

cannot be reduced to fugitive sensations of pleasure. Although he does not address this question, it does not pose a problem for Mill. The higher faculty of reasoning, for example, is a part of the brain that, once developed, can perform inferences and enable the experience of higher pleasures from the performances. It can in principle be re-described as a permanent possibility of sensation that makes possible such higher pleasures, keeping in mind that these higher pleasures always contain among their ingredients sensations of pleasure, present, remembered, or expected. People who do not develop this higher faculty cannot experience the higher pleasure: they are not “competently acquainted” with it.

Although I have cast doubt on his analysis of phenomenism and I regret his omitting to discuss the associationist psychology which, for Mill, is at its core, I share Pelczar’s enthusiasm for phenomenism and applaud his aspiration to restore it to prominence. Mill’s lucid outline of its simplicity and appeal seems to have inclined some leading scholars to take it seriously well into the twentieth century, including Russell, Carnap, C.I. Lewis, Ayer, and even Isaiah Berlin who in an early article admits that he can barely stop himself from declaring that it is “self-evidently true.” But I would hesitate to call any of these people “neo-Millians” for various reasons beyond the scope of this review. In any case, the tides of intellectual history were against phenomenism even as Mill wrote. Movements such as Comte’s positivism, Watson’s behaviorism, the classical pragmatism of James and Dewey, logical positivism which came to embrace the verification principle and operationalism, and even neoclassical economic theory as it evolved, all discounted or ignored introspection of our mental phenomena as unscientific and focused instead on studies of physiology, neuroscience, reflex instincts, and observable behavior. In this light, the rise of materialism, structuralism, cognitive science, and the like can hardly come as a shock, despite their shared neglect of human feelings, moral sentiments, and consciousness in general. It would indeed be wonderful to witness a philosophical revival of phenomenist metaphysics and epistemology, especially if accompanied by renewed interest in the associationist psychology. But do not hold your breath.

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## John Peter DiIulio, *Completely Free: The Moral and Political Vision of John Stuart Mill*

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John Peter DiIulio’s *Completely Free* impressively reconstructs John Stuart Mill’s moral philosophy as a systematic whole spanning a theory of fundamental value through a theory of morality into a theory of politics. Some interpret Mill’s works as fundamentally inconsistent, but DiIulio contends that they present coherent and mutually supporting accounts of happiness, morality, liberty, and freedom. The engaging arguments throughout *Completely Free* do much to support that contention.

The clarity of DiIulio's writing makes following the book's arguments remarkably easy. However, the book is information-dense, draws together parts from Mill's works on distinct philosophic areas, and relates Mill's view to several philosophic debates spanning centuries. Consequently, the book is considerably more accessible to readers with significant background knowledge. *Completely Free* is not an introductory text but is instead primarily intended for scholars of the history of moral philosophy or readers with significant familiarity with Mill's works and the broader debates in moral and political philosophy.

Though the book is geared to specialists, its clear structure and presentation make it generally accessible to non-specialist scholars and advanced students seeking to better understand Mill's philosophy. Thus, the book will interest wide-ranging philosophers, including those interested in liberalism's philosophic foundations and contemporary issues in moral and political philosophy.

It is worth clarifying the book's genre since history of philosophy texts vary widely in aims and methods. In contrast to approaches that focus on uncovering esoteric meanings or examining an author's life and influences, DiIulio's *Completely Free* sits squarely in the tradition of analytic political philosophy. It aims to reconstruct Mill's main arguments, after the fashion of, say, David Gauthier's and Jean Hampton's works on Thomas Hobbes. DiIulio relies most on closely reading Mill's primary texts, supplemented by Mill's wider publications and engagement with other thinkers. Matters of Mill's personal life or circumstances are considered sparingly.

Like other works in this genre within the history of philosophy, *Completely Free* has a complex relationship with contemporary interests. DiIulio elucidates Mill's views on matters of enduring importance, such as the nature of freedom and morality's relation to happiness. Moreover, DiIulio shows familiarity with the contemporary philosophic literature through periodically comparing Mill's views (as DiIulio interprets them) with recent works. For example, he contrasts Mill's conception of impartial moral reasoning with John Rawls's reasoning from an original position and relates Mill's understanding of freedom to that of Philip Pettit.

