*' suggested system as a 'meretricious democracy', a representative government based on popular sovereignty but upholding existing hierarchies through a restricted suffrage.¹³⁹ A similar conclusion may be reached following Bernard Manin's argument that contemporary 'representative governments' operated through a 'principle of distinction': the belief that elected officials should possess superior 'wealth, talent, and virtue' to voters.¹⁴⁰ Consequently, by focusing on property requirements for office-holding rather than for voting, the *farroupilhas*' 1840 direct elections emerge as a less pressing enigma. Their priority was to create a representative government that, headed by a senatorial elite, followed models observed from American republics to European parliamentary monarchies. In one of its few mentions of North American constitutionalism, *O Americano* indeed paid little attention to elections but thoroughly described how Massachusetts's constitution reserved public office for wealthy proprietors.¹⁴¹ Quoting Benjamin Constant, *O Americano* also praised direct elections for their capacity to keep 'voters of the inferior classes...docile and industrious... Satisfied with having exercised their rights'.¹⁴² The *farroupilhas* believed that direct elections, alongside constitutional guarantees, legitimized political authority, but government should be kept to the 'superior' classes.

¹³³ *Ibid.*, pp. 19–20.

¹³⁴ Jardim, 'O anteprojeto', pp. 43–4.

¹³⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 43; Cintra et al., 'Projeto de Constituição', art. 6.

¹³⁶ Reckziegel and Abal, 'Experiências constitucionais', p. 15.

¹³⁷ Guazzelli, *O horizonte*, p. 97.

¹³⁸ Bushnell, *Reform*, pp. 37–8; Tau Golin, *A guerra guaranítica: o levante indígena que desafiou Portugal e Espanha* (São Paulo, 2014), p. 87.

¹³⁹ Paquette, 'Demotic', p. 154.

¹⁴⁰ Bernard Manin, *The principles of representative government* (Cambridge, 1997), p. 94.

¹⁴¹ *Americano*, 23 Nov. 1842, p. 1.

¹⁴² *Americano*, 19 Nov. 1842, p. 2.

It should nevertheless be noted that the *farroupilha* defence of ‘representative democracy’ was articulated not by the constitutional drafters but by their opponents in the constituent assembly. On 18 February 1843, as the constituent assembly stopped holding meetings, six deputies headed by Antônio Vicente da Fontoura (brother to the murdered vice-president) and Onofre Pires penned a ‘Manifesto of the Minority Deputies’.¹⁴³ They argued that President Gonçalves and his supporters had lost touch with the ‘general will’ by suspending individual guarantees and conspiring to create a Council of State, which could be used to reward Gonçalves’s underlings and to indefinitely prolong his ‘absolute power’.¹⁴⁴ Only a constitution that upheld ‘the system of representative Democracy’ could prevent Gonçalves from perpetuating his presidency, but the opposition deputies feared that their only option was to flee Alegrete.¹⁴⁵ Should they stay, they believed that they would either be killed or compelled to join the assembly so that it would reach quorum. If the latter happened, ‘without liberty to discuss, without the liberty of the press’, they would be powerless to prevent Gonçalves from promulgating a constitution ‘of his own moulding’.¹⁴⁶ It was unclear if these deputies had read the 1843 draft. They also did not detail what they meant by ‘representative Democracy’, only stating that it was characterized by a limited Executive, individual liberties, and was followed by the United States.¹⁴⁷ Their opposition nevertheless was successful because a lack of quorum meant that the 1843 draft was never promulgated and the assembly indefinitely paused its works. Military pressures also meant that by early March the assembly was effectively disbanded, a blow which utterly disorganized and dispersed the republic’s government.¹⁴⁸

Following the constituent assembly fiasco and further military defeats, Bento Gonçalves resigned the presidency in August 1843.¹⁴⁹ He was succeeded by José Gomes de Vasconcelos Jardim, who was elected behind closed doors by the remaining *farroupilha* commanders and who soon sued for peace with Brazil.¹⁵⁰ The resulting Treaty of Ponche Verde dissolved the Rio Grandense Republic in February 1845, although rebel *estancieiros* benefitted from concessions like military commissions.¹⁵¹ The treaty also outlined the incorporation

¹⁴³ Antônio Vicente da Fontoura et al., ‘Manifesto’, 18 Feb. 1843, Alegrete, in *AAHRGS*, IV, pp. 190, 207.

