

realise the basic theological belief that God created the resources of the earth for everyone.

- 1 *The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism*, Oxford 1962.
Property (A collection of texts, ed. Macpherson), Oxford 1978.
"Capitalism and the Changing Concept of Property", in *Feudalism, Capitalism and Beyond*, Ed. Kamenka and Neals, London 1975.
- 2 In "Capitalism etc." p 111, 109.
- 3 "The Natural Right of Investment" in *Property*, Macpherson (ed.) p 130.
- 4 *The Sickness of an Acquisitive Society*, 1920, chap v in Macpherson, *Property*, p 149.
- 5 Brian Tierney, *Medieval Poor Law*, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1959. chap II on Property.
- 6 Op. Cit. p 140.

Metaphor, The Self, And The

Language of Religion

Adrian Cunningham

In this paper, I am concerned with some of the ways in which religious language resonates with our sense of being a self, and especially a bodily self. At present we often tend to counterpoise language to the biological and we stress the conventional even arbitrary aspects of language.¹ Religion, however, tends to give language a force that is comparable to that of biology. It is not only that words are creative in that *fiat* which makes the world, or the word which Mary hears as the conception of her son. The whole pattern of the Judaeo-Christian tradition is a pattern only because similarities of meaning have historical force, as the sacrifice of Isaac is linked to the sacrifice of Christ for instance. Things of similar meaning tend to be taken as linked in actuality, either by historical causality, or by being seen as different manifestations of a basic underlying pattern. In general, religious language tends to give a real dimension to linguistic usage that we would tend to say is 'only metaphorical': 'I was in the seventh heaven', 'Christ is present in the Eucharist'. Those religious traditions in which the issue of such language being 'only metaphorical' has arisen, have rejected it as a sufficient account of what they mean. There is no question of our being able to translate religious usage into metaphorical or poetic usage in any easy fashion. But attention to meta-

phor may help us to see the intelligibility of religious language, even if we cannot always take it as comprehensible. Thus consideration of what it means to be 'lost in thought' may help us to understand a little more what someone may mean when they say 'whether I was in the body or out of the body, I know not'. I shall suggest that our ordinary usage of language is a good deal more like the seeming oddities of religion than some of our theories about language will allow, and, further that certain features of metaphorical and religious language can be illuminated by considering the emergence of the sense of being a self.

Some of our puzzles about religion seem to me to be related to changes in our view of language. By 'our' I mean reasonably educated modern Westerners. The more widely one reads the more likely it seems that our common-sense view of the world is, in an historical and comparative perspective, rather peculiar. I think that this peculiarity can be seen in relation to three taken-for-granted criteria of what counts as reliable knowledge. The first is the taking of the visual as the key mode of apprehension, rather than the oral-aural as would seem to be the case in mediaeval Europe, so that we have difficulty in treating as real things that we cannot visualise. The second is the drawing of an over-sharp boundary, as deceptive as it is influential, between an outer world of things and an inner world of feelings and imaginings. This error is compounded when notions of objectivity and subjectivity are deployed as if they naturally belonged on either side of that *same* boundary, making it difficult for us to think clearly about the objectivity appropriate to subjective states. The third is the sense of 'I' (ego) as the sole and continuous agent of my actions and the locus of my identity. Thus, we might have difficulty in seeing the precision of the phrasing in 'Into your hands, Lord, I commend my spirit'. We would probably be happier with saying 'I commend myself', taking 'myself' as merely the grammatical convention for 'I' in this kind of utterance. That there might be a substantial difference between I and spirit, or between I and myself would seem to us most peculiar, perhaps rather frightening.

When Cajetan says, 'Whatever good we do is Christ in us, Christ as sole thinker, seer, actor' he is describing something which we could say involves transcendence of the ego. Transcendence of the ego, however, can also occur when it is not the Holy Spirit that takes over but spirits, especially evil ones. To avoid the positive overtones of 'transcend' we might use the more neutral term 'de-centre'. Thus, both Christ in us and spirits in us involves a de-centring of ego with regard to our common-sense view of its central position. Somerset Maugham somewhere remarked:

There are times when I look over the various parts of my char-

acter with perplexity. I recognize that I am made up of several persons and that the person that at the moment has the upper hand will inevitably give place to another. But which is the real one? All of them or none?

