

THE LEGAL ORDER AND INDUSTRIAL WORKERS IN A COMMUNIST ENTERPRISE: THE POLISH CASE

SEWERYN A. OZDOWSKI
SUE C. ALEXANDER

This is a sociolegal study based on empirical data collected during a two-and-a-half year investigation carried out in ten major Polish industrial establishments. The authors contrast the legal model of industrial social organization with operational reality and emphasize the strong divergence between them. It is suggested that the divergence is due to the fact that the legal structures constructed by bureaucrats in the name of the working class after World War II have not responded to the changes that have occurred within the working class nor to the current structure of power. Because of this divergence, changes in the legal model seem necessary if further escalation of industrial unrest in Poland is to be prevented.

I. INTRODUCTION

The Polish "revolution" after World War II which put Communism into power was atypical. In fact, it was imposed by victorious Soviet troops, aided by limited Polish support, upon a traditionally anti-Russian anti-Communist country. The destruction of Polish statehood in World War II and the subsequent Soviet military presence meant that, literally from the beginning, the new power elite constructed a political order based directly on the Soviet model. The radical changes, imposed from above by the nascent but burgeoning Party and state bureaucracy, were made for and in the name of the working class but without its manifest political participation.

It is characteristic of transitional periods that the new ruling class rejects the solutions of the old legal system and evolves its own legal concepts. In Poland, too, the new rulers made major changes in the existing legislation. Positive law and the administration of justice were used as tools to shape the society in its own image. Now that the organizational system of the "new" state has been stabilized, the transformation has been given legal sanction and Marxism-Leninism acknowledged as the official state ideology. The role of positive law and its administration has changed radically: its func-

We owe a special debt of gratitude to Professor J.H. Bell of the University of New England, Armidale, and Dr. John Besemeres of Canberra for reading and commenting on an earlier version of this paper. We would also like to acknowledge the helpful comments of the editor, Richard Abel, and of two reviewers.

tion is now to maintain the established social and political order. Legislative power is used to modify the direction of social change, or to formalize and expedite, rather than to initiate change. Thus, for example, the Civil Code of April 23, 1964, the Penal Code of April 19, 1969, and the Labor Code of June 26, 1974, in principle constituted only a formal confirmation of the existing status quo; and there has been no further attempt to remodel social relations or existing organizational structures. Changes made in the Polish Constitution in 1976 officially closed the period of the "Dictatorship of the Proletariat" and formally introduced the "Socialist Democracy of the Whole People." This allows us to make a preliminary analysis of the new system's formal structure and its real functioning.

Communist "theory of state and law" strongly stresses the class character and genesis of law. It maintains that the law is influenced by the ruling class and expresses and protects its values. For example, Roman law treated slaves as a *res*, feudal law respected the caste divisions of the society, and Napoleon promoted capitalist values in his Civil Code. The assertion that the positive law promulgated in the name of the working class by the Communist bureaucracy expresses the interest and the will of the working class as a ruling class, and is created to enforce its will upon the others, is prescribed dogma for first-year students in all Polish law faculties. One authority goes so far as to maintain that the legal consciousness of the working class in a Communist state is the "direct ideological source of socialist law" (Łopatka, 1975:218).

Empirical investigation into workers' legal consciousness suggests, however, that there is a clear gap between the norms of positive law and norms perceived by workers as legal or just.¹ Moreover, even a cursory analysis of the Polish legal system reveals that current laws do not always express the interest and the will of the working class; indeed, they sometimes even discriminate against workers. For example, until the early 1970s, blue-collar workers were discriminated against by laws that were less favorable to them than to white-collar workers in such matters as holidays and sick leave, conditions of casual work, and dismissal. Comparison between the labor legislation of the neighboring capitalist states of West Germany and Sweden and the Polish Labor Code indicates that the Polish worker has much poorer legal working conditions. A Polish worker

1. The problem of the gap between norms of positive law and norms perceived by workers as legal or just is discussed in more detail in Ozdowski (1977). For a good discussion about the "gap problem," see Abel (1973).

works 46 hours per week (Labor Code § 129.1); his wages are arbitrarily determined by the state economic administration; he is liable, among other things, to fines that may be imposed by the factory manager for breaches of “prescribed work order and discipline” (Labor Code §§ 108-113); he is responsible for any financial loss to the factory resulting from any act or omission on his part, even if merely negligent (Labor Code §§ 114-123); and he is not entitled to wages if he is responsible for producing faulty products (Labor Code § 82).

Moreover, in analyzing the Polish legal system one gets the impression that the newly established organizational structures of the state do not ensure adequate participation by those in whose name they were constructed. These new structures seem to be more an instrument for subduing than for serving the working class, because they actually deprive employees of effective influence over management of the enterprise, with the result that workers have very limited control over their work situation. In fact, the organizational structure of the “Workers’ State” does not contain even a single organization exclusively representing the interests of the working class: workers constitute only about 45 percent of the national party membership (and a much smaller percentage of key Party organs) and the trade unions are composed of both white- and blue-collar workers.

Nevertheless, the communist “theory of state and law” continues to maintain that positive law in Poland expresses the will and interests of the working class despite empirical data indicating the existing gulf between positive law and the workers’ legal consciousness; and elaborate theories for the ideological justification of this stand have been developed.²

2. The “will” of the working class, it is maintained, is the volitional side of consciousness (a subjective category), whereas the “interests” of the working class are an objective category—an objective goal, the ideal line of social development. Only recognized social interests can be a ground for appropriate action by the Communist state; therefore, proper identification of this interest plays a very important role. Only the Communist party (equated, on the basis of “democratic centralism,” to its highest organs) is capable of the “scientific” assessment of what is in the interest of the governed in Communist society. The general interest of Communist society as a whole is seen as being in conformity with individual and group interests. Thus, the Communist party determines what is the will of the working class on the basis of “objectively” determined interests. In this way, the popular will as established by the Communist party can be different from the actual will of the working class, because workers are not able by themselves (i.e., without the Communist party) to make “scientific” decisions concerning their own interest, and therefore can sometimes be misled by false consciousness against which the Party may have to apply force. In theory, however, as Communist society develops this divergence disappears. See Chhikvadze *et al.* (1970:361-374; 1973:27-43).

The new Polish working class has changed radically since the prewar period. At the level of macro political-economic structure, the workers were formally acknowledged as a ruling class with the introduction of Communism. On another level, change is associated with industrialization and the increase in the size of the working class after World War II. For example, in 1938 urban workers made up less than 10 percent of the economically active population; currently, urban workers constitute 41.5 percent (Green, 1977:74). In contrast to the prewar agricultural economy, over 70 percent of the population of Poland today derives its living from secondary industry and non-agricultural activities (Europa Year Book, 1976:979). Education has also played an important role in the increasing importance of the working class. First, members of the working class have had access to formal education and have developed job skills. Second, all members of the society have been exposed to the socialist ideology that stresses the importance of the worker. These various factors resulted in an increase in the social importance and prestige of the working class.³

The Polish working class has also been changing in its internal composition and class consciousness. Prior to the war, there was a small but socially developed and politically aware working class. This "old working class", with its strong traditions and consciousness of collective interests, lost its dominance due to a number of factors. Many members disappeared during the war (they either died or did not return to Poland after the war). Similarly, many important members were removed from the working class by the Party's policy of rewarding its most active and committed members by "promoting" them into the white-collar jobs of the Party or state apparatus: by 1949, about 20,000 workers had assumed managerial posts in industrial enterprises (Wiatr, 1973:276). After the war, therefore, the influence of this "old working class" waned.

Moreover, with the rapid expansion of the working class as a result of industrialization, another group emerged, largely composed of new, young, industrial workers from rural backgrounds. This group was not formally educated, only weakly linked with the traditions of the prewar class struggle, and viewed being workers in terms of upward mobility. Gradually, however, this has changed. As they have been workers for an increasing period of time they have experienced stability rather than rapid mobility. Moreover, they have received a state-

3. For a discussion of the enhanced prestige of the working class, see Matejko (1969:471) and Podgórecki (1976b:18).

sponsored education in socialist ideology and job skills. A second generation of postwar workers has now joined the first: predominately the children of workers rather than people of rural origins. These new workers have been educated under the new system, have high professional aspirations, and expect social mobility. Even more important, they expect to be able to participate in, and affect, the system built in their name.⁴

As a result of these processes, the Polish working class is becoming more conscious of its interests. For example, there is a strong belief in egalitarianism and the importance of the worker. Thus, there is reluctance to accept the authority of management who have no formal educational qualifications, and an increasing interest in self-government. There is more professional pride and a belief that management should use persuasion rather than administrative measures. Moreover, there is a growing conviction that every employee should feel morally responsible for the whole factory and for community matters and a dissatisfaction with the shortcomings of the work organization (Matejko, 1969:453-79).

With this increasing class consciousness, the working class is becoming aware of the gulf between doctrine and practice, and is questioning the role of the Party and the legitimacy of its exercise of unlimited power in the name of the workers. There is increasing skepticism about social facts. The working class has resurrected a long forgotten instrument for exerting pressure upon the ruling classes: the strike. These strikes are becoming significant and can be viewed as part of the current working class offensive (Green, 1977:70).⁵

The main thesis of the paper is that in contemporary Poland there is a difference between (1) legal structure and ideology and (2) the objectives of the working class. Most of the legal structure was created in the early postwar period, at a time when the working class was relatively weak and lacked self-consciousness. It was heavily influenced by ideology and constructed on behalf of the working class, but today it tends to support the needs of bureaucratic officials rather than the interests of the workers.

