

CONTEMPORARY RESEARCH ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND BUREAUCRACIES IN LATIN AMERICA

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ONE OF THE MOST INCOMPLETELY DEVELOPED AREAS OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES IN the study of Latin America is the field of public administration. As the focus of external studies of Latin America, public administration suffers from a paucity of attention, and internally in Latin America, the subject has lagged behind other branches of political science in development.

This underdeveloped state of public administration research extends especially to comparative studies at the middle-range and broadly theoretical levels. Rare indeed are the studies of Latin American public administration which attempt comparative analysis of different systems of public administration in the area. Such a state of affairs presents both a challenge and an opportunity to concerned students.

It is my purpose in this paper to survey recent and contemporary research on Latin American public administration and bureaucracies. Included in the survey, which makes no pretense of being exhaustive, are, primarily, published books and articles in English which are judged to be significant in terms of further development of the discipline. University theses and dissertations are excluded. Although some studies which are essentially prescriptive are included, the main focus will be upon works which may be classified as broadly theoretical, presenting middle-range theory, or usefully descriptive. Works to be presented and considered are grouped into the following categories: broadly theoretical works, generation of new data and approaches, and developmentally-oriented works. The last two categories were suggested by Lawrence S. Graham (1973) and are employed here to provide a framework for discussing public administration research in general. Arbitrarily excluded, as a general rule, are studies which are oriented essentially toward organization and management unless their pertinence to broader aspects of public administration is evident.

The approach used in the survey has three objectives: (1) to call attention to works which are judged to be significant or which present interesting and useful findings; (2) to briefly summarize the principal points or main thrust of the studies; and (3) to generalize about public administration in Latin America to the extent that the research permits. This is not a critical essay in the sense of positively or negatively evaluating the works surveyed; I have refrained intentionally from such judgments, except to the extent that the inclusion of a study implies that it offers something of value.

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BROADLY THEORETICAL STUDIES: THE GREAT VOID

Broadly theoretical works as the term is employed here would correspond rather closely with the general system model-building studies or middle-range theory formulation studies as suggested by Heady's (1966) classification of public administration literature. The category is intended to suggest works which emphasize the construction of typologies or models for comparative purposes.

One searches the literature in vain for works of a broadly theoretical nature dealing with Latin American public administration. Not only is there a prominent absence of comprehensive theory specifically treating administration in the Latin American setting. Even most general attempts to construct appropriate theoretical frameworks for analysis of administration and bureaucracies gloss over, totally neglect, or treat superficially the Latin American administrative milieu. Theoretical approaches and general works relating to administration in developing countries, such as Riggs (1964), LaPalombara (1963), and Riggs (1957), essentially exclude Latin America as an area for consideration or a setting from which illustrative examples are drawn. Perhaps the general absence of allusions to Latin America simply reflects the low state of development of descriptive and middle-range theoretical works relating to the area. In any case, judged quantitatively, the literature shows a definite preoccupation with the Afro-Asian world to the exclusion of Latin America.

A review of the LaPalombara (1963) volume reveals that Latin American bureaucracy or administration does not comprise the subject of any single study included. Most of the other areas of the world receive either special attention or form the subjects predominately drawn upon for examples. In the selected bibliography appended to the LaPalombara collection, entries relating directly to Latin American states and public administration systems are rare. Most of those which appear, such as Needler (1961), Scott (1959), Johnson (1958), Kuznets *et al.* (1955), and Vernon (1963), are concerned only secondarily with administrative aspects. Only two items of this bibliography, Caldwell (1953) and Richards (1961), focus specifically on Latin America—in these instances, Colombia and Bolivia—and neither is of a theoretical nature.

The Spitz and Weidner (1963) annotated bibliography on development administration lists 340 items, of which only 16 treat aspects of Latin American administration and bureaucracy. The 16 must be reduced further if articles dealing with other aspects such as population, industrial development, municipal government, and political groups are excluded. Most of the remaining items, such as Clapp (1952), Doria (1944), Honey (1948), Kitchen (1950), and Wells (1956), would be subsumed more appropriately under the heading of organization and management (O&M) type studies. The relationship of Ebenstein (1954) and Anderson (1961) to broader theory is only slightly more evident. In general, most of these cited works must be assigned to Heady's "modified traditional" category.

The Wagley (1964) volume on social science research on Latin America includes Kling's (1964) review of political science research and reflects a predictable

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absence of references to works in the field of administration. Kling laments the "awkward" relationship between Latin American studies and comparative politics, noting that authors of textbooks and treatises in comparative politics "ignore Latin American data without evident pangs of remorse or expectations of censure for failure to recognize conspicuously pertinent research." The problem is compounded by the paucity of conspicuous or pertinent research on administration. In the list of concrete research proposals which Kling sets forth, conspicuously omitted are any proposals directly concerning bureaucracy or public administration. Even Huntington's memorandum reprinted in Kling's review fails to suggest research on bureaucracy or administration, except as it refers to political leadership roles; Kling makes similar but fleeting references to such roles, background characteristics, and stability in office. His encouragement of studies of public policy formation cites only one work, that of Hirschman (1963). One might deplore the lack of research interest indicated in administration and bureaucracy as they are reflected in Kling's survey, but the absence of works on these subjects in his survey simply mirrors the relatively barren nature of research to the time of his review. The inventory has been only slightly expanded since 1964.

Several widely used readers in the field of political development and social change, such as Welch (1967), Finkle and Gable (1966), Raphaeli (1967), and Keschull (1968), contain few if any studies relating to Latin American bureaucracy or administration directly and only incidental indirect allusions in the articles included.

Nevertheless, one does encounter scattered enticing suggestions about various characteristics of bureaucracy and administration in the Latin American setting. Kenneth Johnson (1964), for example, relates political instability in Latin America to the "circular interaction" of certain factors, including entrepreneurial deficiencies and "high degrees of role substitutability among politically relevant performance entities." Entrepreneurial deficiency of course influences administrative development, as does the apparent Latin American suspicion of impersonal institutions and the "absence of a truly collaborative spirit." Johnson also suggests that the "prevailing lack of role specialization and interdependence among performance entities in Latin America is a continuing invitation to armies and government bureaucracies to usurp each other in a power grab." Further, a bureaucratic career may provide, in a society relatively lacking in social pluralism, an important if not sole route to socioeconomic mobility.

Roberto de Oliveira Campos (1963) refers to certain impediments to improvement of public administration in Latin America, including the tradition of state paternalism, overcentralization in decision-making, "the absence of an adequate and realistic theory on the role and limits of government intervention," "abnormal discontinuity," and (after Hirschman) the "dilemma of motivation versus understanding."

Each of these impediments, according to Oliveira Campos, operates in various

ways with sometimes serious consequences for public administration and the private sectors. State paternalism encourages affiliative or allegiant recruitment norms rather than achievement norms and impedes impersonal management of public affairs. Over-centralized decision-making, while it weakens provincial and local governments as well as the various sectors, paradoxically does not serve to strengthen the central governments. The lack of an adequate definition of the limits and role of government intervention introduces additional distortions. Among them are the temptation of "subsidy-pricing," management's taking on a political tone, and inadequate sanctions against inefficiency or corruption. The problem of "abnormal discontinuity" in Latin American public administration plagues both the operational level and the policy-making level. Frequent change of government "confronts a civil service that is floating without real roots." At the policy level, such discontinuity leads to "unnecessary originality" which may mean loss and erasure of previous bases for progress. The common "dilemma of motivation versus understanding" leads to frequently simultaneous and frustratingly unsuccessful attacks on complex problems, often impossible to solve quickly.

