

ST THOMAS AQUINAS: SUMMA THEOLOGIAE. Latin Text and English Translation. Introduction, Text, Appendices and Glossaries. Vol. XV: The World Order (Ia, cx-cxix), M. J. Charlesworth, xvi+192 pp. £2.25. Vol. XLV: Prophecy and Other Charisms (IIallae, clxxi-clxxviii), Roland Potter, O.P., xiv+180 pp. £2.10. *Blackfriars*. London: *Eyre and Spottiswoode*; New York: *McGraw-Hill*.

The questions here included under the title 'The World Order' cover a variety of topics ranging from the concern of the angels, good and bad, with material things and human beings to the method of human reproduction, taking in their stride the activity of material things, fate and the conditions of human activity. They are thus in one way or another all concerned with the relation of secondary causes to the primary causality of the Creator. Dr Charlesworth has provided a readable and interpretative translation with useful footnotes and three appendices. The first of these, on Fate, and the third, on human generation, deal helpfully with the Angelic Doctor's dependence on Boëthius and Aristotle respectively; the second, with his doctrine of learning and education. A few comments on individual points seem to be called for. *Angelus* is frequently, and with no obvious need, translated by 'angels', in the plural. On page 53, lines 22f, 'men are different in that they are not subject to dissolution' should be 'men are subject to dissolution in a different way'. On page 55, line 28, 'the sole task of the lowest order of angels', should be 'the task of only the lowest order of angels'. On page 131, line 10, 'a passive intellect' should be 'one passive intellect'. On page 133, line 13, 'uses' should be 'supplies'.

The volume entitled 'Prophecy and other Charisms' is a very important one, as it is concerned with the whole question of man's natural and supernatural knowledge. Not only prophecy in the narrow sense but also ecstasy, the gift of tongues and the grace of working miracles fall in its scope. Fr Potter's helpful

appendices discuss, in a modern context, such vital matters as scriptural inspiration, Old- and New-Testament prophecy, the prophetic element in the Church and charismatic gifts in general. Of special significance are St Thomas's discussion of divine foreknowledge (pp. 25ff), of the various ways in which sensible representations are involved in prophetic visions (p. 57) and of the difference between prophetic illumination and biblical inspiration (p. 77). Fr Potter has grappled very successfully with the difficult technicalities of this particular section of the *Summa*. On page 41, line 25, 'contemplative and spiritual realities' should be 'contemplation of spiritual realities'. On page 49, line 1, 'Sibyl' should be 'Sibyls'. On page 99, lines 7-10, 'affective' should be 'appetitive'. On page 105, lines 30f, 'better still in relation to the aqueous and crystalline heavens' should be 'better still in relation to the starry and to the aqueous or crystalline heavens'. In question 173, article 3, the translation reflects, without exact verbal correspondence, St Thomas's own apparent hesitation as to whether prophetic revelation involves abstraction or alienation from the senses; it is not clear whether he is discussing the epistemology or the psychology of prophetic knowledge or, as is perhaps more probable, both. The discussion of the witch of Endor (qu. 174, art. 5, ad 4) is very relevant to spiritualistic phenomena.

The series, which is now well past its midpoint, continues to maintain its initial high standard and—more remarkably—its moderate price.

E. L. MASCALL

RESPONSIBILITY, by Jonathan Glover. *Routledge and Kegan Paul*, 1970. 204 pp. £2.25.

In considering 'attitudes to people and to what they do' (p. 1), attitudes broadly speaking of approval, disapproval or pity, Mr Glover is at pains to establish criteria whereby it may be possible to judge whether or not a given attitude to someone is justifiable. There are two questions to be answered, neither of which may be treated of in isolation from the other: firstly, whether there are any empirically discoverable conditions or laws governing human behaviour which could excuse from blame (or responsibility, since only responsible agents are to be praised or blamed); and secondly, what part is to be played by moral

judgment in drawing a boundary line between concepts of, for instance, capacity and incapacity which do not apparently admit of precise empirical distinction. Given the central importance of moral judgment in this role, Mr Glover discusses in the final chapters the nature of morality and the sort of grounds on which truly moral beliefs should be founded.