The new workers have learned to believe in the ideology and want to participate in the system. However, the necessary

4. For a more detailed description of the contemporary Polish working class and its history, see Sarapata (1965), Widerszpil (1965), Matejko (1969, 1974), Beskid and Zagorski (1971), and Kolankiewicz (1973a).

5. For more about the current political situation in Poland and the working class role in it, see Bromke (1976) and Green (1977).

structures for meaningful participation are often lacking. Therefore, there is a development of unofficial or informal structures and mechanisms as the emerging working class gains power and works toward its objectives. Because the old structures do not provide the necessary channels for handling these conflicts, strikes and other attempts at creating change are occurring.

One place to look at this process is the factory, the basic unit of society in a Communist state. We therefore propose to look at the official structure of the factory and the extent to which this structure allows participation by the workers and provides the necessary channels within which workers can pursue their objectives.

The empirical data for this study were collected between 1970 and 1973 in the course of a research project on the legal consciousness of Polish industrial workers⁶ carried out in ten major industrial establishments: plants A, D, G, and K were involved in the mechanical industry; C and F in the metallurgical industry; E and J in the chemical industry; H in mining; and B in the electronic industry. Each plant employed between 1,500 and 30,000 workers.⁷ The data were obtained from:

(1) 450 interviews with randomly selected shop-floor workers in five factories;

(2) 20-30 interviews in each factory with "key informants" who, given their functions, could be presumed to be familiar with the situation in their respective factories (e.g., the director and his deputy, the permanent staff of the Factory Committee of the Polish United Workers' Party, the chairman of the Factory Council of the Trade Union, the chairman of the Presidium of the Workers' Council, the chairman of the Factory Arbitration Commission, foremen, and other "activists");

(3) 3,002 opinion poll questionnaires (about 60 percent of all those distributed) completed by workers in the plants; and

(4) analyses of various public and personal documents concerning the activities of social judicial institutions (Work-

6. This research project was originally conceived by A. Podgórecki and his team and later executed by the "Team for Studies into the Legal Consciousness of Polish Society," a section of the Institute for Legal Sciences of the Polish Academy of Sciences, consisting of M. Borucka-Arctowa (Director), A. Gaberle, M. Gębka, S. Ozdowski, K. Pałeczki, A. Pilinow, G. Skąpska, J. Wódz, and Z. Ziembinski. Statements and conclusions in this paper are the authors' own and are not necessarily endorsed by other members of the team. For an account of the research, see Borucka-Arctowa (1974).

7. For a description of the factories studied, see Ozdowski (1974).

ers' Courts and Factory Arbitration Commissions) active in the factories.

The principal aim of the questionnaire was to investigate the legal consciousness of industrial workers; however, it also contained questions about the activity of the Factory Council of the Trade Union, the Factory Arbitration Commission and the Workers' Court. Needless to say, there is a strong possibility of bias in the responses because the study was conducted inside the factories on a politically sensitive issue at a troubled time.⁸

II. POLISH INDUSTRIAL ENTERPRISE: THE LEGAL MODEL AND OPERATIONAL REALITY

Just as the family is commonly taken to be the fundamental cell of Western society, official ideology views the industrial enterprise as the basic cell in the sociopolitical structure of the Communist state. The role and organizational structure of the industrial enterprise in Poland differs from those of industrial establishments in capitalist countries. Polish factories operate within a system based on nationalized ownership of the means of production, central planning, and political control over industry. Politically based decisions are legislated in the form of a plan and determine the goals and tasks for the whole system. In reference to the central plan, the entities to which the enterprise is responsible—the association (*zjednoczenie*) or the ministry—usually decide such things as what should be produced and how, where the factory should buy its raw materials, and to whom the final product should be sold.⁹

Szczurkiewicz (1960:26) describes the role of the industrial enterprise in the communist state as a “functional-productive state institution serving:

(i) the purposes of socialist economy based on the principle of the nationalization of the means of production,

8. The bias is particularly likely to color the interviews and somewhat less likely to distort answers to the written questionnaires. It was evident in some of the responses of certain “key informants.” For example, the respondents in authority are likely to have a personal investment in giving certain answers; e.g., directors may tend to overstate their influence, minimizing the important role of the Party—especially the Party secretary—in informal, predecision stages. Similarly, workers and others sometimes feel threatened and are hesitant to be open when interviewed about controversial issues. For an illustration of this bias, see Ozdowski (1977:18).

9. For more about the enterprise as a part of a national system, see Doktor *et al.* (1965) and Narojek (1970, 1973). See also Staniszki (1972) and Podgórecki (1976b) for further discussion of the problems associated with the Polish planned economy.

(ii) the transformation of the social structure, social relations, human personality and social consciousness in conformity with the requirements of socialist society.”

Economic goals are clearly the most important: “To produce and bring profit is the essential function of an industrial enterprise” (Kulpinska, 1968:50). However, as Szczurkiewicz’s definition points out, production is only one of the tasks of the Communist enterprise. It also has certain sociopolitical functions and for this reason social organizations and institutions have been developed within the framework of the enterprise.

The main sociopolitical function of these organizations is to enable workers to participate in political power and decision-making at the factory level and, through this, at the state level. The discussion in this paper will focus on the position and activities of the enterprise director, the Factory Committee of the Polish United Workers’ Party (*Komitet Zakładowy Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Robotniczej*), the Factory Council of the Trade Union (*Rada Zakładowa*), the Factory Office of the Union of Socialist Youth (*Zarząd Zakładowy Związku Młodzieży Socjalistycznej*), and the organs of worker self-management: the Conference of Workers Self-Management (*Konferencja Samorządu Robotniczego*), the Workers’ Council (*Rada Robotnicza*) and its Presidium, the Factory Arbitration Commission (*Zakładowa Komisja Rozjemcza*) and the Workers’ Court (*Sąd Robotniczy*).¹⁰

Whether analyzing the formal structure or the actual functioning of the enterprise, it is important to remember that the factory does not constitute a closed system; rather, it is closely interrelated with organizations and processes in the macrostructure. For example, the director always has superiors outside the factory in the hierarchy of the larger economic administration. Similarly, the major social organizations within the factory—notably the Party, the Trade Union, and the Union of Socialist Youth—are always linked to the corresponding organizations outside the factory. In fact, some organizations, such as the Factory Committee or Factory Council, constitute important links between the shop-floor workers and the larger national system.

10. Branches of other organizations including, for example, the League of Women, the Union of Rural Youth, the Supreme Technical Organization, and the Polish-Soviet Friendship Society, may also exist, but their activities will not be reviewed here because of their limited role in the enterprises studied.

An enterprise usually consists of several factories or “workshops” (*zakład*) each of which contains the basic cells of institutions like the Factory Council or the Party. The study concentrates on problems of authority and power relations at the *central* level of the enterprise.




FIGURE 1: Principal Offices in the Industrial Enterprises Studied

The present organizational structure of the industrial enterprise in Poland is the end-product of a long and complicated history. It reflects concepts held by the new rulers as these have been modified by various pressures, compromises, and conflicting interests. The origins of the institutions studied are very diverse, often not even comparable: the Trade Union is based on the tradition of class struggle in capitalist society, the Arbitration Commission and the Workers' Court are patterned on the Soviet model, and worker self-management, an idea viewed suspiciously by many governments in both East and West, arose spontaneously as a result of worker pressure on the Party after October 1956.

The formal structure of these institutions, their tasks, and the measures for their realization, are all regulated by norms. However, the correct reconstruction of the legal model is a difficult task. There are a great many legal acts of varying status, often incoherent and at times mutually contradictory, that purport to define the position of these institutions. The provisions that delineate the competencies of particular institutions are expressed in very general terms and the precise demarcation of their respective spheres of responsibility is often impossible.¹¹ The situation is aggravated further by differences in interpretation.

The legal provisions defining the organizational structure of the enterprise are clearly couched in terms of an ideology of consensus. Because there is no room for conflict no structures have been developed for formally settling disputes between groups of employees, between employees and management, or between the factory as a whole and its superiors in the economic-administrative hierarchy. The Factory Arbitration Commission constitutes the one exception for settling some of the disputes between *individual* employees and the factory management. The major emphasis throughout is on cooperation between the economic administration and social organizations in order to increase the economic effectiveness of the enterprise, an objective to which all others tend to be subordinated. Thus, for example, only the director's role is legally defined in a relatively univocal way—he is the head, has wide economic powers and control over personnel, and is, above all, responsible for the productivity of the enterprise. Other roles, like first secretary of the Factory Committee,

11. Many students of the problem point to the proliferation of legal norms in the Polish legal system, e.g., Kowalewski (1967:98-101), Kieżun (1968:148-150; 1971:36), Łypacewicz (1971:175-180), Podgórecki (1976a:1).

chairman of the Factory Council, chairman of the Workers' Council, or chairman of the Factory Office of the Union of Socialist Youth are legally defined very ambiguously. There are clearly marked conflicts within each: representation of the workers' interests, on the one hand, versus increasing the factory's economic effectiveness or enforcement of work discipline on the other.

Postponing more general comments, we will discuss the legal model of each institution and contrast it with actual practices as established by empirical research. Our expositions of the theoretical legal model will of necessity be cursory.

A. Enterprise Director

The enterprise director is nominated by higher administrative organs—the association (*zjednoczenie*) or the ministry; thus he represents the state economic administration in the enterprise. The director is responsible to his superiors for plan fulfillment and is also in charge of day-to-day factory management. He has authority to terminate or dissolve work contracts, determine workers' wages within certain legal limits, and punish workers for breaches of "prescribed work order and discipline" (Labor Code §§ 108-113).

