have attempted to convey in terms of human nuptials, with even a ring, that glorious knowledge of God which overwhelmed her? or is there not some truth in the consideration that though humans can and must become aware of the Divine through the idiom of their own faculties, their own potentially holy instincts and energies, yet to attempt to express that awareness of means by sexual imagery is too often to obscure what is symbolized by the very power of the symbol to evoke its normal legitimate associations? Is it again only an aesthetic queasiness, or is it a wholesome dread of a pathological state of mind, that is sickened by a constant preoccupation with 'drowning in Blood'? Whether or no these considerations are matters of personal and temporal feeling, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion that the radiant sanctity which shone through St Catherine of Siena, drawing the careless, the sensual, and even the proud towards God, healing the plague-stricken, comforting the lepers, inspiring those condemned to death, did not imbue all her political utterances. It looks as if holiness had consumed her personal self, her will, all that she had individually and consciously to give; but had stopped short at that part of her being rooted in collective life. How else can it be explained that a woman invaded, possessed, transformed by God could speak in the same voice of 'Love and the sweet primal Truth' and of 'infidel dogs', urging Christians to fight against them in a Crusade making the name of Christ hateful and hideous to the whole Arab world? Time, place and circumstance do not account for this; St Francis, of the same culture and background, wished to convert, not to conquer the Saracens. Nor does sex; St Teresa was 'all for the Moors and martyrdom'—but of herself, not them. This is not to question the blessedness of St Catherine; it is to plead that the next student of her extraordinary life should face and discuss openly the problems it presents and the difficulties it involves. She should emerge from such treatment as a much more attractive and comprehensible figure.

RENÉE HAYNES

DILEMMAS. By Gilbert Ryle. (Cambridge University Press; 10s. 6d.)

Professor Ryle in his Tarner lectures exhibits admirably that important characteristic of philosophers, an especial sensitiveness to the uneasiness we sometimes feel about accepting an apparently irrefutable argument. While scientists (and theologians too) can sometimes ride roughshod over our poor prejudices, the philosopher must always respect them; and often when some new and paradoxical discovery divides the world into rational revolutionaries and prejudiced reactionaries it is his unpopular task to show its opponents that it is not so false and its adherents that it is not so interesting as they think.

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When in some field of research we come to a conclusion which seems to conflict either with some truism of common speech or with the conclusions of some other science we are in what Professor Ryle here calls a dilemma. No amount of evidence for one of the positions will make us happy about relinquishing the other. It is then the philosopher's task to try to reconcile the disagreement by showing that what we have is not two different answers to the same question, but answers to two different questions. If the dilemma is a real and troubling one we shall not be in a position simply to say that one answer belongs to one subject and the other to another, for until we have examined a number of particular dilemmas we shall not know the boundaries of the two subjects. Until we have dissolved particular conflicts between Science and Theology we shall not be able to say which of them has jurisdiction over a given type of question. 'In the country of concepts only a series of successful and unsuccessful prosecutions for trespass suffices to determine the boundaries and rights of way.' A genuine dilemma will be set in terms that have an unfamiliar logical behaviour; it is by the elucidation of this behaviour that we shall reconcile the conflicting views.

Professor Ryle begins by illustrating the type of muddle that lies behind dilemmas from a discussion of two classical examples. The first of these is the puzzle that worried Aristotle about predictions: if it was true yesterday that I was to do this today then my doing of it today cannot be a contingent event, it must be already determined and I am not free to avoid it. His answer is the familiar Thomist one that one cannot speak of yesterday's prediction as being true or false yesterday, but only as coming true or failing to come true today. To say that a prediction of an event E has come true is to say both that E was predicted and that E has occurred, and since before the occurrence of E we cannot say that E has occurred (even if we know infallibly that it will occur) we cannot yet say that the prediction of E has come true. God cannot make predictions, but if he did even his predictions could not be said to have come true until the predicted event occurred. In this respect predictions resemble desires, promises and hopes, but we are apt to overlook this and to treat all indicative sentences in the future tense as capable of making true or false statements in the same way as do those in the present or past tense. In ordinary speech we do not blunder in this way. We can handle particular instances of the future tense as easily as the past or present, and it is only when we begin to theorize about the statement-making character of sentences in general that we are liable to such confusions. We know how to make predictions, promises, guesses and bets about what will happen next week, but we are not always sure how to talk about what we are doing; in the same way (and this is the moral that the author draws) we all know

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how to use words like 'feel', 'hear', 'perceive', 'enjoy' and 'dislike', but we are exceedingly likely to be confused about the proper logic of the second-order abstract words like 'perception', 'pleasure' and 'pain'.

