

- and from dogmatics to apologetics (cf. Eric Osborn, *Tertullian*, p. 35).
- 33 Cf. John Paul II, *Fides et ratio*, no. 86, at *ibid.*, p. 128.
- 34 Cf. John Paul II, *Fides et ratio*, no. 87, at *ibid.*, p. 128.
- 35 Cf. John Paul II, *Fides et ratio*, no. 87, at *ibid.*, p. 128.
- 36 Cf. Joseph Ratzinger, *The Salt of the Earth*, San Francisco 1997, p. 66.
- 37 "The scientific mentality has succeeded in leading many to think that if something is technologically possible it is therefore morally admissible" (cf. John Paul II, *Fides et ratio*, no. 88, at *ibid.*, p. 130).
- 38 One is reminded of the postcard adage which a seminarian in the heady Seventies had pinned to his wardrobe: "change as an unchanging ideal itself becomes changeless."
- 39 Cf. John Paul II, *Fides et ratio*, no. 90, at *ibid.*, p. 131.
- 40 Cf. John Paul II, *Fides et ratio*, no. 91, at *ibid.*, p. 134.

The Recovery of Metaphysics

Francis J. Selman

One of the most notable features of *Faith and Reason* is its plea for metaphysics. The twentieth century saw interest in metaphysics recede to a low ebb. There were signs, however, that the tide had already begun to turn before Pope John Paul made his plea. Calls for metaphysics sometimes came from unexpected quarters. At the end of 1996, Clifford Longley wrote in *The Tablet*:

Unless it is grounded in reality, one must doubt whether a sense of the sacred can be much more than a kind of aesthetic sensitivity, an accoutrement of a man or a woman of exemplary taste. And one must doubt whether it can be grounded in reality without something like metaphysics to give it firm anchors.¹

In the same article, Longley suggested that the answer to the philosophical debate of our time about what is real, may be connected with "perhaps the most important event in European history in the entire second millennium", namely the rediscovery of most of Aristotle's thought by the West in the thirteenth century. "It brought about the rebirth of Christian metaphysics, and it put them on a rigorously logical

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basis.” But, he goes on, metaphysics went out at the Reformation, because the Protestant principle of “Faith alone” denied the possibility of knowing about God by natural reason. This divorce of faith from reason then encouraged unbelieving scientists to think that religion is irrational. The consequence was the conflict between science and religion that has marked the climate of thought in Britain since the middle of the nineteenth century. Now, however, Longley notes, it is scientists, especially physicists and cosmologists, who are bringing back metaphysics by the back door as the limitations of a purely scientific view of the world became apparent towards the end of the twentieth century. Longley called on “departments of post-Reformation Christian Faith to re-examine their tradition’s rejection of metaphysics,” and thought that Aquinas may be “the man whose time has come again.”

These reflections, coming independently from a lay writer almost two years before the appearance of *Faith and Reason* in October 1998, help us to see that the Pope’s call for a return to metaphysics in the teaching of Catholic theology converges with a trend of thought that has already begun in secular learning. As Longley indicates, one of the benefits of a return to metaphysics will be to open up the dialogue between scientists and theologians. This may help to dispel one of the main challenges to Christian faith, from science, for the last century and a half. If metaphysics for Longley will renew the dialogue between religion and science, for the Pope it also has a moral purpose, since it helps to provide the answer to questions about the meaning of life and our destiny.

But what is metaphysics? Metaphysics arises when we ask what are the real things. Are the only real things what natural science can tell us about? Or is there more to reality than physics describes? When we go *beyond* physics, we come to *metaphysics*. Although the word ‘metaphysics’ comes from the title of Aristotle’s book known by that name, Aristotle did not call what he does in it ‘metaphysics’ but ‘*first philosophy*’. The only other thing he calls part of it is ‘*theologia*’, which is the third of Aristotle’s speculative, or theoretic, sciences.

