

theorisings; for Mr. Read seems to argue there that soon we shall be able to gather in beet and cut our hay by pressing electric buttons. Mr. Bloomfield is afraid that the despairs and misgivings of artists and poets will play into the hands of the tyrant, the slave-driver and the Philistine. Doubtless, but how much more their partial and selfish attitudes—e.g., ‘Poets and artists produce things of a spiritual order unlike craftsmen who do it for use.’ Even Salvador Dalí telling U.S. factory audiences about surrealism makes better sense than this. (Incidentally the name is Bedaux not Bedeaux.)

There is some good sense of course: ‘Industrial labour is too much for Others, not enough for Self.’ But there is no analysis. One can scarcely share the author’s faith that ‘it is not hindering the course of social justice to commit these thoughts to paper.’

J. DURKAN.

SCIENCE AND ETHICS. (An Essay). By C. H. Waddington, Sc.D. (together with discussion). (Allen and Unwin; 7s. 6d.)

This book is an amplification of the discussion following the publication of an essay by Dr. Waddington in *Nature*. Dr. Waddington claims that the future ‘development’ of ethics lies within the sphere of science, and that ethical judgements are of the same kind as scientific statements. The questions he set himself, and his answers, are conveniently summarised by Professor Bernal:—

“Why do we feel in ourselves that anything is good?” and “Is there a Good outside and independent of what we feel?” These questions he answers by equating the feeling of goodness to satisfaction of the demands of the Super-Ego, and defining objective Good as the direction of Evolution.’

The main thesis is founded on a mixture of the doctrine of evolution with psychological theories of a decidedly Freudian character, which is happily made up with the help of Dr. Karin Stephen—who manages to effect an agreement not only with the author, but also with Professor Bernal and the Bishop of Birmingham.

Among these pages, full of bewildering statements, there stand out several good points made by Professor Joad, Professor Dingle, the Dean of St. Paul’s, and others, but these are dealt with in a way which illustrates the main feature of the discussion—i.e., a complete inability to recognise the fundamentals of the problem.

In one place (p. 140) the author confesses he is ‘unable to offer a satisfactory reconciliation of materialistic determinism and the efficacy of the human will.’ He does suggest a solution, which in fact reduces man to a complicated robot, for whom the validity (or otherwise) of ethics would be irrelevant.

At first sight it would appear unfortunate that no Catholic voice was heard in a discussion where the moral law in its fulness was obviously unknown. A separate volume would, however, be required to deal with the many ramifications of the discussion.

A.H.W.