hope for mankind. Again and again had the demon of war been cast out of the house of the peoples and the house swept clean by a treaty of peace; only to prepare a time when he would enter in again with spirits worse than himself. The house must now be given a tenant who could hold it against all such. Convenient, indeed indispensable, as statesmen found the newly planned League of Nations to be for the execution of present plans of peace and reparation, they saw it in a new aspect before their work was finished. They saw it as the main object of the peace, as the only thing that could complete it or make it worth while. They saw it as the hope of the world, and that hope they did not dare to disappoint. Shall we or any other free people hesitate to accept this great duty? Dare we reject it and break the heart of the world?

LETTER OF HONORABLE ELIHU ROOT TO HONORABLE WILL H. HAYS REGARDING THE COVENANT OF THE LEAGUE OF NATIONS

NEW YORK, *March* 29, 1919.

The Honorable WILL H. HAYS,
Chairman, etc.

DEAR SIR: I have received your letter of March 24 and I give you herewith at perhaps inordinate length my views regarding the proposed convention for a League of Nations.

I am sure that all of us earnestly desire that there shall be an effective international organization to preserve the peace of the world, and that our country shall do its full share toward the establishment and maintenance of such an organization. I do not see much real controversy about that among the American people, either between parties, or within parties, or otherwise.

There is, however, a serious question whether the particular proposed agreement which is now under discussion by the Peace Conference in Paris under the title a "Constitution of a League of Nations" will accomplish that end in its present form, and whether it cannot be made more effective and free from objection. A careful study of the paper under the urging of intense interest in the subject has led me to the conclusion that a large part of its provisions will be of great value, but that it has very serious faults, which may

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lead to the ultimate failure of the whole scheme unless they are remedied, and some faults which unnecessarily and without any benefit whatever to the project tend to embarrass and hinder the United States in giving its full support to the scheme.

I think there should be several very important amendments to the agreement.

This seems to be the general view. Mr. Taft, who joined the President in advocating the agreement, says it ought to be amended, almost as strongly as his former Secretary of State, Senator Knox, says the same thing. When Mr. Lodge and Mr. Lowell had their great debate in Boston both said the agreement ought to be amended.

A discussion of the merits and faults of the scheme with a view to amendment is now the regular order of business. It was to give an opportunity for such a discussion that the paper was reported to the Paris Conference and made public by the committee that prepared it.

At the time of the report, Lord Robert Cecil, who represented Great Britain in the committee, said: "I rejoice very much that the course which has been taken this afternoon has been pursued. It seems to me a good omen for the great project in which we are engaged that before its final completion it should have been published to the world and laid before all its people for their service and for their criticism."

Signor Orlando, who represented Italy, said: "We all expect from the discussion and development of the present act a renewal of the whole world, but, as the present debate has for its object to bring the whole scheme before the public opinion of the world, I wish to bring to that debate my personal contribution."

M. Leon Bourgeois, who represented France in the committee, said: "Lord Robert Cecil has said we now present to the Conference and to the world the result of our work, but we do not present it as something that is final, but only as the result of an honest effort to be discussed and to be examined not only by this Conference, but the public opinion of the world."

At that very time M. Bourgeois suggested an amendment about which I shall say something presently, and he went on to say: "The observations we have made on some points will, we hope, be of some value in the further discussions, since we are at the beginning of the examination of the whole plan."

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These gentlemen represented all the great Allies by whose side we have been fighting in Europe, and it is plain that they expected and wished that the scheme which they had reported should be subjected to public discussion and criticism in their own countries and in ours. It is also plain that they saw no reason why the proposed agreement should be rushed through in such haste that there would not be an opportunity for public discussion and criticism and for communicating the results to the Conference.

Under our Constitution it is the business of the Senate to take the lead in such a discussion, to compare the different opinions expressed in the several States and to draft in proper form the amendments which the public judgment seems to call for. It is unfortunate that the Senate has not been permitted to perform that duty in this case. It seems to me that the Senate ought to have been convened for that purpose immediately after the 4th of March. In addition to the regular and extra sessions of Congress the Senate has been convened separately in special session forty-two times since it was first organized, ordinarily to confirm a few appointments or pass on unimportant treaties, never for any reason more important than exists now.