The first, physics, considers moving bodies. The second, geometry or mathematics, considers bodies but not as they move. The third considers the source of all motion, which is not itself a body and is unmoved. In Aristotle’s opinion, divine science is ‘the most noble, because God is thought to be the cause of all things’.² If the only real things were material, physics would be first philosophy. Many scientists now recognise that not everything is explained by science. Science raises questions that it cannot itself answer. Thus physics leads to metaphysics as we have to go beyond physics to answer some of its

questions. It is a mistake, however, to think that metaphysics is just about abstract things; it is rather about everyday things in the world around us, but considered in an abstract way. Of course, if physics is not the end of what there is to say about reality, metaphysics will also include the existence of some immaterial things or beings.

Losing Sight of the Goal

In order to appreciate what is said in the encyclical, we first need to look at its review of philosophy in the modern era. John Paul II observes that ever since the philosophy of being was abandoned, philosophers have tended to concentrate on the question of how we know anything. This is almost inevitable, because without metaphysics what is one left with but epistemology or logic? We see that the metaphysics of Kant in the *Critique of Pure Reason* is a form of epistemology. The result has been that philosophers have steadily narrowed down the limits of the human mind for knowing truth with certainty.

The Pope remarks that modern philosophy neglects the pursuit of ultimate truth: it either stops short at science (logical positivism) or at human beings (atheistic existentialism). Its two main streams have confined themselves to questions of how we know or how we use words. Linguistic philosophy, for instance, tends to discuss narrower issues and technical points; it has lost sight of a wider view of the world and the meaning of human life. As philosophers have emphasised the limits of reason, scepticism has become prevalent. The mistrust of reason has led to a loss of the sense of the transcendent. One consequence of scepticism in the modern age has been a spiralling introversion, which also loses sight of the transcendent, for it looks inwards rather than outwards. In John Paul's estimate, reason has 'forgotten that men and women are always called to direct their steps to a truth which transcends them'.³ But in order to know there is a truth above us, we need to know that there is a reality beyond the physical world. This is where metaphysics comes in. We cannot shape our lives by a higher truth unless we know that there is something more than the world we see. Unless we perceive that there is a truth above us, we turn in on ourselves and life loses its meaning as we are caught in subjective introspection. As many doubt our power to know the truth, so they rest content with partial and provisional truths. The Pope points out that reason is in danger of missing its goal, which is to arrive at the truth. It risks being confined within walls erected by ourselves instead of opening its eyes to the vision presented to us by the revealed Word.

Opening up the Vision.

Besides his sombre account of the main direction of modern philosophy, John Paul II also sketches the positive role of philosophy. The first task of philosophy, he says, is to recover what he calls its 'sapiential dimension.' 'To be consonant with the word of God, philosophy needs to recover its sapiential dimension as a search for the ultimate and overarching meaning of life.⁴ This requires no more than for philosophy to be true to its name, which is the love of wisdom. We note that, in John Paul II's view, the proper nature of philosophy is partly given by the revealed Word. His starting point, then, is Scripture. Theology cannot render intelligible to us the mystery revealed in the Bible unless it employs philosophy suited and open to certain features of Scripture. First, it constantly speaks of a transcendent reality. Secondly, it assumes that we can know plain truth.⁵ As the Word of God is expressed in human language, faith presupposes that human language is capable of expressing divine reality in a universal way (for all peoples and times), at least analogically. The interpretation of Scripture must lead us to know the truth, otherwise the Bible does not contain revelation but only expresses human notions about God.⁶

In the light of this, the Pope states three requirements for a philosophy that will aid theology in its task of rendering the revealed mystery intelligible.

- 1) It needs to be a philosophy that is aware of its role as wisdom.
- 2) It must also allow the possibility of knowing objective truth. This excludes phenomenalism. The ability to know objective truth is coupled with the correspondence theory of truth by the Pope, since philosophy that meets this second requirement 'affirms our capacity to reach objective truth by means of the *adaequatio rei et intellectus*.'⁷ I shall return later to the correspondence theory of truth.
- 3) The first and second requirements together imply, thirdly, the need 'for a philosophy of a genuinely metaphysical range'.⁸ That is, one transcending empirical data in seeking the foundation of existence and ultimate truth. As John Paul II remarks, the human understanding is not limited to observable data. He calls on philosophers to move from phenomena to foundations; we cannot stop short at experience.