DiIulio excellently structures the book given the aim of reconstructing a coherent and systematic view from Mill's work. Instead of relying on a single work or examining them chronologically, *Completely Free* builds the overall view up from Mill's value theory, through his moral theory, and to his political theory. Along the way, DiIulio skillfully weaves together elements from across Mill's works to defend his interpretation. In the remainder of this review, I will briefly sketch DiIulio's account as he develops it across the book's main chapters.

In Chapter 1, DiIulio explains Mill's views on value and happiness. On DiIulio's interpretation, Mill's Aristotelian theory of well-being privileges intrinsically valuable activities with particular emphasis on self-realization and sympathy. In contrast with Bentham's hedonism, Mill describes us as progressive beings capable of higher pleasures, making being Socrates dissatisfied better than being a pig satisfied.

Chapter 2 moves to moral theory, particularly emphasizing how it follows from Mill's value theory and specifications of the intrinsically valuable activities for humans given their capacities. Central to his moral theory is an impartial-observer account that generates judgments for assessing individuals as well as social and political institutions. DiIulio presents Mill's moral theory as centrally concerned with properly specifying the relevant sort of impartiality with a limited set of morally relevant interests and with discerning the judgments and feelings of such a properly impartial observer.

DiIulio's reconstruction of Mill's impartial-observer view provides valuable insight into Mill's own view that is fruitful for contemporary considerations. DiIulio (p. 116)

presents his impartial observer as being concerned with the interests of, or having the perspective of, each person rather than being a disinterested third party. DiIulio's discussion of this not only illuminates Mill's view, but also underscores distinctions in the recent literature such as Ryan Muldoon's conception of the view from *everywhere* in contrast with Thomas Nagel's view from nowhere.

Chapter 3 focuses on Mill's understanding and defense of individual liberty. This chapter, more than any other, presents what most readers will find familiar about Mill's view. A reader casually familiar with Mill will not be surprised that DiIulio interprets *On Liberty* as centered on Mill's famous Harm Principle and as endorsing protections for individual liberty. DiIulio does defend an interpretation of Mill's view as including *absolute* protections for some liberties, which many interpreters reject, but DiIulio is far from alone in supporting this absolutist interpretation. The chapter also addresses some of the challenges of interpreting *On Liberty* accordingly, such as debates about whether Mill's account leaves the normative force of liberty an open question depending on the contingencies of possible harms.

To my mind, the most important arguments of Chapter 3 are not those defending DiIulio's specific reading of *On Liberty*. Instead, most important are the arguments regarding how that view fits with other aspects of Mill's view in a broader and coherent whole. For instance, while some may see *On Liberty* as standing free from or even contradicting the utilitarianism of Mill's other works, DiIulio argues that Mill's moral theory, including the Utility Principle and the impartial-observer doctrine, support the Harm Principle and protections for individual liberty. DiIulio's discussion thus valuably illuminates two key aspects of Mill's views. It shows how Mill's liberalism gains support and specification from his moral theory. It also makes the moral theory, in turn, more specific by bringing out its implications and possibilities.

Chapter 4 argues that Mill conceived freedom as non-domination, as in the republican conception of freedom. While other chapters tend to compare Mill with thinkers earlier or co-temporaneous with Mill, Chapter 4 compares Mill's conception of freedom with the later accounts of Isaiah Berlin and Philip Pettit. As in the prior chapter, DiIulio argues extensively and compellingly that this conception is not only a plausible interpretation of Mill but also that it follows from his moral theory since Millian impartial observers would reject domination.

Chapter 5 addresses criticisms of Mill's philosophy and in so doing further elaborates and clarifies Mill's views. For instance, in responding to an objection that Mill's philosophy fails to restrain degrading personal vice, DiIulio defends the Millian insight that the legal institutions face serious epistemic limits in identifying personal vice particularly in the complex circumstances an individual may face. Furthermore, Mill's account is capable of saying much about personal vice as matters of value or morality, even if not as matters of enforceable justice. The chapter thus fruitfully draws together aspects, and brings out additional implications, of Mill's view.

In summary, *Completely Free* is an impressive contribution to understanding John Stuart Mill's moral and political philosophy. Clearly written and well structured, DiIulio's study is accessible to anyone familiar with Mill. It reconstructs Mill's views in an analytic and systematic manner, providing a comprehensive understanding of his philosophy.

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