

William M. Kimmelman, University of Alabama, Birmingham: associate professor.

David G. Lawrence, Westmont College: associate professor.

Chae-Jin Lee, University of Kansas: professor.

Paul Lermack, Bradley University: associate professor.

Stephen C. Markovich, University of North Dakota: professor.

Arthur H. Miller, University of Michigan: associate research scientist.

David J. Myers, Pennsylvania State University: associate professor.

Emile A. Nakhleh, Mount Saint Mary's College: professor.

Raymond Pomerleau, San Francisco State University: professor.

Donald V. Poochigian, University of North Dakota: associate professor.

Ronald E. Pynn, University of North Dakota: associate professor.

T. Ramakrishna Reddy, Weber State College: professor.

Thomas H. Roback, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University: associate professor.

Richard H. Rosswurm, Marshall University: associate professor.

Lester H. Salamon, Duke University: associate professor.

Lawrence A. Scaff, University of Arizona: associate professor.

Robert Sharlet, Union College: professor.

Leonard Stitelman, University of New Mexico: professor.

Frank Tachau, University of Illinois, Chicago Circle: professor.

Charles M. Tidmarch, Union College: associate professor.

Peter C. Unsinger, San Jose State University: associate professor.

Richard Vengroff, Texas Tech University: associate professor.

Victor Wallis, Indiana University-Purdue University at Indianapolis: associate professor.

Henry J. Warmenhoven, Virginia Commonwealth University: associate professor.

Ralph G. Jones, Texas Tech University, has retired from active teaching and will be professor emeritus of political science.

Ruth C. Lawson, professor of political science, Mount Holyoke College, has retired after 34 years at the College.

J. Roland Pennock, Swarthmore College, has retired.

William W. Shaw, professor of political science and Director of the Urban Studies program at Tulane University, retired July 1, 1976 as Emeritus Professor.

Addition

PS wishes to draw to its readers attention the following information from the University of Missouri, St. Louis, on data on women and men faculty and graduate students at that institution. The information is as follows:

	Fall		Associate		Assistant		Instructor	
	M	W	M	W	M	W	M	W
Missouri-St. Louis	5	0	3	0	6	1	0	0
Number of Students in M.A. Program	M		W					
	100	17			Total M.A. Degrees to Women in 3 Years			
				9				

In Memoriam

Hannah Arendt

Hannah Arendt died December 4, 1975 of a heart attack, while in her apartment entertaining friends. Her death came as a great shock, for since her recovery from an earlier heart attack two years ago, she seemed as vigorous and intellectually alive as ever. At an age when most other thinkers have already finished their important work, she was engaged in a major new project, a philosophical reflection on man's mental faculties, which she had chosen to call *The Life of the Mind*.

Hannah Arendt was one of the outstanding political thinkers of our time, recognized both inside and outside the academic community, and she had a long list of accomplishments and awards to her name. Among her most recent honors were the Benjamin Lippincott Award from the APSA and the Sonning Award of Denmark. Two years before, she had been invited to give the prestigious Gifford Lectures, which had given her the impetus to begin her latest book. She explained something of what this success meant to her in her acceptance speech for the Lessing Prize which she received in 1959. "An honor gives us a forcible lesson in modesty; for it implies that it is not for us to judge our own merits as we judge the merits and accomplishments of others. In awards, the

Retirements

William O. Farber, University of South Dakota, retires after 40 years as chairman and professor of political science.

John S. Gillespie, associate professor of political science, Tulane University, retired July 1, 1976 as Emeritus Associate Professor.

world speaks out, and if we accept the award and express our gratitude for it, we can do so only by ignoring ourselves and acting entirely within the framework of our attitude toward the world."

It is difficult to describe Hannah Arendt. She seemed to be made up of many contradictory traits, each one of which was so greatly magnified by her enormous intensity, that it was impossible to conceive of them all existing in the same person. She was warm and friendly; yet with an abrupt but benign "so," a conversation might unexpectedly come to a close. She welcomed debate, "a free for all" as she called it, but she could become suddenly impatient. "My dear," she would say, and that was that. She was generous, yet there was something slightly chaotic about it, though the combination never failed to charm. Mary McCarthy captured this in her eulogy at a Riverside Chapel. "She would press on a visitor assorted nuts, chocolates, candied ginger, tea, coffee, Campari, whiskey, cigarettes, cake, crackers, fruit, cheese, almost all at once, regardless of conventional sequence or, often, of the time of day."

