

est number because we don't know enough, divine law is based on God's well-informed calculation of this end and for this reason should be obeyed) on the grounds that God might judge that a false revelation would work out for men's good. (p 96). I hold no brief for the doctrine Geach is attacking but because of what must count as man's good (and not because of anything to do with the benevolence of God) it does not, I think, make sense to say that Man's good might be achieved in his being fundamentally deceived about himself. We can only think so by a careless extrapolation from the evident truth that a man may occasionally be advantaged by being deceived about particular matters. It involves the same kind of logical ineptitude as supposing that because I would be better off if I owned some perfectly forged pound notes, everybody would be much better off if we all owned lots and lots of forged pound notes.

Geach is refreshingly permissive about the breaking of promises (which at one time seemed to be the only serious crime known to English moral philosophers). For him it is simply a matter of letting someone down, but 'if the circumstances come to be such that A's fulfilment of his promise to B will injure C more than non-fulfilment will injure B, then whatever B may feel about the matter A is released, and it would be preposterous for B, knowing the circumstances, to reproach A for breaking his promise and letting B down.' Then, however, he goes on inconsistently to make an exception of vows. He is, course, aware that you can't let God down by breaking a vow, but then he simply states that 'it would be a great and manifest sin to fail of performance'. Precisely why? Geach's theory offers no reason whatever for this and must therefore be inadequate.

Geach, happily, has now joined the majority of Catholic moralists in no longer

CHRISTIAN BELIEFS ABOUT LIFE AFTER DEATH, by Paul Badham, Macmillan. 1976. 174pp. £8.95.

The resurrection of the body is a fundamental piece of Christian belief, and basis of Christian hope. In a vague way, Christians take it for granted as a kind of background for their whole existence, without thinking about it very clearly or deliberately. Maybe this is just as well: for when

holding the view once held by Pope Paul VI (*Hum. Vit.* 10 and 12) that traditional christian sexual morality can be justified by an appeal to the teleology of the generative organs (p 138) but he is likely to depart much further from them in the justification he himself provides: this is that sex in our fallen world is a manifestly evil and corrupting thing to which the only antidote is marriage: "Apart from the good of marriage that redeems it, sex is poison." (p 147). Like *Playboy* and so many modern writers, Geach seems to believe that it is possible to discuss, and characterise morally, something called 'sex' in the abstract, as though it named a specific piece of human behaviour. The proper starting point is, of course, the complex sexual, social, linguistic activity called marriage which is not an 'antidote' for anything, but a necessary human sphere of occupation like house-building, transport, teaching, and civil authority. (It would be odd to speak of London Passenger Transport as an antidote to being stranded in Upminster by the Tube breaking down.) From there you can, if you like, go on to consider the defective or fake variations on marriage; fornication, sexism, adultery, 'deviant behaviour' and the rest, and assess them in terms of the teleology not of bodily organs but of the natural human relationship of marriage.

But, all in all, an enjoyable book with some good arguments and insights and jokes as well, (do not miss the biblical warrant for believing that $\pi = 3$, on page 159), and a refreshing change from the prevailing moralising amongst both philosophers and theologians.

On page 95 'through' should be 'though' and there is a comma to be omitted.

HERBERT McCABE O.P.

you do think about it, and what it implies, you are bound to come up against some pretty awkward problems which can sometimes only be overcome by extremely bizarre solutions. Paul Badham's book confronts some of these, in an amiable and unassuming way (though relying heavily

on the recent work of John Hick for its style of enquiry) and comes up with a refreshingly unfashionable answer. This is that in all essentials, Descartes was right; we *are* minds only contingently linked to the bodies we now have, so we can live after death by being immortal souls provided with 'image-bodies' and having telepathic communication with other survivors in another world.

After two chapters on the Old Testament contribution to, and on the Significance of, the doctrine, Part II of the book discusses why we must reject both what is called the 'Traditional Belief in the Resurrection of the Flesh' and certain typical modern re-interpretations: notably those of John Hick (the 'Exact Replica' theory) and of the many thinkers who argue for our being provided with 'new bodies' that have no material continuity with our present ones. In Part III he sketches his own theory, firstly by defending the concept of the soul and its immortality, and secondly by adopting certain views of Professor Price in order to show how the doctrine of the immortality of the soul can become a doctrine of the resurrection of the body.

Badham's view of the Resurrection of Jesus is that it was a case of "Jesus's surviving soul communicating his continued aliveness to the disciples by telepathically induced veridical hallucinations" (p 43) and this conclusion results, first from an alleged incoherence in the notion of a resuscitated corpse (and he certainly produces some pretty weird examples of patristic argument for such a view); and secondly from the conviction (based on Professor Lampe's work) that the Empty Tomb is but a 'mythical' later reflection of the primitive tradition. On the second point, it is a pity Badham could not consider the points raised by Michael Dummett in this journal (February 1977) about the tendency of modern scholars to interpret anything they find hard to believe as merely 'mythical' whether or not there is any mythical character in the story itself. It is certainly a fault of Badham's general approach, I think, to be too impressed by what modern men can or cannot believe, especially since he quotes surveys which show that thirty per cent of modern worshippers believe in Hell even though this is something modern man is supposed to find incredible!