Laurin Henry (1958) discusses some general characteristics of Latin American administrative systems and the civil services, viewing such systems as combinations of various New and Old World characteristics. Henry notes the tight stratification of the bureaucracies along traditional class lines and their deficiency in scientific, technical, and middle management skills. The quality of administration, in most countries, is seen to be directly related to recent political history; with every change of leadership, Henry says, "There is likely to be a major turnover and shuffling of personnel, all up and down the hierarchy." Civil service reforms, in some instances, have produced dysfunctional effects; one result is that ministries "become over-staffed, undisciplined, and difficult to organize along rational lines" (Henry, 1958).

Henry mentions three other characteristics of the traditional Latin American administrative environment, including centralization (encouraged by both the unitary system of government and the unsettled political environment), a tendency to legalism, and administrative leadership (greater autonomy because of the relative absence of competing pressures). Henry notes the "fascinating duality" about the legalism of public administration in Latin America, referring to the "intricate set of informal methods" by which formal rules are "ignored, cut short, or circumvented." The congruence between this view and Fred Riggs' (1964) notions regarding formalism in the prismatic bureaucracy is striking. But Henry also emphasized that many of the traditional characteristics of public administration are rapidly giving way to new attitudes and reforms.

Jacques Lambert, in considering various contradictions in Latin American society, notes the difference between the theory of centralization of administration and the countervailing pressures of the social structure which made the theory ineffectual. "Latin America was not the land of almighty officials, but on the contrary the land of unruly caciques and caudillos" (Lambert, 1967: 130). That reference to the colonial period applies similarly to the contemporary period. Lambert appropriately

suggests that the formal concept of centralized versus decentralized governments be discarded in favor of the concept of an "area of weakened action." "Only a developed section of a country is an area of direct action of the government and can really be administered" (Lambert, 132). Again, Lambert's interpretation of centralization of power corresponds closely with Riggs' concept of the "equivocality of power," in which extreme centralization of authority can be seen as "a desperate attempt to bring the bureaucracy and society under control" (Riggs, 1964: 282).

Freeman J. Wright (1970) attempts to evaluate the conceptual framework of Gabriel Almond and G. Bingham Powell relating to political development by applying it to Latin American bureaucracies. Following the Almond and Powell model, which defines political development in terms of "increased differentiation and specialization of political structures and the increased secularization of political cultures" (Almond & Powell, 1966: 105), Wright focuses on trends in differentiation and secularization in Latin America.

There is abundant evidence of increasing differentiation—in ministerial structures; in the proliferation of decentralized structures further removed from presidential direction; in hierarchical (vertical) differentiation through the growth of centralized staff agencies; in recruitment patterns which show a trend toward greater specialization in various technical areas.

In terms of secularization, progress has been made, but not as much as would appear on paper. Civil service codes have often been observed only formalistically. "Although achievement standards increasingly have been honored in the selection of bureaucratic personnel, they often coexist with criteria of nepotism, friendship, and, most commonly, political affiliation" (Wright, 9).

Looking at another level—system performance—Wright reviews the relationships of differentiation and secularization in terms of five capabilities (extractive, regulative, responsive, symbolic, and distributive). Generally, he finds negative correlations between these relationships.

Wright's principal conclusion is that Almond and Powell's criteria seem "particularly inappropriate as indicators of development in Latin America" (Wright, 18).

Robert E. Scott (1966) is concerned with political change in societies where "Lack of widely shared values and understandings among the populace combines with weaknesses in the informal political mechanisms which might aggregate disparate opinions to overload the constitutional policy-making agencies." (Scott deals with government bureaucracy only.)

He sees bureaucracy as occupying a primary role in development: ". . . The public sector is so strongly involved in the entire process of transition that to study the bureaucrat who implements government policy is to study the one factor in the pattern of change that is most likely to come into meaningful contact with all the others".

Scott cautions against lumping all Latin American bureaucrats together for analysis because of wide differences in background, training, role in administrative rule-making, etc. He focuses primarily on the "administrative class," those occupying the more powerful positions within the bureaucracy. The members of this group usually

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comes from the lower and middle ranges of the middle class, and their shared values result from the "common experiences and common aspirations of its members." Scott found in Mexico, Peru, and several Central American countries that a large proportion is recruited from "bureaucratic families," with recruitment based on personal and political considerations." He minimizes the threat of the spoils system to security or the administrative class. There is a tendency for office-holders to regard themselves as a group apart and a certain group consciousness has developed gradually.

Latin American bureaucracies find themselves under increasing pressures because, as Scott puts it, they are asked to perform an "impossible task—that of reconciling the problems inherent in the conflicting demands of a traditional society." That task is trust upon the bureaucracies in raw form because of the underdevelopment of buffer units such as parties and functional interest groups. Commenting on the deceptive legalistic tendency of public administration in Latin America, Scott observes that "formality and *papelaria* (red tape) often are no more than a convenient facade behind which the inside dopesther and the *coyote* (a Mexican term for go-between or fixer) operate to provide the services demanded by highly specialized interest in an expanding economy or the control devices required to assure a stable society."

Categorizing Latin American republics according to the degree of change and fusion of values, Scott derives three groupings:

- (1) those in which relatively little attitudinal adjustment to change has occurred. In some of these countries (Guatemala, Honduras, Haiti, and Paraguay) forces of change and development are so weak that conflict between traditional and modern is not very meaningful. In others, the problem of conflicting values exists but is checked by the nature of the political system (Peru, Ecuador, and Nicaragua);
- (2) those where a "constructive mix" of institutionalized values and change values has not been reached (El Salvador, the Dominican Republic, Panama, Bolivia, Cuba, Venezuela, Colombia, Chile, and Argentina);
- (3) those where traditional and modern values have blended reasonably successfully (Uruguay, Costa Rica, Mexico, and Brazil). (Even in this category, the transformation is incomplete).

Scott's overview of Latin American bureaucracies leads him to cast doubt on the likelihood of bureaucrats moving strongly for change and on the capacity of the bureaucracies to resolve crises of change without support of other interests in the polity.

Harold F. Alderfer (1967) includes Latin America in his survey of public administration in newer nations. His approach is to outline existing practices and institutions in various nations, under the headings of the governmental setting, national administrative organization, deconcentration and decentralization, administrative dynamics, personnel administration, finance administration, and management. There is no indication that any attempt at comparison was made.

An example of a basically traditional approach may be seen in the Pan American Union's *Public Administration in Latin America* (Pan American Union, 1965),

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summarizing the findings of consultative missions sent to the Latin American countries under the auspices of the OAS. The report identifies in a general sense the administrative deficiencies obstructing or delaying development and makes recommendations regarding Latin America's needs for technical assistance in public administration. This document is a follow-up to the report of the Blandford Mission of 1954–1955. (Public American Clearing House, 1955).

The report cites as the most noteworthy deficiencies of a general nature those concerning government employment (selection, compensation, obligations and rights of personnel). Another general deficiency lies in the criteria for assigning functions organizationally. Also noted by the mission were the unnecessary or outmoded juridical, legal, or procedural formalities which stand in the way of development in Latin America.

