

# FACTORS AFFECTING INDUSTRIAL CONFLICT IN THE CARIBBEAN

(1962–1971):

A Preliminary Analysis

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## INTRODUCTION

Without exception, all studies of Caribbean industrial relations and the attendant conflicts have either been descriptive historical accounts<sup>1</sup> of the emergence of labor movements and trade union parties or institutional analyses<sup>2</sup> of the systems of collective bargaining developed in the postwar period. While these studies have been important in documenting industrial relations practices and the political dimension of Caribbean trade unionism, they lack both a rigorous comparative frame as well as a commitment to the measuring and testing of explanatory propositions.<sup>3</sup> As a result, relevant behavioral data in this field remain crude, unanalyzed, and largely uncollected. Although the traditional emphases on historical, political, and institutional perspectives are desirable and important, particularly in view of the major social and political changes that both shaped and were influenced by the labor movement in the region, other perspectives are now necessary in coming to grips with the difficult task of comprehending and explaining patterns and variations in the relations between labor and capital in the Caribbean. These perspectives can only evolve through self-conscious attempts at both theory building and comparative analysis of quantitative data. This study represents a modest step in this direction that poses rather than answers some basic conceptual and theoretical questions, in view of the limits of the available data.

An important aspect of any industrial relations system is the level of conflict that occurs between labor and capital. The level of these conflicts can be measured on two separate dimensions that are not necessarily interrelated.<sup>4</sup> These include the ideological intensity of the conflicts and the level of militant tactics used in resolving disputes. The former relates to whether conflicts center on the mere distribution of the social product or on more fundamental questions of decision-making power and ownership of the means of production. The latter concerns the use and frequency of such tactics as strikes, demonstrations, violence, and lock-outs in industrial disputes. The data examined in this study focus on "labor militancy" as measured by indices of strike proneness.<sup>5</sup>

Current literature on industrial relations in the Caribbean tend to treat the various territories as part of a uniform pattern without sufficient analysis of both quantitative and qualitative differences between the territories (see, for example, Henry 1972 and Farley 1957). In addition, because of colonialist biases, studies

on the English-speaking territories tend to exclude any treatment of the non-English-speaking French, Spanish, and Dutch territories. This obviously removes from these studies any genuine claims to a regional scope and frame of reference.

Caribbean industrial relations systems do not vary significantly with respect to the ideological intensity of conflicts in that distribution<sup>6</sup> (in contrast to power and ownership) is the overwhelming dominant focus of labor-capital conflict. Important qualitative and quantitative differences are, however, to be found in the area of militancy in the tactics utilized in those conflicts. This applies particularly to labor militancy. A central question that arises is whether these qualitative and quantitative differences are accountable to economic, social, organizational, or political causes.

#### THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

The intensity of conflict between labor and capital is primarily a function of the development of social classes, which in turn is a reflection of the level of capitalist economic growth.<sup>7</sup> The relationship is, however, a complex one. As capitalism develops in its early stages, economic growth is accompanied by an intensification of conflicts between labor and capital. This arises from the fact that workers' potential for collective action and organizational strength increases as the labor force becomes more proletarianized and as employment in large- and medium-scale plants replaces own account feudal or petty capitalist occupations as the modal sources of livelihood for the mass of the population. This intensification applies to militancy rather than to ideological consciousness. While labor militancy is a function of material factors, ideological consciousness among the working class is due to the ideological tendencies and influences passed on to workers by middle-class leaders in parties, trade unions, and other social organizations.<sup>8</sup> Therefore, this militancy can be channeled in a "Left," "Center-Left," or "Right-Wing" direction depending largely on the character of influential leadership formations.

As capitalist systems approach very high levels of growth and maturity, a process of de-proletarianization sets in primarily through (1) the accelerated growth of a large middle class of professional, semi-professional, and white-collar strata who supercede the factory proletariat as the largest sector in the labor force and (2) the growth of a large service sector that outgrows the productive sector of the economy.<sup>9</sup> The result is an overall decline in labor militancy.<sup>10</sup> As a result, there is a higher level of labor militancy in the less mature and developed Euro-American capitalist systems such as France and Italy than in the more mature systems such as Germany (West) and the United States. Similarly, among the latter countries, there has been a secular decline in labor militancy between the early period of the twentieth century and the postwar era.