I would suggest that the experience described here, the indwelling of Christ, spirit possession, and the dissociation of centres of awareness which is schizophrenia, whilst they are distinct, can be related to one another. What they have in common is that ego is pushed off, or not allowed on to the centre of the stage of activity. In these instances, relationships between the centre and periphery of action have changed. And this affects the issue of where we think the boundaries of our experience lie. Sometimes discrimination of inner and outer in our experience are coincident with the sense of the inside and the outside of our body. Sometimes, however, the simplicity of this distinction of what is inside the body from what is outside is misleading as a basis for our discriminations and it is better to think of the boundary of the surface of the body as providing only one among many sources of reference for what we take to be inner and what we take to be outer.

The idea may seem complicated but it is in fact a very simple one and can help illuminate some awkward issues in religion. For instance, a root metaphor of much anthropological, psychological and sociological study of religion over the last one hundred and thirty-five years is that religion is a series of 'projections' of inner realities into outer ones. The idea is at once a powerful one and yet to the religious mind unsatisfactory, and not only on account of the reductionist purpose of which it is usually an instrument. One reason for both the appeal and the lack of satisfaction is that this idea of our exchanges with objects (real or imagined) is usually couched in terms of simple dichotomies of inner and outer, self and others, imaginings and objects, feelings and bodies. The question never seriously asked of the congeries of theories (those of Marx, Durkheim, Freud and so on) required to make the metaphor scientifically defensible is *how* exactly is this process of projection possible in groups and in individuals? As far as I can see the only really detailed work that has been done here is by psychoanalysts. To summarise a complex argument: the a priori possibility of projections of any kind is that we are able to confuse our awareness of inner and of outer states. For instance, to project the father-figure on to God involves four factors: my actual father, 'God' (that, whatever it is, upon which I project) independent of me, a father-image within me capable of referring to both my actual father and 'God' outside me, and an ego which is sufficiently distinct from the father-image within the personality to be able to confuse it with the external father/'God'. That is, projection

theory requires, at root, the possibility of ego confusing different kinds of realities which are outside the personality (father, 'God') with realities which are inside the personality (father-image, emotions). The boundary between ego and non-ego turns out to be two-fold; that is, a non-ego area outside the personality, and a non-ego within the personality. If this is not the case, the confusion of the two implicitly required by projection theories could not occur.

In general, that is, the distinction between subjective and objective is not equivalent to that between the interior and the exterior of persons. One advantage of psychoanalytical language in the investigation of religion is that it provides means of a novel kind for discussing the objectivity of many 'subjective' phenomena – in particular, image and fantasy in their coherent and regular forms and not just in their arbitrary and wholly individual forms.

* * *

As a highly sophisticated and representative sample of traditional religious thinking about metaphor and about metaphysics which raises the key issues, let us take this description of an Indian temple:

The altar, like the sacred hearth, is always theoretically at the centre or navel of the earth, and the solar eye of the dome is always in the centre of the ceiling or *coelum* immediately above it; and these two are connected in principle, as they were in some early structures in fact, by an axial pillar at once uniting and separating floor and roof, and supporting the latter; as it was in the beginning, when heaven and earth, that had been one, were 'pillared apart' by the Creator. It is by this pillar – regarded as a bridge, or ladder, or because of its immateriality, as a bird on wings . . . that ascent must be made. . . .²

One has here the idea that a fundamental symbolism links the three 'houses of the Spirit' – the bodily, architectural, and cosmic. There is also the sense of the bodily shape of the temple echoing the separation of heaven and earth, male and female, in the beginning. The axis is present in principle even when not physically represented. This axis both unites and separates. By considering this functional relation of above and below, a bird can be an appropriate associated symbol, an intermediary between heaven and earth. In context, this move from non-existent pillar to bird is perfectly intelligible. Out of context, it could easily feature as part of a list of confusions of the primitive mind. The category of primitive thought is now rather studiously avoided, but it had one positive function in highlighting oddities of usage which still remain and require explanation. Elsewhere, the same writer, Coomaraswamy,

will explicitly defend 'primitive mentality':

The eagle or the lion is not so much a symbol or image *of* the sun as it *is* the sun in a likeness (the form being more important than the nature in which it may be manifested); and in the same way every house *is* the world in a likeness, and every altar situated at the centre of the earth; it is only because we are more interested in what things are than in what they mean, more interested in particular facts than universal ideas, that this is inconceivable to us. (*ibid.* 295)