Hannah Arendt was also an extraordinarily worldly person, though she sometimes seemed a little uncomfortable or removed from it. What she wrote of Waldemar Gurian seems to apply to her too. "He was a stranger in the world, never quite at home in it, and at the same time a realist. . . . His whole spiritual existence was built on the decision never to conform and never to escape, which is only another way of saying that it was built on courage. He remained a stranger and whenever he came it was as though he arrived from nowhere."

Finally Hannah Arendt was intensely American: open, informal, enthusiastic; yet there remained a certain German formidableness about her. This was reflected in her teaching. For an hour or so she would read off a complicated lecture with great power and eloquence, but it was impossible to follow it completely. No doubt she recognized this, for she made her lecture notes available to students, who would pore over them when class ended. But after an hour of lecturing, she would sit down, light up a cigarette, and enthusiastically engage in a "free for all," answering all the questions that would inevitably arise from the lecture.

It is no less difficult to speak of Hannah Arendt as a thinker. For what she had to say and the way she said it was always new and unexpected. She was extraordinarily versatile; she often combined in a single work literary criticism, biography, history, philosophy, and political philosophy. Although her work was highly theoretical, her model of explanation was actually the story. It is the story which most reveals the meaning of our experiences which "would otherwise remain an unbearable sequence of sheer happenings. "In the story, the past is presented in such a way that "the network of individual acts if transformed into an event, a

significant whole," which "establishes its meaning" as a process of recognition very much akin to tragedy. This representation of the past through the story not only allows us to understand it, but also to reconcile ourselves to it, however disturbing it may have been. Through this "consent and reconciliation with things as they really are" we may overcome our aversion to reality, our temptation to withdraw from it, so that we may be willing to act once again.

Another way to describe Hannah Arendt's special style is to recall her characterization of Walter Benjamin's way of writing. She said he possessed the "gift of thinking poetically." That Hannah Arendt also possessed this gift is clear from her very description of this kind of thinking which she develops at the close of her essay on Benjamin with images taken from Shakespeare's *Tempest*.

This thinking, fed by the present, works with the "thought fragments" it can wrest from the past and gather about itself. Like a pearl diver who descends to the bottom of the sea, not to excavate the bottom and bring it to light but to pry loose the rich and the strange, the pearls and the coral in the depths and to carry them to the surface, this thinking delves into the depths of the past—but not in order to resuscitate it the way it was and to contribute to the renewal of extinct ages. What guides this thinking is the conviction that although the living is subject to the ruin of time, the process of decay is at the same time a process of crystallization, that in the depth of the sea, into which sinks and is dissolved what once was alive, some things "suffer a sea-change" and survive in new crystallized forms and shapes that remain immune to the elements, as though they waited only for the pearl diver who one day will come down to them and bring them up into the world of the living—as "thought fragments," as something "rich and strange," and perhaps even as everlasting *Urphänomene*.

Hannah Arendt's work is distinguished not only by her unique style, but also by the range of subjects with which she dealt. Her writings may be divided into four categories. First there are her topical essays, reflections on current or past events, or on the personalities who in some way helped to illuminate them. Then there are her critical investigations, exercises, or "thought experiments" as she liked to call them. Here she tries to clarify such key concepts as power and violence, tradition and authority, culture and education, freedom and judgment. In a third category are her two major works which analyze what she believed are the most important new political phenomena of the modern age, totalitarianism and revolution. Lastly, in *The Human Condition*, her most theoretical work, she attempts to explain the ultimate significance of the political realm in relation to the

whole of the *vita activa*, man's practical activities. We shall now briefly point out some of the principal themes that are developed in her three most important and well known books, *Origins of Totalitarianism*, *On Revolution*, and *The Human Condition*.