However, his authority is restricted by:

(1) the authority of social institutions within the enterprise, especially the Factory Committee of the PUWP (he is usually a Party member¹² which means that he is subordinated to Party discipline), the Factory Council of the Trade Union, and the Workers' Council.

(2) vertical subordination to higher organs of economic administration: plans, directions, implementing orders, contracts signed in the name of the enterprise by the association, etc.

(3) subordination to other governmental institutions, such as the Voivodship or District People's Council (*Wojewódzka Rada Narodowa*), branches of the National Polish Bank, the Chief Board of Supervision (*Naczelna Izba Kontroli*), etc.,¹³

12. Seventy-eight percent of the directors of industrial enterprises are Party members (Hoser, 1970:202). For more data concerning the social origins and educational backgrounds of enterprise directors in Poland, see Kolaniewicz (1973b:180).

13. The survey of directors found that 74 percent of those questioned regarded the large number of external administrative authorities to which they were subordinated as a significant obstacle to their effectiveness. See Kieżun (1971:35-39, 94).

and

- (4) various legal provisions.¹⁴

The directors investigated identified strongly with the enterprises they managed. They were keenly interested both in plan fulfillment and in the further development of the enterprises. They often blamed higher organs of economic administration for being ineffective and bureaucratic, and cited examples of excessive bureaucratic subordination to superiors. In their view, this imposed inflexibility on the factory management and made formal plan fulfillment more important than production reflecting real market needs. Thus, their critiques of "superiors" were often an indirect way of criticizing the whole system.

Within the enterprise, the directors usually saw themselves as clearly in command, superior to all employees and intra-enterprise organizations. They often saw their interests as opposed to those of the workers and did not regard them as equal partners. Shop-floor workers and lower administrative-clerical personnel were treated very paternalistically; directors viewed them as people whose every activity should be supervised, and whose behavior should be subject to arbitrary punishment for "breaches of prescribed work, order and discipline," and conversely rewarded for conformity.

We often observed directors defending their authority against the day-to-day interventions of their superiors, or attempts by social organizations within the factory to exert influence, by emphasizing their exceptional political or professional qualifications, experience, and real or fictitious merits. They tried to surround themselves with an aura of indispensability, to convey the impression that without them plan fulfillment would be in jeopardy.¹⁵

The directors were generally content with the existing social organizations within the enterprises and strongly opposed any suggestions for change. Social organizations were usually regarded as useful instruments for increasing the effectiveness of their decisionmaking power or simply another bureaucratic structure that had at most only an ideological justification. They were never seen by the directors as representing the in-

14. Directors are bound by numerous legal prescriptions specifying their tasks and obligations. Kieżun (1971:33) describes a branch bank director whose activities were regulated by more than 400 detailed regulations. See also Kowalewski (1967), Kieżun (1968:149-150), Zypacewicz (1971:101), Hirsowicz (1973:96-97).

15. Sarapata (1970) found that Polish directors often felt insecure in their job and experienced lack of opportunities for self-actualization.

terests of employees as a whole, as partners in cooperation between management and labor. Activists who did not limit themselves to strictly social or "political" activity were criticized. The directors underlined that "proper" candidates for posts in the Party, the Union, or the self-management organs should have the "necessary sociopolitical qualifications" (i.e., should display a predictable conformity). During interviews the directors argued that it would be better if their real position in the enterprise were to find more adequate formal reflection in the law. This would not only stabilize that position but also increase the economic effectiveness of the industry.

The actual scope of the directors' power resembled that prescribed by law only in enterprises A and K. In enterprises D, H, and I, directors had much more power than was envisaged by the relevant legal provisions, because they had secured authority over all of the social institutions in the enterprise. They also held dominant positions in enterprises B, C, E, and G. In these plants directors used the social institutions as aids to increase the effectiveness of managerial decisionmaking. The director's power was greatly limited in enterprise F, where the first secretary of the Factory Committee of the PUWP was the real head of the factory. In practice the director's role and power were strongly influenced by the power of the social organizations in the plant. The key relationship was that between the director and the first secretary of the Factory Committee of the PUWP because the latter has an unwritten right to interfere in economic management and personnel matters.

Considerations of plan fulfillment (whether real or merely theoretical) increased the director's position inside the enterprise because of his power of patronage over premiums and other perquisites for employees, especially for the "active group." Therefore, fulfillment of the plan was a critical objective, which directors were determined to achieve, by illegal means if necessary. In order to meet their quotas they hid production reserves in factories, stockpiled raw materials in times of shortage, and violated employment rules by various practices, semilegal at best, e.g., exceeding overtime limits by giving unofficial leave during slack periods, hiding wage rises by fixing special norms and work rates for key workers, "plan storming" towards the end of the year, etc. However, in spite of all these practices, plan indices were often reached only by falsifying reports and accounts (Hirszowicz, 1973:98).

Finally, the level of social activity among the workers and the political abilities of management were also important in de-

termining the actual scope of the director's power. A good example of this was observed in enterprise K where cooperation between the director and the social organizations was based on a balance of power. In enterprise E, where the director held the central position, there were unresolved tensions still between management and the manual workers represented by the Factory Council of the Trade Union.

B. Polish United Workers' Party


The Polish United Workers' Party is the dominant power in contemporary Poland. On January 1, 1975, it had more than 2,364,000 members and candidates, of which 34.2 percent were employed in industry (Wacławek, 1975:36, 153).¹⁶ The organizational structure of the Party within industry is based on the "trade-and-territorial" principle: every territorially integrated enterprise has one Party organization. The Party organization has two levels in enterprises with more than 100 Party members and candidates, and three where their number exceeds 400—usually in enterprises composed of more than one factory (Statute of the PUWP § 55). In accordance with the principle of "democratic centralism" and the effects of existing electoral procedures, the statute gives a dominant position within the Party organization to the executive of the Factory Committee, or of the Inter-Factory Committee (*Komitet Ogólnozakładowy*) in the case of the three-level structure. The head of the executive is the full-time first secretary.

The Statute of the PUWP, several legal norms, and above all political pressures have reserved a peculiar place for the Party organization within the industrial enterprise. Matejko (1969:454) defines the Party as "the real backbone of the elaborate system of institutions and organizations."

Analysis of the provisions of the PUWP Statute concerning the place and functions of the Party within the enterprise suggests that the Party organization constitutes a second institutional structure within the factory, overlaying that of the state economic administration. According to § 50 of the PUWP Statute: "The Factory Party organizations in enterprises are responsible to the Party for the economic condition and efficient operation of their factories. The fundamental duty of Party industrial units is political control, which bears upon the work of the enterprise administration in basic production and economic

16. The population of Poland on December 31, 1974, was estimated to be 33,845,700 (Europa Year Book, 1976:981).

matters, in personnel policy, and in relation to the conditions of work and life of the work force. These Party tasks should be performed in the first instance by active participation in worker self-management activities, simultaneously safeguarding workforce interests and the interests of the whole nation.”



PPO - Primary Party Organization
 SPO - Shop-Floor Party Organization

FIGURE 2: Party Organization in Industrial Enterprises

The main task of the factory Party organization (performed, in accordance with the principle of "democratic centralism," by its executive) is the "inspiration" of and "political control" over the economic management and the social organizations within the enterprise. The first secretary of the Factory Committee has the right and duty to be informed about all matters affecting the factory, as well as authority to intervene in them. Since the Factory Committee's responsibility to its superiors is limited to the economic effectiveness of the enterprise, Party functionaries can be secure against reprimand as long as they obey the orders of superiors. The factory management remains legally responsible for the activities of economic administrative organs even when in fact a decision was taken by the Party.

The Party organization in a factory also has the duty to: coordinate the activities of organizations within the enterprise, assess the attitudes and actions of those who have higher posts in the enterprise administration and social organizations (even if they are not Party members), make recommendations to the Party and other higher officials about filling the more important offices and positions within the factory, organize "work competition," increase work effectiveness, enforce work discipline, and engage in education and propaganda. These duties should be carried out by giving directives and tasks to individual Party members (who are, of course, all subject to Party discipline), through active participation in the social institutions within the factory (the Party is *ipso iure* represented at the Conference of Worker Self-Management and in the Presidium of the Workers' Council), and by regular reporting to superiors.

Our research established that the proportion of Party members varied considerably in different enterprises. However, all the directors and a majority of the "active group" in the factories investigated were Party members. By the "active group" I mean all individuals holding posts in social organizations as well as informal group leaders acting outside those organizations.¹⁷ The real power and *modus operandi* of the executive of the Factory Committee also varied from factory to factory.

The Primary Party Organization in enterprise F was very strong—44 percent of all respondents were Party members.¹⁸

17. For a discussion of the social role of factory activists, see Kulpińska (1968:55-58).

18. The percentages of respondents who were Party members in other factories were: A—22; B—16; C—21; D—29; E—21; G—29; H—20; I—21; K—23; the national average for Party membership among factory workers is 18

The Party represented the interests of the "old working class" and their employed relations, who together constituted more than 60 percent of the work force.¹⁹ The first secretary fully exercised his rights. He did not limit himself to "inspiration" and "political control" but also exercised executive power over economic and personnel matters which are usually the exclusive concern of the economic administration. The director and other officials generally felt obligated to respect his decisions, even when they were not Party members. These directives were communicated in a very informal way, often by word of mouth. Twice in the last few years conflicts between the Factory Committee and the factory management resulted in recall of the director from the factory.

The position of the Factory Committee was radically different in establishments B²⁰ and I.²¹ Party organizations played a classical "transmission" role, limiting themselves to handing down recommendations from higher Party authorities without actively participating in factory life or seeking power. In both of these factories young women were a majority of the work force.