Charles W. Anderson (1967), in a chapter devoted to the administrative process, describes the administrative culture of Latin America as "a given of development policy, a limitation of the capacity of the state to act as an instrument of change." (Anderson, 1967: 139). The costs of excessively large public bureaucracies are "political overheads," just as education, health and similar costs are considered social overheads: institutionalized corruption is an example. Even when adequate resources are provided, these "must filter through an administrative labyrinth in which the roles of political manipulator, formulator of intricate patterns of administrative interaction, and sinecurist are often more highly regarded and more frequently rewarded, than is the efficient performance of public business" (Anderson, 1967: 144–145). In considering the problem of penetration, Anderson notes aspects of administrative organization (including patronage, nepotism, the multiple career pattern, chronically low civil service salaries, inflexibility, intricate administrative regulation and law, multiple internal checks, centralization of decision-making authority, a lack of mutual trust, and a low capacity for voluntary teamwork). But clientele resistances also pose serious problems: "The ultimate problem of administration is often one of directed cultural change" (Anderson, 1967: 149). And often the faith of the reformers in the all-powerful state is shattered on that obstacle.

The works cited in this section fit the category of broadly theoretical studies only incompletely and in a general sense. A comprehensive, theoretical model of public administration in Latin America, one that possesses real explanatory power, remains to be constructed. Works to date have dealt only with segments of the whole, non-comparatively, and with relatively little attention to broad systemic aspects.

GENERATION OF NEW DATA AND APPROACHES

In the first section of this paper, broadly theoretical works are described as the great void in the literature. Progress toward filling that gap has been impeded in part by the paucity of empirical works which would provide the foundation for more broadly gauged studies. A number of empirically oriented investigations have been carried out with this purpose. Although most of these studies are not limited simply to generation of new data, that at least is a major objective.

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This type of research attempts to answer a number of basic questions about Latin American public administration, the actors in administrative subsystems, and the bureaucratic phenomenon. Little has been known, for example, about the social backgrounds of government officials. What kinds of people comprise the public bureaucracies?

My study of the senior level executives of the government of Peru (Hopkins, 1967) was founded on the thesis that knowledge of social origin, education, mobility, and similar background factors is necessary for full understanding of their roles. The study is oriented largely toward the production of a foundation of idiographic data (concrete empirical data or case studies) but also includes attitudinal findings which deny the validity of any simplistic "Latin American type" executive. The subjects of the study, 221 upper and mid-level government officials, stood apart unmistakably as an elite group in Peruvian society, set apart by family background, by superior education, and by experience.

An important need in comparative administration is filled by Greenberg's (1970) case study of the Mexican Ministry of Hydraulic Resources. Not only does it provide a body of previously unavailable factual information about Mexican bureaucracy, but it also tests certain middle-level generalizations about bureaucratic behavior in a transitional setting.

Greenberg describes the Mexican bureaucracy as relatively efficient, explaining that on the basis of the political milieu (a broadly based, unified elite and a flexible ruling party), healthy economic expansion, the impact of the Revolution, and (in the case of the Ministry of Hydraulic Resources) a technical function carried out by expert employees. Personalism seems to characterize the inner workings of politics; despite this, however, a stable core of functionaries (whether or not "in favor") carries on the essential work of bureaucracy. (Cf. Rood and Sherwood, 1963, and Diamant, 1957). The most important factor influencing bureaucratic behavior derives from Mexican society: the very personal nature of relationships. Internal ethics thus revolve around loyalty to one's patron more than to any abstract principle. Constant concern with security ranks as another striking feature of the bureaucracy. Recruitment reflects a pronounced personalism, appointments tend to emphasize confidence, and little or no job protection exists. The insecurity of the bureaucrat is not therefore surprising. A linked effect is seen in the existence of widespread corruption. However, in this case, corruption seems to increase morale and raise the overall efficiency because of the incentives it offers to officials.

In general, Greenberg's findings support the work of Fred Riggs in regard to transitional bureaucracies and such characteristics as formalism, role overlapping, personalism, patronage, and corruption. However, the effectiveness of the Ministry of Hydraulic Resources suggests that certain of the implications of concepts in comparative administration need further thought and research. This applies equally well to some of the prescriptions of traditional public administration doctrine as they pertain to the virtues of the merit system and related personnel practices.

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How does a different set of cultural, structural, and environmental influences function to condition persons who participate in another administrative system? My observations on the Peruvian bureaucracy (Hopkins, 1969) were intended to compare some of the distinctive features of the Peruvian bureaucratic system with corresponding aspects of the United States bureaucracy as described by Leonard D. White (1948). Noted therein was the strongly legalistic and formalistic nature of Peruvian public administration. The bureaucracy operates with more independence of the legislature. Administration reflects much of the hierarchical rigidity characteristic of Spanish colonial administration, and it functions with relatively little dependence upon popular consent. Compared with North American public administration, the Peruvian system was judged to be inflexible, non-innovative, and generally strongly fettered by precedent. The system is unitary in nature, strongly centralized (in authority if not in control), and has relatively limited roots in local communities. Admittedly, many of these observations were, like White's, intuitive or impressionistic in nature, and all require empirical testing.

What values are characteristic of Latin American government officials and how do these value systems influence bureaucratic behavior? Focusing on the Guatemalan bureaucracy, Jerry Weaver (1970) in an experimental paper probes the value systems of individuals through the analysis of responses to questions calling for the expression of opinions. Field work was carried out in 1966 while the *Gobierno Militar* ruled Guatemala and data were drawn from a sample of 250 bureaucrats.

Answers to interview questions relating to attitudes towards public service as a career suggest a "particularistic" and narrow "identity range" among Guatemalan bureaucrats and indicate that professionalism and nationalism are weakly held values. Yet most respondents indicated a career orientation and a desire to remain in public service. Seeking to determine how one gets ahead in the bureaucracy, Weaver found that the most commonly mentioned qualities for promotion were honor, honesty, discipline, and respect. Only six percent mentioned "pull" (*cuello*) as a major factor. Similar qualities characterized the "good" public employee. Questions relating to attitudes toward the work situation led to some unexpected findings. Nearly half the sample refused to indicate that anything concerning the work situation should be changed; a large proportion perceived no major problem. Weaver hypothesizes that the reluctance to offer a critical opinion stemmed from the calculation that it would lead to some sort of negative sanction by superiors. Noncommittal answers probably reflected occupational insecurity.

One of Weaver's most intriguing suggestions contradicts a common view which attributes the pervasive legalism, formalism, and indecision of Latin American administration to the Spanish colonial origins of the republics. His findings suggest rather that these characteristics are "defense mechanisms employed by insecure bureaucrats, bureaucrats who see no reason to value reform, who have developed procedures not with regard to efficiency, effectiveness, impersonalism, and other Weberian norms, but out of a primary concern for self-protection."

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What are the roles of the bureaucracy and the bureaucrat in the process of change and how well equipped are they, in the context of Latin America culture, to manage that process? Chapter 8 of Petras' (1969) work on Chile is devoted to the bureaucracy, in which he sees a fusion of modern and traditional values. As such, the administrative apparatus "has served to stabilize the political system by moderating political antagonisms." Petras describes the bureaucracy as the "political anchor" of the Chilean system in a way reminiscent of Alfred Diamant's analysis of the French bureaucracy (Diamant, 1957). In this respect, he sees the Chilean bureaucracy as comparable to Mexico's.

Petras examines the bureaucracy in terms of internal organization and attitudes and values, and finds it to be a combination of an "impersonal tool of policy makers" and a "politically involved personalistic organization." The direct relationship between position and education of officials suggests a rational organization, but social background is seen as a prime determinant of attitudes. Further, promotion depends to a large extent on "pull" of various kinds. More critically, "the values and commitments (of bureaucrats) influence the bureaucracy's choice of development plans." There is a strong (75 percent) identification with the middle class. The values of the elite are reflected in their inclination toward gradual change; more radical structural change would likely encounter at least passive acceptance if not resistance in the bureaucracy. (It should be noted that Petras wrote before the election of the Allende government in 1970).