There is a special reason why the Senate should consider this proposed agreement. Ordinarily treaties are negotiated by ambassadors, ministers, or delegates, and their work is supervised and corrected if need be by the President and Secretary of State at Washington, who from their different points of view frequently see things the actual negotiators overlook. In this case, since the President himself is negotiating the treaty in Paris, there is no one in Washington to supervise the negotiation, and there is no one with authority to give the negotiators the benefit of independent official judgment, unless the Senate is to perform that function.

This situation throws upon the people of the country the duty to answer the expectations of the Conference by studying and discussing and expressing their opinions on the various provisions of the proposed agreement, and to make their expressions of opinion heard the best way they can.

The avowed object of the agreement is to prevent future wars. That is what interests us. We are not trying to get anything for ourselves from the Paris Conference. We are not asking any help from the other nations who are in the Conference, but we would like

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to do our part toward preventing future wars. How does the proposed scheme undertake to do that?

To answer that question one must call to mind the conditions to which the scheme is to be applied.

All the causes of war fall in two distinct classes.

One class consists of controversies about rights under the law of nations and under treaties. In a general way these are described as justiciable or judicial questions. They are similar to the questions between individuals which courts are all the time deciding. They cover by far the greater number of questions upon which controversies between nations arise.

For more than half a century the American Government has been urging upon the world the settlement of all such questions by arbitration. Presidents Grant, Arthur, Harrison, Cleveland, McKinley, Roosevelt and Taft strongly approved the establishment of a system of arbitration in their messages to Congress. Thirty years ago our Congress adopted a resolution requesting the President to invite negotiations with every other Government "to the end that any differences or disputes arising between the two Governments which cannot be adjusted by diplomatic agency may be referred to arbitration and be peaceably adjusted by such means."

President McKinley in his first inaugural declared: "The adjustment of difficulties by judicial methods rather than force of arms has been recognized as the leading feature of our foreign policy throughout our entire national history."

We have illustrated the benefits of this method of settling disputes by the Alabama arbitration in 1872, the Bering Sea arbitration in 1893, the Alaska boundary tribunal in 1903, the North Atlantic fisheries arbitration in 1910.

The two great international conferences at The Hague in 1899 and in 1907 established a permanent court of arbitration and rules of procedure. They also made great progress in agreeing upon and codifying the rules of international law which this court was to administer.

There was a weakness in the system devised by The Hague Conference. It was that arbitration of these justiciable questions was not made obligatory, so that no nation could bring another before the court unless the defendant was willing to come, and there was no way to enforce a judgment.

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But the public opinion of the world grew. Nations began to make obligatory treaties of arbitration with one another. Hundreds of such treaties were made. The United States made some thirty such treaties with most of the principal countries in the world agreeing absolutely to arbitrate questions arising under international law and upon the interpretation of treaties.

A strong opinion arose in favor of establishing an international court composed of judges who would devote their entire time to the business of the court. The Second Hague Conference adopted a plan for such a court, and while Mr. Knox was Secretary of State he negotiated a treaty with the other great Powers for its effective establishment. It became evident that the world was ready for obligatory arbitration of justiciable questions.

After the great war began the American "League to Enforce Peace," at the head of which are Mr. Taft and Mr. Lowell, made the first plank in its platform that "All justiciable questions arising between the signatory Powers not settled by negotiation shall—subject to the limitation of treaties—be submitted to a judicial tribunal for hearing and judgment, etc."

A similar group in Great Britain, of which Lord Bryce was a leading spirit, made the first plank in its platform the following:

> The signatory Powers to agree to refer to the existing Permanent Court of Arbitration at the Hague, or to the Court of Arbitral Justice proposed at the Second Hague Conference, if and when such court shall be established, or to some other arbitral tribunal, all disputes between them (including those affecting honor and vital interests) which are of a justiciable character, and which the Powers concerned have failed to settle by diplomatic methods.

