

justified. Just at the point where one would expect the idea of God as supremely personal to be discussed, the treatment falls off. Of course, one may be greatly stimulated to respect another person because he is held to be made in the image of God who is supremely personal—though this does not necessarily require that God exists. But Christians, surely, draw their inspiration about what it means to be fully personal from an historic individual, Jesus Christ?

Coming after a closely reasoned work like the above, the book by O. Sydney Barr is disappointing. J. W. Bowker, in his quite admirable essay in *Making Moral Decisions*, criticizes Situation Ethics for being atomistic and subjective and for protesting against law theories without putting anything in their place. He might also have said that Situation Ethics needs to claim a warrant in the scriptures. The claim is implied by, among others, Von Rad in his 'Theology of the Old Testament' (see the discussion of moral norms in volume 1, p. 371f.), and it is obviously important if Situation Ethics is to become respectable. But this book will not serve the purpose. It is astonishing to find a discussion of New Testament ethics which nowhere refers to eschatology. Law is made relative, surely, not by the highest expression of human love which Jesus embodies, but by the imminence of a totally new aeon in which the demands of God are personal and immediate. Further, in what sense is the life

of Jesus revelational except—to quote Bultmann in his *New Testament Theology* (volume 1, p. 294f.)—in its character as the act of God, which may, in fact, not require much reference to the 'human personality' of Jesus, even supposing that the gospels supplied such information? Barr does not wrestle with the problem posed by Paul. In what sense do we imitate Christ? Situation Ethics must find its warrant in eschatological ethics; that this can be done is shown by Bultmann himself. It is on dangerous ground by referring back to an old-fashioned Liberal portrait of Jesus. Barr's all-too-worldly *agapé* needs a good dose of dialectical theology.

*Making Moral Decisions* is a collection of four lectures given to students in Cambridge. The introductory essay by D. M. MacKinnon is a most interesting discussion which allows the force of the deterministic argument yet argues for self-awareness as a presupposition for moral freedom on lines established in Kant's *Critique of Pure Reason*. Allowing for our more complex experience, Professor MacKinnon claims that this can be the basis for a reconstruction of moral thought, not denying causality but seeing also the dynamic element in the rational, committed man's 'introspection'. The other lectures are by Professor Leslie Banks and Michael Howard who makes a plea for sympathy for the politicians engaged in moral decisions far more onerous than those considered in the academic class-room. I EUAN ELLIS

**MAN DIVIDED**, by Stan Windass. *DLT General Studies series*, 95 pp. (price not printed).

**DEATH AND IMMORTALITY**, by Josef Pieper, trans. Richard and Clara Winston. *Burns & Oates*, 130 pp. £1 1s.

**HOPE AND HISTORY**, by Josef Pieper, trans. Richard and Clara Winston. *Burns & Oates*, 92 pp. £1 1s.

*Man Divided* is an impressive small (too small) book. In it the modern Catholic attack on 'dualism' finds itself: approaches really important ground. Here the argument no longer thrashes at its own version of Absolute Evil (Descartes, Plato, or empirical philosophy); but considers the great Manichean myth itself, the myth of Darkness and Light, Good and Evil, and the battle between them, from which our culture, from far before Plato, has drawn its energies; and by which both a Left and Right are still equally imprisoned. Teilhard de Chardin had an insight into a new vision of evil: no longer punishment for sin but 'sign and effect' of progress ('and matter, no longer a culpable and inferior element, would take on a meaning diametrically opposed to that habitually

considered Christian'). It is with this raising of Evil to become part of the dialectic of Life itself that this book is concerned. It will be resisted as Mr Windass foresees, by those on the Left who, locked in combat with Absolute Evil in the form of Capitalism or Apartheid, still depend for their energy on the myth of Holy War. But the myth's true usefulness is over. Moreover, "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do": forgive them, that is, because *they are not guilty*'.