Nonsocialist Caribbean societies are caught in the trap of persistent underdevelopment posed by Euro-American imperialism and economic dependency (see Beckford 1972). Economic growth takes place but is limited to the

lower end of the curve of capitalist development. This implies from the above propositions that economic growth in this context should therefore be associated with higher levels of worker militancy. A number of other factors have, however, to be taken into account. These include both the character of the labor force and the structure of ownership and production. In the Caribbean context economic growth does not necessarily induce rapid proletarianization,<sup>11</sup> nor incorporate the poorest strata of the labor force into the union movement,<sup>12</sup> nor shift ownership and production from small family-owned enterprises,<sup>13</sup> nor reduce unemployment<sup>14</sup> so that there is no reserve army of unemployed to weaken a trade union movement and depress wage levels. This means that the absence of most or all of these factors will limit the quantitative effect of economic growth on labor militancy and that the level of labor militancy is likely to be below that of the less mature Euro-American capitalist systems where these factors accompanied economic growth from low to intermediate levels of development.

Another important consideration is the character of the plantation-type social structure inherited from the slave societies that preceded recent capitalist growth in the postwar period (see Beckford 1972). Most analysts of Caribbean society tend to see the plantation residues and influences as preserving bitter and explosive class and racial antagonisms which represent a very divisive and conflict-prone set of influences on these essentially multi-ethnic Caribbean communities.<sup>15</sup> It could therefore be argued that capitalist growth may induce a weakening of the traditional plantation-type social structure with its master-servant view of management-worker relations, its preservation of racial property privileges and exploitation, its reliance on backward and low-productivity cheap labor, and its promotion of deference, servility, and paternalism in social relations between workers and management. To the extent that the plantation sector (particularly sugar and banana) has undoubtedly been an arena for intense conflicts between labor and management in the Caribbean, and economic growth typically has involved the emergence of nonplantation productive and service sectors in tourism, manufacturing, mineral production, and mining, economic growth could be seen as a factor reducing rather than increasing industrial conflict.<sup>16</sup> Implicit in the proposition is the view that the modern nonplantation sectors are likely to throw up a less militant proletariat than that found in the traditional estate sector.

An alternate view would be that although the plantation sector declines in importance with economic growth and the emergence of these new sectors, "plantation" social attitudes persist in master-servant role relations between workers and management; racial conflicts between Indian and black labor and white owners and managers; and aggression, worker distrust, and antagonism towards the latter because of the condescending paternalism, status distance, cultural gap, and ascriptive nonegalitarian values they maintain in these modern sectors that emerge with economic growth. This means that the new proletariat in mineral production, manufacturing, and construction are likely to be as conflict oriented as the traditional proletariat in the plantation sector,<sup>17</sup> so that economic growth either increases or at least maintains the level of industrial conflict in this context.

To be sure, economic factors do not exhaust the range of variables likely to influence the intensity of industrial conflict in the Caribbean. Two important areas of change that are of some relevance are changes in the level of social modernization at the macro societal level and changes in the level of political decolonization in the respective political systems. Earlier studies (see Deutsch 1969) in political sociology have consistently shown the linkage between social modernization and mobilization through literacy growth, increased urbanization, and mass media expansion and conflict behavior. Industrial conflict might not be insulated from these general environmental influences in that the union movement and working class are affected by these society-wide agencies of socialization. Although there tends to be a correlation between economic growth and social modernization among Third World countries (see Stone 1975), the rate and level of social modernization tends to accelerate ahead of the rate of economic growth with a consequent heightening of conflict generated by the gap between emergent social aspirations and the supply of goods and services to the masses (see Huntington 1968). To the extent that this effect can be distinguished empirically from the influences due to economic growth, it will be necessary to explore the impact of social modernization on labor militancy in the analysis that follows.