From all this, the Pope's view of metaphysics emerges. It is concerned with reality and truth, which transcend mere facts and empirical data. Secondly, we can know what is transcendent, albeit imperfectly and by analogy. John Paul II is convinced that if the understanding of faith wants to integrate the wealth of theological

tradition, it must turn again to a philosophy of being.⁹ But, in his view, metaphysics possesses the qualities of being a dynamic, strong and enduring philosophy, because it is open to reality as a whole, surpassing any arbitrarily set limits of our questioning. Few things in philosophy can be so exciting as the topic of existence. Aquinas was an existentialist in the true sense of the word, that is, one interested in the existence of all things, not just the transitory conditions of human life in this world.

Without metaphysics, the Pope thinks, theology hardly rises above an analysis of religious experience. 'A theology without a metaphysical horizon could not move beyond an analysis of religious experience, nor would it allow the *intellectus fidei* to give a coherent account of the universal and transcendent value of revealed truth'.¹⁰ This was Longley's point, that we need metaphysics to show that religion is founded on objective reality.

For John Paul II, metaphysics shows us the way out of what he discerns to be the present crisis in modern philosophy, which he says is a crisis of meaning that has resulted from pluralism and the fragmentation of knowledge. Consequently, many despair of ever attaining a unity of vision. Metaphysics clearly is the Pope's means of restoring the unity of knowledge. Implicit in this aim seems to be the understanding that truth is one, a view that has often been disregarded in the past century. In other words, there are not different sorts of truths: scientific, religious, psychological, historical, mathematical, but there is one standard of truth for all branches of knowledge. Only on this basis can we see the harmony between faith and reason. Once we set aside the view that truth is one, the double-truth theory enters, which puts faith and reason in separate compartments. We can trace this separation back to the fourteenth century, when the nominalists also held the double-truth theory. Perhaps the Pope rather overlooks the extent to which nominalism paved the way for the Reformation, which turned away from reason in faith and spirituality. As there are historical grounds for thinking that faith and reason move apart when metaphysics is overlooked, so the return to metaphysics can only buttress their connection. As the Pope says, 'an intimate relationship exists between faith and metaphysical reasoning'.¹¹ He notes that the fragmenting of knowledge has impaired our interior unity. But wisdom seeks unity, because this is the good of the human person. When philosophy preserves its role of wisdom, it has a beneficial effect on the human being as well as, in the Pope's view, enabling us to unify our knowledge.

The British Scene

Although a few books by teachers of philosophy in English universities on metaphysics have appeared in the last 30 years, metaphysics does not fit easily with the British tradition. Much British philosophy still assumes that metaphysics cannot make true statements about reality. It only allows one to talk about beings and true things (statements, thoughts), but not about Being or Truth. Yet, when one recognises that everything which receives existence must go back to something which does not receive it, or therefore share in it, one comes back to something that simply *is* Existence. The same goes for Truth and Life. The life of a living thing is not anything that can be identified under the microscope besides its chemical constituents, but we do not exclude the word 'life' from biology; it is natural for biologists to speak of it.

