



Academics and Peripatetics favoured the quiet life of study, the *θεωρία* of *Nic. Eth.* 10.7, and were indeed criticised for serving their own pleasure by that choice (see *Luc.* 127, *Off.* 1.28; *Plut. St. Rep.* 1033d). We also know that Cicero had studied the arguments of Theophrastus and Dicaearchus on this point (*Att.* 2.16.3, *Fin.* 5.11; S. McConnell, ‘Cicero and Dicaearchus’, *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy* 42 [2012]). A more inclusive consideration of the βίος θεωρητικός tradition sees that Cicero’s target in *DRP* 1.1–11 is not the Epicurean *λάθε βίωσας*. That would be all too easy. Rather, it is the inclination of philosophers of every stripe to retreat into intellectual activity at the expense of civic engagement – an inclination that had sometimes been Cicero’s own, but which did not represent his considered opinion of how a person of conscience should behave.

Never shy of thin ice, Z. occasionally carries a point beyond what the evidence seems to me to bear. The case for Lucretius being an important influence on the *De re publica* rests primarily on the fact that both *DRP* and *De rerum natura* refer to the dream of Ennius as well as that both works are in six books paired 1–2, 3–4, 5–6. These are interesting points, but not ones that rise to the level of ‘almost certainly’ (p. 176) or ‘unquestionably’ (p. 307). I was dissatisfied, too, with the claim that the debate on justice in *DRP* 3 is presented as between two speakers who would each prefer to make the opposite case, namely ‘Philus the Stoic’ and ‘Laelius the pragmatic skeptic’ (p. 268). Of course, Philus favours justice, and it is perhaps not wrong to read his remark about the *mundus* at 1.19 as indicative of a Stoic inclination, though we have no other evidence on that score (p. 200). But Laelius is a different matter. His objection at 1.19 was to astronomy, not to justice, and his tendency to ask questions does not make him anything like a sceptic in the philosophical sense; in fact, he is the one who has Stoic credentials (e.g. *Fin.* 2.24). Finally, while the treatment of the *Somnium Scipionis* is illuminating in many ways, it becomes rather strange when it comes to the way the dream was introduced. Z. presses the reports of Favonius and Macrobius to yield a level of metatheatricity that strains credulity: apparently, Scipio himself must have said not only (with Favonius) that speculations about the soul’s immortality ‘are not the fictions of dreaming philosophers’ but also (with Macrobius) that he chooses to avoid the foolish criticism directed against Plato’s myth of Er by having *himself* awakened rather than brought back to life. Z. sidesteps this last awkward implication of his analysis on pp. 301–2, but it is there. I should prefer to believe that Macrobius, at least, editorialises at this point.

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## THE ANECDOTE IN CICERO

GRANDL (M.) *Ciceroniana. Zur anekdotischen Strategie in Ciceros rhetoriktheoretischen und philosophischen Schriften.* (Episteme in Bewegung 27.) Pp. xii + 401. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2022. Cased, €89. ISBN: 978-3-447-11811-8.

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Since Classics has overcome its reservations concerning Cicero’s philosophical and theoretical writings in recent decades, intensive research has emerged that is working on

an unbiased reassessment of the Roman author and his oeuvre, revising the negative judgements that go back far into the nineteenth century. This research concentrates primarily on the content of his work and, without negating Cicero's repeated recourse to Greek models, successively exposes the specific autonomy of his philosophical and theoretical endeavours. Recently, increasing importance has been attached to the cultural conditions of his thought. However, current interest in Cicero has so far been less focused on the stylistic and argumentative strategies of his writings and the question of the extent to which specific characteristics can be identified in them, which are possibly complementary to their content-related characteristics.

G.'s monograph, which is based on a dissertation at the Freie Universität of Berlin, makes a substantial contribution to this. Its aim is threefold: firstly, it wants to analyse the use of the anecdote in Cicero's philosophical and rhetorical writings, and, secondly, building on this, to consider the implications that arise from Cicero's specific use of this so-called miniature narrative for the understanding of his oeuvre as a whole. Finally, it aims to make a fundamental contribution to sharpening the anecdote as a genre and, in particular, its epistemological potential. This quite complex objective requires the skilful combination of modern theory and philologically exact analysis of the ancient texts, which G. succeeds in doing in a thoroughly convincing manner.