One of the conditions which has generally been held to excuse from blame, or from punishment by the law, is incapacity to have acted otherwise. But philosophical, legal and psychological theories about human capacity for action have suffered greatly from the

prevalent practice of discussing them in isolation from one another. It is one of the author's aims to correct this imbalance, and in his discussion of determinism in chapters 2–4 he demonstrates how far wrong philosophers can go by ignoring contemporary advances in the physical sciences. He defines determinism as (p. 21) 'the thesis that all human behaviour is governed by causal laws', and rejects the view that the truth of this thesis would mean that we are never responsible for our actions as being based upon too crudely mechanistic a view of causality. Instead, while rejecting any notion of contra-causal freedom, he concludes that all action can in principle be causally explained, and it is an open empirical question whether in fact it will be. But as with all matters of discoverable fact, the truth of this does not, in his opinion, force us to adopt one moral attitude rather than another, so that we are still left with the problem of deciding which reasons for an action to take into account when deciding to absolve someone from blame.

The next three chapters demonstrate the extent to which psychological theory has suffered from inadequately examined grounds either for defending a concept of mental 'illness' in the first place, or for laying down what counts as incapacity rather than, for instance, weakness of will. The author argues that there are positive empirical criteria upon which answers to both of these questions may

be based; and the following chapter on punishment demonstrates the importance of these answers for legal theory. Mr Glover would like to see the assumptions upon which our penal system is established made explicit and re-examined not only in the light of such arguments as he has already outlined, but also of a far greater programme of practical experimentation than has hitherto ever taken place.

Although Mr Glover does point out that we hold attitudes not merely to actions but to people (identified with their will or intention, pages 64–6), throughout the book his emphasis is upon responsibility for *actions* and people as moral *agents*. He rightly brings out in his discussion of conscience and moral attitudes in chapter 5 (perhaps the best chapter in the book) that one of the most important factors in their development is the activity of 'imagination', the growing awareness of other people and how they feel; the same imagination which can be used (p. 93) 'in producing an original scientific theory, in writing a poem, or in drawing up a political programme'. But it is a pity Mr Glover did not take his account of responsibility one step further back and apply it more explicitly to the continuing moral personality which is the basis from which spring the moral actions and judgments with which he does deal.

DAPHNE NASH

MAN FOR OTHERS, Reflections on Christian Priesthood, by John Jay Hughes. *Sheed and Ward*, London and Sydney, 1970. 137 pp. £1.50.

One of the abuses denounced by Bishop De Smedt at Vatican II was clericalism, a perversion of the institutional structure of the Church. At a time when the whole pattern and working of the institution is under re-examination it is inevitable that the priesthood should come under this scrutiny. Fr Hughes' book is a popular contribution to this discussion, springing out of a set of lectures for a conference on priesthood.

The framework is provided by the account of the appointment of the twelve in Mark 3, 13–15, taken phrase by phrase to provide a peg on which the chapters are hung. Usually there is an endeavour, in informal style, to describe the Markan peg first; but in the crucial chapter on the priesthood as essentially a ministry of the word, no such attempt is made: no room has been kept in which to show the transformation of the original proclamation of the kingdom into the gospel of the Church.

The central chapter begins from the unique priesthood of Christ, as expounded in Hebrews. He is the only priest there is, he has offered a perfect and unique sacrifice. Priesthood in the Church is only a participation in or representation of that unique priesthood. The priesthood of believers is a matter of the spiritual sacrifice of their loving obedience. Ministerial priesthood has to do with the spiritual cult of the word. The celebration of the eucharist is the most intense form of the priestly proclamation of the word (Rom. 15, 16), proclamation in a sacrament which enables us to be present at the unique, unrepeatable event of Calvary.

Considerable stress is laid upon the fundamental equality of priests and people, upon the way in which ministers and lay people share in a common vocation. The ministerial priesthood is not a status apart but a function within and on behalf of the Christian people. But occasional touches of clericalism still survive, e.g. the cross