In examining the internal structure of the bureaucracy, Petras analyzes the relationship between education and rank (strongly correlated), sex and mobility (not affected except at the highest levels), ethnic and religious discrimination (not evident), and salary and authority (strongly correlated.) Self-evaluations suggest a higher attractiveness of private employment. He concludes that the formal structure appears to be based on rational considerations, but that "traditional" values persist nevertheless.

The effects of traditional values emerge more clearly when the "rationality" of the bureaucracy is viewed in a broader context. For example, education is "a necessary but not sufficient condition for advancement to higher positions in the bureaucracy. The major vehicle . . . is personal, family, or political connections." In general, Petras concludes that a "fusion culture" has been produced in Chile and the public administration reflects this in outlooks, values, and behavior. Public employees favor a "radical ideology without radical action and commitment to short-range, liberal-reform issues. . . ." The bureaucracy identified itself with the middle class and reflects a middle-class consciousness. Its self-perception of its influence in society is generally low. Yet there are inherent advantages, potentially vital strengths, in the bureaucracy's "buffer" role between labor and capital. Petras describes the bureaucracy as "a major integrating" force holding the framework of Chile's "bargaining politics" together, and suggests that the stability and order of Chilean politics may be explained in part from the consequences of the fusion culture.

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Rudolph Gomez (1969) undertakes to study the Peruvian administrative system first descriptively—that is, the formal, prescribed organization of public administration, and then attempts to apply Riggs' *sala* model as an analytical tool. (Riggs employs the term "sala" to describe the administrative role or bureau which "combines the traditional diffuse aspect of older multifunctional bureaucracies with the more specific aspects of modern professionally oriented bureaucracies" Riggs, 1973). Gomez concludes that the *sala* model is highly appropriate for analysis of Peru's transitional society and bureaucracy and that most of its features apply well.

In one of the early articles on public administration in Mexico, Ebenstein (1945) views the administrative system against the background of Mexican society and politics. Societal realities and the weight of tradition made it necessary to devise diverse administrative techniques and methods because the more impersonal, standardized procedures would not work universally.

A number of Ebenstein's observations probably would require some modification in the light of nearly three decades of experience since he wrote. For example, considerably more attention has been given to broad scale planning and this brought about changes in the maturity and relative autonomy of the bureaucracy. (In this respect, note Grimes and Simmons' comments, 1969). Ebenstein observed a great problem to be the relative failure to recognize the merit system in appointment and the "relatively high prevalence of personal gain through public employment." At the same time, he was confident that the evolving political democracy of Mexico would be accompanied by increasing use of the merit system. Whether such confidence was justified may be questioned by present-day observers.

José A. Silva Michelena (1967), in the chapter devoted to the Venezuelan bureaucrat, views the bureaucracy in the broader context of change in Venezuela. His findings are important because of their potential application to public administration systems in similar environments in Latin America. Silva Michelena describes a bureaucracy incapable of retaining its best people, mainly because of the influence of factors in the larger political system, but also because of a strategic error in modeling change too much on the legal-rational Anglo-Saxon example. Much along the same lines set forth in Leonard White's prestige studies (White, 1929, 1932), the Venezuelan connotation of "bureaucrat" is strongly derogatory. Other elites have a decidedly negative evaluation of government officials, ranking them eleventh among twelve occupational groups. The causes of the problem are most commonly seen to be the intrusion of kinship, friendship, or political influence, and a general absence of technical standards, as well as various organizational inadequacies.

Silva Michelena questions the functionality of the legal-rational Weberian model for development of the Venezuelan bureaucracy (Cf. Graham, 1968). Much the same kinds of cross-cultural transfer of POSDCORB* approaches to administra-

* POSDCORB: an acronym for planning, organizing, staffing, directing, coordinating, reporting, and budgeting, summarizes the responsibilities of the administrator according to the "scientific management" school, and is often used as a shorthand reference to that approach.

tion that characterized the growth of the Administrative Department of the Public Service (DASP) in Brazil were employed in Venezuela to establish what Silva Michelena terms a "Weberian-style meritocracy." He questions whether an adequate model exists for a transitional bureaucracy, and he suggests that such a model may prove quite different from Weber's. The complex interaction of economic, political, and sociocultural forces in a rapidly developing nation complicates the resolution of the conflict between the Weberian ideal and the need for freedom of action in personnel matters.

The Silva Michelena study finds the Venezuelan bureaucrats subject to a set of psychological stresses which poses a serious problem to the bureaucracy. An important manifestation is the high potential turnover rate, which the author attempts to explain by linking certain external, internal, and global (relating internal and external) variables to turnover. Silva Michelena argues that the sort of administrative reform attempted to date is likely to increase potential turnover rather than lead to stability. Such reforms intensify cognitive conflicts by reinforcing the universalistic job orientations of the bureaucrats without changing particularistic political practices. Further, they highlight the lack of social support by improving the bureaucrats' self-perceptions faster than others' perceptions of them. As an alternative, Silva Michelena suggests that a long range strategy of reform should focus on efficiency "by stimulating the continuing adaptation of bureaucratic performance to the nature of politics and to the pressures of public opinion."

Various students have considered the role of the *técnico* (those who are charged with the technical and planning aspects) in Latin American public administration. In situations where increasing demands for technical planning and services fall upon the bureaucracies in the course of development, the *técnico* may occupy a critical role. How he responds appears to depend to a large extent on the relationship existing between the bureaucracy and the larger political system.

Grimes and Simmons (1969) look at the changing role of the *técnico* in the Mexican bureaucracy. In the past there was little question that the Partido Revolucionario Institucional exercised dominant control over the administrative apparatus and imbued the bureaucracy with the PRI's modernizing values. Further the bureaucracy was staffed largely by PRI adherents, and it provided a convenient rewards system for loyal party members.

However, this comfortable relationship between party and bureaucracy, it is suggested, may deteriorate as the demands of development force strategic planning out of its secondary role. That change is accompanied by an expanded role for *técnicos* and experts, and these functionaries are likely to chafe increasingly under the close political control of PRI. Despite the authors' recognition of that well established political control, they suggest that "the complexities of Mexico's development are creating conditions whereby the influence of the bureaucracy is increased, and the *técnico* is in an increasingly strategic position for making decisions which have traditionally been the province of the *político*." (Compare Greenberg, 1971).

Ai Camp (1971) examines the characteristics of top level government appoint-

ments in Mexico and the United States as a way of gaining understanding of the administrative systems. Data indicate that *técnicos* have filled increasingly important roles since the 1940s in the top administrations of both countries.

Describing Costa Rica as an "immobilist" society (implying a static or unchanging social system rather than one which is developing or decaying), Denton (1969) attempts to test hypotheses developed from the conceptualizations of Riggs and Huntington in the context of Costa Rican politics. His research concerns the relationship between politics and administration in an economically underdeveloped society. In regard to Riggs' "interference complex" (which suggests bureaucratic domination of decision-making), Denton concludes that under the conditions prevalent in Costa Rica, participation in policy-making by administrators may actually diminish. Further, the ideology of the long-dominant Partido de Liberación Nacional, has led to immobilism of the political institutions of Costa Rica as well as its administrative agencies. "In order for the administrators of these agencies to implement their decisions, however, they must enter into the political arena, and, in doing so, they run into competition with the party that immobilizes them." Denton's preliminary research in Costa Rica leads him to suggest that the cross-cultural application of concepts such as the politics-administration dichotomy appears to be "misapplied and ineffective."

Preliminary hypotheses derived from the study suggest: (1) If a strong modern party is established, this does not necessarily lead to the development of a society or to political control of the administrative process; (2) If politics in a transitional society are immobilist, public administration will also be immobilized; and (3) the "ideal type" dichotomy between politics and administration will be found no more relevant in Costa Rica and possibly in other transitional societies than it is in economically developed societies.