This strikes me as a good example of a substantial and metaphysical view of what we should want to call 'only metaphorical'. In trying to render this position more intelligible, it is necessary to be clear that, whilst it may on occasion be, such symbolizing is not essentially, the *substitution* of one thing for another. This is a common error and one that still affects much Freudian thought. As is notoriously the case, classical psychoanalysis held that while there is an infinite number of possible symbols, what is symbolized will turn out to be one of only half a dozen things: birth, death, parenthood, sexuality and so on. The mistake, of course, is that whilst from the Genesis story to the earlier films of Ingmar Bergman the falling of rain may be a substitute for the depiction of sexual relations, sexuality is not a thing but a major and indefinitely complex sector of human experience. So the simplicity of the half dozen things symbolized vanishes.³ The classic Freudian case has often been derided, but the consequences of its rejection rarely thought out. If, as here, one questions the notion of substitution with regard to specific contents, one can press on and question it with regard to symbolization considered as a *process* of substitution. What one is questioning here is the idea that symbolic utterances may, with varying ease or difficulty, be translated into non-symbolic ones. Some, indeed, may. Some may be translated *back* into non-symbolic terms from which they have arisen. Others, however, may not. "I'm burning to see you" seems to me direct and effective; to translate it into something else is only to complicate and confuse the issue. This was, of course, a major issue in the early psychoanalytic movement and to some extent remains so. The issue is whether all symbolizing is primarily to be examined for its substitutive or defensive function (that is, seen as derivative from something non-symbolic), or whether symbolizing as such is a natural human activity, like the use of language to which it is closely allied. To grant this independence to symbolizing no more means that one abandons scientific investigation of its regularities and oddities than it does in the case of language. It does, though, determine profoundly the angle and spirit of investigation. For instance, it is often objected to certain studies of rel-

igion (those of Eliade and Jung in particular) that one is simply referred from one symbol to another. As always, some circles are vicious and others beneficent. But, that the meaning of a symbol is its translation into another symbol is a perfectly proper interpretative principle (at least since C. S. Peirce). The idea that it is always wrong to refer one symbol to another implies that all symbolic utterances can be translated into non-symbolic ones, and this is, of course, absurd.

Besides the error of thinking that symbolism substitutes one thing for another, one should also note the error of thinking that symbolism *identifies* one thing with another, in the strong sense of identification. For if this were to happen, if the symbol is identified with what it symbolizes, then communication ceases to be possible. A schizophrenic asked why he had ceased to play the violin replied, with some violence, 'Do you expect me to masturbate in public?' The obvious symbolic possibilities of the action are lost in the concretization of the symbol. The overstressing of the analogy makes playing impossible. The person is talking but is not communicating either with us or with himself. In such instances, 'the means of communication are lacking since the symbols are felt in a concrete fashion and are therefore unavailable for purposes of communication,'⁴ This can be argued further, but I accept the example. Symbols are neither arbitrarily related to what they symbolize, nor is the symbol to be taken as fused with what it symbolizes if communication is to be possible.

Does the bird as manifestation of the sun, in my example, or the linking of the rose with the Virgin in Christianity imply such a fusion? Clearly not. The devout rose-grower may set about his clippers and fertilizers and believe in the Rose of Sharon and the Mystical Rose of the litany of Loreto. A violinist might be well aware of the symbolic potential of his instrument; indeed, some pop guitarists seem to have let this go to their heads. The matter is not simple. The primitive or religious mind is quite capable of thinking X is also Y and *using* X and Y differentially. Likewise, to recognise the distinction of X and Y in practical matters does not mean that one cannot also, on occasion, assert their connexion. The difficulty lies with us, in thinking that a certain kind of practical use is normative, the reliable area from which everything else is to be seen as derivative.

The position being presented here may be illustrated by consideration of an important bodily and religious symbol, that of the heart. It may be significant of our own time that whilst we give a lot of attention to symbolism of the body's surface, especially the signs of sexual differentiation, we seem to have an undifferentiated sense of space within the body.⁵ We do speak of people 'getting

their heads together', of gut-reactions and heartaches, and we have a general awareness of psychosomatic disturbances, but we do not seem to have those fairly precise inner biographies, characteristic of many cultures, correlating regions of the body and emotional and mental states. It is, of course, difficult to ascertain just how really those correlations were experienced, but there does seem in our case to be a diminished range of reference: the connexions of the physical, the symbolic, and the metaphysical in traditional symbolism can grate on us.