In enterprises D, E, and H the Factory Committees collaborated closely with management, whereas in enterprises A, G, and K such collaboration was more limited. In each of these factories there was a so-called factory collective composed of the director, the first secretary of the PUWP Committee, and the chairmen of the Factory Council and of the Workers' Council, which met to discuss current issues.²² Collaboration was

(Wachawek, 1975:153). That this last figure is lower than our findings can be explained by the facts that we studied only large industrial establishments, where more workers belong to the Party, and that Party members are more likely than other workers to respond to a questionnaire sponsored by the Polish Academy of Sciences, as ours was.

19. Enterprise F, created after World War I, is located in a town of about 50,000 and employs about 10,000 workers. An intensive process of development and modernization, entailing the recruitment of many new workers, especially those with formal qualifications, started after 1960. Plant F is the biggest employer in town and working there confers local prestige. The tradition of class struggle, dating from the interwar period, is still very much alive.
20. Enterprise B was established after 1945. It employed about 8,000, 57 percent of whom were younger than 30 years and 66 percent of whom were women. The first secretary had been nominated from outside the factory 7 months before research began.
21. Enterprise I was established after World War II. Its development had been particularly dynamic after 1957. The work force was about 2,000, 85 percent women and 50 percent younger than 30 years. This work force had the highest average level of education of those studied because the factory was in the electronics industry.
22. For more about "factory collectives", see Magdonia (1972:3) and Kolaniewicz (1973a:142).

largely restricted to economic matters, particularly measures to raise productivity and to a lesser extent personnel matters. Decisions were binding on all concerned and were enforced by their organizations. In fact, the lower organs of the Party, the Trade Union and the Conference of Worker Self-Management, were usually forced by their superiors to mobilize the work force to fulfill the economic plan.

Certain Factory Committees represented the interests of certain groups of employees to management: thus in G the Factory Committee represented the interests of the "young" technical intelligentsia who had migrated from long-established industrial centers,²³ whereas in K it represented the "old working class." Moreover, "white-collar workers" seemed to be represented more often and to have greater influence in the central organs of the factory Party organization, whereas the lower Party echelons tended to be dominated by shop-floor activists.

It is also worth stressing that even the first secretaries appointed to the Factory Committee from outside the enterprise more or less identified with the factory (although not the first secretary in B), regardless of their actual positions in the factory power structure. They often played a very important role in relations between the enterprise and representatives of the "outside world," such as superior administrative organs and other factories. More than once the intervention of a first secretary overcame the bureaucratic inertia of the centrally managed economic system. Their position enabled them to see that bylaws or orders were issued that increased the economic effectiveness of the enterprise.

C. Union of Socialist Youth

The Union of Socialist Youth (USY) is a mass organization under the direct ideological and political supervision of the Party, whose fundamental aim is to educate youth to become good Party members; it is often affectionately called "the Party kindergarten." The Statute of the USY pays minimal attention to the protection of the rights and interests of the young by the USY organs. The organizational structure of the USY is simi-

23. Enterprise G had been established in 1948, but its massive modernization and development dated from 1956. Employees who had been working in managerial and other higher and middle posts between 1948 and 1956 were replaced by newcomers from other industrial centers, who had higher formal qualifications, as new technology was introduced.

lar to that of the Party and based on the principle of “democratic centralism.” A Factory Office of the USY is to be found in every large enterprise; it employs a full- or part-time chairman and a treasurer. The representatives of the USY are included *ipso iure* in the Conference of Workers Self-Management.

In some of the factories investigated the USY not only performed ideological work but also participated very effectively in the power structure. In enterprise K (where about 25 percent of the employees are members of the USY) it was the spokesman for the young work force (those younger than 30 years and with up to 6-7 years in the work force). The Factory Office of the USY in K effectively competed for influence over the division of production tasks and incomes with the Factory Committee of the PUWP (which represented the “old working class”) and was also able to influence management decisions. The function and activity of the USY in enterprises A and B was very similar. However, there the Factory Offices did not represent the interests of all young workers but those of a “young employees’ elite”—mostly young white-collar workers. Only 13 percent of all employees were members of the USY in plant A, where about 50 percent of the work force were younger than 30; in factory B, where 57 percent were younger than 30, only 10 percent were members.

Very close collaboration bordering on subordination was noted in enterprises F and G. In plants D, H, and I Factory Offices of the USY were not active and did not play an important role in factory life. The role of the USY in enterprise E was not established.²⁴

D. Trade Union

“The Trade Union participates in formulating and carrying out tasks in the socioeconomic development of the country, works on improving the conditions and level of workers’ lives, and influences the state of social consciousness and socialist relations among people. In particular the Trade Union joins with the competent state organs in promulgating and enforcing the law and strives to strengthen the observance of law in order to protect the rights and duties of workers” (Labor Code § 19.2).

24. The reason for this is that only the workers of establishment E displayed manifest mistrust of the members of the research team. We thought this was an expression of the strong conflicts within this factory.

The Factory Council of the Trade Union and its subordinated Sectional and/or Shop-Floor Councils (*Rady Wydziałowe* or *Oddziałowe*) form the lowest level of the Trade Union organizational hierarchy. The Factory Council has a full-time chairman paid by the enterprise. The executives of the Factory Council and of the Sectional and/or Shop-Floor Councils are *ipso iure* members of the Conference of Worker Self-Management and the Workers' Council; they are also often Party members. The legally defined tasks of the Trade Union organs in industrial enterprise are very broad, and include: the protection of employees in the case of disputes with the factory administration, enforcement of labor law within the factory, work safety, increased productivity, work discipline, and various social activities such as excursions, vacations, factory kindergartens, and canteens.

Only in enterprise A did the Factory Council actively represent the interests of all employees to the factory's top management. It was not dominated by either top management or any specific group of employees; moreover, in the cases of conflict with management (e.g., on issues of working conditions, dismissal, compensation, or housing) it consistently supported the employee involved. The Factory Councils in enterprises E, G, and D also brought pressure to bear upon the management, but they were used by particular groups of workers. In plant E the Council expressed the interests of manual workers. There, in the event of conflict with the administration, the Factory Council employed a part-time attorney to protect the workers' claims, indicating both the intensity of the conflict and the determination of the manual workers. The Factory Council in plant G represented the "old technical cadre" and "old working class," both rather small groups; and in enterprise D it represented administrative-clerical personnel.

Simultaneously, in plants E, G, and D the Factory Councils were used by management as instruments to increase economic effectiveness of the enterprise and encourage employees, compliance with the commands of the director. The Factory Councils in establishments B, F, and I were either passive or purely formal; and the one in H was totally subordinated to top management. In enterprise K we found a complicated situation, where the chairman of the Factory Council had been recalled one month before the research began, and it was not possible to determine the Council's position in the enterprise structure.

However, Factory Councils were often limited, in fact, to

“social activities” (except in A and E). It was rare for the Factory Council to intercede for an individual worker or group of employees, even when management decisions were illegal. An exception was the activity of Union officials during meetings of the Conference of Worker Self-Management concerning division and allocation of profits. Most of the workers interviewed, especially the younger ones, saw the Councils as that part of the administration responsible for social services rather than as an organ to represent their interests in case of conflict.

Trade union shop-floor officials seemed to be much more closely linked with the workers they represented. Shop-floor Councils sometimes functioned in plants where the Factory Councils were partly or totally subordinated to top management or were passive. Shop-floor Councils were often able to use subtle techniques (e.g., ostracism or work slow-downs) to affect working conditions within their own section or shop-floor. They often acted very informally, were less receptive to outside pressures than were the Factory Councils, and usually enjoyed higher prestige among the manual workers. It was also interesting that some members of the Sectional or Shop-floor Councils and other Union activists from the shop-floor tolerated workers obtaining extra income by methods of dubious legality, e.g., by doing private jobs using factory stock during their worktime, by lowering piece work norms (and thereby work productivity), and even through petty larceny. There were many conflicts of interest between different Sectional and/or Shop-Floor Councils and between each and the Factory Council, the latter often caused by the fact that questions relating to housing, dismissals, or the like, which should have been discussed with the relevant Sectional and Shop-Floor Council(s), were frequently resolved by the top Union functionaries without any reference to the representations made by shop-floor activists.

Trade Union activists identified more with their enterprise than with the higher organs of the Trade Union. One reason was that full-time functionaries of the Trade Union were paid by the enterprise where they worked. Union activists were given premium payments by the directors. Union officials and workers often suggested that the chairmen of the Factory Councils should be financially independent of higher management.

E. Worker Self-Management.

The history of the rise and fall of worker self-management

in Poland is unusually interesting.²⁵ On November 19, 1956, the bill dealing with Workers' Councils was enacted that sanctioned the spontaneous workers' organizations, formed in many factories after the events of June and October, 1956. Workers were given legal authority to participate in factory management. But two years later, on December 12, 1958, a new bill was introduced into the Parliament (*Sejm*) that imposed from above a new organizational structure known as the Conference of Worker Self-Management, which is still in existence. As a result of this legislation the organs of worker self-management have become only one among many institutions that decide policy within the enterprise. The organs of worker self-management are the Conference of Worker Self-Management, the Workers' Council, the Presidium of the Workers' Council and its chairman, and the Sectional or Shop-Floor Workers' Councils.²⁶

The Conference of Worker Self-Management (CWSM), often referred to as the "factory parliament," includes all the important formal organizations within the factory and should meet at least once every three months. It is composed of the members of the Workers' Council, the Factory Committee of the PUWP (the Party secretary acts as a Chairman of the Conference), the Factory Council of the Trade Union, representatives from the Union of Socialist Youth, the Supreme Technical Organization (*Naczelna Organizacja Techniczna*), and other organizations in the enterprise. People are members of CWSM because their positions are *ipso iure* included in it or because they are nominated; there is no free election of CWSM members by the work force. The director and sectional managers are not formally members of the CWSM but are obliged to attend the meetings. It should be noted that, because of its large membership, the CWSM works sessionally.