The volume begins with a concise introduction, in which G. outlines the project, justifies the choice of corpus and develops the structure of the study. This opening reveals the two decisive areas of tension in which G. wants to situate the anecdote in principle, but especially in relation to Cicero's philosophical and rhetorical oeuvre: on the one hand, between its character as a small narrative unit and its presumed significance for larger argumentative structures and, on the other hand, between its generally life-world content and the theoretical content of the philosophical writings in which it is embedded. Against this background, G. strives to prove that the anecdote marks a specific form of knowledge within Cicero's philosophical writings and thus has to be considered an integral part of their argumentative logic.

Chapter 2 serves to lay the foundation for the study by providing a description and definition of the anecdote on the basis of a conceptual history, which G. does not limit to the relevant modern period, but traces back to antiquity. In this way, he succeeds on the one hand in achieving a broad understanding of the phenomenon, which, with recourse to the structural features *occasio*, *provocatio* and *dictum* or *factum* laid down as characteristics in modern definitions, includes further specific features in a well-balanced manner, such as brevity, which is not understood absolutely but relationally, realism as the text-internal representation of factuality, the impression of resting on oral tradition as well as the claim to be a concise unit of larger content-related or argumentative contexts. On the other hand, this overview exposes a corresponding discussion in antiquity, especially in Cicero with his theoretical reflections on *facetiae* in the second book of *De oratore*. This is all the more significant because G. rightly points out that the anecdote is hardly discussed in scholarship in Classics and is at best blurredly distinguished from comparable small forms such as the *apophthegma* or the *exemplum*. Against this background it becomes clear that it is not only a matter of expanding the textual basis for a theory of the anecdote to include antiquity, but also of establishing a research context for it in the first place on the basis of Cicero.

In Chapter 3 G. turns to Cicero's oeuvre and clarifies the potential of the anecdote for biographical profiling. The starting point for this is his attentive eye for the specifics of literary dialogue, in which topics are not only developed in dependence on the speakers, but these are themselves characterised more closely through their conversation. Cicero's approach in this regard is made clear by an analysis of various dialogue figures from

his oeuvre. On the basis of a convincing reading of the two late dialogues *Cato maior* and *Laelius*, G. shows in detail that the anecdote is used by Cicero to shape different speakers. In the case of the two eponymous figures, for example, G. reveals a specific understanding of philosophy on the basis of a conversational style rich in anecdotes, which, in view of their biographical location in the second century BCE, also points to an epochal style in which the anecdote advances within Cicero's understanding of philosophy to become a compositional indicator of an autochthonous Roman *sapientia*.

Chapter 4 turns to an examination of Cicero's *De divinatione* and the tension between factuality and fictionality of anecdotal narratives and shows how Cicero discusses the problem of the contingency or explicability of the *divinatio* relevant to the Roman cult by means of his dialogue figure and that of his brother Quintus. Through finding a constitutive strangeness of the events discussed by the two brothers, from which Quintus wants to derive the validity of divinatory practice, G. demonstrates that the speaker Marcus Cicero, by pointing out their constitutive contingency, conceives the anecdote as a kind of enlightening medium, which does not so much guarantee reliable knowledge as instruct to test it. In this way he exposes Quintus' hasty *admiratio* of the events described and is able to separate *superstitio* from appropriate *religio*. In his dialogue figure's critique of unambiguous attributions of meaning in anecdotes that are supposed to prove the truth of *divinatio* Cicero thus negotiates not only the question of the facticity or historicity of the narratives, which is crucial for a theory of the anecdote, but ultimately once again a topic that refers to his understanding of philosophy.

Thus, this chapter connects with the preceding, but also with the following fifth chapter, in which G. comprehensively explores the philosophical dimension of the anecdote in Cicero and convincingly proves it to be an essential structural element of Cicero's scepticism. G.'s focus is primarily on proving the anecdote to be a constitutive medium of epistemology. In his comprehensive approach, however, he provides nothing less than a kind of archaeology of the Ciceronian concept of *sapientia*. In an effort to present the anecdote as the privileged space of thought of Ciceronian scepticism, he first considers the significance of the anecdote in Nietzsche's concept of a history of philosophy and Blumenberg's understanding of the anecdote as a crystallisation medium of thoughtfulness and thus as a philosophical narrative form par excellence, which he understands as the original narrative of all theory. After illuminating explanations of Cicero's efforts to use the anecdote to record in writing knowledge that had hitherto been passed down orally in traditional Roman educational contexts and thus to gain a monopoly on its interpretation, G. portrays the anecdote as a seismograph for the mobility and dynamism of Cicero's sceptical conception of knowledge in opposition to the static nature of a dogmatic understanding. Accordingly, he opens up the anecdote as a fragment of knowledge, as it were, which indicates the lack of closure of philosophical discourses and thus becomes recognisable as a narrative complement for the constitutive openness of Cicero's dialogues. Finally, G. illuminates the function of the anecdote as a medium of an aitiology of the presuppositions of Cicero's concept of philosophy.