In Buddhism there is the Diamond Heart, in Judaism belief that the heart is the dwelling of God, in Hinduism the dwelling-place of Brahma, in Taoism the seat of understanding. In Christianity there is the Sacred Heart of Jesus. The common motif is of the heart as the centre of being, in *both* physical and spiritual senses. Esoterically, the heart is the symbolic seat of intellect in us, which exteriorized and polarized produces mind and body. 'As mind is the centre of body, so the Heart is the centre of both', and thus a symbol of the self as opposed to the ego. When we think of our rather vague sense of the heart having reasons of its own, then we can see that the esoteric belief is not that esoteric. The heart represents a point where feeling and intellect meet independent of ego, and thus imply the presence of the soul. One searches one's heart, one asks 'can you find it in your heart to forgive?'

We do not always find it easy to pick up the most precise resonances of the image of the heart in Christian tradition. Devotion to the Sacred Heart (the subject of two of Rahner's most fascinating papers)⁶ seems too mixed up with folk Catholicism, and more recently with integrisme and political reaction, to be something we take to readily, if at all. And we can be puzzled when religious tradition speaks of God appearing to the mind in the heart (St John of the Ladder), or the various traditions of 'the eye of the heart'. St Simeon speaks of 'opening the eyes of the heart', as do the Sufis; in Hinduism the eye of the heart is the third eye of Siva, transcendent wisdom, omniscient spirit. This idea of the heart as a sanctuary made active by the Spirit (St Gregory of Sinai) is not merely a conceptual device. It also can have specific bodily reference, and again this can puzzle us; like the Sacred Heart of Jesus its physicality can seem to us as tending towards the naive and the gross. We are perhaps happier with something a little more rarefied like breath, and thus sympathetic to passages like this from Nicephorus the Solitary:

. . . breathing is a natural way to the heart. And so having collected your mind within you, load it into the channel of breathing through which air reaches the heart, and together with this inhaled air, force your mind to descend into the heart and re-

main there. Accustom it . . . not to come out of the heart too soon, for at first it feels very lonely in that inner seclusion and imprisonment. But when it gets accustomed to it, it begins on the contrary to dislike its aimless circling outside, for it is no longer unpleasant and wearisome for it to be within.⁷

This passage should suggest that we are not dealing with a metaphor in the sense of a transfer of meaning between otherwise distinct entities, any more than we are when considering the intensity that devotion to the Sacred Heart can arouse. We are dealing with something more mysterious and more resilient than what can be conveyed by the idea of such a transfer. The symbolic resources drawn upon in the examples I have given seem to indicate the reverse of a transfer; they seem to draw upon a level of experience which is definite but resists definition, where we do not put already existing separate things together but try to establish the separateness of things amidst their inter-connexions. Let us consider one way in which we might come to know the meaning of heart. A child, for instance, may become familiar with a range of meanings which all imply something central: 'putting one's heart into something', 'with all my heart', 'getting to the heart of the matter', 'being in the heart of the countryside', 'being light-hearted'. It may come much later and as something of a surprise to see a heart in a butcher's shop and to realise that one has something like that inside oneself! Of course, people learn things in different ways but it seems clear to me that, typically, we do not move from the physical object, heart, to metaphorical transpositions or applications of it. Rather, we come upon the physical heart as a highly concrete, even crucial, instance of the range of meanings of the centre of life, the place where life is most precious. It would be a mistake to take this crucial physical instance of a meaning as if it were, thereby, the origin of the meaning for us.

In rejecting both the view of symbolizing as substitution of one thing for another, and the view of it as identification of one thing with another, I am necessarily rejecting the idea that symbolizing involves regression to an early stage of development at which we *fail* to see the world correctly, as adults do, with clear boundaries between one thing and another, and between ego and non-ego (understood as outside the body). However, it does seem to me likely that symbolizing is connected with very early experiences in which boundaries are established between what is I and what is not-I. Some pertinent observations here arise from study of the nature of playing in infancy and the question, which is a good one although it sounds a bit odd, of *where* playing takes place. We spend most of our time neither in overt behaviour nor in contemplation of ourselves, but somewhere else. *Where* is that somewhere

else? When we are in a muddle or at sea, where are we? Isn't it our experience that the place where we live, where we experience, is some third place between behaviour and contemplation, between inner and outer, 'an intermediate area of experiencing, to which inner reality and external life both contribute'. As Winnicott says, 'the playing child inhabits an area that cannot be easily left, nor can it easily admit intrusions. This area of playing is not inner psychic reality. *It is outside the individual but it is not the external world.*'⁸ This world of play is beyond our ordinary distinction between the perceptual image produced by the world's impingement upon our sensory system and the mental image produced by the mind itself. A sphere and a manner of relating have been created in which things are neither just what they are perceptually or flimsy imaginings. To the privileged toy or object of infancy, the teddy bear or the piece of blanket, Winnicott gave the name 'transitional object'. The realm of the transitional object is not only as he claimed, but did not elaborate upon, the source of a cultural life, it also has an obvious bearing upon the religious life. As Paul Pruyser has observed:

The transcendent, the holy, and mystery are not recognizable in this external world by plain realistic viewing and hearing, nor do they arise directly in the mind as pleasurable fictions. They arise from an intermediate zone of reality that is also an intermediate human activity — neither purely subjective nor purely objective. They derive from transformations of the subjective into something original, as they derive from the transformation of the objective into something special.⁹

A celebrated example of Winnicott's is that of the child who had run pieces of string between various pieces of furniture. It was already probable that the child was concerned about its mother's absence. The originality of Winnicott's observation was that the string both linked the items of furniture and drew attention to the space between them. One might ask of the completed scene whether the items were linked or whether their separateness was emphasized, whether there was more space between the pieces of furniture with the string or without it. Recall 'the axial pillar at once uniting and separating floor and roof' in the Indian temple. What is going on in the string game is an exploration of the nature of 'relatability' of remarkable sophistication. With luck, in infancy we can separate out various strands of our experiencing without experiencing too much of a sense of separation, of alienation:

In separating-out, separation is avoided by the filling in of the potential space with creative playing, with the use of symbols, and with all that eventually adds up to a cultural life. (Winni-

cott, *ibid.* p 128)

Winnicott's contribution is so important because it offers an account of the capacity for symbol formation in the infant and, unlike most discussions, is not restricted to talk of symbol and *things* symbolized; it directs us to the symbolic aspect of relationships and prepositions and their roots in human development.¹⁰

Symbolizing and the establishment of these basic senses of bounded identity are pre-linguistic. I shall, however, take linguistic examples to round out my case, drawing attention to four types of metaphoric usage. First, there is what I shall call original metaphor. John Donne's 'Busy old fool, unruly sun . . .' puts together otherwise unrelated things to convey a new meaning. This is what we commonly understand by metaphor – a putting of things together, a transfer of meaning, a construction. We are thus disposed to ally metaphor to the idea of the world as a human construction, reality as socially constructed. There is, however, another form of original metaphor which is less often recognised and which relies less on a construction and more on a revealing of an association that was, one feels, already there, latent. Sexual innuendo or *double entendre* is a prime example. Nothing is put together, nothing is added. We are simply given a clue by tone of voice or expression of the eye to read or hear what is there in more than one way. 'She invited him home and he came immediately.' A simple example, but it suggests to me that the 'double' is not put in, rather we normally leave it out. I think that there may be various kinds of association of this kind, from functional analogy to similarity of sound, which we experience, once alerted, as 'already there'. Thirdly, there are established metaphors or clichés, one could call them dead metaphors. For example, 'flogging a dead horse' or 'raining cats and dogs'. We use these phrases without any suggestion of visualization or awareness that they might be found at all odd. We may even say that it was *literally* raining cats and dogs'. It is perhaps not considered as seriously as it should be how one distinguishes living from dead metaphor in an exotic or ancient culture. Imagine what a Martian anthropologist might infer about mental processes from our seeming association of rain with animals falling out of the sky. . . .

Lastly, there are metaphors which are like those 'revealed' in my second category above. They are 'already there', like the possibilities of sexual innuendo, but in a much deeper way. They seem built into the fabric of our language in an absolute way. There are obvious difficulties associated with talk of such root terms, all the problems of phoney folk-lore and phoney philology, and the sands into which Jungian efforts to establish specific contents (Great Mothers, Eternal Children etc.) on a universal basis have run. Nonetheless . . . I think one might start not with con-

tents but with forms or processes. In the present case, one might consider *relational* terms – for instance, the value of ‘in’ that has featured in several of my examples: the various instances of having something ‘in mind’, being saved ‘in Christ’, being lost ‘in play’. These are both ordinary remarks and, if one thinks carefully about them, extraordinary ones with respect to what we are expected to consider normal. I suggest that the force of these terms derives from an early exploration of what is in the body and out of the body, and, by the same token, that we can, on occasion, link up differentiated senses of the less-differentiated sense of ‘in’.