A somewhat modified view would see social modernization as influencing industrial conflict not *directly* through socialization and attitudinal influences on the working class but more *indirectly* through its facilitation of a more congenial social environment for organizational growth of the trade union movement. To the extent that such growth means more than mere numerical strength but also organizational strength, it creates a situation of increasing working class power that enables and facilitates higher levels of tactical militancy and strategic aggression in industrial action. The effect would be a heightening of strike proneness among unionized workers. It will therefore be necessary to examine both the direct and indirect paths through which social modernization influences the level of labor militancy.

Changes in the wider political environment are also of some importance as a potential source of influence on the level of industrial conflict. While the traditional literature concentrates on the patterns of coalition between trade unions and political parties in the region, the extent to which broad political tendencies, moods, and social movements and consciousness influence working class behavior remains unexplored.<sup>18</sup> Greene (1976) has argued that decolonization represents the most significant dimension of political change in the region in the postwar period. This process of decolonization has involved more than the mere transfer of state power to local hands. It embraces as well the promotion of indigenous cultures, economic nationalism, assaults on neocolonial patterns of trade, the transformation of inherited Westminster political institutions, and the development of new directions of nationalist ideologies. Given the high incidence of foreign ownership, especially of the commanding heights of Caribbean economies, it is not farfetched to suggest that accelerated growth of decolonization might induce higher levels of militancy among the working class.<sup>19</sup>

The central thesis of this study is the linkage between economic growth

and worker militancy in industrial action as measured by strike proneness. In view of the other systemic factors that are also likely to influence industrial conflict, the study will attempt to explore a number of alternative and in some respects complementary hypotheses within the limits of the data available. Clearly, there are a number of factors outside of those mentioned here that influence strike proneness in the Caribbean. Many of these are either common to the region as a whole and therefore are not likely to account for between-country variations in strike proneness or are limited in effect to one or two territories.<sup>20</sup> Among the former are such factors as the rate of inflation and political unionism,<sup>21</sup> and among the latter interracial conflicts between racially aligned trade unions and hostile racially supported regimes<sup>22</sup> and intensely competitive inter-union rivalries.<sup>23</sup> To the extent that these latter localized factors are pre-eminent, region-wide causal factors such as are posed in the central hypotheses in this study will either be reduced in significance or alternately show no clear pattern of association with the variation in levels of strike proneness.

#### RESEARCH DESIGN

In order to examine by way of appropriate statistical tests the propositions outlined above, strike data as well as data on the aggregate economic and socio-economic profile of ten Caribbean states were gathered and put together in a standardized form. Ideally, the propositions would be best explored by way of a longitudinal research design but data limitations made it necessary to use a cross-sectional design covering a short period of time. The decade 1962 to 1971 was chosen as the period over which to measure strike proneness. Data on the independent variables that touch on economic and socioeconomic profiles were taken from 1960 census and economic source materials. This was done because no continuous year-by-year data are available and 1970 data from which projections could be made were only available for the English-speaking territories.

#### *Dependent Variables*

Two indicators were used to measure strike proneness. The first was the duration of strikes (1962–71).<sup>24</sup> This was measured by dividing the number of workers involved in strikes into the number of working days lost over the period. It shows the amount of time lost per striker and is a measure of the average duration of strikes weighted by their size. The second was the strike involvement proportion (1962–72). This measures the percentage of employees who are trade union members who are involved in strikes over the period. To arrive at the indicators for the ten-year period, both the *strike involvement index* and the *strike duration index* were calculated for each year and a mean index was calculated from the ten year-by-year indices.

*Independent Variables*

Four independent variables were used in the data analysis. These include level of economic growth, level of social modernization, union membership, and level of decolonization.

Level of economic growth was measured by the per capita GNP of each of the ten countries around 1960. Although the qualitative weaknesses of this indicator are acknowledged, the fact that these economies share a common history and certain basic structural features minimizes the extent to which the GNP index will distort the comparative income standing of the territories. In addition, the GNP index correlated positively with such other indicators as diversity of export commodities, nonagricultural labor as a proportion of the labor force, and the proportionate contribution of manufacturing, mining, and construction to GDP among the ten countries in the sample.