Professor Ryle's second classical dilemma is that of Achilles and the tortoise. This he handles with quite exceptional lucidity, and once more the moral to be drawn is that the dilemma 'does not occur while we are thinking at ground-floor level of such things as Achilles' paces, the dusty furlongs of the track and the tortoise's inferior speed. It occurs when we reach the first-floor level of thinking on which we try to work out if and when Achilles will catch the tortoise by procedures of calculation which are of quite general application. . . . We talk about the race in one tone of voice, we talk arithmetic in another tone of voice; but in talking the arithmetic of the race we have to mix our tones of voice and in doing this we may easily feel—and even speak as if—we were talking out of different sides of our mouth at the same time' (pp. 50 & 52).

The first of the 'issues which are more than riddles, issues namely which interest us because they worry us' which is dealt with concerns pleasure. Here we have a dilemma because the common-sense truth that some people are self-sacrificing seems to be denied by the psychologist's conclusion that whatever we do is in some way pleasing to us. It looks as though 'the altruist differs from the selfish man only in the fact that the altruist's self-indulgences happen to be of sorts which increase the pleasure of others'. The criticism of this takes the form of a rather extended re-statement of part of Chapter 4 of *The Concept of Mind*. It is made convincingly clear that pleasure cannot be regarded as the opposite pole of pain, that it is not a sensation or a feeling, that 'in the way in which a sensation or feeling is a predecessor, a concomitant or a successor of other happenings, enjoyment is not a predecessor, concomitant or successor of anything', and that it is not a process of any kind. Turning from the attack on the para-mechanical theory of motivation, Professor Ryle then attacks what he calls the 'political' theory—the picture of man as maintaining an uncertain control over his turbulent passions. This he criticizes mainly in order to show that pleasure cannot be regarded as one of these passions. 'The concept of enjoyment refuses to go through the same logical hoops as fury, despair, panic or glee.' In general, he makes it clear that pleasure or enjoyment cannot be a cause or an effect of human actions in the sense that, for example, pain is a cause of grimaces and winces or an effect of scalding. The positive account of pleasure which begins, but only begins, to emerge seems to resemble the traditional Aristotelian account of *beatitudo*.

The treatment of perception is in many respects parallel to that of

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pleasure. The same sorts of mistake are criticized; he points out, with Aristotle, that seeing and hearing are not processes, and he makes use of the important distinction made in *The Concept of Mind* between Task-verbs and Achievement-verbs. Thomists will recognize in this some similarity to their distinction between transient and immanent action.

In Chapters V and VI the author takes rather a long time to explain that the world of common sense and the world of the physicist differ as formal objects of knowledge and not as material objects. It is our tendency to hypostatize these formal objects which leads us to imagine an incompatibility between the two 'worlds' and to the belief that only one of them is 'genuine'. The most interesting thing here is the reference to a sense of 'logical presupposition' which is quite distinct from either material implication or deducibility. The reader's account of the books in a library (in terms of literary criticism or of arguments) cannot imply or be deduced from the accountant's description in terms of prices, but the fact that there can be an accountant's description does presuppose that there can be a reader's description. What has a price cannot be simply a vehicle of a price. Professor Ryle does not, and I shall not, enter into a discussion of this kind of presupposing, but it is worth noting its close relation to the sort of presupposing with which, as Mr Strawson and others have pointed out, a statement simply as being a statement at all presupposes the existence of what is referred to by its subject.

One of the few criticisms I would make of this excellent book concerns Professor Ryle's interpretation of the Categories. I do not think that Aristotle can have been so silly as to believe that there were only ten kinds of terms (in Greek) that could be used for speaking about an individual thing. An alternative traditional interpretation which Professor Ryle ignores is that, roughly, Aristotle was interested in the different ways in which we can make statements (the irreducibly different way in which we use the words 'statement', 'true', 'is the case', etc.) and not in the innumerable ways in which we can construct indicative sentences. The latter depends on the vocabulary and grammar of a particular language; the former, in Aristotle's opinion, does not. But all this is quite incidental to the author's main theme.

We do not get from Professor Ryle in this work any startling novelties (most of his views have a history that goes back to Aristotle), nor any very great profundity, but perhaps the most important thing we do get is a valuable lesson in how to write philosophy in English. For this reason, if for no other, it is to be hoped that the book will have a large sale amongst Thomists and neo-scholastics.

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