scholars who are notable exponents of this approach (Eichrodt, von Rad and Childs), despite their weaknesses, are on the right road. In Chapter 6 Watson attacks Moltmann's view of creation as foundation in favour of a view of creation as beginning: the beginning of the story, with Jesus as the middle and end. He then turns on James Barr's case, in his Edinburgh Gifford Lectures, for saying that the Bible contains natural theology. Watson argues that neither Psalm 104 (103), the Areopagus speech in Acts 17, nor Paul's argument in Romans 1 about the universal knowledge of God is properly described as natural theology. Knowledge of God's power and deity can never be brought back to life without reference to Jesus. In Chapter 7 Watson argues that humanity's being in the likeness of God means, when we read the Bible as a whole, that everyone is like God because they are like Jesus (291). Some human beings can directly participate in Jesus' God-likeness in the Christian community (291–2). The Genesis texts are prophetic of Jesus. In Chapter 8 Watson shows how Justin Martyr in his Dialogue with Trypho the Jew defends his incarnational theology on the basis of Jewish scripture: Justin's "radical reinterpretation ... creates a fundamental rift *within* that [Jewish] heritage" (324).

Watson is reviving Barth's view of biblical theology, although he does not endorse everything Barth does with the Bible (247; 303 note 23). Like Barth, Watson sees Christian Biblical Theology as engaged in a power struggle against aggressive (106), high-handed (140), rigidly doctrinaire (209) subverters of the integrity of holy scripture as a whole (287). He attacks Bultmann for "interpreting the Christ-event as the radical divine challenge to human self-assertion, while practising precisely such self assertion in [his] arbitrary and high-handed treatment of the texts which provide our primary access to this event" (169). The difficulty is that, unless we can reason about what is right and good and true without necessarily referring to Jesus, we are hard put to it to distinguish one claim to power from another.

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Short Notices

THEORIES OF COGNITION IN THE LATER MIDDLE AGES by Robert Pasnau , *Cambridge University Press* , **1997, Pp. 330, £38.50.**

Highly recommended on the wrapper by Scott McDonald, supervised in its original form by the late Norman Kretzmann, this fine book attests Cornell University's hospitable environment for medievalists who are also analytically trained philosophers. Primarily, the book

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unravels complicated arguments from about 1250 to 1350 over issues in philosophical psychology: in particular, bringing the positions of Peter John Olivi (c. 1248–98) and William Ockham (c.1285–1347) to bear on the Aristotelianism of Thomas Aquinas (who died in 1274). Etienne Gilson, from the 1920s onwards, taught one generation after another to believe that one way of combating the modern assumption that what we know directly are the data provided by our senses or some other representation in our heads of things out there, is to return to the premodern philosophy of Aquinas. He asks, for example, whether what we know are things themselves or our representations of them, and comes down firmly in favour of the former (e.g. *Summa Theologiae* 1a., 85. 2). With his Aristotelian thesis that, in thinking, our minds take on the form of the external object of our thought, Aquinas has no gap between the world out there and the world as pictured in our heads. Robert Pasnau's research undermines this story. He shows convincingly that, in his early writings, Aquinas's account of acts of knowing focuses on a relationship to some object internal to the mind (pp. 200–208). While allowing us space to argue for development, Pasnau himself maintains that, even in his mature theory, though 'subtle and interesting', Aquinas 'shares the presupposition, characteristic of seventeenth century philosophy, that the immediate and direct objects of cognitive apprehension are our internal impressions' (p. 293). Pasnau hopes, indeed, that this book will put an end to the story propagated by Richard Rorty as well as Gilson. In an appendix on 'the identity of knower and known', he contends that the significance of the thesis is 'neither as striking nor as mysterious as Aquinas's students often claim' (pp. 295–305). For once, then, a book that should engage analytical philosophers as well as medievalists, not to mention Thomists of whatever persuasion: a good deal of detailed discussion of texts would be required to refute Pasnau and save Aquinas's mature theory of knowledge from incipient 'Cartesianism'. Funnily enough, Olivi and Ockham turn out to be the ones who reject any account of thought that postulates mythical inner representations that mediate between our cognitive acts and the objects of these acts in the external world.

SANCTIFY THEM IN THE TRUTH: HOLINESS EXEMPLIFIED by Stanley Hauerwas *T&T Clark* **Edinburgh, 1998, Pp. 267, £14.95 pb.**

Stanley Hauerwas teaches theological ethics at Duke University, North Carolina, and is to give the Gifford Lectures in the year 2000–2001 at the University of St Andrews. This substantial collection of essays appears in the 'series of short

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