In order to understand the virtual exclusion of metaphysics from English and American philosophy of the past century, we should trace our philosophical tradition back to the fourteenth century, for the empiricism of Locke and Hume can be seen as directly descending from the nominalism of Ockham. Locke is a nominalist, who denies that natures are anything real and makes them inventions of the human mind. Thus our words for general natures are just names of ideas for Locke. If we substitute 'terms' for 'ideas' in Locke, W.V. Quine says, we are with Ockham's nominalism.¹² As Locke held that all we directly know is ideas, not real things, Berkeley did away with the real world and kept ideas; Hume did away with Locke's unknowable substrate of things and kept qualities without anything to inhere in. Hume is really a latter-day Ockhamist: as Ockham has a world of individuals without any real relation, so Hume, by denying that we can know real causes of things, prevents us from seeing their connection or the intelligibility of the universe. Thus Hume obscures the presupposition of all science, that there is an intelligible pattern in nature; without this it is not possible to have science. It is an irony that the empiricist philosophy, which may seem especially suited to empirical science, is quite unsuitable for it, because the empiricists say that what we know is our sense-impressions rather than things themselves. But science, one hopes, tell us about real things, not just the scientist's own sense-data. Two of the most influential English philosophers in the twentieth century stood squarely in this empiricist tradition: Bertrand Russell was a combination of Berkeley's phenomenalism with Hume, A.J. Ayer a Humean.

The common attitude to metaphysics in this country has been influenced by three doctrines:

1. The verification theory: only what can be verified by the senses can be true.
2. Only sentences of natural science tell us anything true.
 'The right method in philosophy would properly be: to say nothing but what let's itself be said, therefore sentences of natural science—therefore what has nothing to do with philosophy—, and then always, if another wanted to say something metaphysical, to point out to him that he has given certain signs in his sentences no meaning.'¹³
3. 'The meaning of a word is its use'. A word gets its meaning from its everyday uses.

When it was seen that the demand for a precise language was impossible to realise, there was a return to ordinary language. Words now have no definite meaning but overlap in various meanings. One could say that twentieth century English philosophy was a new idealism: the idealism of language. Language instead of our ideas is the measure of reality. Both views of language, whether based purely on science and mathematics or ordinary language, were opposed to metaphysics. The later Wittgenstein wrote: 'Philosophy simply puts everything before us, and neither explains nor deduces anything. Since everything lies open to view, there is nothing to explain. For what is hidden, for example, is of no interest'.¹⁴ We should note, however, that Wittgenstein himself, at least in his earlier writing, did not deny the transcendent (*Die Ethik ist transscendental*); he merely said that it is inexpressible.

In his essay 'Metaphysics and the Limits of Language', Cahal (now Cardinal) Daly notes that it was unfair to take natural science as the measure of what we can say, because science only says how the world is; it does not talk about existence because it takes the existence of the world for granted.¹⁵ As Daly points out, existence is presupposed by all predication. I do not say, 'Flamingos are pink' without also thinking that flamingos exist. This is what Aquinas means when he says that 'being (*ens*) is the first thing that comes in to the mind's conception, because in this way something is knowable in that it actually exists'.¹⁶ Wittgenstein seems to recognise the same point when he writes: 'The "experience" that we need to understand logic is not that something stands so and so, but that something is; but that is no experience. Logic is before every experience — that something is so. It is before the How, not before the What'.¹⁷ Daly remarks (p.195), that being does not lie beyond things but is *in* things. The question of existence arises as soon as we notice that things exist in different ways. The following things, for example, do not all exist in the same way: the British Museum, the British Academy, the British Constitution, the Equator, the Iron Curtain (when it existed),

comets, greenfinches, rainbows. We cannot exclude existence from philosophy as something metaphysical, for it is part of the very way we think and speak.

Although Wittgenstein called on us to 'bring back words from their metaphysical to everyday use' (*Investigations I* 116), his idea of the 'family resemblance' of the various meanings of words opens up the path to speaking by analogy, which is connected in the Pope's mind with metaphysics. It is now being recognised that when natural scientists use 'models' to explain reality, they are explaining by analogy. For example, Bohr used the model of planets in orbit round the sun to explain the inner structure of the atom, with electrons in orbits round a nucleus of protons. Einstein's 'curvature of space' is a metaphorical way of speaking, but perfectly acceptable to scientists. Space is not curved like a flexible piece of willow that you can bend with your hands. Schrödinger said that no model can ever be true in the strict sense. We can only speak of it being 'adequate', because for it to be true it would have to be capable of being compared directly with the actual facts.¹⁸ Thus not even scientists now agree that the old demand for verification can be upheld for their own science.