And both of these groups proposed to provide for enforcing the judgments of the court by economic pressure or by force.

The other class of disputes which give rise to war consists of clashes between conflicting national policies, as distinguished from claims of legal right. They do not depend upon questions of law or treaty, but upon one nation or ruler undertaking to do something that another nation or ruler wishes to prevent.

Such questions are a part of international politics. They are similar to the questions as to which our courts say "This is a political question, not a judicial question, and we have no concern with it." The question whether Russia should help Servia when Austria in-

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vaded Servia in July, 1914, is an illustration. Our own Monroe Doctrine is another illustration. That is not an assertion of any legal right, but it is a declaration that certain acts will be regarded as dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States and therefore unfriendly.

Such questions are continually arising in Europe and the Near East, and the way in which the European countries have been in the habit of dealing with them has been to bring about a conference of the representatives of the different nations to discuss the subject and find some way of reconciling the differences, or of convincing the parties to the dispute that it would not be safe for them to break the peace.

For example, in 1905, when the German Emperor's dramatic challenge of the policy of France as to Morocco had made war seem probable, the Algeciras Conference was brought about largely by the influence of President Roosevelt and that conference resulted in preventing war. In 1912, when the Balkan wars had brought Europe apparently to the verge of universal war, the Ambassadors of all the great Powers met in London and the result of their conference was to avert war. So, in the last week of July, 1914, Sir Edward Grey tried to bring about another conference for the purpose of averting the great war in which we have been engaged, but Germany refused to attend the conference, and she refused because she meant to bring on the war, and knew that if she attended a conference it would become practically impossible for her to do so.

The weak point about this practice of international conferences in times of danger was that they were left solely to the initiative of the individual nations; that nobody had a right to call a conference and nobody was bound to attend one.

The great and essential thing about the plan contained in this "Constitution for a League of Nations" is that it makes international conferences on political questions compulsory in times of danger; that it brings together such conferences upon the call of officers who represent all the Powers and makes it practically impossible for any nation to keep out of them.

This effect is produced by the provisions of Article 15, relating to the submission of disputes to the Executive Council of the League or upon demand of either party to the Body of Delegates. Article 15 is the central and controlling article of the agreement. Putting

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out of consideration for the moment Article 10, which relates to a mutual guarantee of territory, Articles 8 and 9, which relate to the reduction of armaments, and Article 19, which relates to mandataries, all the other important articles in the agreement are designed to make effective the conference of the Powers resulting from the submission of a dispute upon a question of policy under Article 15.

Especially important among these ancillary articles is Article 11, which declares war or threat of war to be a matter of concern to the whole League; Article 12, which prohibits going to war without the submission of the dispute and without allowing time for its settlement, or contrary to a unanimous recommendation of the Executive Council or an award of arbitrators (if there shall have been an arbitration), and Article 16, which provides for enforcing the provisions of Article 12 by economic boycott or, should the Powers choose to do so, by military force.

I think these provisions are well devised and should be regarded as free from any just objection, so far as they relate to the settlement of the political questions at which they are really aimed. The provisions, which, taken together, accomplish this result, are of the highest value. They are developed naturally from the international practice of the past. They are a great step forward. They create an institution through which the public opinion of mankind, condemning unjust aggression and unnecessary war, may receive, effect, and exert its power for the preservation of peace, instead of being dissipated in fruitless protest or lamentation. The effect will be to make the sort of conference which Sir Edward Grey tried in vain to get for the purpose of averting this great war obligatory, inevitable, automatic. I think everybody ought to be in favor of that.

I repeat that this scheme for the settlement of political questions such as brought about the present war is of very great practical value and it would be a sad thing if this opportunity for the establishment of such a safeguard against future wars should be lost.

This plan of automatic conference, however, is accompanied by serious defects.