The legally defined authority of the CWSM can be divided into three categories:

- (1) supervision and control over the operation of the enterprise and its administration
- (2) participation in deciding the basic direction of the development of the enterprise, for example, commenting upon

25. In this paper we analyze only the current situation in Polish enterprises. A good analysis of the rise and subsequent vicissitudes of worker self-management can be found in Kolankiewicz (1973a:96-120); see also Matejko (1962:130-134); Krzykała (1975:215-223).

26. For more about the formal structure and functions of the Worker Self-Management system in Poland, see Jarosz (1967) and Magdziak (1970).

and approving plans, expressing views on and participating in taking centralized investment decisions, and

(3) rationalization of the activity of the enterprise, e.g., deciding on new directions in technological innovation and work organization, or raising productivity.

The exclusive competence of the CWSM includes:

- (1) promulgating work regulations (*regulamin pracy*)
- (2) dividing the factory funds (that part of the profit left in the enterprise to be shared among the employees), and
- (3) approving the elected chairman or Presidium of the Workers' Council.

Between Conferences the decisionmaking functions and worker control are entrusted to the Workers' Council and its Presidium, which consists of the chairmen of the Department Workers' Councils, the chairman of the Factory Workers' Council, the Party Secretary, and the chairman of the Factory Trade Union Council.

Both the Workers' Council and the Presidium or chairman of the Workers' Council legally have two different functions:

(1) they are executive organs of the CWSM; i.e., they execute the resolutions undertaken by the CWSM and prepare the agenda for the next CWSM session, and

(2) they also control the current economic activity of the enterprise administration, establishing monthly and quarterly operating plans, mobilizing workers to increase their efficiency, activating by-production, encouraging production to satisfy current market demands once the plan quotas have been fulfilled, and so on.

Even this outline of the formal functions of the CWSM and its executive shows that their activities are largely limited to voting on decisions such as production plans that have been taken earlier, sometimes outside the enterprise. Furthermore, control of management activity depends on the degree to which the management is itself autonomous. Other legal norms reinforce the subordination of worker self-management to Party and Trade Union control. Thus, for example, § 25 of the Act of December 12, 1958, states that the Central Trade Union's Council (*Centralna Rada Związków Zawodowych*) determines election procedures for the Workers' Councils, the number of Council and Presidium members, their terms of office, and recall procedures for elected Council members. It can also dissolve a council "when the council's actions are against the interests of the national economy."

The operation of worker self-management organs differed among factories. The CWSM was no more than a formality that automatically ratified all decisions submitted to it in enterprises F and H. In other establishments the CWSM sessional meeting was often a platform for discussion and argument, especially over the division of the factory fund. In such controversies groups of employees acted through the institutions they dominated to maximize their own advantage. Sometimes one could observe the rise of coalitions within the framework of the CWSM, e.g., between the Factory Committee, the Union of Socialist Youth, and the Presidium of the Workers' Council. In enterprises composed of more than one factory there were also struggles between the different factories or departments for greater participation in the fund. This problem dominated the CWSM sessions in enterprises B and C.

The division of the factory fund was often used by the CWSM as an instrument for enforcing work discipline and increasing the economic effectiveness of the enterprise. Often individuals or whole groups of employees (e.g., particular shop-floors) were punished for breaches of work discipline or plan nonfulfillment by a reduction or elimination of their share of the factory funds. In practice, these sanctions were directed only against manual workers. Our research did not reveal any instance in which an entire group of white-collar workers was excluded from a share of the fund, only individual exclusions. This no doubt reflects the fact that the Conference is dominated by higher ranking activists who usually belong to white-collar groups. Rank-and-file workers had no direct influence on these decisions. The less money blue-collar workers get from the factory fund, the more there is to divide among the others. Activists are also interested in work discipline and high productivity because of rewards they get in the form of premiums and various financial rewards and fringe benefits. The other legally prescribed functions of the CWSM activity were usually ignored.

The institution of the CWSM was respected only by some of the directors and higher "activists." Lower ranking activists assessed its performance as poor. They often referred to it as a "clique," pointing out that workers are not represented on it and that even active participation in a session can not change decisions previously taken. Workers who did not belong to the "active group" had, for the most part, only a foggy idea about the structure of the CWSM, and some did not even know of its

existence.²⁷

The Workers' Councils in enterprises D, G, and K were relatively independent and their activities were based more on patterns established during 1956-58 than on current legal provisions. They tended to be supported by members of the "old working class" and expressed their interests. In these enterprises the Presidiums of Workers' Councils and their chairmen also represented the interests of the "old working class." In factory D, we detected strong authority conflicts between the chairman and the director, and noticed that the chairman was opposed to the economic policy of the current management. However, we did not find that the chairman's activity had influenced decisions made by the director personally or in consultation with the Factory Committee or Factory Council. In enterprises G and K the chairmen's actions were more oriented toward conciliation than conflict.

The Presidiums of the Workers' Councils in other enterprises were controlled by the Party, Trade Union, or management, but not by the manual workers, even when the workers were well represented on the plenum. In these other enterprises the Presidiums mainly contained foremen, middle and high ranking activists, and administrative-clerical personnel. Chairmen did not play any significant role, apart from being a part of the establishment and supporting management requests that the work force increase productivity. In these enterprises the Presidiums and the Workers' Councils had no authority in the eyes of the manual workers.

F. Social Judicial Institutions

Two social judicial institutions exist in each industrial enterprise: the Factory Arbitration Commission (*Zakładowa Komisja Rozjemcza*) and the Workers' Court (*Sąd Robotniczy*). Members of both work without remuneration and outside working hours. Factory Arbitration Commissions (FAC) are set up in factories with more than 100 workers. The Commission is composed of representatives of management and workers, appointed by the factory director and the Factory Council of the Trade Union from among those employees who fulfill certain legal conditions.²⁸ The socio-occupational composition of the Commission should reflect that of the factory work

27. For more about workers' attitudes toward the CWSM, see Jarosz (1967:207-263) and Owieczko (1967:23).

28. See sections 4-7 *Rozporządzenie Rady Ministrów* from October 25, 1974 (Dz.U.nr 41 poz. 243).

force as a whole. Each FAC is divided into Adjudicatory Panels (*Zespoły Orzekające*). Employees are entitled to file complaints against the factory administration about conditions of employment, e.g., dismissals, wages, leave, hours of work, special rights for women and juvenile workers, special benefits for occupational injuries or chronic sickness, etc.²⁹ The hearings are public and decisions by majority rule.

The FAC approximated this legal model in establishments A and F, where it helped to resolve many conflicts between management and employees. The Commissions also intervened to conciliate disputes before formal claims had been asserted, although such activity was of course difficult to analyze because of the lack of formal documents. In these two plants, the composition of the FAC mirrored the socio-occupational composition of the work force, i.e., blue-collar workers were adequately represented in relation to white-collar workers.

The Commission in enterprise K engaged in more activities than its statutory authority envisaged. It maintained an active conciliatory role, especially in the early stages of conflicts, provided legal aid and legal education for workers, and actively protected workers' rights. We observed more than once that the chairman of this FAC performed an essentially Trade Union function by intervening with the management on behalf of employees. In the case of legal questions he turned to Union lawyers rather than to the legal counselor (*radca prawny*) employed by the enterprise. Most of the Commission decisions favored employees.

The Arbitration Commissions in enterprises B, C, E, and G were active but management influence could be detected in their decisions (*orzeczenie*). Most of the decisions were not in the employees' favor and some were even against the law. In plant E, for example, only 10 cases out of the 56 examined in the years 1969-70 were decided in favor of the workers. The Commissions in enterprises D, H, and I were subordinated to management and did little work, typically examining only 3-4 cases a year. Their activity was often limited by the administration, which imposed additional formal conditions for applications made by employees to the FAC, although such conditions were not prescribed by law. For example, in plant H approval of the director was required for an application to be heard by the Adjudicatory Panel.

29. This was partly changed by the Labor Code (*Kodeks Pracy*) of June 26, 1974 (Dz.U.nr 24 poz. 141).

It was clear that both the director's position within the enterprise power structure and the degree to which the Factory Council of the Trade Union was independent of management were correlated with the type of activity conducted by the FAC. It was also apparent that when the socio-occupational composition of the Commission varied from the legal model, i.e., when it was dominated by white-collar workers, decisions did not favor workers, which could result in a decline in its activity. Thus, for example, in plant G, 15 of the 28 members of the FAC were engineers or economists, 8 were technicians, 4 administrative-clerical personnel, and only 1 a manual worker. In enterprise C, only 20 percent of the Commission were blue-collar workers, although these constituted about 80 percent of the work force.

The chairmen of the FAC usually complained that they did not have access to the necessary legal literature, that the legal counselor of the enterprise did not want to give advice when asked, and that it was difficult to cooperate with state legal institutions.

The number of cases dealt with by the Arbitration Commissions has recently increased.³⁰ This may testify to a greater acceptance of this institution in at least some factories, but it may also have other sources, e.g., an increase in the number of conflicts, changes in the political climate since the events of December, 1970, expansion of the jurisdiction of the Commissions to include workers' compensation cases.