While some scientists are opening up the way for a return to metaphysics, some philosophers of language have gone on to deny the reality of objects. Whole things were just mental constructions for Russell (we make sense-data into whole things). W.V. Quine speaks of 'the myth of physical objects'¹⁹, which he says are just 'cultural posits'. Although for Quine our knowledge just comes from stimuli to the surface of the body, nonetheless he admits 'the abstract objects of mathematics'. 'Abstract objects have long since proved indispensable to natural science—thus numbers, functions and classes'²⁰. Quine frequently uses words like 'entity', 'modality', 'propensity', 'salience', for one who rejects the immaterial. How can you talk about modality if you exclude the philosophy of existence, for modality means the way something is affirmed? This presupposes that we grasp the way in which something exists. As Aquinas said, existence is the first thing that comes into our minds. The discovery of constants in the laws of nature witnesses to the reality of what is general. The word 'object' itself is general. Material things are particular and individual: they exist here and now. What is general is immaterial. It is difficult to see why we can think of things in an immaterial way if our thought only has material causes.

The Uses of Metaphysics

While the prevalent view of the mind is materialist, matter comes to be seen as less and less like solid matter by physicists, so that some even

think away its material aspect. Schrödinger, for example, asks what is the same about a meadow and stream he revisits after 30 years, which looks unchanged although he knows new plants have sprung up in place of the old and the matter of the original plants and trees been changed. So he concludes that what things really are is their *form*. Form has been a much neglected topic in most schools of philosophy since the time of Descartes. Interestingly, it is returning through science. Schrödinger writes about particles: 'There is no point in thinking of them again as consisting of some material; they are, as it were, *pure shape*, nothing but shape'.²¹ You do not get matter, however, from any number of immaterial particles, for immaterial particles do not make a material atom. Form is the form *of* something, unless a thing or being is just a form. But this is what some have thought angels to be, just their form because immaterial beings. While philosophy has to take note of what natural science tells us, it can also help us to think straightly about matter. Scientists need a view of the world in order to interpret the data of their observations, and this view often comes from a philosophy. The idea of atoms came from a philosopher (Democritus).

When scientists say that the matter of the universe has infinite density and zero magnitude at the beginning, they seem to be running up against the idea of creation from nothing. No magnitude is zero; if something has a magnitude, as all matter does, it must be some magnitude, however infinitesimal. Metaphysics can help us to think about creation. For example, everything made in the world is made out of something else. In all our making there is a maker who acts and something, matter, which receive his or her action: for example, a blacksmith and the metal he beats. But we must come to an end of making one thing out of something else. We then come to pure making without anything to receive this action, for it is also the making of the very thing to receive the action. This is creation. Creation itself lies outside, beyond physics, because it is the original making of the things which physics studies. When we go beyond physics, we come to metaphysics.

Without metaphysics science goes too, for without the idea of cause there is no intelligible order, which presupposes intelligence. But, as John Haldane points out, intelligence is not explained by natural science, for it is the very condition which makes it possible.²² Reality, he says, is ordered and intelligible. When we ask, What explains this reality? we pass into metaphysics. When we affirm the possibility of science, metaphysics also appears to explain why the world is ordered and intelligible.

Another area in which metaphysics opens up the foundation of what we do, is ethics. It seems that if we are to overcome relativism and establish generally acceptable objective moral standards we require

some agreement about what human nature is. This presupposes that things have natures, an idea by no means generally accepted at present. It belongs to metaphysics to show that things have real natures. To take a question of more immediate concern in society today: why should we treat unborn children and the severely incapacitated in the same way as human beings active with all their powers? It is because they share the same nature. Thus metaphysics, although it is often thought to be of purely abstract interest, has far-reaching practical relevance in the everyday lives of many.