A concise summary, an exhaustive bibliography and a list of anecdotes in Cicero's works conclude a study that represents a substantial contribution to the understanding of Cicero's philosophical and rhetorical writings in terms of literary studies and the history of philosophy as well as to the further refining of a systematic theory of anecdote. In doing so, G. not only expands the formation of theory with a view to Cicero's oeuvre to include antiquity, hitherto marginalised, but also demonstrates the significance of the genre for ancient literature, which has hardly been considered in Classics in the past. With regard to Cicero, G. not only demonstrates the recurrence of the anecdote in his writings, but also that it characterises his understanding of philosophy to a particular degree.

One of the particular achievements of the work is to prove that the recurrent use of the anecdote manifests Cicero's sceptical attitude on the one hand and, above all, the Roman character of his philosophy in a privileged way on the other.

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## ANACHRONISMS IN VIRGIL

PAUSCH (D.) *Zeitmontagen in Vergils Aeneis. Anachronismen als literarische Technik.* (Hypomnemata 215.) Pp. 162, colour ill. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2023. Cased, €60. ISBN: 978-3-647-31152-3. doi:10.1017/S0009840X23002731

How many authors nowadays can say that they have tackled a theme in which 'sich die Forschung bislang . . . kaum interessiert hat' (p. 14)? P. says exactly that, and his claim is quite justified. His theme is Virgil's use of anachronisms, not so much in the stellar passages (which since antiquity have endlessly fascinated) such as Jupiter's prophecy to Venus, the parade of heroes, the Roman scenes on the shield of Aeneas or Jupiter and Juno's ultimate shaping of Rome. He focuses rather on the multiple 'everyday' moments in which Virgil narrates the poem on two time-levels, the prehistory of Rome and the Roman present. He examines the technique whereby in the narrative and the similes Virgil uses contemporary Roman terms from Roman architecture, weaponry, military tactics and customs to describe the world of Roman prehistory. Virgil simultaneously 'prefigures' the contemporary Roman experience from the vantage point of the past and prompts his contemporary Roman readers to imagine that they are present in the portrayal of their prehistory – *tua res agitur*, as P. puts it, introducing the term 'Zeitmontagen' ('time-montages') to describe such moments.

P. is perfectly aware that Virgil's anachronisms have been criticised since the *Aeneid's* appearance, for example by the influential C. Julius Hyginus (Augustus' librarian), Aulus Gellius and Servius. Gellius follows Hyginus in objecting that Palinurus' body cannot have been swept to Velia on the Italian shore (*Aen.* 6.337–83) because that city only came into being 600 years later, in the reign of Servius Tullius. P. sees this as an intentional anachronism with the aesthetic aim of helping Virgil's readers to relate to the prehistoric event, and he proceeds to approach other anachronisms along the same lines.

Let us look in greater detail at two more significant examples drawn from P.'s extensive study, two from the narrative and two from the similes. For the first, I select the descriptions at *Aen.* 1.421–9, 446–9, 505–6, 640–2, 697–702, 725–7 of the newly founded Carthage, its buildings and dining-room decorations and arrangements. Many words are taken anachronistically from contemporary Roman architectural vocabulary to conjure up the external architecture and living interiors of a city founded in the ninth or eighth century BCE (quite apart from the well-known anachronism of the three or so centuries between the founding of Carthage and Aeneas' time): for example *strata viarum*, *iura*, *magistratus*, *senatus*, *theatrum* (compare the Theatre of Marcellus, erected by Augustus after 23 BCE in memory of his nephew, son-in-law and successor), *scaena*, *machinae* (building-cranes mentioned at *Aen.* 4.86–9, and supplied in the Vatican Virgil illustration for the passage in Book 1, which P. prints), *fastigia urbis*, *aerea . . . limina*, *testudo* (here