According to Hannah Arendt, totalitarianism is an altogether new form of rule. This does not mean, however, that there are no similarities between totalitarianism and other forms of tyranny, or that totalitarianism springs up *ex nihilo*, without any prior historical antecedents. On the contrary, as the title itself suggests, the seeds of totalitarianism are already sown in certain earlier experiences. Arendt singles out two: the rise and development of 19th century anti-semiticism which culminated in the Dreyfuss Affair, and the imperialism of the latter part of the 19th century, which revealed the weaknesses of the modern nation state principle. Yet despite these antecedents, and the obvious fact that tyrannies have always existed in the past, she believes that totalitarianism is a unique political phenomenon.

Both its principle and means of rule are new: its principle is the belief that everything is possible, that an entirely new kind of reality can be established if only one has sufficient power. Thus it seeks total control through a new form of party organization and a new concept of leadership whose chief means of control are terror and ideology. Together they destroy common sense and the traditions which stabilized and guaranteed it. By common sense, Arendt means both our perception that the world is contingent, i.e. that the unexpected can always occur, as well as our sense that there is a reasonable relation between cause and effect, means and ends. Totalitarianism destroys these common guideposts both because it seeks to create a world which is ideologically consistent, and because it uses means which are incomprehensible in terms of any recognized ends or goals. What can explain the cruelty and killing in the German concentration camps, the slaughter of party members in the purges, or the systematic liquidation of innocents in the Russian labor camps? This is precisely what rule by terror means: the systematic elimination of innocents after all real enemies have already been removed. Indeed, the entire population becomes superfluous: one is either a possible suspect of crimes never committed, or a possible informer willing to admit to what never happened. Through these methods, reality becomes whatever the party or leader decides is necessary, and an entirely fictitious world is established.

This whole process, Arendt argues, occurs in three stages: first, the individual is deprived of all political rights; then the moral person is destroyed, for "the alternative is no longer between good and evil but between murder and murder. Who could solve the moral dilemma of the Greek mother, who was allowed by the Nazis to choose which of her three children should be killed?" Finally, through sheer physical suffering and complete anonymity, the very

uniqueness and spontaneity of the person is destroyed. Thus we are in the midst of radical evil: "we can neither punish nor forgive," for what is done is no longer comprehensible in terms of any known motives. The totalitarian leaders, Arendt concludes, are "beyond the pale even of solidarity in human sinfulness."

In *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Hannah Arendt tries to understand what she says ultimately defies understanding: the demonic wish to make men superfluous. In *On Revolution*, she analyzes the modern age's attempt to establish not control, but freedom. Revolutions are those great eruptions where politics aims directly at achieving the wholesale overcoming of both social and political oppression, and the permanent founding of free institutions. By freedom, Arendt means not only the protection of the individual against social and political abuse, but the establishment of a republic where citizens can act together in public.

Except for the American revolution, these attempts to lay the foundations for freedom have failed and even in the case of the American, the success was never complete. *On Revolution* examines the reasons for these failures as well as the reasons for America's relative success. The European revolutions failed, Arendt argues, because their leaders did not understand the true nature of freedom. They confused social well-being with public happiness and, thus, sacrificed political freedom to the seemingly more urgent and humane goal of providing economic security. Second, they misunderstood the relation between freedom and authority. The problem of authority arises most forcefully at the foundation of a new state, for it is here that men are directly confronted with the question of how to establish binding laws without any prior recognized principle of legitimacy. In the face of this dilemma, the great temptation is to legitimate new laws either by an appeal to some transcendent source, such as natural or divine law, or to some other outside source, such as History. Yet, Arendt argues, these attempts are doomed to fail. By contrast, the American revolution succeeded largely because the principle of authority was grounded in the political realm itself. It rested on the conviction that men could govern their affairs themselves, an opinion that slowly developed and took shape through the colonial experiences of self rule, resting on mutual promise and consent. Thus, for the Americans, the constitution, which embodied this conviction and symbolized the founding experience itself, became the true principle of authority.

Finally, the European revolutions failed because they did not properly understand the relation between freedom and power. Only the Americans saw this and, thus, successfully distributed power so as to preserve freedom. Still, the American achievement was not complete because the Founders failed to provide sufficient means for encouraging freedom in the sense of active public participation. What this entire analysis rests on, then, is Hannah

Arendt's special understanding of freedom, its public political character, the fact that it emerges only through the mutual dependence upon men who share a concern for the public realm and a joy in appearing in public for its own sake.

