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Vol. 62

• July 2010

• No. 3

CONTENTS

Bricks and Mortar Clientelism: Sectarianism and the Logics of Welfare Allocation in Lebanon	<i>Melani Cammett and Sukriti Issar</i>	381
Choosing to Target: What Types of Countries Get Different Types of World Bank Projects	<i>Matthew S. Winters</i>	422
Power and the Ascendance of New Economic Policy Ideas: Lessons from the 1980s Crisis in Israel	<i>Ronen Mandelkern and Michael Shalev</i>	459
How Do Crises Lead to Change: Liberalizing Capital Controls in the Early Years of New Order Indonesia	<i>Jeffrey M. Chwieroth</i>	496
The Contributors		ii
Abstracts		iii

THE CONTRIBUTORS

MELANI CAMMETT is an associate professor of political science and the director of the Middle East Studies Program at Brown University. She is the author of *Globalization and Business Politics in Arab North Africa: A Comparative Perspective* (2007) and is currently completing a book manuscript, "In the Service of Sectarianism: Welfare and Politics in Weak States," and a co-edited book, "The Politics of Non-State Social Welfare in the Global South." Her research focuses on social service provision by nonstate actors and politics in plural societies. She can be reached at melani_cammett@brown.edu.

SUKRITI ISSAR is a Ph.D. candidate in sociology at Brown University. Her research interests include welfare policy, economic sociology, urban sociology, and spatial analysis. She can be reached at sukriti_issar@brown.edu.

MATTHEW S. WINTERS is an assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign. His articles have appeared in various journals. He is currently working on a book manuscript about corruption in World Bank projects. He can be reached at mwinters@illinois.edu.

RONEN MANDELKERN is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. His dissertation is entitled "Professionals Struggling for Reform: Entrepreneurs and Power in Israel's Political-Economic Liberalization." From September 2010 he will be a postdoctoral researcher at the Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies in Cologne, conducting a study of macroeconomic policy responses to the global recession. He can be reached at ronen.mandelkern@mail.huji.ac.il.

MICHAEL SHALEV is chair of the Department of Political Science at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem and an associate professor of sociology and political science. He has published on the political economy of Israel and comparisons across the OECD states. His ongoing research is on class voting, gender inequality, and the role of "loyalty benefits" in welfare states. He can be reached at michael.shalev@gmail.com.

JEFFREY M. CHWIEROTH is a senior lecturer in the Department of International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political Science. His current research examines the behavior of international organizations and the political economy of sovereign wealth funds. His newest book is *Capital Ideas: The IMF and the Rise of Financial Liberalization* (2010). He can be reached at j.m.chwieroth@lse.ac.uk.

ABSTRACTS

BRICKS AND MORTAR CLIENTELISM

SECTARIANISM AND THE LOGICS OF WELFARE ALLOCATION IN LEBANON

By MELANI CAMMETT and SUKRITI ISSAR

In plural societies, social welfare can be a terrain of political contestation, particularly when public welfare functions are underdeveloped and ethnic or religious groups provide basic social services. It is well established that such organizations favor in-group members, but under what conditions do they serve out-group communities? To address this question, the authors compare the welfare programs of the predominantly Sunni Muslim Future Movement and the Shiite Muslim Hezbollah in Lebanon. Although they operate under the same institutional rules and economic contexts and boast the largest welfare programs in their respective communities, the Future Movement aims to serve a broader array of beneficiaries, including non-Sunnis, whereas Hezbollah focuses more exclusively on Shiite communities. Based on analyses of an original data set of the spatial locations of welfare agencies, qualitative data from interviews with providers and beneficiaries, and case studies of areas where the two parties established and did not establish welfare agencies, the authors argue that distinct political mobilization strategies—whether electoral or nonelectoral—explain different patterns of service delivery across the two organizations.

CHOOSING TO TARGET

WHAT TYPES OF COUNTRIES GET DIFFERENT TYPES OF WORLD BANK PROJECTS

By MATTHEW S. WINTERS

Well-governed countries are more likely to make use of foreign aid for the purposes of economic development and poverty alleviation. Therefore, if aid agencies are providing funds for the sake of development, these countries should receive more aid and categorically different types of aid as compared with poorly governed countries. In poorly governed countries aid should be given in forms that allow for less discretion. Using an original data set of all World Bank projects from 1996 to 2002, the author distinguishes programmatic projects from investment projects and national from subnational investment projects. If the World Bank allows more discretion in well-governed countries, then it will choose to provide programmatic and national aid for these recipients. The author presents evidence that the World Bank provides a larger proportion of national investment lending in better-governed countries. With regard to programmatic lending, he finds mixed evidence. Among counties eligible for International Development Association (IDA) aid, good governance surprisingly is associated with a lower proportion of programmatic aid, whereas for International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) borrowers, good governance is associated with a higher proportion. The author subjects these results to a number of robustness checks. Although he confirms the existing result in the literature that the World Bank provides larger overall amounts of aid to better-governed countries, his examination of the disaggregated data leads to questioning whether both lending wings of the World Bank are designing aid programs in the most prodevelopment way possible.

POWER AND THE ASCENDANCE OF NEW ECONOMIC POLICY IDEAS

LESSONS FROM THE 1980S CRISIS IN ISRAEL

By RONEN MANDELKERN and MICHAEL SHALEV

Recent explanations of transformations of macroeconomic policy under crisis conditions spotlight the intrinsic properties of ideas and the persuasiveness with which they are marketed. Bridging the divide between power and discourse approaches, this article reveals the causal role played by the power resources of expert ideational entrepreneurs, conditional on the political conjuncture in which they operate. The authors exploit a fortuitous natural experiment from the early 1980s, when the Israeli economy spiraled into hyperinflation. Two similar proposals for economic stabilization and reform were offered by different teams of economists, less than two years apart. While the government rejected the *dollarization* plan, its authorization of the *stabilization* plan inaugurated a new political-economic regime. This case, in which similar pro

grams were advocated by different ideational entrepreneurs in a largely stable institutional and economic context, makes it possible to pinpoint why radically new ideas succeed or fail. Previously underutilized analytical tools are employed to conceptualize the power of idea carriers, at both the individual and the group level.

HOW DO CRISES LEAD TO CHANGE?

LIBERALIZING CAPITAL CONTROLS IN THE EARLY YEARS OF NEW ORDER INDONESIA

By JEFFREY M. CHWIEROTH

How do crises lead to change? Rationalist approaches to the question that emphasize inexorable structural responses and the pursuit of distributive preferences by newly dominant coalitions are inadequate because they obscure the social mediation of material events and the pervasive uncertainty that follows destabilization of the precrisis status quo. The latter constrains actors from fully grasping their distributive preferences. Until uncertainty is reduced, persuasion emerges as a key mechanism of change. Although constructivist approaches emphasize persuasive practices, they have yet to adequately specify the scope conditions underpinning the selection of new ideas. This article goes beyond much of the constructivist focus on domestic legitimacy and static notions of resonance by emphasizing external credibility and dynamic processes of resonance-building by norm entrepreneurs. The author specifies four features—what he calls the four Cs of crisis resolution—that shape the process of idea selection: carriers, composition, crossover appeal, and credibility. Developing these arguments in the case of the early years of New Order Indonesia, the article suggests that whenever a prominent and cohesive group of advocates promotes an idea that has sufficient ideational and distributive appeal and the endorsement of external actors whose seal of approval is perceived as important, intersubjective belief change, and thus institutional and policy change, is more likely.