The scheme practically abandons all effort to promote or maintain anything like a system of international law or a system of arbitration, or of judicial settlement, through which a nation can assert its legal rights in lieu of war. It is true that Article 13 mentions arbitration and makes the parties agree that whenever a dispute

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arises "which they recognize to be suitable for submission to arbitration," they will submit it to a court "agreed upon by the parties." That, however, is merely an agreement to arbitrate when the parties choose to arbitrate, and it is therefore no agreement at all. It puts the whole subject of arbitration back where it was twenty-five years ago.

Instead of perfecting and putting teeth into the system of arbitration provided for by The Hague Conventions it throws those conventions upon the scrap heap. By covering the ground of arbitration and prescribing a new test of obligation it apparently by virtue of the provisions of Article 25 abrogates all the two hundred treaties of arbitration by which the nations of the world have bound themselves with one another to submit to arbitration all questions arising under international law, or upon the interpretation of treaties.

It is to be observed that neither the Executive Council nor the Body of Delegates to whom disputes are to be submitted under Article 15 of the agreement is in any sense whatever a judicial body or an arbitral body. Its function is not to decide upon anybody's right. It is to investigate, to consider and to make recommendations. It is bound to recommend what it deems to be expedient at the time. It is the states which act and not the individuals. The honorable obligation of each member is a political obligation as the representative of a state.

This is a method very admirable for dealing with political questions; but it is wholly unsuited to the determination of questions of right under the law of nations. It is true also that Article XIV mentions a Court of International Justice, and provides that the Executive Council should formulate plans for such a court, and that this court shall when established be competent to determine matters which the parties recognize as suitable for submission to it. There is no agreement or direction that such a court shall be established or that any questions shall be submitted to it.

International law is not mentioned at all, except in the preamble, no method is provided, and no purpose is expressed to insist upon obedience to law, to develop the law, to press forward agreement upon its rules and recognition of its obligations. All questions of right are relegated to the investigation and recommendation of a political body to be determined as matters of expediency.

I confess I cannot see the judgment of three generations of the

https://doi.org/10.1017/S0002930000185641 Published online by Cambridge University Press

wisest and best of American statesmen concurred in by the wisest and the best of all our allies thus held for naught. I believe with them that—necessary as may be the settlement of political questions upon grounds of expediency—it is also necessary to insist upon rules of international conduct founded upon principles, and that the true method by which public right shall be established to control the affairs of nations is by the development of law and the enforcement of law according to the judgments of impartial tribunals. I should have little confidence in the growth or permanence of an international organization which applied no test to the conduct of nations except the expediency of the moment.

The first change which I should make in this agreement accordingly would be to give effectiveness to the judicial settlement of international disputes upon questions of right—upon justiciable or judicial questions—by making the arbitration of such questions obligatory under the system established by The Hague Conferences, or before the proposed Court of Arbitral Justice, or, if the parties prefer in any particular case, before some specially constituted tribunal; putting the whole world upon the same footing in that respect that has been created between the United States and practically every nation now represented in Paris, by means of the special treaties which we have made with them. The term "Justiciable Questions" should be carefully defined, so as to exclude all questions of policy, and to describe the same kind of questions the Supreme Court of the United States has been deciding for more than a century.

When that is done the reference to arbitration in Article XII will have some force and effect instead of being as it is now—a mere idle form.

The second change which I think should be made is to provide for a general conference followed by regular conferences at stated intervals to discuss, agree upon and state in authentic form the rules of international law, so that the development of law may go on, and arbitral tribunals may have continually a more perfect system of rules of right conduct to apply in their decisions.

I send you herewith drafts of two suggested amendments designed to accomplish these results.

The distinction between the treatment of questions of legal right and questions of policy which I have drawn above has an important

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bearing upon the attitude of the United States toward the settlement of disputes.