Poitras and Denton (1971) use the concepts of Ferrel Heady (1966) relating to polyarchal-competitive and dominant party, semi-competitive politico-administrative systems to study bureaucratic performance in Mexico and Costa Rica. They focus on the relationships between developmental goals, bureaucratic performance in reaching those goals, and support or opposition toward performance. The unit of analysis is the perception of the relationships rather than any direct measure of them.

From case studies of a Mexican welfare agency and planning and reform agencies in Costa Rica, Poitras and Denton found that bureaucrats in both countries appreciate the general role of bureaucracy in development. The Mexicans perceive relatively better performance in that role; further, they perceive relatively greater external support for their agencies than do the Costa Ricans. The authors raise the possibility that "bureaucratic performance, as perceived by bureaucrats, may be enhanced rather than jeopardized by a political system which restrains the competitive but immobilistic tendencies of divided societies."

Jerry Weaver (1973a) examines the role of the Guatemalan bureaucracy as a political force during the recent history of that country, a period of social upheaval and political change. He employs the following research hypothesis: the extent to which the bureaucracy is an agent of rationalization is a function of the interaction

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of three factors: elite ideology, bureaucratic values, and system of administration.

Weaver notes that the bureaucracy, which was deployed as an instrument for rationalization by the Revolution and by succeeding governments, became increasingly less able to fulfill its role. Contributing to that inability were organizational inflexibility, lack of integrated control, and intra-elite rivalry and competition. From a questionnaire administered to supervisory personnel, Weaver drew data concerning the administrative system and career stability. The data indicated that middle level supervisory personnel are affected most directly by reorganizations and personnel shuffling, and the rapid turnover adversely influences performance in various ways. One effect is that clients are encouraged to "go to the top" for decisions, almost all of which require ministerial approval. Legalism reinforces the tendency to centralize control. Yet real control is made impossible by inadequate communication, ineffective staff management procedures, and almost non-existent delegation. The net effect is that the Guatemalan executive possesses almost no means to enforce compliance and middle levels remain virtually autonomous, in a strange contradiction. One of Weaver's observations summarizes several of his principal points:

Everything rises to the top; the top does not delegate and thus cannot fix responsibility; the operational level exercises effective control by refusing to take action; patrones protect; subordinates express deference and rectitude; compliance, not performance, is the standard for evaluation (Weaver, 1973a: 359).

A central conclusion identifies the key to the role of the Guatemalan bureaucracy: it is the "configuration of values, attitudes and perceptions held by bureaucrats and the political elite."

What special conditions arise from revolutionary change? James Petras (1973) devotes part of his paper on Cuba to administration in a revolutionary setting. He notes an increasing merger of the politician and the administrator in a situation where politics is largely the administration of work. Because of this, the ambulatory bureaucrat is a characteristic feature of the Cuban bureaucracy. Further, bureaucrats tend to be generalists, changing positions from one area of political administration life to another. Professionalism is the exception: few officials were prepared for their administrative careers and many are from lower income or lower status occupational groups.

Recruitment criteria emphasize political reliability. This pattern resulted partly from the alleged sabotage by hostile administrators of social and economic projects in the early years of the revolution. However, one result has been a lessening of organizational efficiency. Another problem has been a lack of initiative, stemming from caution in making decisions which might turn out to be mistakes.

Cuba's three revolutions after 1959—first political, then social, finally the drive for economic development—imposed different requirements on the country. The development revolution necessitated the conversion of social revolutionaries into a technical and administrative cadre, requiring a new set of qualifications.

RESEARCH ON PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION AND BUREAUCRACIES

The subject of bureaucracy in Latin America and the Caribbean occupied the entire August 1972 issue of the *Journal of Comparative Administration*. The majority of the articles in the special issue were generated by the 1971 National Conference on Comparative Administration held at Syracuse. Included were studies by Jerry L. Weaver, Robert T. Daland, Joseph Rajbansee, Harold A. Lutchman, and Lawrence S. Graham.

The Weaver (1972) study employs concepts from role theory as the analytical device for surveying selected accounts of the behavior and attitudes on Latin American bureaucrats, with the objective of refining a model of bureaucratic behavior. The four concepts used are societal norms, ideology, organizational norms, and reference groups. Weaver proceeds to examine the salience of these various factors as correlates and determinants of bureaucratic behavior, drawing upon the data and findings of earlier studies by Petras (1969) on Chile, Wright (1968) on Ecuador, Hopkins (1967) on Peru, Silva Michelena (1967) on Venezuela, Weaver (1973a) on Guatemala, and Graham (1968) on Brazil. He concludes that his assumptions regarding the relative salience of the four sources of expectations were not confirmed.

For example, in personnel administration societal norms (kinship and partisan considerations) take precedence over organizational norms (abstract notions of merit and seniority). A distinction must be made between the official and the operational norms of organizations. Expectations based on ideology appear to have limited significance even in the more politicized societies of Brazil, Chile, and Venezuela. The available data do not confirm the significance attributed to reference groups. Finally, it is clear that a variety of factors, which Weaver terms "organizational characteristics," are major explanatory variables in administrative behavior.

Daland's (1972) article examines the potential of top civilian executives in the Brazilian government to achieve the changes sought (in this case, economic development) by the military regime. His study is based upon attitudinal data on 325 administrators collected in 1968 and 1969. Positing certain key subjective judgments and assumptions about bureaucracies (values considered crucial to administrative effectiveness in development), Daland then considers responses of the officials to questions relating to efficiency values, innovation, deconcentration of decision-making, need for structural change, and planning versus implementation.

He describes the attitudes as "disquieting," forming a pattern wherein the dominant majority of executives score lower on the values posited as necessary than the atypical or marginal groups. The prognosis for change is pessimistic. It appears that the recruitment process has ensured the admission of people with the same values as those already in the bureaucracy, and promotion patterns (based on patronage and personalism) propel to the top those who conform to those values. Nevertheless, considerable progress has occurred, not because of positive values, but because the development-oriented function has been given first priority, over other functions. These, however, might be in the long run the crucial functions.

Joseph Rajbansee's (1972) article attempts to explain how small size conditions

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and influences Caribbean bureaucratic systems. Among the dimensions considered are geonomic size, organic size, economic size, experiential size, social size, technological size, and systemic size. Each of these poses certain problems, frequently severe, for government and bureaucracies in the Caribbean area. Rajbansee's solution is a "therapeutic relationship," either with the metropole or with other Caribbean and Third World countries.

Harold A. Lutchman (1972) provides a historical study of racial imbalance in Guyana and its effects on bureaucracy and society.

Needs and directions of future research are considered by Lawrence S. Graham (1972) in the concluding article of the special issue of the *Journal of Comparative Administration*. He points to the obvious deficiencies of the body of research to date—the paucity of cross-national studies, the lack of comparative data on bureaucratic performance and attitudes, the unconnected and often theory-free discrete studies, and similar problems—and suggests some solutions. Graham's lament is well-founded, and it applies clearly to the body of literature which has been surveyed in the present article: What we have is "a disjointed collection of insights and viewpoints which in themselves are interesting enough, but which simply confirm an already well-known fact: the range in bureaucratic organization and behavior in the Americas is immense."

One possible solution would be a refocusing of research by emphasizing collaborative investigation among multinational groups of scholars using common research designs. Another solution would be greater emphasis on systematic comparative empirical work. "What is critical is that in the future we begin to delimit in a much more precise way the variables concerned, the units of analysis we wish to employ, and the relevance of our research to the comparative analysis of bureaucratic phenomena in general" (Graham, 1972).

