

will be we are left to guess. From a Catholic admirer of the Whig tradition, such as the author, one expects a discourse on politics. May it be strewn with those footnotes from St Thomas which made the bottom of the pages in *Barbara Celarent* a re-introduction to Thomism, and which one rather misses in the present volume.

D.N.

THE POWER AND LIMITS OF SCIENCE. A Philosophical Study. By E. F. Caldin. (Chapman & Hall; 12s. 6d.)

The first part of this book provides an excellent introduction to the scientific method. Mr Caldin emphasises the radical nature of the abstraction involved in the physicist's view of the objects given in experience and makes it clear that the valuable element in physical discussion is contained in equations rather than in imaginative models, however stimulating these latter may have been in the construction of hypotheses.

In spite of, or perhaps in consequence of, a strong bias in favour of an empirical, as opposed to an *a priori*, interpretation of the method of science, which is apparent in his lucid account of Eddington's philosophy of science, Mr Caldin makes a good case for the view that current theories regarding the status of scientific generalisations do not avoid the classic difficulties of Hume.

Mr Caldin escapes from these difficulties by postulating a difference of insight between the scientist, concerned with measurable relations, and the metaphysician, whose task it is to render experience intelligible and to provide a basis for scientific faith.

Here we encounter a difficulty, for Mr Caldin seems to make a distinction between phenomena, which are studied in physics, and agents or substances acting as efficient causes in real changes, which fall under the consideration of the metaphysician. As it is stated the distinction seems to fall between a phenomenal sphere or inorganic world and a world which is revealed in organic behaviour, above all in our own self-conscious activities: that is to say between a phenomenal world of indeterminate status and a metaphysical (real?) world. Mr Caldin, it is true, because he insists that it is one of the tasks of the metaphysician to examine the presuppositions of the scientist and to criticise his somewhat naive belief in the regularity of 'nature' is far from intending to give expression to a radical form of Dualism. Yet although he assigns a task to metaphysics, he does not make it very clear how the metaphysician is to carry it out. It would be unfortunate if Mr Caldin were to leave the subject there and it is to be hoped that in the future he will carry his inquiries further.

I.H.