The present crisis of meaning, of which the Pope speaks, seems to come, at least in part, from seeking purely inner-worldly values and ends. If we are to discover a purpose and meaning for human life that satisfies, we have to look beyond this world. But there are no transcendent values unless there is something real above the world, which metaphysics can show us. The young Wittgenstein thought that the meaning of life must lie outside the world, because everything in the world is contingent.

The meaning of the world must lie outside it. In the world everything is as it is and everything happens as it happens; there is no value in it. If there is a value, which is of value, it must lie outside all happening and being so.²³

Again, metaphysics helps us find, or to ground with reason, the answer to what John Paul II says are three of the great questions of our contemporaries: Who am I? Where do I come from? Where am I going to? For human beings have arisen purely from matter by evolution and are going nowhere beyond this world unless there is more to reality than the visible world. Metaphysics can show us that there is more.

Realism and Truth

When the Pope calls for a return to metaphysics, he means a realist metaphysics, for he says that philosophy, if it is going to serve theology, must affirm our ability to know the truth, which includes the world around us. Realism is the doctrine that 1) there is an external world, and 2) we can know it. It seems that once we cannot know the real world we also lose touch with God, since the only way we can come to know by natural reason that God exists is by beginning with the world. It is significant that Descartes has to make God an innate idea after he has doubted the existence of the world around him. Some, like Michael Dummett and Fergus Kerr, would say that realism goes with theism. Realism also seems to lead to theism in Aristotle, who only calls metaphysics 'theologia' besides 'first philosophy'. John Haldane,

however, points out that not all who regard themselves as realists are theists, and instances J. Smart. Haldane would only say that then it is not easy to explain the reality one affirms.

The main alternatives to realist metaphysics have been:

1. The visible world is not the real one (Plato).
2. We cannot know things themselves directly (empiricists and Kant in different ways).
3. Materialism, which the Pope says binds and enslaves us because it denies, or at least ties down, the liberty of the spirit.

Metaphysics liberates the mind because it helps us to rise above matter and thereby prevents us from being weighed down by purely material concerns. As Père Humbert Clérissac once said at a retreat preached in England:

Many discerning people have been struck by the freshness, innocence and disinterestedness of those who have spent years in the study of metaphysics.²⁴

The consequences of eliminating metaphysics have been:

1. To confine the mind to the imagination (all our ideas are derived from impressions, there is nothing real of which we do not have an image or picture).
2. To cut off the mind from the senses, which is a dualism of mind and body, if we can bypass the senses for our knowledge (Plato, Descartes' 'mental inspection').

Ever since the loss of realist metaphysics in the modern era, there has paradoxically been a distrust of the senses. We see evidence of this in Hume's chapter 'Of Scepticism with regard to the Senses' (*Treatise* I iv 2), although he is an empiricist. It is metaphysics, when it is realist, which upholds the role of the senses in the human way of knowing. Far from metaphysics being 'the age-long refusal to acknowledge the bodylines of meaning and mind',²⁵ which may be true of idealist metaphysics (Plato and Kant), realist metaphysics upholds the importance of the body for acquiring knowledge. Although Wittgenstein, in the *Investigations*, frees us from 'the myth of the soul imprisoned in the body', this does not mean that there is no room left for metaphysics. After all, the two principal exponents of realist metaphysics, Aristotle and Aquinas, affirm the unity of the body and soul; realist metaphysics, at least, need not go with the invisible self hidden in the body.

As we need to distinguish between idealist and realist metaphysics,

so we need to be aware of a division within the realist camp between those who think that realism goes with the correspondence theory of truth and those who do not. John Haldane appeals to Aquinas' theory of truth being the conformity of the mind with reality to show that realism is possible. In thinking of a horse, my mind is informed with the form of a horse. Thus the mind is *conformed* with the formal structure of reality, for the same form exists in my mind as in the real thing (horse) I am thinking of, albeit in a different way (intentionally, not naturally). Whether we think realism is right or not, we can say that our knowledge is *caused*. Either we cause it or it is caused by real things. If all that I know is my perceptions, how do I know that they are caused by external reality? If, on the other hand, the world is constructed by our ideas, why is there only one natural science over all the world and why do scientists so widely agree about its structure? It seems then that our minds are not the measure of reality but reality is the measure of our minds, and truth a matching (*adaequatio*) of the mind with reality.