So far as the determination of justiciable questions arising under the law of nations or under treaties is concerned, we ought to be willing to stand on precisely the same footing with all other nations. We should be willing to submit our legal rights to judicial decision, and to abide by the decision. We have shown that we are willing to do that by the numerous treaties that we have made with the greater part of the world agreeing to do that, and we should be willing to have the same thing provided for in this general agreement.

With regard to questions of policy, however, some different considerations are apparent.

In determining the extent of our participation in the political affairs of the Old World, we ought to be satisfied that a sufficient affirmative reason exists for setting aside to that extent the long established policy of the United States to keep the Old and the New World from becoming entangled in each other's affairs and embroiled in each other's quarrels. Just so far as such a reason exists, we ought to go, but no further.

We have to start in the consideration of such a subject with the words of Washington's Farewell Address: "Europe has a set of primary interests which to us have none or a very remote relation. Hence, she must be engaged in frequent controversies, the causes of which are essentially foreign to our concerns. Hence, therefore, it must be unwise in us to implicate ourselves by artificial ties in the ordinary vicissitudes of her politics, or the ordinary combinations and collisions of her friendships or enmities." And Jefferson's advice to Monroe: "Our first and fundamental maxim should be never to entangle ourselves in the broils of Europe; our second, never to suffer Europe to intermeddle with cis-Atlantic affairs."

Unquestionably, the Old and the New World have come into much more intimate relations since the time of Washington and Jefferson, and they have many more interests in common. Nevertheless, the basis of the expressions I have quoted remains in substance. The people of the United States have no direct interest in the distribution of territory in the Balkans, or the control of Morocco, and the peoples of Europe have no direct interest in the questions between Chile and Peru, or between the United States and Colombia. Based upon this fact, the Monroe Doctrine has hitherto kept the Old World and the

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New in two separate fireproof compartments so that a conflagration in one did not extend to the other.

There never was a time when the wisdom of the Monroe Doctrine for the preservation of peace and safety of the United States was more evident than it is now. Some facile writers of late have pronounced the doctrine obsolete and useless, but I know of no experienced and responsible American statesman who has ever taken that view, and I cannot help feeling that such a view results from insufficient acquaintance with the subject.

There has, however, arisen in these days for the American people a powerful secondary interest in the affairs of Europe coming from the fact that war in Europe and the Near East threatens to involve the entire world, and the peaceable nations of Europe need outside help to put out the fire, and keep it from starting again. That help to preserve peace we ought to give, and that help we wish to give.

In agreeing to give it, the following considerations should be observed:

We are not asking, and do not need, any help from the nations of the Old World for the preservation of peace in America, nor is any American nation asking for such help. The difficulties, the disturbing conditions, the dangers that threaten, are all in the affairs of Europe and the Near East. The real reason for creating a League of Nations is to deal with those difficulties and dangers, not with American affairs. It is, therefore, wholly unnecessary for the purpose of the League that purely American affairs should be included within the scope of the agreement.

When we enter into the League of Nations we do so not with any desire to interfere in the concerns of foreign nations, but because the peaceable nations of Europe ask us to put our power behind theirs to preserve peace in their part of the world. It is not reasonable, therefore, that such participation as we agree to in the activities of the League should be made the basis of an inference that we are trying to interfere in the Old World, and therefore should abandon our objection to having the Old World interfere in America.

With reference to the most important American questions, Europe as a whole on one side and the United States on the other occupy positions which however friendly are nevertheless in opposition. It must be remembered that the League of Nations contemplates the membership not only of our present allies, but ultimately of all the

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nations of Europe. Now, the Monroe Doctrine was declared against those nations of Europe. It was a warning to them not to trespass on American territory and, admitting exceptions and speaking only in the most general way, the nations of Europe are on one side of that question and the United States is on the other. To submit the policy of Monroe to a council composed chiefly of European Powers is to surrender it.

I will add—without taking up space to discuss it—that I cannot escape the conclusion that to ratify this agreement as it now stands would itself be a surrender of the Monroe Doctrine, and that the agreement as it now stands gives to the United States no effective substitute for the protection which the maintenance of that doctrine affords.