Workers' Courts, the other judicial institution in industrial enterprises, were established in the early sixties to settle disputes arising out of the breakdown of social relations, e.g., brawls, insults, petty larceny, and breaches of work discipline, such as drinking on the job, lateness, etc. These Courts, whose members are workers elected by their colleagues, follow no formal procedure and rely entirely on the pressure of public opinion within the given group (though it can ask management to impose administrative sanctions). The Court can only hear disputes between enterprise employees.

The Workers' Court in factory A heard about 10 cases per year out of a work force of 15,000. Of the cases examined in 1970, 70 percent concerned larceny of factory property. The Court also conducted informational and prophylactic activities.

30. The number of actions indicated in the Factory Arbitration Commission varied among the enterprises: from 3 per year (plant D) up to 70 (plant A). However, most plants exhibited an increase in recent years, especially after 1970; e.g., in enterprise F: 1968-30 actions, 1969-23, 1970-19, 1971-35, 1972-60, etc.

This Court enjoyed very high prestige among the workers. The chairman said that no defendant had relapsed in the last three years.

In three factories the Workers' Court had never been convened and in six others it was moribund.³¹ "Key informants" thought this was explained by employee dislike of the public investigation of their offenses and to weak support from the professional judicature. They also stressed that the range of sanctions available to the Court was too narrow. Enlargement of the number and type of sanctions available and payment of the judges were proposed to increase the Courts' prestige so that they might improve work discipline and reduce criminality in the factory.

In some of those plants, however, there were quasicourts—informal groups of foremen, Party, Union and other activists from particular workshops—that examined cases within the jurisdiction of the Workers' Court. Such informal quasicourts imposed a very wide range of sanctions (much more varied than the Court could have enforced) and were generally respected by workers.

DISCUSSION

The primary conflict in the Polish system is between the enterprise and outside authorities, rather than between management and labor within the factory. The significance of the conflict between the enterprise and outside authorities derives from the nature of the centrally planned economy in Poland. From the point of view of the enterprise—both workers and management—formal plan fulfillment is the primary goal because it is the basis on which the factory is evaluated and rewarded. Even if the plan goals are seen as inappropriate or poorly conceived, the workers and management share the objective of reaching them. And, since the plan is seen as imposed from outside, there is often a feeling of joining together against an "outside enemy." Thus, the plan and the emphasis on achieving the goal and overcoming the "outside enemy" serve to minimize conflict within the factory and increase the emphasis on the conflict between the factory and outside authorities.

Therefore, directors, first secretaries of factory Party organizations, chairmen of the Trade Union Councils, the Presidi-

31. A different view on the social functioning of the Workers' Courts in industrial enterprises is presented by Podgórecki (1969). However, his study was carried out in 1962, soon after the Workers' Courts were established.

ums of Workers' Councils, and other "activists" identified strongly with their enterprises and sometimes saw even the superiors within their particular organizational hierarchy as foreign elements that interfered with the correct functioning of their enterprise. They criticized higher administration as bureaucratic and inefficient. Often, in the case of outside intervention, one could observe a common front forming between the enterprise management, intrafactory social institutions, and the workers against the "outside enemy." At the same time, it is more likely that the Factory Committee of the PUWP, rather than the Factory Council, would persuade higher Party officials to intercede in cases where the interests of the enterprise (often identified with their own interests) were threatened, for example, where there was a danger of plan nonfulfillment because of the faults of other enterprises. Thanks to such intervention, it is often possible to secure the means necessary to fulfill a production task whose realization by legal means is extremely difficult, if not impossible, for instance, to obtain scarce raw materials necessary for current production that have been omitted by plans or are unavailable because of some short-term change in the profile of production.

As we can see, we are dealing with the process of alienation of the enterprise and its social institutions (including the local Party organizations) from centrally determined directives and goals. This situation distorts communication between the enterprise and hierarchical organs. The information provided to superiors is often tendentiously formulated, sometimes even falsified, and orders may be given that are apparently incompatible with those of the central organs. When such situations are discovered by superiors they usually replace personnel in the top posts of the enterprise and its social institutions. Such changes alter the institutional activity of the enterprise only until the new first secretary, chairman, or director finds acceptance with other higher "activists," at which point he starts to identify more closely with his factory or institution than with the superior organs that appointed him. And so the process repeats itself.

Although the primary emphasis is often on the "outside enemy," there is still conflict between workers and management within the factory³² and both attempt to gain control of the social organizations within the factory in order to pursue their own interests. Workers are primarily interested in controlling

32. Similar findings were also reported by Kolaja (1960a; 1960b).

the distribution of housing, bonuses, tasks, etc., for their personal benefit. Management is interested in controlling this distribution so that it can be used as an incentive system for more efficient production.

From a formal viewpoint, the director and the social organizations constitute separate centers of authority and power. In fact, however, the legal model differs markedly from the operational reality of most of the enterprises studied,³³ and it would be more correct to speak about hierarchical subordination than about a balance of power. Only in two of the ten factories investigated was the real system of power comparable with the legal model. In enterprises A and K there were four autonomous centers of decisionmaking whose relations were those of partners to a certain degree. In the other eight enterprises one dominant center could be discerned; in seven it was the director and in one (F) the first secretary of the Factory Committee of the PUWP.

The directors, who represent the state economic administration, usually managed to expand the scope of their power well beyond their legally defined authority.³⁴ This was achieved by transforming social organizations into instruments to increase the effectiveness of management decisionmaking power, or by neutralizing them. Only rarely were such outcomes the result of an open power struggle or bureaucratic or political pressure from above. Fundamentally, this situation was determined by the common interests of management and the leaders of these organizations as well as by the legally ambiguous definitions of the roles of the latter. It is also not without significance that the dominant ideology stresses consensus rather than conflict and conformity rather than independent thought or action.

However, power was not centralized to the same degree in every enterprise. Sometimes, even in factories where the director exercised considerable control, certain institutions preserved some independence, e.g., the Trade Union in E or G.

33. No single operational model is adequate to describe our ten factories for no two enterprises had a similar structure. Often the same organization played different roles in different enterprises or similar issues were the concern of different organizations in different factories. For example, workers' claims were usually handled by the Factory Committee of the PUWP in enterprise F, by the Factory Councils in plants E and G, and even by the Factory Arbitration Commission in K. However, for purposes of illustration it may be helpful for those interested to refer to an operational model constructed by Dyoniziak (1967:80) on the basis of a very thorough investigation of one industrial enterprise in 1962-63.

34. The centralization of power in the position of director was also reported in other studies, e.g., Kiežun (1968:218-326).

Above all, the scope of the director's power depends upon his relations with the first secretary of the Factory Committee because of the latter's political power and unwritten right to intervene in every matter. As was stated earlier, both the director and the first secretary are responsible to their superiors for any activity within their enterprise, and in particular for plan fulfillment. Their professional or political future is indissolubly bound up with an operation of the enterprise that satisfies their superiors. Plan nonfulfillment or a continuing power struggle between management and the Party produces a high level of job insecurity for both director and first secretary. This commonality of interest constitutes a stable basis for their close collaboration: both want a single strong power center that can dominate the employees.

The concentration of power in the director rather than the first secretary can be explained as follows. There is a long established tradition that the director is in charge of the factory; this tradition is widely accepted by both shop-floor workers and officials. Such paternalism is also ideologically justified and supported.³⁵ Secondly, the legal definition of the director's role emphasizes economic efficiency, whereas the first secretary's role is also social and political. Thirdly, the secretary is simultaneously responsible to Party members, especially those who control factory Party organization. Therefore, we would suggest that as long as the social and economic situation of the factory is stable, it is much more common for the first secretary to support the director actively, or at least passively, rather than challenge him directly on important issues.

Control of the Factory Office of the Trade Union also contributes to the centralization of power. Unlike the Factory Committee of the PUWP, or management, the Factory Council of the Trade Union derives no power from its superiors, because the nationwide Trade Union movement is totally subordinated to the Party and state bureaucracy. This means that the Factory Council's ability to challenge the director's decisions depends on the unity and militancy of the factory team as a whole or of a particular group of employees. Greater than average militancy was observed in enterprise E, and to a lesser extent in A and G. Centralization of power in the hands of the director was facilitated when the higher organs of each organi-

35. This role is supported by the substantial respect accorded the director of a large enterprise, who is ranked fifth on a scale of occupational prestige and second on a scale of occupational achievement, see Sarapata (1975:66). Furthermore, the senior author suggests that a director who was too democratic might not even retain the prestige necessary to function properly.

zation were controlled by white-collar workers and foremen. It was especially evident when the Party organization was controlled by them. Finally, the activity of the Presidium of the Workers' Council and the Factory Arbitration Commission reflected the *de facto* power relations between management, Party, and Union.

Once the position of an institution in the factory power structure is established it is relatively stable. Normally, it is only changed by outside intervention (typically through personnel shifts in top posts), or through a decline in the importance of groups of employees who had been using the institution in question as their own private instrument of pressure (for example, technological change may lead to an influx of new highly qualified workers into the factory, thereby reducing the importance of other groups of workers).

In the previous section we discussed some of the ways in which managers gained power over the social organizations within the factory with the result that those organizations often did not perform their statutory role. For example, the Factory Committee of the PUWP often collaborated with rather than exercised "control" over management; the Factory Council of the Trade Union did not represent the interests of the employees to the economic administration; organs of worker self-management did not facilitate employee participation in decisionmaking; the Factory Arbitration Commission seldom protected workers' rights properly. In general, all these organs were used by management as instruments to increase the economic effectiveness of the enterprise.