John Searle, however, wants realism without the correspondence theory of truth. Realism for Searle means that the world exists independently of my representations of it. It does not mean that we know *how* things exist but only *that* there is a way that they are which is logically independent of the mind. Searle observes that the understanding of many sentences presupposes external reality, even when they are false: for example, the sentence 'Mont Blanc is covered with snow'. For Searle it is enough that sentences claim to refer to phenomena that are accessible to others, e.g. mountains and snow.²⁷ The question is whether there are any phenomena and we are right in assuming that there is an external reality. Our statements only show that there is the external reality that Searle says they presuppose, if they are true. At some point we have to make a *judgement* by comparing what we say, or think, with external, objective reality. So it seems that we come back to the correspondence theory of truth. Unless we can know the real world itself, and not just *that* there is an external reality, how do we know that the world our sentences presuppose is not constructed from language and the way we happen to speak? On Searle's view, the world may be constructed from language, just as it was from our ideas for Kant. Our ability to understand one another seems rather to rest on our knowing a reality that is independent of our minds. We do not know that our sentences presuppose external reality unless we can know this reality itself. One may also have realism without metaphysics, which properly speaking goes beyond the things accessible to the study of physics.

Pope John Paul constantly steers his thoughts towards the topic of truth throughout his encyclical. Although we might think its main theme

is faith and reason, it is primarily about truth, for this is what we ascend to on the wings of faith and reason, which are *ways* of knowing it rather than *what* we know. As John Paul II reminds us, we only realise our human nature by knowing reality and the truth, since we are made in the image of God, who is the Truth.²⁸ Metaphysics for the Pope is always directed towards the human person, as it is an indispensable means for coming to know that reality which is the end of human existence. Indeed, as Aquinas boldly sketches it in the opening chapter of the *Contra Gentiles*, truth is the end of the universe, for it comes from a Mind and the good of the mind is truth. As metaphysics opens up the path to complete reality, we may see it as part of the present Pope's programme, which I think can be summed up in a verse he has returned to throughout his reign: 'The truth will set you free' (*John* 8,32).

- 1 *The Tablet* 21 December 1996, p.1674.
- 2 *Metaphysics* I c.2.
- 3 *Faith and Reason* 5.
- 4 *Ibid.* 81.
- 5 *Ibid.* 82.
- 6 *Ibid.* 84.
- 7 *Ibid.* 82.
- 8 *Ibid.* 83.
- 9 *Ibid.* 97.
- 10 *Ibid.* 83.
- 11 *Ibid.* 97.
- 12 *From Stimuli to Science* (1998) p.6.
- 13 *Tractatus* 6. 53
- 14 *Philosophical Investigations* I 126.
- 15 *Prospects for Metaphysics* (ed. I. Ramsey) p. 161.
- 16 *ST* I 5,3.
- 17 *Tractatus* 5. 552.
- 18 *Nature and the Greeks. Science and Humanism* p.129.
- 19 *From a Logical Point of View* p.44.
- 20 *The Pursuit of Truth* (1992) p.25.
- 21 *Loc. cit.* p. 125.
- 22 *Atheism and Theism* (with J. Smart) pp.91 f
- 23 *Tractatus* 6.41.
- 24 *The Spirit of St Dominic* (London 1939) p.43.
- 25 F. Kerr, *Theology after Wittgenstein* p.136. cf p.169.
- 26 *Reality, Representation and Projection* (with C. Wright ed.) pp.21 f.
- 27 *The Social Construction of Reality* (1995) pp.185-189.
- 28 *Faith and Reason* 81.