¹⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, pp. 192–3, 197–200.

¹⁴⁵ *Ibid.*, pp. 194.

¹⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 206–7.

¹⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 194.

¹⁴⁸ Flores, *República*, pp. 439, 452.

¹⁴⁹ Bento Gonçalves to José Gomes de Vasconcelos Jardim, 4 Aug. 1843, Estância do Contrato, in Gonçalves, *Coletânea*, letter 345; Anonymous, *Reflexões sobre o generalato do Conde de Caxias* (Rio de Janeiro, 1938), pp. 42–4; Caxias to Manuel Antônio Galvão, 5 Aug. 1844, São Gabriel, in Luís Alves de Lima e Silva, *Ofícios do barão de Caxias, 1842–1845*, ed. Canrobert P. da Costa (Rio de Janeiro, 1950), p. 131.

¹⁵⁰ Joaquim Gonçalves da Silva to Alfredo Varela, 1895, in *AAHRGS*, XXI, p. 42; Flores, *República*, p. 435.

¹⁵¹ ‘Treaty of Ponche Verde’, 25 Feb. 1845, quoted in Augusto Tasso Fragoso, *A Revolução Farroupilha (1835–1845): narrativa sintética das operações militares* (Rio de Janeiro, 1939), p. 270.

of *farroupilha* soldiers into the Brazilian army, including enslaved soldiers who were promised manumissions in exchange of military service. But predicting this outcome and unwilling to free enslaved soldiers, republican and monarchist commanders engineered the Porongos Massacre of November 1844, when 400 black *farroupilhas* (mainly enslaved or freedmen) were ambushed just as peace talks were about to start.¹⁵²

IV

The hopes the *farroupilhas* placed on their much-anticipated assembly and constitution raised fundamental questions about the history of constitutionalism and *caudillismo* in post-colonial Latin America. While first animated by landowners' fiscal interests, the Rio Grandense rebels quickly adopted a republican discourse and representative institutions. As they did so, they were accused of *caudillismo* for following their River Plate neighbours, which they sought to rebuke while defending republicanism. The *farroupilhas*' own understanding of 'caudillo' certainly was pejorative, but this was the result of an ongoing semantic shift and did not necessarily imply a disinterest in constitutionalism. Since the 1810s, after all, self-styled *caudillos* had defended republican and monarchical understandings of popular sovereignty and constitutionalism. It ultimately was the ramification of debates around Rosas's dictatorship, in addition to Brazilian nationalist narratives, that definitely opposed *caudillos* and constitutions.

This is not to say that the *farroupilhas*, as constitutionalists, were democratic social reformers – quite the contrary, as episodes like the Porongos Massacre proved. But this article has shown that many of Latin America's early and often forgotten state-building experiments were understood by contemporaries both through the prisms of *caudillismo* and constitutionalism. The *caudillo*, therefore, still has an important role in studies of Latin American politics, but it should not be taken as a historically static concept. 'Failed states' like the Rio Grandense Republic likewise did not illustrate the inexorable fate of a 'republic of *caudillos*', just as 'provincial' constitutions like Corrientes's should not be seen as destined to be replaced by 'national' ones. Distinct state-building experiments indeed shared key assumptions regarding constitutionalism, elections, and representative government. The conflicts surrounding these ideas and experiments highlighted the deep uncertainties that characterized post-colonial Latin America and elsewhere in the age of revolutions, and the various means by which contemporaries sought to understand or influence their situation.

¹⁵² Spencer L. Leitman, 'The road to Porongos: *haitianismo* and *artiguismo* in the massacre that ended the *farroupilha*, 1835–1845', *Revista Brasileira de História & Ciências Sociais*, 13 (2021), pp. 558–91.

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