STRATEGIES FOR DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION

A limited number of studies perhaps may be most appropriately described as transitional between Heady's "modified traditional" and "development oriented" categories. These fall generally in the area of strategies for development administration, and they range from the specific to fairly broad consideration of societal conditions affecting development.

John C. Honey (1968), following a very broad definition of public administration ("the processes of government in their totality"), has the objective of suggesting strategies for strengthening the public administration processes in Latin America. Although he recognizes the limited utility of generalizations about the state of public administration, Honey points out the generally low prestige of the public service systems, weak merit recruitment systems, and a low level of training of government personnel.

In considering strategies for development, Honey focuses on several fundamental conditions at the root of public administration: processes of political socializa-

tion, the nature of civic cultures, and the structure and functioning of governments. Incomplete understanding in such fundamental areas stands as a serious obstacle to public administration development as well as overall modernization, yet relatively little attention to such areas has been included in assistance programs in public administration. The Honey essay then treats operational considerations of development programs (for example, pressures for rapid development, country style, institutional competence, and donor style) and various specific elements of action for broad public administration development. These action elements include such measures as establishing national councils on the public service, collection of data, education and training, extension of technical advisory services, and development of political leadership.

A valuable feature of the Honey work is the commentaries by Peter D. Bell (Brazil), Richard A. Fehnel (Chile), James R. Himes (Peru), and George Sutija (Venezuela), which analyze the public administration situation in each of those countries.

Bell notes various administrative problems plaguing the Brazilian bureaucracy, including low wage levels, absenteeism, general shunning of the merit system required by state and federal law, and slow administrative procedures. He estimates that nearly 90 per cent of civil servants entered the bureaucracy outside of the compulsory examination system and "thereby continue to be suspect of nepotism, favoritism, and clientelism" (Honey, 1968). Despite numerous attempts at reform, Bell describes Brazilian government as being "characterized by a perfidious formalism," and observes how Brazilians overcome such formalism by improvisation or *jeito*. "It is a morass of conflicting tendencies and unresolved tension which result in strangulation and stagnation and some grudging innovation and development." (Honey 1968).

Commenting on Brazilian research on public administration, Bell sees the juridical approach as the dominant one, especially until the mid-1930s. The technical approach represented an inevitably unsuccessful attempt to apply prescriptions from earlier literature on U.S. administration. Thus the social and political environment of administration was neglected until quite recently. (In this respect, compare the observations of Lawrence S. Graham, 1968). Even much of the more recent sociological literature, which attempts to move beyond the juridical and technical approach, tends, as Bell observes, to be "written on a theoretical and holistic plane and drawn principally from foreign models" (Honey, 1968: 100–101). Empirical research generally has not followed these sociological works to provide needed tests.

Fehnel comments on Chile within a framework emphasizing political socialization, the status of political competition, and the structure of political authority. He emphasizes the need to change attitudes through socialization and competition, if responses to public administration development efforts are to be appropriate.

Himes' observations regarding Peru focus primarily upon the importance of post-secondary education and training, the level at which foreign assistance most

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likely will be directed. "The really significant elements of public administration development," Himes believes, "are the whole array of institutions in the country which determine attitudes toward government and public problems, and the higher education institutions where both attitudes and important technical and professional skills are acquired simultaneously" (Honey, 1968).

George Sutija's note on Venezuela surveys on-going efforts in that country and offers an optimistic prognosis on the future of public administration there.

Can we derive certain lessons from attempts to induce change in Latin American public administration? Gilbert B. Siegel (1966) reviews Brazil's experience in attempting administrative reform through its Administrative Department of the Public Service (DASP), dating from Vargas' *Estado Novo* of 1937. DASP reflects the export of U.S. theory and practice to the effect that a central staff agency (responsible for budget preparation, personnel procedures, and purchasing practices) is "very nearly essential to efficient and economical administration." Siegel concludes that DASP failed largely because it overzealously attempted centralization and control, often in disregard of the environment and cultural traditions in which it operated. The Brazilian experience reveals the serious limitations in this approach to change and suggests the need for empirical case-by-case determinations of the requirements for administrative reform.

Lawrence S. Graham (1968), focusing on the period 1945–1964, further examines attempts to reform the Brazilian administrative system, efforts characterized generally by the imposition of borrowed concepts and techniques. He attempts to explain why these efforts to transfer techniques have typically failed to close the gap between principles and practices in Brazilian public administration. A basic cause of the lack of success was the failure "to come to terms with the conflict emerging between individual values and the new norms which had been forcibly applied to the administrative system" (Graham, 1968: 191). Simple imposition of foreign norms, concepts, and techniques did not always result in changed administrative behavior. Graham observes that "the basic deficiency of the scientific management school in Brazil has been its neglect of the prescriptive bases from which it has been operating and its failure to test empirically the principles it has asserted" (Graham, 1968: 190–191).

Other perspectives on Brazil may be seen in Daland's (1963) edited collection of papers from the University of Southern California's mission to schools of public administration in Brazil. Among the studies in that volume, Gilbert Siegel's "Administration, Values and the Merit System in Brazil" (Siegel, 1963) considers the pathology of the civil service system, and (as Graham) conflicts of values stressing economy, efficiency, and rationality with traditional values of Brazilian culture, e.g., individualism, regionalism, and patronage. Siegel suggests some correspondence of the Brazilian system and Riggs' prismatic society. John Rood and Frank Sherwood in "The 'Workhorse' Group in Brazilian Administration" (Rood and Sherwood, 1963) give credit to small "workhorse" groups who provide indigenous leadership in a

situation of essential disorganization. Ivan Richardson's "Public Administration Education in Brazil" (Richardson, 1963), surveys efforts to upgrade such preparation for the public service as a means of overcoming the neglect of the human aspects of administration.

Perhaps the basic assumption of developmental efforts are wrong. The thrust of Guerreiro-Ramos (1973), is that a new model of development organizational systems is needed, in centric as well as peripheral nations. The central issue, much as propounded by advocates of the "new public administration," tends to be organization-client relationships. In advanced nations the poor and in peripheral nations the masses have been unable to make their needs perceived and satisfied by existing bureaucratic structures. In peripheral countries, the need is for non-prescriptive approaches to design organizational systems which can promote a broad resocialization process. In this context, legitimacy becomes a critical and meaningful issue, yet there is little guidance to be found in the literature dealing with this issue.

Guerreiro-Ramos examines some aspects of administrative issues and problems in Latin America in the framework of the emergence of the world as a single system. He sees the limited vision of students of administration as a serious problem when they view each of the Latin American nations as a closed system. A linkage framework, on the other hand, would suggest that much of the formalism in Latin American bureaucracy stems from the pressures exerted by external and internal linkage groups. Further, formalism may sometimes serve as a very positive strategy of institution-building and modernization. Similarly, Guerreiro-Ramos sees the typically negative view of penetrative processes to be unfortunate and ill-founded: "to declare exploitative all external penetration into Latin American countries is far from factual." (Guerreiro-Ramos, 1973:411).

Guerreiro-Ramos is most concerned with problems of optimizing administrative models for Latin America. That objective—humanistic administrative styles—requires the discovery of *ad hoc* procedures of resource optimization through action-research. This research needs to discover which client-centered and resocializing organizations are best adaptable in poor contexts. (Compare, for example, the results of the Vicos project as a humanistic client-oriented effort.) Guerreiro-Ramos also urges practitioners and scholars to raise systematically the issue of legitimacy versus administrative effectiveness in Latin American administration.

