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approach should be rather through the Beautiful than through the True or the Good—who is there to command the spirit, not to blow where it listeth? Hitherto Catholicism—for a multiplicity of historical reasons—has to the average Hindu seemed not worth knowing: now that, here and there, eminent Hindus are beginning to see that Catholicism is worth studying and are beginning to know it, is there not every hope that, with God's grace, they will end by understanding it?

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DIEU SOLEIL DES ESPRITS. La Doctrine Augustinienne de l'Illumination. By Régis Jolivet. (Desclée de Brouwer; Frs. 12.)

Some modern expounders of Plato suggest that he never disclosed his proper conclusions in philosophical thought, that his mind spent itself in secret musings. Neither Aristotle nor Augustine so treated him. Both accepted his account of the 'Ideas' seriously. 'The crux of all Platonism, of the whole Tradition,' to quote Dr. Schiller, 'is that it is vital to Platonism to project beyond our present life a transcendent realm of intelligible and eternal Being that hovers above the flux of sensible Becoming. For unless this is done there is no stable background over which the shadows of the Cave can flit: moreover, in Plato's eyes at least, the very form of rational communication and of predication, "is," attested that such being *could* be asserted. Yet by weird fatality as soon as intelligible being had been affirmed it generated an insoluble problem as to the relation of Being and Becoming, of the sensible and the intelligible. All Plato's loftiest flights were shattered by this obstacle and none of his successors have failed so gallantly . . . the resources of every language have been exhausted to render intelligible the ineffable nexus which attaches the world of sense to the world of intuitive reason or spirit as Dean Inge prefers to call it' (*Mind*, July 1934, p. 387). Does Jolivet relieve St. Augustine of 'failing gallantly' in his criticism of this tradition?

To follow Jolivet, what does St. Augustine make of this problem? Certitude is got by principles known by the light of reason, our reason, by which God speaks interiorly. Certitude is not given by exterior matter or fact; by an exterior master. And if the latter takes us from conclusions to principles again we should not accept his science unless we had the certitude of the principles into which consequences are resolved within our minds. As Jolivet sees it: 'The real problem for Augustine is to explain the certitude of our judgments—this is the problem of Illumination—but not the formation of concepts.' Can these

be separated? How is the judgment of existence, when we judge this man to be, applicable, unless we can resolve it by the senses, by the sensible visible thing? The senses are the guarantors of 'this' existence. A metaphysician deprived of his senses and of what they convey would be an impossibility for an Aristotle or St. Thomas, not only because ideas come through the senses, but also because the senses are speculatively indispensable for science, even for the science the most elevated and immaterial. The actual existence of the sensible world which science cannot ignore can only be attained indirectly by the mind going beyond its proper sphere through the ministrations of the senses. Not thus St. Augustine. For him there are no 'concepts' of the existence of sensible substances. His notion of the rôle of the soul forbids it. The soul which rules the body cannot receive from the lower thing. The soul for him is a complete substance *using* the body, and therefore, as Jolivet notes, it is not a joint substance of body and soul which simultaneously and indivisibly is the subject in which the images, phantasies and bodily similitudes are conserved. This Jolivet calls the 'sensible memory,' and he points out that with Augustine the similitudes confided to the memory are not identical with impressions received by the sense organs: they are spiritual. If sensation is the product of the soul, reminiscence is much more so. This doctrine of memory which our critic declares is the centre of this whole system of Illuminism is thus summed up by G. S. Brett in his work, *The Psychology of Religion*: 'From the assertion that the object of consciousness is always our own states, it follows that memory is always of ourselves and not of things.' We can even say in a sense that memory is the soul itself, remarks Jolivet, quoting the Saint in the *Confessions* (X, c. xiv, ii, 2, 1, *Hic vero cum animus sit etiam ipsa memoria*). He clearly sees the embarrassments which a definition of man by the soul alone gets him into. *Apropos* of this dilemma, he draws upon M. Gilson, who boldly maintains 'that the abstract (*sic!*) problem of the metaphysical structure of man seems rather idle to Augustine, and that, on the other hand, if he had tried to solve it, would have seemed insoluble, for the want of a doctrine of act and potency helping him to understand the metaphysical structure of composite existences.' A simple 'message' addressed to the soul to form corporeal similitudes—*information* as the Saint sometimes calls it—is not, as our critic discerns, got from without the soul, 'for these similitudes avoid the universal flux of things, while the impressions of the senses are perpetually changing' (*de Trinit.*, V, c., 5, 7, 8). The contrary, then, of what *information* is for Aristotle as for St. Thomas.

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Augustine himself realizes the difficulty of solving the problem of the union of the soul and body by his definition of man by the soul—in his eyes a complete substance (*de Morib. Eccles.*, L. 1, c. iv-6); and remarks that this problem is secondary. What is at stake is to affirm the superiority of the soul. As Père Cayre says, 'What intrigued Augustine was the value of existence perceived intellectually rather than the methodical analysis of the conditions in which this intuition is obtained.' But as R. P. Bissen (approved by Jolivet) shows, 'there is no intention of giving us a theory of knowledge in the strict sense of the word.' What does Jolivet mean, then, by telling us on p. 174 that there is no innateness in the formation of the intelligible ideas on this theory, but only an innateness of the conditions of science and wisdom: that the corporeal similitudes have only been formed by the soul and 'given' to the memory, thanks to the help of sensations? Nor does he tell us where the intelligible content, the quiddity of external substance, comes from, for he denies the theory of an infusion into the soul of intelligible ideas entirely formed. Hence he does not clearly decide, as does M. Gilson, 'that St. Augustine has never distinguished the problem of the content of thought from that of the judgment, nor the problem of judgment in general from that of a true particular judgment in whatever interpretation of his doctrine one comes to.' Neither memory-images nor formal reasons nor absolute principles explain the lack of the concept, its intelligible content of sensible substance. On the other hand, Jolivet does not attempt to conciliate the divergence in the teaching of St. Augustine and St. Thomas on the rôle of the Illumination of the human mind by the Divine Mind. Both agree as to the necessity for the human mind to participate somehow in the Divine Reason for the last basis of a true judgment. And this is the capital truth which commands all the discussions of the Schools and which more than the question of the manner of illumination is the central preoccupation of St. Augustine.

Jolivet's book is direct and informing, the texts of the Saint are well marshalled and handled, the Aristotelian formulas are shown in their true light—these have misled many—he leads the reader carefully up to the fundamental difficulty. If he has failed, he has 'failed gallantly.'

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