Level of social modernization represented a composite index reflecting the standing of the countries in the three areas of mass literacy, level of urbanization, and level of nonagricultural employment in the labor force as a whole. The countries were classified into high, medium, and low scores on each of the three measures; this was done by dividing the scores into three equal intervals between the highest and lowest scores. The rankings were then given numbers ranging from one to three and the aggregate scores on the three measures were used as the index of social modernization.

Green's (1976) index of decolonization was modified and used to scale the countries into a ranking scale of decolonization.<sup>25</sup> The scale consisted of three points. The first included territories that did not enjoy independence; the second, those territories which while being independent had made no advances in the direction of economic nationalism, indigenous political ideologies, or indigenous cultural and institutional development; and the third, those territories that both had independence and had made *some* initiative in these areas. The countries were classified in terms of the highest level of decolonization attained during the ten-year period.

Union membership was measured as the proportion of the employed members of the labor force who were members of registered trade unions around the period 1959–61. In view of the uncertain level of accuracy in these data and the extent to which it is the practice in some countries to inflate records of union membership for political purposes, the findings relating to union membership must be treated with some caution in view of the small size of the sample of countries.<sup>26</sup>

The countries selected for the sample were Jamaica, Barbados, St. Lucia, Antigua, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, Guadeloupe, Surinam, Puerto Rico, and Grenada. It represents a diverse mix of countries from the Leeward and Windward Islands; the English-, Dutch-, Spanish-, and French-speaking Caribbean; and from the northeastern as well as the southeastern and mainland territories in the region.

In view of the crude nature of the data being examined, and the tentative and preliminary character of the hypotheses being explored, the simple rank

order (Rho) correlation was used to determine measures of association between the variables in preference to the more statistically rigorous measures of correlation.

#### HYPOTHESES AND FINDINGS

##### *That Countries with Higher Levels of Economic Attainment Will Experience Higher Levels of Strike Proneness*

Table 1 sets out the level of association found between per capita GNP and level of strike proneness among the ten countries in the sample of Caribbean countries. In the case of either measure of strike proneness and level of industrial conflict, a positive though only moderately high rank order correlation was found with respect to per capita GNP. Although the coefficient is not very high, the consistency of the finding in relation to the two distinctly different measures of strike intensity strengthens support for the hypothesis.

A regression analysis was done to identify exceptional deviant cases in the relationships between per capita GNP and strike duration and strike involvement. In the case of strike involvement Guyana scored far above the level of strike involvement predicted from the regression trend line with an index of 80 percent involvement on the part of unionized workers, while the mean index for the group was a mere 13.2 percent. Interestingly, when Guyanese data were removed and the rank order was calculated for the remaining nine countries the coefficient rose from .5 to .7. Clearly the racially influenced labor-government conflicts in Guyana escalated the intensity of strike action over and beyond the general Caribbean pattern and weakened the overall relationship between per capita GNP and strike involvement. Another outstanding deviant case was that of Puerto Rico which showed a level of strike involvement some 35 percent below the level predicted by its per capita GNP. The reason could well lie in the massive pattern of migration to the U.S. that might have had the effect of creaming off the more potentially dissatisfied and militant younger members of the labor force by way of U.S.-bound migration, leaving behind the more docile and compliant strata of workers.

This positive association between level of economic attainment or growth and labor militancy as measured by strike involvement and strike duration can be seen as reflecting a number of interrelated forces. These include an income or supply effect and a class demand effect. The income effect refers to the fact that

TABLE 1 Rank Order Correlation Coefficients between Per Capita GNP and Strike Duration and Strike Involvement

	Correlation Coefficients
Per Capita GNP and Strike Duration	.5
Per Capita GNP and Strike Involvement	.5

in the countries with a higher per capita GNP there is a larger economic surplus to be fought over by organized minorities among the capitalist and wage labor classes. Where the surplus increases or is larger, worker militancy increases proportionately in the effort to wrest a larger share of the total social product. In all countries, however, the struggle between labor and capital takes place between strata that fall within the top 40 percent income earners in the respective societies, and tends to leave behind the poorest 60 percent who earn roughly 20 percent of national income. In the more well-endowed economies of the region income growth is accompanied by an expansion of the middle class generally as well as a growth of middle income earners.<sup>27</sup> The result is an intense struggle on the part of the more skilled and strategically located sections of the working class to push upwards by sheer militancy at the bargaining table in industrial relations into the top 20 percent of income earners who accrue some 55 to 60 percent of national income.