The problem of the resurrection is how to preserve continuity of personal identity. If you do it by asserting an immortal 'soul' as the spiritual essence which persists, then the whole notion of person as a physical organism becomes problematic. If you do it by asserting a bodily resurrection, all sorts of weird difficulties have to be faced. Badham discusses a large number of these: such as whether the notion of a heaven where resurrected bodies live has to be a space related 'spatially' to the cosmos we know (e.g. on another galaxy); whether being subject to the laws of gravitation is so fundamental a condition of being human that heaven must be a planet of roughly earth-size (then what about the over-population problem in heaven?); and whether being sexual is so fundamental a matter that a heaven (or at least a purgatory) without sexual activity is simply not conceivable at all. Faced with the many bizarre conceptions which seem to him to follow from the orthodox idea of bodily continuity through death, he finally decides that the doctrine is too weird in its implications to be either reasonable or appropriate, and so tries to work out a theory which preserves what he sees as the religious and moral essentials. My own view is that he rejects some of the 'orthodox' argument too easily, and does not take sufficient account of the difficulties of his own alternative. But beyond that, may not some of the more bizarre implications be the result of misinterpreting the purpose of the doctrine, or perhaps of the sort of language it uses? Once we have agreed what a doctrine states, our primary requirement from the philosopher is a demonstration that it is logically coherent. But in the case of the resurrection of the body, it is often far from clear whether logical coherence is established or not. For example, Badham says of the 'resuscitated corpse' theory of the resurrection appearances of Christ, 'in order to account for the body passing through the doors we should have to suppose that it de-materialised outside the doors and was then reconstituted inside' (p 37). It is not clear to me that this is so: or indeed, precisely what the statement means. Of course, no *corpse*, resuscitated or otherwise, can go through a door: but this merely shows that the resurrection, whatever it was, was not a resuscitation of the corpse. No amount of gobbledegook about 'de-

materialisation' can make any difference here. The question is, *could* God do something to a body (or to a door) which would make it possible for the body to go through the door? I see no reason for clearly saying No to that question. But I am far from clear that the doctrine of the resurrection of the body is supposed to take us beyond this kind of point, into the bizarre realms of speculation about (for example) whether a man who dies with a sprained Achilles tendon will be resurrected with a sprained or a healed one. Are

we here not in danger of simply using the doctrine for a purpose it was not designed to carry out? If so, it is no wonder that, having asked a silly question, we get a silly answer. I don't think it is mere evasion to say that Keat's 'negative capability', i.e. the rejection of an 'irritable reaching after fact and reason' needs to come in here, as well as his doctrine of 'soul-making' which is an important element both of Hick's and Badham's thought about the after-life.

BRIAN WICKER

EZEKIEL AMONG THE PROPHETS, by Keith W. Carley. *SCM Press (Studies in Biblical Theology)*, London. 1975. 112pp. £2.80.

This little monograph, stemming from a doctorate thesis of 1968, examines the connection of Ezekiel to previous prophetic tradition, chiefly that betraying the influence of the Northern kingdom of Israel, and especially the movement which we see in Elijah and Elisha. The author, now a lecturer in Papua, New Guinea, works chiefly by following up expressions which are found frequently in Ezekiel and occur also in striking contexts in the sources. Thus Ezekiel is connected to pre-classical prophecy by such expressions as "the hand of Yahweh was upon me", "that you may know that I am Yahweh", "setting his face towards...". Connections with other major streams of Old Testament tradition are also discussed: to Hosea he is linked by some special uses of the prostitute theme (which occurs also in Isaiah and Jeremiah), to Deuteronomy by a number of minor themes and expressions. The link with Jeremiah is considerably stronger, and here the author has an interesting hint on the development of the

new heart theme: in Jeremiah Yahweh promises to write a new Law on their hearts, but by Ezekiel their irreformability is such that it will need a new heart and a new spirit.

There is little that is new or exciting in this book. The author seems to rely on studies already published, rather than trying out new ideas of his own. He does not seem to have any particular thesis which he is passionately anxious to prove. Much of the book is routine thesis material, on which the author has nothing to say (e.g. the section on the ecstatic element in prophecy in the Introduction). What he does say is mostly unexceptionable (though he is distressingly willing to postulate a claim for the miraculous in the accounts of Elijah running before the chariot of Ahab and the translocation of Ezekiel to Jerusalem), but it should have been possible to write a book both more profound and more interesting theologically on this topic.

HENRY WANSBROUGH

IMAGINATION, by Mary Warnock, *Faber and Faber*, London. 1976. 213pp. £6.50.

A writer who begins an investigation into 'imagination' with Hume and Kant risks the same fate as Conrad's Captain MacWhirr, whose investigation of the typhoon produced the general conclusion that it was 'a damned awkward circumstance'. Inevitably, so expert a witness as the author of the *Ancient Mariner* and of the *Biographia Literaria*, if measured by the standards of Hume and Kant, will be dismissed as 'not a professional philosopher'. He has no tools to do philosophy with. Mrs Warnock shows Coleridge the door, and it is Wordsworth who is preferred.

Now it is true that Coleridge was guilty of writing that 'philosophy begins in wonder'. It is also true that Wordsworth was the better poet, and might be regarded, therefore, as the more reliable witness. The snag is that abundant evidence exists to prove that Wordsworth owed the *intellectual* foundation of his vision to Coleridge. Not for nothing has he been facetiously referred to as Coleridge's masterpiece.

It is hardly surprising, therefore, that half the book is taken up in reaching the main track-