Nevertheless, these organizations were also used by particular groups of workers to exert pressure upon top management. For example, in enterprise K, skilled workers belonging to the "old working class" dominated the Factory Committee, higher and middle production supervisors used the Workers' Council and its Presidium, and young workers controlled the Factory Office of USY. It was interesting to observe how an organization could be used by a particular group to influence management while obediently performing the director's commands in matters related to different groups of employees. This was especially evident when such an organ was controlled by white-collar workers.

The manifest pressure groups did not always correspond to the actual divisions within the enterprise, and not all groups of employees were represented in social organizations. For this reason, the activity of organizations expressed the interests

and demands of only a narrow segment of the factory work force. Different groups of workers have not had an equal opportunity to participate in authority and to use legal power to secure their interests. Therefore, intrafactory conflicts were often not dealt with in the organizational forum.

The factors that favor the development of interest groups may be bound up with the structure of Polish society, and in particular with the internal differentiation of the Polish working class, as well as with circumstances specific to the particular enterprises investigated. Pressure groups often presented their own interests as the vital interests of the entire factory staff and some peculiar group ideologies were expressed. The following clearly differentiated groups became visible in the course of our research:

(1) "Old working class." These workers have typically been brought up in a large city (a high percentage are second and third generation industrial manual workers), have spent more than 20 years in the work force, and have relatively little formal education. They are prone to view worker-management relations in terms of class conflict. Older workers placed more confidence in Trade Union organs and said that workers' demands should be made known to the government through Union channels. They have relatively little faith in factory management and state administrative organs. Their knowledge of the legal provisions governing the organizations studied and of workers' rights and duties within the enterprise was above average. "Old workers" tended to have a legalistic attitude but they also said that "we should aim to change unjust regulations."

(2) Workers 30 to 40 years old, with a secure occupational and social status, differing social origins but high formal and professional qualifications, . 10-20 years experience in the work force, earning high wages, and relatively active socially. They were also knowledgeable about the legal provisions concerning the organizations investigated and about workers' rights and duties in the enterprise but they strongly tended to have an instrumental attitude toward the law (i.e., to adhere to the law is the best way to realize a given purpose, for instance, a higher income, or a bonus).

(3) Young workers, educated and brought up under communism, 25 years old or less, who were often continuing their formal education. Their attitudes toward management, social organizations in the factory, and the law differed significantly from those of their older colleagues. For example, when the in-

terests of the younger workers were threatened they tended to seek redress through administrative channels or, to a lesser extent, through Party channels or the Union of Socialist Youth. Only rarely did they seek help from the Trade Union, which they saw as a social service agency rather than an organization to represent them in conflict. The young workers characteristically were more willing to trust factory management and estimated their own legal knowledge as very great even when they knew almost nothing about the duties and tasks of the Trade Union or Workers' Council, for example. They rarely held positions in social organizations other than the Factory Office of the USY.

Most members of the "active group," 7 to 10 percent of the total factory staff, were recruited from the above groups and from the white-collar workers. The scope and characteristics of the "active group" were a decisive factor in determining the entire social life of the enterprise. Within this category it is necessary to distinguish between the "professional" activist and the "shop-floor" activist.

The "professional" activists have full-time positions in or are members of the highest Party, Union or worker self-management organs within the enterprise and have served in these organs for many years, without any contact with their prior occupation. They identify much more strongly with their organization and with the economic interests of the enterprise than with the interests of shop-floor workers. They regard themselves as a part of the established order and often display a cynical opportunism. Manual workers call them "*apparatchiki*."

The "shop-floor" activists are sharply differentiated from the professionals. They represent a kind of natural working class elite. Many display an authentic dynamism, high social morality, strong professional ambition, and pride in their background as workers. They identify strongly with their workshop and demand the development of "real" worker self-management.

These contrasting characteristics often lead to conflict between the "professional activists" and the worker activists, who are conscious of their interests and power, and sometimes disposed to undertake nonconformist actions. In the enterprises investigated, the conflict between "professional activists" and informal shop-floor leaders seemed to be largely stabilized. To achieve this stability, management and some of the heads of social organizations employed a variety of measures such as

pressure on the members of the Sectional Workers' Councils, or partial appeasement of worker demands. Conflict was also avoided by a common mobilization against the "outside enemy." But the apparent stability was superficial. There were still informal power centers outside the formal organizational structure and informal group leaders who based their shop-floor power on their prestige among manual workers.

The disjunction between the different levels of organizational structure within the enterprise is crucial. Informal shop-floor activists, often members of the Party and Union but unable to identify with the policies espoused by the formal leadership, are actually "shadow functionaries" who escape the control of the organizations to which they are formally affiliated. In the case of industrial disputes they may play a very important role and sometimes even try to gain control over social organizations. Industrial action forces Party members who are workers to choose between loyalty to the Party (which is managed by *apparatchiki*) and to their worker-colleagues from the shop-floor. The accounts of the rapid shop-floor mobilization during the industrial disturbances in June 1956, December 1970, and June 1976 point to the fact that on such occasions it is the worker-activists who are elected to head Strike Committees to negotiate with the higher organs of economic management and the Party.

Our research showed a strong divergence between the organizational structure prescribed by law and operational reality. It would appear, indeed, that legal norms play a secondary role in the social mechanism of the enterprise.³⁶ They constitute, in a sense, the organizational skeleton of the enterprise; but the way this is fleshed out differs greatly from factory to factory. These differences indicate the existence of various individuals and groups whose expectations of the law diverge and frequently conflict. The power exercised by each decides for whose benefit the law is going to be enforced. However, the divergences and the social processes that occur in different enterprises appear to have a high degree of similarity as well as a common genesis.

Despite the extensive nationalization of property in Poland, the degree of socialization is still low whether the criterion is the number of persons involved in determining property issues or the scope of property decisions that are socially controlled. Nationalization eliminated the capitalist class but called into

36. A similar thesis is presented by Kurczewski and Frieske (1977).

being a new, powerful communist bureaucracy, which has become the dominant force in contemporary Poland. Our findings can be explained as expressing the conflict that still exists in Communist industrial enterprises between those in authority and those who are subordinated—conflict that seems to be comparable to the struggle between labor and capital in contemporary Western societies.

There is presently a major conflict between the bureaucracy and the working class. The bureaucracy controls the central government (e.g., through the plan and other legislation) and the industrial enterprises that are expected to fulfill the plan. The working class has relatively little control over either. The power and class consciousness of the working class has increased significantly since World War II, and it now has the desire to participate as co-owner; but existing legal structures do not allow this. Conflict between the bureaucracy and the working class is intensified by the inefficiencies of the present system. Thus, the conditions have developed for a major clash between these two sectors of Polish society.

Analysis of the various industrial laws makes it obvious that the law supports the industrial bureaucracy against the workers. The law, and the official ideology, assumes that there is no conflict in a classless Communist society. It also assumes that all social and economic change in the Communist state is caused by, and can only be controlled by, a powerful and centralized Communist bureaucracy. This emphasis on consensus and centralization serves the interests of those who are in authority, and fails to take account of actual conflicts between the bureaucracy and the workers.

The present bureaucracy resists the development of powerful worker-controlled organizations for various reasons. The emergence of an organization that represented only the interests of the workers or the effective socialization of industrial property would mean a significant reduction in industrial bureaucracy and the power of the *apparatchiki*. This seems to be why the law promulgated by the bureaucrats seeks to deprive workers of the ability to participate effectively in the enterprise management; why the new organizational structures are more an instrument for subduing the working class than for serving its interest; and why every resistance against the ruling bureaucracy brings severe sanctions—as, for example, participation in the spontaneous industrial actions of June, 1976, brought immediate dismissal for many (under § 52.1 of the La-

bor Code) and often imprisonment as well (under § 127.2 of the Penal Code, the so-called anti-strike bill).

CONCLUSION

Empirical observation of the functioning of social organizations and their higher organs in Polish industrial enterprises reveals major divergences between Communist doctrine and the norms and practices of social life. The research did not support the claims of Communist jurisprudence that the newly established organizational structure of the industrial enterprise, and especially worker self-management system, facilitate active participation by workers in the decisionmaking processes within their factory, or that there is a unity of interest between the working class and Communist bureaucracy. Instead, the formal organizational structure of the enterprise is used to centralize power in the hands of the industrial bureaucracy. The institutions investigated were more a *part* of the administration than agents exercising control over it.

This divergence between doctrine and practice is due to the fact that the formal organization of the state, and of industrial organizations in particular, is out of date. The present formal structure does not take into account the changes in the distribution of power that occurred after it was created.

The macrostructure of power in Poland has changed significantly since the legal model of social relations for Communist enterprises was imposed by the new rulers. A new working class has emerged and is developing an offensive against the central authorities. Increasingly, the workers are blaming the central system for problems and inefficiencies and participating in strikes directed against the central state authorities. Although lipservice is paid to worker participation, the bureaucracy maintains control over legislation and plans.

At the factory level, the formal system is also unsuitable for present needs. It neither allows worker participation in the management of the factory nor successfully channels their power. At best it can be used by small groups to promote their particular interests, or by management to increase the effectiveness of the enterprise. Moreover, the current system stimulates the development of informal power structures. This situation creates the possibility of uncontrollable and unpredictable eruptions of industrial action, even when the enterprise seems peaceful on the surface.

The current economic crisis and the growing social pressures for an increase in the living standards have accelerated

the conflict between workers and the bureaucracy. Given the interest of the ruling bureaucracy in economic efficiency and social stability and given the political impossibility of making macrolevel changes in the organization of the Polish economy, introduction of legal changes in the contemporary social organization of industry should be expected.