This capacity to act together with others is *the* persistent theme in all of Hannah Arendt's works. But it is only in *The Human Condition* that the theoretical basis for this view is supplied. *The Human Condition* is a defense of politics and an analysis, indeed, a celebration of action, which, according to Arendt, is actually the real content of politics. In order to see this, both politics and action must be grasped in their own right. They cannot be understood either by assimilating them to standards and categories which transcend the political, or by reducing them to those which are pre-political, to the domain of what Arendt calls labor and work.

Action, then, is the unique human capacity to initiate, to start something entirely new in direct company with others in order to take care of the common world. The products of action are speeches and deeds which when completed become events whose meaning is revealed only retrospectively, when they can be told in the form of a story or historical narrative. The chief criterion of action is greatness, its innermost aim, immortality. But action is not simply heroic deeds. What might be called the other side of action is its inherent precariousness and unpredictability. Because action always depends on others who themselves are capable of acting, its outcome can never be known in advance. Hence it requires courage, the willingness to accept responsibility for consequences never intended, and judgment, the capacity to take into account as many perspectives of those involved as possible, faculty which is neither logical deduction, nor calculation in terms of the means-end relation.

There is obviously much more that can be said about Hannah Arendt's work, its richness, its complexity, its elusiveness. But this is not the place for such a discussion. Instead, let us close by noting that Hannah Arendt's attitude toward death was complex (as is only right). She was contemptuous of death. It is not mere life, but the world and man's deeds which are important. And she was even, perhaps, a bit reckless in the face of death. After her first heart attack, and her remarkable recovery, she refused to slow down. She still had her work to complete. That was more important. She was also serene before the thought of death. She ended her essay on Pope John quoting approvingly his maxim: "Every day is a good day to be born, every day is a good day to die." And finally, she was in awe of death. In her memorial tribute to W. H. Auden she said quite simply that it is not vouchsafed to man to know when he will die.

Our attitude, on the other hand, is much simpler, at least when we think of the death of Hannah Arendt herself. Here we can only

register a sense of loss. For she was a rare and wonderful woman and we shall miss her, her warmth and generosity, her liveliness and wit, her delightful storytelling, and her incomparable ability to constantly illuminate what she chose to call, after Brecht, our dark times.

Jean Yarbrough
University of Connecticut, Groton

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New School for Social Research

Louis Nemzer

On May 27, 1976 Louis Nemzer died, unexpectedly, at age 62. Nemzer had been a member of the Political Science Department of the Ohio State University for 28 years; and his career was distinguished by his dedication to two of the enduring values of the academic order: excellence in teaching and faculty responsibility for the governance of the university.

Nemzer accomplished his Bachelor's and Master's degrees at the University of California at Los Angeles; his Ph.D. at the University of Chicago in 1947. His fields of scholarship were International Relations and Soviet politics; and he enhanced his competence in the Soviet field as holder of a number of fellowships, including Fellow of the Social Science Research Council; Fellow at the Harvard Russian Research Center; Interuniversity Travelling Fellow for study in the Soviet Union.

During the years of the Second World War, Nemzer filled a number of research and administrative positions in the Federal Government: the War Communications Research Section of the Library of Congress; the War Policies Division of the Department of Justice; and in 1947 he became Branch Chief of the Office for Research and Intelligence of the Department of State.

Nemzer joined the Ohio State University in 1948; and almost immediately attempted to implement his conviction that politics is best approached through cultural understanding. He helped organize the University's first attempt at an interdisciplinary curriculum in the social sciences, and for many years served as administrative head and teaching mainstay of what later became the University's International Studies Program. In 1967 he received one of the University's ultimate accolades for excellence in teaching: The Good Teaching Prize of the College of Arts and Sciences.

Over and beyond his concern for good teaching, Nemzer believed strongly that the good of the academic order is dependent upon faculty involvement in university governance. He served as president of the local chapter of the American Association of University Professors, and was twice elected to serve as a member of the University Senate. He was Ohio State's delegate to the all-Ohio Faculty Senate. And during the troubled Spring of 1970, he was a member of numerous committees seeking to bring peace to