An increasing concern with some of the problems raised by Guerreiro-Ramos, more effective client service and social intervention by bureaucracies, led to my article on dialectical organizations in the Latin American setting (Hopkins, 1971). Extending Orion White's (1969) conception of the dialectical organization whose basic orientation is toward the clientele, this article speculated about some of the ramifications of bureaucratic social intervention in less-developed administrative systems. It is suggested that to White's various dimensions for analysis of organizational types must be added at least two more aspects: the cultural constraints under which bureaucracies function and the position of bureaucracies in the larger society. The article concludes

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that the distinctive cultural traditions and social environment of the Latin American bureaucracy place serious barriers in the path of development toward more client orientation and toward broader participatory forms of administration.

This article has been interpreted by at least one scholar (see Paulo Motta, 1973) as a suggestion that participatory administration is applicable only to more "developed" systems. The intent, on the contrary, was mainly to suggest that many of the requisites for reorientation of clientele relationships are lacking in less developed politics, and that the reorientation problem would be more difficult, though no less desirable.

Do commonly used theories of political development provide an adequate framework for the study of public administration in Latin America? Parrish (1971) contends, using Chile as an example, that organization theory provides a much better base than political development theory in the study of public bureaucracy in underdeveloped countries. His paper explores some aspects of the relationship between the operation of public bureaucracy and the selection and achievement of development goals in Chile. Faced with implementing development goals which are likely to be perceived as threats to those with formidable social power, some way must be found to ease the tension between formal authority supporting development policies and social power. Parrish suggests that comprehensive national planning may be a means of breaking the sort of deadlock which has been produced in Chile through the operation of disjointed incrementalism. A related problem is making the bureaucracy adopt development goals as its own rather than redefining them into other goals to serve other purposes. Among other conclusions, Parrish observes that Selznick's concept of cooptation provides greater insight into the problems of development policy-making in Chile than political development approaches such as Riggs' prismatic model.

Several studies treat the problems which arise out of attempts to induce change in Latin American public administration and suggest strategies appropriate for such efforts. Austin and Graham (n.d.:1970?) examine the cooperative effort of the United States and a series of ruling groups in Peru to improve the capacity of Peruvian public administrators to implement national development programs. That effort took place at the time when serious doubt and discontent were developing over the universal applicability of traditional administrative thought and perceptions. The authors comment:

In effect, the technical assistant had been stripped of his techniques. Had the technical assistance effort taken place in the 1930's the adviser would have had few doubts concerning the content of his administrative message. In the 1960s, he may have wondered if he had a message at all. (Austin and Graham, n.d.: 1970?).

However, largely because of the difficulty of quickly incorporating the special influences of the local culture, there was a relatively uncritical transfer of institutions, concepts, and practices between cultures. Frequently, these attempted transfers have

met with rejection, in spite of the fact that the higher civil service appears to have internalized the values abstracted from traditional literature on administration.

In Peru, although a reform agency, the National Office for Public Administration Reform and Training (ONRAP) was founded, it was evident that the agency "never satisfactorily reconciled its ideal model for administrative reform with the limitations imposed by reality." ONRAP's vision (the ONRAP doctrine) was universal reform, but its services tended to be pedestrian, narrow-gauge, and specific, and because its recommendations were typically standardized remedies they were rejected frequently by the recipient. Unfortunately, ONRAP's financial survival depended upon its service functions and its utility to the bureaucracy (in teaching and consulting to generate income) rather than on its ability to bring about broad reform. This situation limited its efforts and eventually contributed to its demise.

Despite the apparent failure of ONRAP as an institution, it appears that many of the ideas and doctrines promoted by ONRAP had a significant impact on influential members of the Peruvian military. Thus the decree law which abolished ONRAP after the 1968 coup also provided the framework for incorporation of the ONRAP doctrine and its advocates into the central government. Reform and reorganization of the bureaucracy remain key goals, even though the long-range effects are still problematical.

Siegel and Nascimento (1965) show how attempts to institute position classification in the Brazilian civil service produced two types of formalism. One type of formalism stemmed from an incongruence between the objectives of technician-reformers and politicians and civil servants. "The idea of uniformity conflicted with the special interest orientation of civil servants and legislators." Formalism resulted from the discrepancy between the plan's technical objectives (such as equal pay for equal work) and the political compromises necessary to secure passage of the Classification Law of 1960. The second type of formalism grew from technical inadequacies in attempts to implement the plan, because in large part it was based upon ideal criteria rather than factual ones.

Siegel (1973) attempts a synergistic explanation of the problems of response by Brazilian government organizations to demands and pressures from the political environment. The framework is one in which diffusion and centralization of political power are counterposed, so that power diffusion leads to the cure of centralization. Siegel's paper illustrates the situation wherein planned change initiatives appear to suffer equally under either power diffusion or centralization, and offers some possible alternatives.

Three vignettes of organizational consequences to this situation are offered: the experience of DASP, a review of institutionalized planning, and tax administration reform and its effects upon Brazilian municipal government. The demise of DASP must be attributed in large part to its heavy emphasis upon control and centralization rather than on more positive aspects of organizational studies, with one result being increased formalism in government organization. Even under closed systems, DASP's

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goals for reform were displaced by the leader's needs for power maintenance. Institutionalized planning is seen to have several values beyond the attainment of the plan's goals. These include the public relations benefits of the plan; the provision of a specific technique for focusing the effort to arrive at consensus on policy; demonstration of worth for foreign aid; and finally, a calculated effort to increase the powers of the executive. Regrettably, the experience of Brazil suggests that the implementation of central plans is dysfunctional from the point of view of the bureaucracy, running counter to the self-perceived interests of the bureaucracy.

Siegel presents Brazil's dilemma in the following equation:

diffused power > consensus-building institutions → centralization and control.

Because of the undesirable effects of such centralization and control, he suggests ameliorative alternative approaches which seek to modify basic aspects of society such as culturally based behavior or focusing upon consensus-building institutions.

Daland (1967) in his study of Brazilian planning, argues that the classical (Weberian) model of bureaucracy which has structured and constrained developmental planning in that nation has proven unsatisfactory in satisfying the requirements of Brazilian political culture. He explores the administrative environment to explain the conditions which tend to make planning a "shadow-play," in Riggs' words (Riggs, 1964). Rather than decentralizing planning or employing incentives rather than controls, Brazil attempted to organize a strong, national, central planning system using the classical bureaucratic model. Programs fail because "the majority of the Brazilian bureaucrats do not administer programs. They occupy positions of privilege. Persons who enter the bureaucracy with the motive of public service are constantly frustrated in trying to do their job, normally by their superiors." (Daland, 1967: 199). Daland describes this kind of bureaucracy as a "welfare and patronage payroll," lacking the capacity for positive administration." "The failures of planning are due to the fact that the classical bureaucracy does not exist in Brazil" (Daland, 1967: 202).

Daland (1968) argues that a political system such as Brazil's, characterized by a non-consensual elite and a history of systemic instability, can achieve optimum governmental participation in development only through decentralization of development programs. A large part of the problem derives from the great variety of demands directed toward the bureaucracy, demands which are in conflict among themselves and against which the bureaucracy is poorly insulated. Administrative research needs to focus on identifying loci where there is a conjunction of consensus and stability, talent, an adequate support system, and resources.

Groves and Levy (n.d.) in another LADAC paper describe the efforts at administrative reform from 1958–1963 and the experience of central planning by CORDIPLAN in Venezuela. Although the Public Administration Commission failed to achieve the broad reform it anticipated, largely because of political problems and lack of presidential backing, it probably made a significant contribution to long-term improvement. The greatest impact of the planning agency is seen in the effect of the

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planning concept on the processes of other agencies and its non-technical roles impinging of the overall decision-making process.