The class or demand effect refers to the changes that take place in the composition of the labor force with higher levels of per capita income. The changes embrace an extension of the proletariat whereby a new proletariat in manufacturing, mining, and construction is added to the old proletariat in export agriculture. This is reflected in the relatively high .7 rank correlation between per capita GNP and the proportion of the labor force employed in manufacturing, mining, and construction. Added to this is the fact that public sector employment in production, utilities, and critical services increases in proportion to increases in per capita national income. The result is an overall increase in the proportion of potential militants within the labor force.

The data provide no clues, however, as to how much weighting to attribute to either the income or class effects and as to whether the correlations found are due largely to one or the other effect. While support is presented for this first hypothesis, further work needs to be done to fully account for and explain the link between per capita GNP and strike proneness.

On the other hand, the findings clearly refute the null hypothesis that suggests a decline in industrial conflict and labor militancy as Caribbean economies modernize and as the plantation export sector recedes in importance. Such a decline in industrial conflict is only likely to accompany the decline of the export plantation sector where the latter is dismantled and gives way to either tourism (Antigua) or declines at the expense of small peasant agriculture (St. Lucia). In the case of the more advanced Caribbean economies the plantation sector has tended to remain intact while receding in quantitative importance. As can be seen from the data presented in table 2 on the sectoral distribution of industrial disputes in Trinidad and Jamaica, the modern sectors of these economies make a disproportionately high contribution to the pattern of industrial conflict. This is in contrast to a less developed economy such as Barbados where the traditional agroproletariat in export agriculture provides the main initiatives in industrial conflict. It therefore seems to be the case that as the Caribbean economies grow and diversify, the emergent urban proletariat both replaces the traditional agroproletariat as the main actors in industrial conflict and increases



the level of intensity in the struggle between labor and capital for a larger share of the social product.

TABLE 2 *Sectoral Distribution of Industrial Disputes*

	<i>Percent of Strikes</i>	<i>Percent of Labor Force</i>	<i>Percent Difference</i>
<i>Jamaica, 1962–71</i>			
Agriculture	25	38	–13
Manufacturing and Construction	41	23	18
<i>Trinidad, 1960–64</i>			
Agriculture	19	21	–02
Mining, Manufacturing, and Construction	53	32	21
<i>Barbados, 1960–65</i>			
Agriculture	74	26	48

*That after Taking into Account the Effect of Other Variables, Social Modernization Should Correlate Positively with Strike Proneness*

In examining this second hypothesis, it was first necessary to establish whether there was a high positive correlation between per capita GNP and social modernization in order to distinguish their respective effects on the dependent variables. Due mainly to the very low association between mass educational level and per capita GNP, the rank order correlation between the latter and the social modernization index was a relatively low .3 coefficient. As a result, there was no statistical problem of distinguishing the relative effects of these independent variables. The rank order correlations shown in table 3 indicate that there is a positive, moderately high association between social modernization and strike duration, but no association in the case of strike involvement.

The finding supports the view that countries with a labor force that is relatively high in literacy, urbanization, and nonagricultural labor will tend to have longer strikes than countries that are not as socially modernized because the labor movement and organizations in the former are likely to be stronger and capable of more sustained collective action. It should be borne in mind, however, that unlike strike involvement which shows wide variation between the countries, the range of variation in strike duration was quite small. The range was between 2.07 days (St. Lucia) and 14.26 (Barbados). More importantly, for most countries strike duration fell within a range of 6 to 14 days (on average) which does represent a very high level of strike intensity.<sup>28</sup>

It is not quite clear why social modernization should correlate with strike duration and not with strike involvement, although it could perhaps be argued

TABLE 3 Rank Order Correlation Coefficients between Social Modernization Index and Strike Duration and Involvement

	Correlation Coefficients
Social Modernization and Strike Duration	.5
Social Modernization and Strike Involvement	.1

that the latter depends largely on material factors while the former is influenced more by the subjective consciousness and solidarity of workers that are more amenable to the influences of the forces inherent in social modernization. Any such speculative analysis has to be seen as entirely tentative and requiring more adequate data for exploration.