The same thing is true of immigration. The nations of Europe in general are nations from which emigrants go. The United States is a nation to which immigrants come. Apart from Great Britain, which would be bound to look after the similar interests of Canada and Australia, Europe and America are bound to look at questions of emigration and immigration from different points of view, and under the influence of different interests—friendly indeed, but opposing.

It hardly seems reasonable that under these circumstances the United States should be penalized for complying with the request of its friends in Europe to join them in the preservation of peace, primarily for their benefit and not for ours, by giving up our right to self-protection when that is wholly unnecessary to accomplish the object of the agreement. I think, therefore, that these purely American questions ought to be excepted from the jurisdiction of the Executive Council and Body of Delegates, and I have prepared and annexed hereto a third amendment in the form of a reservation, this being the method which was followed without any objection to accomplish the same purpose at the close of both the Hague Conferences.

The fourth point upon which I think there should be an amendment is Article X, which contains the undertaking "to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all members of the League."

Looking at this article as a part of a perpetual League for the Preservation of Peace, my first impression was that the whole article

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ought to be stricken out. If perpetual, it would be an attempt to preserve for all time unchanged the distribution of power and territory made in accordance with the views and exigencies of the Allies in this present juncture of affairs. It would necessarily be futile. It would be what was attempted by the Peace of Westphalia at the close of the Thirty Years' War, by the Congress of Vienna at the close of the Napoleonic Wars, by the Congress of Berlin in 1878. It would not only be futile; it would be mischievous. Change and growth are the law of life, and no generation can impose its will in regard to the growth of nations and the distribution of power, upon succeeding generations.

I think, however, that this article must be considered not merely with reference to the future, but with reference to the present situation in Europe. Indeed, this whole agreement ought to be considered in that double aspect. The belligerent power of Germany, Austria, Bulgaria and Turkey has been destroyed; but that will not lead to future peace without a reconstruction of eastern Europe and western Asia. The vast territories of the Hohenzollerns, the Hapsburgs and the Romanoffs have lost the rulers who formerly kept the population in order, and are filled with turbulent masses without stable government, unaccustomed to self-control and fighting among themselves like children of the dragon's teeth. There can be no settled peace until these masses are reduced to order.

Since the Bolsheviki have been allowed to consolidate the control which they established with German aid in Russia, the situation is that Great Britain, France, Italy, and Belgium, with a population of less than 130,000,000 are confronted with the disorganized but vigorous and warlike population of Germany, German Austria, Hungary, Bulgaria, Turkey, and Russia, amounting approximately to 280,000,000, fast returning to barbarism and the lawless violence of barbarous races. Order must be restored. The allied nations in their council must determine the lines of reconstruction. Their determinations must be enforced. They may make mistakes. Doubtless they will, but there must be decision and decision must be enforced.

Under these conditions the United States cannot quit. It must go on to the performance of its duty, and the immediate aspect of Article X is an agreement to do that. I think, therefore, that Article X should be amended so that it shall hold a limited time, and there-

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after any member may withdraw from it. I annex an amendment to that effect.

The fifth amendment which I think is needed is one suggested by M. Bourgeois in his speech at the conference which I have quoted above. It is to the provisions regarding the limitation of armaments. The success of those provisions is vital. If they are not effective the whole effort to secure future peace goes for nothing.

The plan of this League is contained in Articles 8 and 9. They provide that there shall be a reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety, that the Executive Council shall formulate plans for a general agreement as to the amount of these reductions, and that when an agreement has been made by the Powers the parties will not conceal from each other, but will give full and frank information regarding their industries capable of being adapted to warlike purposes, the scale of their armaments and their military and naval programmes.

Article 9 provides for a permanent commission to advise the League on the execution of these provisions. This full information is essential. Otherwise one nation will suspect another of secret preparation and will prepare to protect itself in the same way, so that the whole scheme of limitation will be destroyed. There would be some justification for this, because there are some nations of whom it would be idle to expect the truth on such a subject; their public officers would regard it as a duty to conceal and mislead. The only way to prevent that sort of thing is by giving the permanent commission power of inspection and verification. Every country should assent to this just as every trustee and treasurer is willing to have an independent audit of his accounts. I annex such an amendment.

