

account of the believer's relationship to their new personal history in Christ, rather than from more traditional questions of grace's mode of operation.

John Bowlin and Holly Taylor Coolman examine moral theology, under the rubric of 'election, providence and natural law'. Bowlin highlights a shared commitment to a social theory of obligation, noting that whilst Barth's hyper-Augustinianism is formally (if not materially) indebted to Hegel, Aquinas does not begin with post-Kantian actualism. Coolman's adroit exposition of Aquinas's rich concept of law (particularly the status of human action as created participation) indicates the presence of an *analogia legis* in the *Summa's* treatise on law: that law has Christology as its foundation and *telos* is undoubtedly a point of convergence with Barth.

Throughout, Barth and Aquinas are presented not primarily as primogenitors of theological trajectories with a shared vector away from Liberalism (*pace* Reginald Cant), but as theologians offering distinctive doxological grammars. The authors' ability to identify fertile points of connection—without yielding to a Procrustean consensus—attests to the value of shared dogmatic reflection as a means of moving beyond the illusory comforts of inherited caricatures.

Material dogmatic convergence, however, may conceal a formal disagreement regarding the 'shape' of theology and the prominence given to particular articles of doctrine (for example the extent to which election can serve as the governing theological principle *par excellence*): by isolating individual doctrines with an almost surgical precision, the relation of particular 'theological organs' to the 'body theological' is potentially overlooked. Indeed, it is clear that such differences in theological form are a function of a more properly basic disagreement regarding matters of fundamental ontology and the metaphysics of knowing: this, indeed, was the subject of an earlier work by the editors, exploring the *analogia entis*. Nonetheless, that this qualification clearly emerges from the text attests to the honesty of its exploration of fertile lines of dialogue without elision into the chimera of a *tertium quid*.

Perhaps most edifying, however, is the book's overall tone and style: the volume is an exemplary instance of the shared theological reflection that ought to characterise ecumenical relations. Benefiting from its status as a dialogue of individual theologians rather than ecclesial communities (alluded to by the presence of 'unofficial' in the subtitle), the contributors are freed to exchange suggestions and offer non-binding—even provocative—interpretations. As a fraternal quest for the truth, the simplistic binary application of 'Catholic' and 'Reformed' is robustly avoided, seeking instead to elucidate the inner logic of each thinker on their own terms. This, as McCormack notes in the afterword, is ultimately grounded by a shared communion in the truth, thereby witnessing to the theological vocation as an exercise of the glorious freedom of the children of God.

OLIVER JAMES KEENAN OP

IN DEFENCE OF WAR by Nigel Biggar, *Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013*, pp. xii + 316, £25.00, hbk

Any work which sets out not only to defend the just war tradition, but to argue for the justice of particular historical conflicts is bound to court controversy. When the particular conflicts defended include 'the British prosecution of the First World War in 1914–18' and 'the American-led Coalition's invasion of Iraq in 2003' (p. 331) then the task would for many critics of just war seem somewhat ludicrous. So it is to the credit of Professor Nigel Biggar that he not only

provides robust arguments for his position, but in doing so provides a lesson in moral theological engagement with concrete cases. Biggar argues that the moral theologian should not rest in the realm of abstract principles, but should be engaged in helping decision-makers reach concrete conclusion (p. 333). The book can thus be understood as appealing not only to specialist theologians, but to all who have an interest in war (which is arguably all of us). His own interest is not hidden, and in the introduction he admits his life-long fascination with war, a passion which he puts to work in using the wide and varied sources from which he draws across several disciplines.

The book is not a manual setting out classical just war theory and seeking to defend it in a number of theses. Rather, it assumes some familiarity with the main tenets of just war theory. Neither is it a work which sets out systematically to explore just war theory; which is not to say that important conclusions are not developed in the course of Biggar's defence. Some of the materials used in the book come from previous publications, so we should not expect the unity of a systematic work, nevertheless Biggar has arranged the materials in an order which brings a progression through the two halves of the book.

The first half is concerned with defending just war against critics within the Christian tradition. Here Biggar faces the challenge of explaining how war can be the expression of Christian love. In response to this he lays out his own position as an expression of Augustinian Christian Realism, arguing that it is wishful thinking to imagine that war will somehow go away if our response to injustice is pacifism. He engages with some of the leading proponents of Christian pacifism, taking on their readings of scripture and questioning their understanding of justice, love and forgiveness. Next he looks at some of the key principles of just war tradition, the principles of double effect and proportion, concluding this first half of the book with a concrete examination of how to apply the principle of proportion to the First World War.