Overall, my suggestion is that some of the power of religious language and its resistance to exhaustion resides in this: that it engages in a formal way basic senses of connexion and distance, association and separating-out that are close to our core experience of emergence into a world. Our quest for the understanding of religious realities runs out (and yet remains intelligible in its incompleteness) at the point where the examination of the roots of our own experience runs out. We reach the point where we have to say, in an exact sense,

‘This is where I came in.’

A version of this paper was first given at the second Consultation on Implicit Religion, June 1979.

- 1 I have not commented in the body of this paper on the view that the relation between symbol and symbolized is of an arbitrary nature. This is, I think, a bad misreading of an original point, that the relation between sound and meaning is of an arbitrary nature. The error lies in not specifying, ‘arbitrary for whom?’ Clearly, users of the language could not use the language if they took seriously the arbitrary nature of the sounds they were employing. From outside the language, the connexions are arbitrary. From inside, the conventional links have the over-riding force of the natural, the taken-for-granted. Quite a few of the most serious criticisms of Lévi-Strauss hinges on this point.

For the purposes of this paper, I quite deliberately do not distinguish symbol and metaphor, for the point I am endeavouring to make rests upon a degree of interchange of visual (“symbolic”) and oral-aural (“metaphoric”) elements.

- 2 Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, ‘The Indian Temple: Kandarya Mahadeo’ reprinted in *Selected Papers* vol 1, R. Lipsey ed. New York 1977.
- 3 An elegant exposure of the Freudian problem here is given in Charles Rycroft’s essay in I. M. Lewis ed. *Symbols and Sentiment* 1978.
- 4 The violin example and quotation are taken from Hanna Segal ‘Notes on Symbol Formation’ *International Journal of Psycho-Analysis* vol 39, 1957.
- 5 Erik H. Erikson, ‘Inner and Outer Space: Reflections on Womanhood’, *Daedalus* 93 no 2 1964 pp 582-606.
- 6 “Behold This Heart!” Preliminaries to a Theology of Devotion to the Sacred Heart’, and ‘Some Theses for a Theology of Devotion to the Sacred Heart’, chaps 21 and 22 of *Theological Investigations* vol 3 1963.

- 7 *Writings from the Philokalia on Prayer of the Heart* trans. E. Kadloubovsky and G. E. H. Palmer 1951, p 33. A splendid source of material from Christian and other traditions is provided by *Le Coeur*, Les Etudes Carmelitaines, 1950.
- 8 D. W. Winnicott, *Playing and Reality* (Penguin 1974) p 60.
- 9 Paul W. Pruyser, *Between Belief and Unbelief* 1974 pp 110-113. I am grateful to Wendy Robinson for alerting me to this passage. See also Buber's 'Distance and Relation' *Hibbert Journal* Jan. 1951.
- 10 This said, no theory of symbolism can stand on its own. One line of connexion may lie with Rahner's sketch of an ontological basis for the symbol apart from all notions of transfer, projection, substitution and identification noted earlier. He argues that since in the long run anything agrees in some way or another with everything else, it would be a false start for a theory of symbolism to start with similarities between different items. A basis is to be sought in the fact that beings are not only identities but also and simultaneously multiplicities, 'plural moments in the unity of a being'. Thus, it is only by expressing itself that a being can know itself and be known by others. It is the basic principle of an ontology of symbolism that 'all beings are by their nature symbolic, because they necessarily express themselves in order to attain their own nature.' A symbol is not then something separate from the symbolized: 'symbolic reality is the self-realization of a being in the other, which is constitutive of its essence.' As he summarizes his position, carefully if complexly, '... the symbol is the reality, constituted by the thing symbolized as an inner moment of itself, which reveals and proclaims the thing symbolized, and is itself full of the thing symbolized, being its concrete form of existence.'
- Chapter 9 of 'The theology of the Symbol', *Theological Investigations* vol 4 1966. Cf. 'Poetry and the Christian' in vol 4 and 'Priest and Poet' vol 3.

A Letter From Tanzania:

"God has no favourites"

Marcel Boivin W F

January, in this part of Tanzania, is perhaps the most enchanting, spring-like month of the year. The November and December light rains have re-vitalized the soil and the planted seeds begin to rise from the ground. People are looking ahead to the heavy rains soon to come: with hope, for if the rain falls in due measure the harvest will be plentiful; also with anxiety, for angry storms might form which could devastate the promising crops.

January 1981 has, to me, this peculiarity that it happens to coincide with a comparable phase of transition unfolding in my own life. For the last five years, I have had the good fortune of being engaged in the pastoral ministry, in a village of North-West Tanzania. There, in unison with the peaceful rhythm of days and