Enough has been said already to indicate that this Constitution of a League of Peace cannot be regarded as a final and conclusive instrument. It necessarily leaves much to be determined hereafter. We do not know yet what nations are to be the members of the League, what nations are to be represented in the Council, what the limitations of armaments, what the regulations for the manufacture of munitions, or what the parties understand to be the scope of the provisions for freedom of transit and equitable treatment for commerce. The provision of Article 19 (of which I fully approve), relating to mandataries to aid or take charge of administration in new

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states and old colonies, necessarily leaves both the selection of the mandataries and the character of their powers and duties unsettled. All these uncertainties are not matters for criticism, but of necessity, arising from the situation. Still more important is the fact that no one knows when or upon what terms the Central and Eastern Powers are to be admitted to the League.

The whole agreement is at present necessarily tentative. It cannot really be a League of Peace in operation for a number of years to come. It is now and in the immediate future must be rather an alliance of approximately one-half of the active world against or for the control of the other half. Under these circumstances it would be most unwise to attempt to give to this agreement finality and make the specific obligations of its members irrevocable. There should be provision for its revision in a calmer atmosphere and when the world is less subject to exciting and disturbing causes. In the meantime the agreement should not be deemed irrevocable. The last amendment which I annex is directed to that end.

If the amendments which I have suggested are made, I think it will be the clear duty of the United States to enter in the agreement.

In that case it would be the duty of Congress to establish by law the offices of representatives of the United States in the Body of Delegates and the Executive Council, just as the offices of Ambassadors and Ministers are already provided for by law, and the new offices would be filled by appointment of the President with the advice and consent of the Senate under Article II, Section 2, of the Constitution of the United States.

Very truly yours,

ELIHU ROOT.

Annexes

FIRST AMENDMENT

Strike out Article XIII and insert the following:

> The high contracting Powers agree to refer to the existing Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague, or to the Court of Arbitral Justice proposed at the Second Hague Conference when established, or to some other arbitral tribunal, all disputes between them (including those affecting honor and vital interests) which are of a justiciable character, and which the Powers concerned have failed to settle by diplomatic

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methods. The Powers so referring to arbitration agree to accept and give effect to the award of the tribunal.

Disputes of a justiciable character are defined as disputes as to the interpretation of a treaty, as to any question of international law, as to the existence of any fact which if established would constitute a breach of any international obligation, or as to the nature and extent of the reparation to be made for any such breach.

Any question which may arise as to whether a dispute is of a justiciable character is to be referred for decision to the Court of Arbitral Justice when constituted, or, until it is constituted, to the existing Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague.

Second Amendment

Add to Article XIV the following paragraph:

The Executive Council shall call a general conference of the Powers to meet not less than two years or more than five years after the signing of this convention for the purpose of reviewing the condition of international law and of agreeing upon and stating in authoritative form the principles and rules thereof.

Thereafter regular conferences for that purpose shall be called and held at stated times.

Third Amendment

Immediately before the signature of the American delegates insert the following reservation:

Inasmuch as in becoming a member of the League the United States of America is moved by no interest or wish to intrude upon or interfere with the political policy or internal administration of any foreign state and by no existing or anticipated dangers in the affairs of the American continents, but accedes to the wish of the European states that it shall join its power to theirs for the preservation of general peace, the representatives of the United States of America sign this convention with the understanding that nothing therein contained shall be construed to imply a relinquishment by the United States of America of its traditional attitude towards purely American questions, or to require the submission of its policy regarding such questions (including therein the admission of immigrants) to the decision or recommendation of other Powers.

Fourth Amendment

Add to Article X the following:

After the expiration of five years from the signing of this convention any party may terminate its obligation under this article by giving one year's notice in writing to the Secretary-General of the League.

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