With Mr Windass I believe that this is the unmistakable conclusion of every advance being made either in theology or in the various sciences of human affairs. It does not lessen human responsibility for change, but rather increases it. Mr Windass is quite clear that

the myth, and the war and violent revolution which it promotes, has had a useful evolutionary purpose. It was one way of adapting to conflict: it enabled decisions to be made that had to be made. But we must move on, or back, to another way of doing it: perhaps the ritualized conflict (the stag's antlers are good for ritual, bad for killing) which is so much more characteristic of the beasts than the 'nature red in tooth and claw' in which our ancestors, by a self-projection, so fondly believed.

In the light of a current debate, must we fear, with Adrian Cunningham, that Evil is by this writer being 'ontologized': represented as an aspect of existence *as such*? I think the answer is yes, but that the fear is itself part of the Holy War mythology. 'I cannot imagine the end of the world before the victory of truth', said Teilhard. If Last Judgement (End of the World) is in fact *one* with the victory of truth: then Evil is one aspect (the inert, negative aspect) of materiality as such: Put another way: if the world is a statement, *in the medium of space and time*, of God's nature, then when that statement is completed, time will not continue. Perhaps evil (cf. the Buddha) is indeed an aspect of the material world as such: but intimately part of its creative possibilities. It could be in this area that the dualist insight can be incorporated into a new philosophy of being: deeper than either its acceptance or rejection.

Both the quotations from Teilhard which I have used above come, not from Mr Windass's book, but from *Hope and History* by Josef

Pieper. Professor Pieper represents what is best in the Thomist tradition: a well-tempered (good-tempered) philosophical mind, unfailingly open, unfailingly critical, sensitive to modern (existentialist) language; clearly marking the line between philosophy and revelation, and submitting each issue to the test of both. It is a measure of his relevance that all Mr Windass's main themes are echoed in one or other of the two books under review; but it is a fairly different world. Thus the concept of death as punishment for sin is scrutinized, and found, of all the possible pictures of death, to be 'absolutely radiant, a supreme testimony to hope and light': 'for it is inherent in the concept of punishment that it makes up for the fault: that it makes good again.' Thus (in opposition to all forms of historicism) the perfection of man, for which he 'hopes', is placed ineluctably outside and beyond history: for hope is seen to transcend the object hoped for, and to reject its claim to define and limit it. If man is defined by transcendence, then there can indeed be no end to it. Plato's Banquet of 'true being' is what we existentially hope for; and only the revealed dogma of the resurrection places this back in the *midst* of the historical world: stating, in faith, that no jot or tittle will be lost 'of all that is good, true, beautiful, well-made and healthy'.

We need to remake our eschatology. Both writers under review would be necessary contributors to such a project.

JULIAN DAVID

**DEVELOPMENT OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE: SOME HISTORICAL PROLEGOMENA**, by Jaroslav Pelikan. *Yale University Press*, New Haven and London, 1969, 149 pp. 52s. 6d.

Professor Pelikan says that, while Newman's *Essay* is 'the almost inevitable starting-point for an investigation of development of doctrine . . . this is not to be yet another book about Cardinal Newman: he is not the subject of it, only the provocation for it' (p. 3). Thus, for example, his summary of Newman's seven 'notes of a true development' is only designed to provide him with a convenient set of categories from which, after a trenchant critique of Dewart's *Future of Belief* for its 'refusal to take history seriously' (p. 28), he can build up the thesis that insufficient attention has been paid, in studies of doctrinal development, to the way in which 'Christian doctrine has in fact developed' (p. 4): 'The tough questions in the development of Christian doctrine will not finally be settled by any historical research, but they can be faced

theologically only when such research has been done' (p. 53). In other words, the purpose of the book is accurately stated in the subtitle.

Accordingly, the second part is devoted to a case-study of three important instances of doctrinal 'development' (the subject-matter of each of which had interested Newman): Cyprian's doctrine of original sin; Athanasius' Marian theology, and the problem of the 'Filioque' as it emerges from Hilary's treatment of the doctrine of the Trinity. The importance of these examples, according to Pelikan, is that they indicate various different 'methods of development of doctrine' (p. 91).

Too often, as Pelikan points out, '*Dogmengeschichte* has concentrated not on the history of what the Church believed, taught, and confessed, but on the history of erudite theology' (pp. 46-7). Whether he is correct in