Most likely, the bureaucracy will suggest some form of decentralization; decisionmaking power will be shifted from the center to the factory in order to increase the efficiency of the centrally planned system. These changes are likely to concern two different issues. First, the actual power of the economic administration within an enterprise, in particular that of the director, will be reflected in new legislation. The role of the director will be more precisely defined in legal terms; the numerous formal restrictions on his power will partly be abolished. Secondly, there will be changes in worker participation. Here it is more difficult to make accurate predictions. The pragmatism that dictates the existence of such legal structures would seek to channel effectively the power of the workers and thereby ensure the resolution of conflict without open confrontation. This could be achieved within the existing structure by subordinating it to shop-floor pressures, or by constructing a totally new system of worker self-management. But changes of this kind would be strongly opposed by the economic administration, by "professional activists," and by top Party and Union functionaries, who would rightly see a threat to their own decisionmaking power, not to mention the possibility of intervention by the Soviet Union. All in all, it seems likely that legal changes in the structure of worker participation will be very limited, aiming basically at the maintenance of the existing status quo.³⁷

Summing up, it can be suggested that if the shift of decisionmaking power from the center to the factory does happen and if it is not followed by the development of an effective system of worker participation, it will mean only a temporary shift of the class conflict from the national level to that of the factory.

37. This conclusion seems to be strongly supported by a series of articles concerning worker self-management and the director's position within industrial enterprise recently published by the weekly *Polityka*. See, e.g., Kasprzyk and Zaręba (1977), Maziarski (1977), Paszyński (1977), Podemski (1977), Urban (1977), and Wróblewski (1977).

REFERENCES

- ABEL, Richard L. (1973) "Law Books and Books about Law," 26 *Stanford Law Review* 175.
- BESKID, Lidia and Krzysztof ZAGÓRSKI (1971) *Robotnicy na Tle Przemian Struktury Społecznej w Polsce*. Warsaw: P.W.N.
- BORUCKA-ARCTOWA, Maria (ed.) (1974) *Świadomość Prawna Robotników*. Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich Wyd. P.A.N.
- BROMKE, Adam (1976) "A New Juncture in Poland," 25 *Problems of Communism* 1.
- CHHIKVAÐZE, V.M. et al. (1970) *Marksistsko-Leninskaia Obschchaia Teoria Gosudarstva i Prava. Osnovnye Instituty i Poniatiia*. Moscow: Iuridicheskaja Literatura.
- (1973) *Marksistsko-Leninskaia Obschchaia Teoria Gosudarstva i Prava. Socialisticheskoe Pravo*. Moscow: Iuridicheskaja Literatura.
- DOKTÓR, Kazimierz, Maria HIRSZOWICZ, Jolanta KULPIŃSKA and Aleksander MATEJKO (1965) "The Rise of the Socialist Model of Industrial Relations," 2 *Polish Sociological Bulletin* 107.
- DYŃOZIŁAK, Ryszard (1967) "Grupy Nacisku w Przedsiębiorstwie Przemysłowym," in M. Hirszowicz (ed.) *Sociologiczne Aspekty Kształtowania się Socjalistycznego Przedsiębiorstwa*. Warsaw: P.W.N.
- EUROPA YEAR BOOK (1976) Volume 1. London: Europa Publications Ltd.
- GREEN, Peter (1977) "Third Round in Poland," 101-102 *New Left Review* 69.
- HIRSZOWICZ, Maria (1973) *Komunistyczny Lewiatan*. Paris: Instytut Literacki.
- HOSER, Jan (1970) *Zawód i Praca Inżyniera*. Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich.
- JAROSZ, Maria (1967) *Samorząd Robotniczy w Przedsiębiorstwie Przemysłowym* Warsaw: P.W.E.
- KASPRZYK, Krzysztof and Janusz ZARĘBA (1977) "Każdy z Nas Robi Swoje," 28 *Polityka* 6 (July 9).
- KIEZUN, Witold (1968) *Dyrektor. Z Problematyki Zarządzania Instytucją*. Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza.
- (1971) *Organizacja Pracy Własnej Dyrektora*. Warsaw: P.W.E.
- KOLAJA, Jiri (1960a) "Workers' Participation in the Management of a Polish Textile Factory," 19 *Human Organization* 13.
- (1960b) *A Polish Factory. A Case Study of Workers' Participation in Decisionmaking*. Lexington: The University of Kentucky Press.
- KOLANKIEWICZ, George (1973a) "The Polish Industrial Manual Class," in D. Lane and G. Kolankiewicz (eds.) *Social Groups in Polish Society*. London: Macmillan.
- (1973b) "The Technical Intelligentsia," in D. Lane and G. Kolankiewicz (eds.) *Social Groups in Polish Society*. London: Macmillan.
- KOWALEWSKI, Stanisław (1967) *Przełożony-Podwładny w Świetle Teorii Organizacji*. Warsaw: P.W.E.
- KRZYKAŁA, Franciszek (1975) *Wprowadzenie do Socjologii Socjalistycznego Przedsiębiorstwa Przemysłowego*. Warsaw: P.W.N.
- KULPIŃSKA, Jolanta (1968) "The Social Functions of an Industrial Enterprise," 2 *The Polish Sociological Bulletin* 50.
- KURCZEWSKI, Jacek and Kazimierz FRIESKE (1977) "Some Problems in the Legal Regulation of the Activities of Economic Institutions," 11 *Law & Society Review* 489.
- ŁOPATKA, Adam (1975) *Wstęp do Prawoznawstwa*. Warsaw: P.W.N.
- ŁYPACEWICZ, Stanisław (1971) *Kierownik i Zespół*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Związkowe CRZZ.
- MAGDONIA, Adam (1972) "Decyzje na Szczepku Zakładu. Gdy Zbiera się Kolektyw," 5 *Trybuna Ludu* 5 (January 6).
- MAGDZIAK, Henryk (1970) *Struktura Organizacyjna i Funkcje Samorządu Robotniczego*. Warsaw: Wydawnictwo Związkowe CRZZ.
- MATEJKO, Aleksander (1962) "Aktywizacja Robotników w Zakładzie Pracy," 6 *Kultura i Społeczeństwo* 119.
- (1969) "Some Sociological Problems of Socialist Factories," 36 *Social Research* 448.
- (1974) *Social Change and Stratification in Eastern Europe: Interpretative Analysis of Poland and Her Neighbours*. New York: Praeger.
- MAZIARSKI, Jacek (1977) "Korzenie Demokracji," 13 *Polityka* 1 (March 26).

- NAROJEK, Winicjusz (1970) "Conceptualization of the Economic System in the Categories of the Sociology of Political Relations," 4 *Polish Round Table Yearbook* 57.
- (1973) *Spółeczeństwo Planujące*. Warsaw: P.W.E.
- OWIECZKO, Adam (1967) "Samorząd Robotniczy w Przedsiębiorstwie Przemysłowym a Załoga," 22 *Studia Sociologiczno Polityczne* 23.
- OZDOWSKI, Seweryn A. (1974) "Charakterystyka Badanej Populacji," in M. Borucka-Arctowa (ed.) *Świadomość Prawna Robotników*. Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich Wyd. P.A.N.
- (1977) "'Workers' Law' and their Legal Consciousness: The Polish Case." Presented at the World Congress on Philosophy of Law and Social Philosophy, Sydney/Canberra (August 14-21).
- PASZYŃSKI, Alexander (1977) "Ostrzenie Piły," 25 *Polityka* 1 (June 18).
- PODEMSKI, Stanisław (1977) "Garnitur w Przemiarkach," 19 *Polityka* 4 (May 7).
- PODGÓRECKI, Adam (1969) "Attitudes to the Workers' Courts," in V. Aubert (ed.) *Sociology of Law*. Baltimore: Penguin.
- (1976a) "Prestiż i Korozja Prawa," 9 *Polityka* 1 (February 28).
- (1976b) "The Global Analysis of Polish Society," 36 *The Polish Sociological Bulletin* 17.
- SARAPATA, Adam (1965) "Klasa Robotnicza w Polsce Ludowej," in A. Sarapata (ed.) *Przemiany Społeczne w Polsce Ludowej*. Warsaw: P.W.N.
- (1970) "Motywacje i Satysfakcje Dyrektorów-Studium Porównawcze," 38 *Studia Socjologiczne* 51.
- (1975) "Z Badań nad Hierarchią Prestiżu Zajęć w Polsce," 56 *Studia Socjologiczne* 47.
- STANISZKIS, Jadwiga (1972) *Patologie Struktur Organizacyjnych* Wrocław: Zakład Narodowy im. Ossolińskich.
- SZCZURKIEWICZ, Tadeusz (1960) "Zmiany w Świadomości Społecznej Społeczeństwa Wielkopolskiego Wywołane Procesami Industrializacji w Polsce Ludowej," 1959/1960 *Rocznik W.S.E. w Poznaniu* 26.
- URBAN, Jerzy (1977) "Ucieczka od Konfliktów," 11 *Polityka* 1 (March 12).
- WACŁAWEK, Juliusz (1975) *Podstawowa Organizacja Partyjna*. Warsaw: Książka i Wiedza.
- WIATR, Jerzy J. (1973) *Spółeczeństwo. Wstęp do Sociologii Systematycznej*. Warsaw: P.W.N.
- WIDERSZPIL, Stanisław (1965) *Skład Polskiej Klasy Robotniczej*. Warsaw: P.W.N.
- WRÓBLEWSKI, Andrzej K. (1977) "Remis . . .," 23 *Polityka* 3 (June 4).