The main thrust of Clarence Thurber's (1966) paper is the focus on "islands of development" as the most effective approach to development administration. The strategy is to identify elements of strength and potential in a society and concentrate in them resources and efforts for planned change.

Tuohy (1970) focuses on the sources, nature, and consequences of centralized control in Mexico, particularly as the behavior of middle- and low-level political elites is affected by that control. Preservation of the existing regime—organizational maintenance—is seen to be a compelling force in politics and bureaucratic behavior.

Almost all individuals find strong limitations on their decisional power, and the major capabilities for decision-making are reserved for the highest governmental levels. One result is the burdensome inefficiency of concentration of routine and frequently trivial decisions on a limited number of officials in the hierarchy. One factor contributing to this concentration appears to be a "fear of decisional responsibility," which in turn stems from a "widely shared sense of personal responsibility." These factors result in the "customary stress on subordination and the conspicuous communication of deference."

Tuohy sees patronage as a control and reward mechanism which is tied directly into continuous recruitment. The system operates to remind one constantly of the need to conform to the rules of the political process, one of which is enforced turnover of elected officials, a turnover affecting many administrators as well.

Patterns of centralized control and recruitment tend to encourage officials toward conservative detachment from the content of public policy because this is the safest stance. The "good" administrator thus is the efficient manager of delegated responsibilities rather than the responsive public servant in the classic sense. Rapid rotation in office tends to be "extremely corrosive of a continuing and creative focus on problems of public policy." Tuohy observes that "developmental planning gets sacrificed to system maintenance, and patronage takes precedence over expert performance." For this and other reasons, "the fate of Mexican development is an eminently political question."

Greenberg's (1971) paper examines the power position of the Mexican civil bureaucracy, focusing on the role of expertise and ideology in the process of planning and decision-making. Because environmental quality and the ecological future of many societies may depend upon the relative power position of their bureaucracies, this is a critical consideration.

In Mexico, the operation of the system has produced highly efficient bureaucratic outputs despite the domination of political constraints. The fact that most senior Mexican bureaucrats are also important actors in the PRI and have significant economic influence as well, provides a fusion with important implications for environmental quality in Mexico. "The emerging Western pattern of government acting on the abuses of private enterprise in ecological matters is not likely to be repeated in

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the Mexican system, where those entrusted with the policing function may have vested interests which conflict with environmental decision-making" (Greenberg, 1971).

There are also various aspects of the political system which make the bureaucracy less likely to act decisively on environmental matters. For example, in terms of externally operated controls, the bureaucracy has limited responsibility and accountability. There is little internal bureaucratic protection of civil servants to encourage forthright action. The bureaucracy has important allies and rivals which influence and limit its power position. It appears that status derived from expertise does not significantly increase bureaucratic power; thus the environmental expert may lack influence. The sensitivity of Mexican presidents to material accomplishments has serious implications for environmental quality. Likewise, the need of bureaucrats to maintain political ties is not conducive to risk-taking on environmental problems. Overall, Greenberg concludes that "the relatively weak power position of the Mexican bureaucracy means that loud demands for increased environmental priorities in the planning process are improbable from this source." On the positive side, however, there remains the possibility that successful eco-protections could be built into planning if the revolutionary family so decrees.

The reform effort in Venezuela which took place after the overthrow of the dictatorship in 1958 is reviewed by Roderick T. Groves (1967). The program was headed by the Public Administration Commission, with much of the consulting done by three American firms.

The reform, particularly in the vital area of personnel management, was not very successful and most of the changes were superficial, Why? Because it lacked the full support of strategic leaders in the government, and more importantly, the reform showed an "unawareness of or inadequate sensitivity to the political needs and emphasis of Venezuela's post-1959 leadership." This was evident in its reliance on foreign consultants; disregard of the need to cultivate public favor; and its posing a situation where the government was forced to choose between political stability and improving administrative competence, because a thorough purge of incompetents would surely have caused a political uproar.

The "old way" at least had the advantage of flexibility and adaptability, so that the government could concentrate on especially bad areas of the bureaucracy. It could use traditional practices to improve competence without endangering political stability.

Groves concludes that "administrative plans or reforms, no matter how well conceived, stand little chance of being accepted if they fail to take into account the political realities in developing nations," and ". . . the necessities of political survival for governments of developing nations make it unlikely that the risks inherent in large-scale programs will be taken." These governments "are aware of the insecurity of rule in a society which has broken ties with the past but has not established roots in the present." "It can be concluded . . . that a regime sincerely oriented toward national improvement will be interested in making some compromise between short-

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term security and administrative improvement in the interest of its long-term political survival" (Groves, 1967).

Some studies delve into public administration strategies for development of certain sectors of the economy. For example, Martin Kriesberg (1965) focuses on the agricultural sector, and proposes a strategy for rural development. Its elements include linking public policies to the new agricultural technology, improving the administrative capacity in agricultural agencies, applying Thurber's concept of "islands of development" by concentrating efforts on situations where success is most likely, and establishing new linkages between national governments and rural institutions.

The most recent broadscale treatment of the problems of development administration in Latin America appears in the collection of studies edited by Thurber and Graham (1973).

Although the Thurber and Graham volume offers no encompassing theoretical explanation of public administration in Latin American (that not being its purpose), the overview it provides aids materially in filling some of the gaps. The collection of studies included in the volume contributes a rich sample of research, suggests the complexity of the administrative environments in Latin America, and offers possibilities for further fruitful research.

AN AFTERWORD

The holy grail of an all-encompassing theory of bureaucratic behavior or administrative development obviously remains an elusive goal. The exigencies of research, funding and time constraints, availability of data and, indeed, individual proclivities, are likely to continue to produce disjointed insights and viewpoints and a mountain of idiographic data.

Even synthesizing the variety of findings exemplified by the studies included in this survey poses a difficult task. Distilling these findings, one may well arrive at the disquieting realization that our understanding of administrative behavior, at least in any universal sense, remains limited.

The way scholars go about filling the many gaps in knowledge is in many respects inefficient, partly because of the nature of undirected research itself. A group such as the Latin American Development Administration Committee (LADAC) could fill an important role in encouraging focused and collaborative research on various aspects of bureaucracies in Latin America. Systematically researching, for example, the wealth of hypotheses in a work such as that by Anthony Downs (1967) should prove most fruitful in terms of integrating theory and data. Likewise, there is much validity in Herman Lujan's (1973) call for a shift from the level of structural/functional analysis of individual bureaucracies to system level analysis.

In no sense is this a suggestion for controlled research. However, it is an affirmation of Graham's observation regarding the disjointed nature of our efforts. A large part of the problem could be erased by scholars facing up to a very basic question: why do research? If we continue to carry out research in isolation and on an almost

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completely undirected basis, the discipline may eventually arrive at some reasonably coherent explanations of public administration and bureaucratic behavior, but these will come only after a great deal of muddling through.

In this respect, Graham's realistic assessment of the subject matter provides a sobering measure of the difficulty of the task:

. . . perhaps we would do better to begin with the disjunctures inherent in Riggs' model of transitional societies as a premise, rather than attempt to construct a single integrated, composite picture linking together what is by definition a series of incompatible elements. (Thurber and Graham, 1973: 426).

As Ilchman (1971) has suggested, we badly need to systematize comparative observations by the use of common questions which will lead to comparable answers. The variegated descriptions of public administration and bureaucracy and role structures reviewed here suggest the crying need for broadly integrative work to coherently and systematically relate and test an array of hypotheses. The magnitude of that task is sufficient to challenge a generation of scholars and practitioners.

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