*That after Controlling for the Effects Due to Other Factors, Level of Union Membership Should Be Positively Associated with Strike Proneness*

Preliminary to examining this hypothesis, it was necessary to determine the extent of the correlation between union membership and both per capita GNP and social modernization in order to distinguish independent causal effects. In either case the correlations were very low. The rank order correlation coefficient was .2 in the case of per capita GNP and .1 in the case of social modernization. This implies that, surprisingly, union membership does not seem to increase proportionately with either GNP growth or increases in the level of social modernization. This is due to the fact that the linkage between political parties and trade unions creates state promotion of unions that results in higher levels of membership in some of the less advanced economies and societies with lower levels of social modernization than would have been predicted from their ranking on these variables.

Table 4 gives the rank order correlations between union membership and both strike duration and strike involvement. There is a moderately high correlation between union membership and strike involvement which is not surprising. It suggests that the larger the relative or comparative numerical strength of a trade union movement, the greater its capability to induce workers into strike action. In other words, growth in relative size as represented by the percentage of the labor force unionized involves more than mere quantitative changes as it also means an increased potential for strike action among unionized workers.

TABLE 4 Rank Order Correlation Coefficients between Union Membership and Strike Duration and Strike Involvement

	Correlation Coefficients
Union Membership and Strike Duration	.0
Union Membership and Strike Involvement	.4

On the contrary, however, there is no association between union membership and strike duration, which was found earlier to correlate with social modernization. Again, while speculative interpretation can give some rationale for the findings, the reason for this lack of an association is not completely clear and poses a number of questions about the character of union organizations and their strengths and weaknesses in industrial conflict which cannot be answered with the limited data available here.

*That Other Things Being Equal, Industrial Conflict Will Increase with More Advanced Levels of Decolonization*

Contrary to Green's findings which were limited to the English-speaking Caribbean, no relationship was found between either per capita GNP and social modernization on the one hand and decolonization on the other. Only Guyana qualified for the category of states that had advanced beyond mere formal independence during this period. This means that the comparisons to be made are between the colonial and independent territories. The mean per capita GNP of the colonial territories was \$344 (U.S.) and that of the independent territories \$337 (U.S.), while the median modernization scores for the two groups were identical. Table 5 sets out the median strike duration and strike involvement scores for the two groups of territories. In neither case are the differences significant. This is not surprising since it is probably at the highest stage of decolonization that socialization effects are likely to be strong enough to influence working class political behavior.

In order to place these findings in the context of the general pattern of industrial conflict in the region, the two variables of strike duration and strike involvement were used to generate a simple typology of industrial conflict among the sample of ten countries. A distinct pattern emerges. The countries fall into three main types with Guyana and Barbados emerging as atypical special cases. The groupings include three countries with both low levels of strike duration and strike conflict where obviously the trade union movement was not a very potent force over the period under study. There is as well a second group of countries where both strike duration and strike involvement was at a medium level of development where the union movement is a force to reckon with. Finally, there are two countries where strike duration was very high but strike involvement moderate and unions assumed the role of a political opposition (Puerto Rico and Trinidad).

The grouping of countries is shown in table 6. Barbados is an interesting

TABLE 5 Median Strike Duration and Strike Involvement Scores by Colonial Status

	Strike Duration	Strike Involvement
Colonies	8	11
Independent States (excluding Guyana)	10	12

TABLE 6 Cross-Classification of Patterns of Industrial Conflict by Strike Duration and Strike Involvement

Strike Duration	Strike Involvement		
	Low	Medium	High
Low	Antigua St. Lucia Grenada		Guyana
Medium		Jamaica Surinam Guadeloupe	
High	Barbados	Puerto Rico Trinidad	

case of low strike involvement but high strike duration suggestive of a strong and highly disciplined union movement. Guyana at the other extreme shows a high propensity to conflict but the short duration of strikes suggests a pattern of dissipation of union power expended on largely racial-political goals rather than economic ends.