The second half of the work begins at chapter five and Biggar's defence of just war against the arguments developed by David Rodin. Here Biggar moves from engagement with criticism from within the Christian tradition to criticism from a modern liberal thinker in the analytical tradition. This shift enables Biggar to engage with the themes of legality and morality, and the relationship between them. Here he defends natural law against legal positivism, arguing that nations have prior moral responsibilities which entail they can under certain circumstances justly engage in armed conflict without the backing of international law. Concrete application is given in this case by an analysis of the morality and legality of NATO's intervention in 1999 in Kosovo. Here again Biggar combines careful analysis of a particular conflict with his wider theory of the relationship between morality and law, set in the context of his Augustinian Realist theology.

The final chapter is potentially the most controversial, defending the justice of the 2003 Iraq war. Biggar is aware of this and as such uses it to show how the various elements developed throughout the book can be brought together to provide a robust defence of war. Thus he seeks to produce a defence against the strongest case his opponents might throw at him, in order to counter the accusation that his work avoids discussing hard cases, and thus cannot be taken seriously as a defence of just war.

From the above outline it is clear that Biggar had engaged upon an ambitious project, which threatens to win him few friends, but many detractors. As a project some may view it as somewhat over ambitious, but I am inclined to agree with his assessment of the responsibilities of the moral theologian to engage with concrete cases, even if this risks overstepping competencies. When engaging with such a range of fields (history, legal theory, military strategy etc.) there is always the danger that the real experts will dismiss the claims of the theologian. But there is also room for dialogue and mutual enrichment, which is of immense value when

academics leave the class room and come face to face with realities which cannot be neatly divided into a modern curriculum.

The work contains some specific weaknesses, such as Biggar's analysis of intention and double effect. Here the influence of New Natural Law theory leads Biggar to argue that intending to take life is always wrong (directly acting against one of the basic goods), and thus those who are on the side of justice and kill in war cannot be intending to do so. Since most killings in war are not accidental Biggar has to find a way to explain how non-accidental killings are not intentional. This entails performing gymnastics with the notion of intention, to argue that a soldier who deliberately kills an enemy does not intend to do so if the soldier does not want to kill the enemy (e.g. if another means of removing the enemy from the battle were possible). A more general question the book raises is in regard to its underlying theological commitments. We have noted that Biggar engages an Augustinian Realist perspective, but what form of Augustinian does he support? His Protestantism (p. 241) makes him suspicious of claims to the establishment (past, present or future) of international human consensus and harmony. Yet the just war theory which he seeks to defend is itself the product of international consensus, and it is difficult to see how it could have gained much ground without the promotion of international organisations (both ecclesial and secular). Yet despite these question marks, Biggar has written a very good defence of just war, and shown other theologians how to engage with difficult moral questions in concrete cases.

DAVID GOODILL OP

RELATING GOD AND THE SELF: DYNAMIC INTERPLAY by Jan-Olav Henriksen, *Ashgate*, Farnham Surrey and Burlington VT, 2013, pp. 205, £54.00, hbk

Shortly after the first draft of Jan-Olav Henriksen's book was completed, Anders Behring Breivik bombed government buildings in Oslo killing eight people, and went on to murder a further sixty-nine, mainly youngsters, at a Labour Party Youth camp outside the city. Breivik 'appeared to lack any kind of empathy for his victims . . . [seeing] himself on a crusade against what he called the "Islamization" of Norway, convinced that he was on a mission from God' (p. 1). In texts distributed on the tragic day, Breivik also rails against Marxism, multi-culturalism, and feminism. Reflecting on this event, Henriksen, Professor of Systematic Theology and Philosophy of Religion in the Norwegian School of Theology (Oslo), subsequently asks, 'What can cause a man to use religious imagery in this way, when he engages in atrocities so contrary to Christian practice and doctrine? . . . (W)hat kind of *self* is it that . . . separate(s) other humans from its own in the world in such a way that a man can slaughter his own countrymen without empathy? How can religious imagery and religion . . . provide people with the means . . . to split the world into two in such a way that all evil is placed with "the others"' (p. 1).

Important though these precise questions are, as its title suggests *Relating God and the Self* is not solely a book about religious violence, its links with fundamentalism, or the misuse of religious rhetoric to justify patently evil deeds. It has clear and obvious application in these areas, for sure, but its philosophical scope is broader. Its wider aims are to investigate the 'dynamic interplay' of self and God images, 'to explore how notions or symbols of God make a difference with regards to the experience of self' (p. 7), and how such experiences interact with