under the Nazis, while the following chapter, "Nuclear Defense," details the development of the Soviet atomic problem, emphasizing the role of Ukrainian scientists and contesting the narrative that the first Soviet Atomic bomb was merely a copy of the American device.

The book is organized into thematic chapters that mainly follow a chronological order. *Nuclear Russia* starts with Bolshevik nuclear physics and ends with a commentary on the globally- oriented Rosatom State Nuclear Energy Corporation. *Nuclear Russia* tracks the intertwining trajectories of the military and civic applications of the atom from Stalin to Putin. Josephson inserts the history of nuclear technoscience in political, economic, and institutional contexts, demonstrating the many ways the Soviet system failed absurdly, catastrophically, and stubbornly. Readers will easily notice that Josephson is hardly pro-nuclear. However, at the same time he is highly sensitive to the social and cultural significance of nuclear power in Ukrainian and Russian societies and is sympathetic to the progressive reformers of the nuclear and defense industries. Josephson's *Nuclear Russia* is an excellent short and engaging introduction into the politics of the nuclear technology. Its focus combines an analysis of the technological development of nuclear power and nuclear weapons and the arms control movement to reduce nuclear weapons. Inevitably, selections had to be made: for instance, readers will not find much about Soviet nuclear strategic thinking or about nuclear medicine and radioactive isotope applications. Josephson's argument is at its strongest where he shows the environmental cost of Soviet nuclearization and details the many social and economic costs that tend to be unaccounted for by the promoters of nuclear power. The last two chapters, "Nuclear Disintegration" and "Nuclear Renaissance" are particularly interesting as they show how the history of Soviet nuclear power shapes the nuclear complex of twenty-first century Russia. As Josephson put it, reflecting on the Kursk submarine disaster of 2000, "Putin will not make this mistake of being distant from the atom—or accidents—again" (140). Josephson shows us that both the Russian environment and its political imagination are profoundly nuclearized, the result of about 100 years of "unwavering political, economic and ideological support of the atom and neutron" (148). The key difference between Soviet nuclear Russia and Putin's nuclear Russia, according to Josephson, is that Putin has transformed Russia into an outwardly aggressive nuclear power. *Nuclear Russia* narrates this path of transformation in an engaging way, indicating the relevance of the nuclear technology for different spheres of societal life, culture, and politics. *Nuclear Russia* will be essential reading for undergraduate and postgraduate courses as well as for all those interested in the region. Hopefully, we will see Josephson's "Nuclear Ukraine" coming out soon too.

Rotem Kowner. *Great Battles: Tsushima.*

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This meticulously researched and amply illustrated book demonstrates that the Russo-Japanese War's Tsushima was one of history's great battles. It relies on Russian, Japanese,

German, UK, and US archives, newspapers, and official histories. Ch. 1, "Background," covers the preceding First Sino-Japanese War, the naval theorists informing the belligerents' naval purchases and operational plans, a fleet comparison, and the war's course up to Tsushima.

The heart of the book is Ch. 2, "The Battle," which periodizes the war into five phases (inception, first engagement, second engagement, night operations, and final denouement), followed by an explanation of the outcome. Detailed maps illustrate the battle's progress. The last section examines the ships (comparing their armament, armor, structure, and speed); the ability to communicate among ships and detect enemy ships; and the human factors of leadership, preparedness, motivation, tactics, and strategy. Rotem Kowner concludes that superior Japanese tactics, command, and speed produced the lopsided outcome.

Chs. 3 through 5 focus on Japanese, Russian, and global perceptions respectively. Ch. 3 highlights the post-war celebrations, Tsushima as the Japanese navy's defining moment, and the false lessons its strategists drew. The war became a powerful source of nationalism that made Japan a fearsome foe. But the assumption that morale, not materiel explained the victory, and the post-war focus on naval offence to the exclusion of defense served Japan poorly in World War II. Although the post-war US occupation forced a period on amnesia about Tsushima, afterward it became an untarnished source of national pride.

The next three chapters are much shorter. Ch. 4 turns to Russian perceptions. The 1905 Revolution that coincided with Tsushima undermined Russia from within. After the defeat, the blame game began with trials of the surviving naval officers. Russian memory of the loss evolved from shock during the tsarist period, to amnesia in the interwar period, to revenge in World War II, when Russia took southern Sakhalin plus four other islands from Japan.

Ch. 5 examines worldwide media perceptions, the U.S.-brokered Portsmouth Peace Treaty, and the two key naval theorists, Alfred T. Mahan and Julian Corbett, who commented on the war as it was fought. Tsushima impressed them all. Ch. 6 analyzes the war's impact on future naval development—which was surprisingly limited. Post-war technological changes rapidly made the ships that fought Tsushima obsolete. Moreover, the revolutionary Dreadnought-class battleships, based on pre-war operational considerations and launched immediately after the war, did not incorporate any lessons from the war. The subsequent development of submarines and naval air rapidly overtook any remaining operational lessons.

The concluding chapter applies a framework from Eliot A. Cohen and John Gooch's *Military Misfortunes: An Anatomy of Failure in War* to explain Admiral Zinoviĭ Rozhestvenskii's failures in their three temporal categories: he failed to learn from the past, to anticipate the future, and to adapt to present circumstances. Yet before deploying, Rozhesvenskii accurately predicted disaster. He, but not the tsar, knew full well that no navy fights a major naval power on such extended lines without intervening basing to refit and replenish.

A discussion of how naval operations contribute to war termination would have been useful. While defeat at Tsushima would have cut Japan's military supply lines, costing it the war, this was not true for Russia. Other than morale, Russian naval operations had no impact on its land operations, which were supplied overland by the Trans-Siberian Railway. The railway's troop carrying capacity tripled during the war, so that after Mukden, the last major land battle, Russia's total army remained three times the size of Japan's. Unlike Russia's initial forces or Japan's surviving forces, Russia's forces in theater increasingly consisted of crack troops, while Japan was out of men. One more land battle would have shattered Japan's army.

So what happened? The 1905 Revolution was important. Japan contributed by funding Russian, Polish, and Finish revolutionaries. Russia's finances were crumbling. Even before Tsushima, it could no longer secure international loans, while Japan could and did at ever lower interest rates. There was an institutional factor also worth considering. As an autocratic state, in imperial Russia the tsar decided. This is when the "ungreat" men of history matter. Apparently, Nicholas II lost heart. His predecessor Peter the Great or successor Joseph Stalin would have persevered, resulting in Russia's victory, not loss.