

union from childbearing, and seeks to establish for it an independent meaning by arguments which render sexual union, precisely as such, irrelevant. The attempt to attain in terms of spiritual experience a new form of transcendent sexuality is a mark of the new Albigenianism as it was of the old, and it is a further point of significance to note how many of the traits of Albigenianism are being resumed under the aegis of existential philosophy. Of this nature is Berdyaev's dualism, expressed in terms rendered almost inevitable by the problems of the existential philosophy itself.

The philosophical presupposition of unity, of hierarchy, of system and order he denounces as an enslaving presumption of the mind. Of the merely systematizing trend in philosophy his denunciation may be just. But even philosophy has a deeper source of unity in the spirit of wisdom in which all things are kin. Berdyaev's dualism is ultimately a rejection of this spirit.

BERNARD KELLY.

LIBERTY VERSUS EQUALITY. By Muriel Jaeger. (Nelson; 3s.)

We are witnessing in the world to-day a practical demonstration that the principles of the French Revolution are somehow incompatible. The Liberty of the Revolution was that of J. S. Mill, freedom to do what you like provided only it did not harm anyone else. Equality was just as negative an ideal. However much it was a protest against the snobbishness and degradation of the order it had supplanted, in spirit it was a collective envy, a resentment against superiority.

One of the chapters of this book which is full of interesting detail shows the Russian attempt to solve the difficulty by saving Equality at the expense of Liberty. Contrasted with this is the attempt of the New Zealand Labour Government of 1936, since this experiment was made on the old British lines of individual enterprise with democracy and all the civil liberties—a moderate reduction of Liberty for a somewhat closer approximation to Equality.

Liberty and Equality are only incompatible ideals when these terms are defined inadequately. Mill's definition of Liberty is simply a definition of Liberty of choice to the exclusion of Liberty of Spontaneity, whereas this first kind of liberty is only given to enable us to achieve the second. Civil Liberty is but a poor thing if it is merely Liberty of choice. Similarly, an arithmetical idea of Equality must give way to an Equality of proportion, which is the Equality achieved by distributive justice. In a footnote, the author remarks that a discussion on freedom would involve metaphysical implications outside the range of her book. But as long as metaphysics remain outside the range of any book on Liberty, there will be confusion worse confounded.

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