CONCLUSION

This study has attempted to examine preliminary data indicating the linkages between certain broad economic, social, and organizational system level variables and the pattern of industrial conflict in the Caribbean. The data presented confirm the existence of a positive association between industrial conflict and relative level of economic advancement, social modernization, and union membership recruitment. The findings must, however, be seen as tentative and suggestive of areas for more elaborate research in view of the limited time period covered and speculative character of the data interpretations in the face of the very limited evidentiary materials. More importantly, the macro level character of the data merely suggests broad outlines of a picture that will only be complete when complemented with detailed case studies and comparative attitudinal and behavioral survey data.

NOTES

1. For an excellent synthesis of this material, see Henry (1972).
2. The institutional and legal aspects of labor relations are of course critical in that legal biases inherent in capitalist social relations tend to weight the entire process in favor of the owners of the means of production.
3. What is really necessary is the development of empirical categories for the gathering of data on Caribbean industrial relations systems which are grounded in certain coherent explanatory constructs.
4. A case in point is the United States trade unions in certain sectors of the labor force, which combine extreme strike militancy with right-wing "business unionism."

5. The concept of strike proneness is used to encompass both frequency and intensity in strike occurrence.
6. This theme is developed more fully in Stone (1973).
7. A major gap in the historical and sociological writings on the Caribbean is the absence of empirical studies on class formation and development.
8. This is not to deny that folk ideologies and populist notions of new ideological directions sometimes emerge as important frames of reference untaught by middle class abstractions and intellectual categories. Rastafarianism in Jamaica is one such example. However, the point is that party and union movements of right, left, or centrist tendencies usually reflect the ideological currents of the middle classes in their manifold, competing, and complex ideological strains.
9. It is of course debatable whether this trend is contingent on the continued expansion and prosperity of the international capitalist system or whether it can be reversed in the face of a secular decline in monopoly capital and imperialism.
10. For statistical evidence of this, see Ross (1969).
11. In Jamaica, for example, the proportion of own account members of the labor force has remained close to one-third since the early 1940s.
12. As in most of the Third World, the trade unions represent in the main the high wage sections of the labor force.
13. Except for MNCs and some large, locally owned corporations, majority ownership of business in the region is held by small family firms.
14. In these economies the labor market is, however, highly fragmented. Skilled jobs often go unfilled while there is a surplus of unskilled labor and exclusive "white and expatriate" monopolized jobs are often left vacant while skilled nonwhite local personnel are assigned job tasks unrelated to their expertise.
15. This applies particularly to proponents of the theory of cultural pluralism as a theoretical framework from which to analyze Caribbean society (see Smith 1965). For many societies, however, only the middle class can be considered as multi-ethnic. This of course does not apply to countries such as Guyana, Trinidad, and Surinam.
16. Of course the early beginnings of a nonplantation sector are to be found in the traditional service-government and mercantile sectors. These earlier urban sectors must, however, be distinguished from the new sectors added mainly since the early 1940s.
17. Although tourism structurally belongs to this grouping, its productive and class relations are qualitatively different, in spite of the fact that it generates union activity. Where economies are based largely on this sector as against manufacturing, mining, and construction as principal sources of nonagricultural employment, labor militancy is consequently at a low level.
18. Very little has, however, been done to provide detailed empirical and case-study assessments of the many assertions made on this subject.
19. Such a connection could be made between the Black Power nationalist movement in Trinidad in 1970 and the subsequent intensification of trade union militancy in that country.
20. This includes as well divergent patterns of variation over time in the intensity and incidence of industrial conflicts.
21. For a useful historical account of how this phenomenon developed in Jamaica, see Eaton (1975).
22. As was the case in Guyana in the early 1960s.
23. This is especially the case in Jamaica, where large adjustments had to be made to correct figures on union membership.
24. Due to the introduction of legislation in Trinidad legally restraining strike action and setting up an industrial court in March 1965, the period 1960–64 was used as the basis for computing both strike duration and strike involvement indices for that country.
25. The scale is somewhat weak in that the criteria for classification are not common to each point in the scale and it relies too heavily on subjective judgmental classification. See note 23.
26. The impact is, however, primarily urban.
27. This is relatively high compared with similar data for Western Europe.

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