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Turnover and “Family Circles” in Soviet Administration

Students of the Soviet political system have frequently noted the high turnover rates and the short terms of office of middle and lower ranking Soviet party and governmental officials. Soviet leaders have striven to combat the formation of informal structures within the party and governmental bureaucracies which, if allowed to go unchecked, could erode the control of the central political leadership. This, in turn, has important implications for our understanding of the formulation and execution of policy in the Soviet system. Although there is widespread agreement that the turnover rates are high and the terms of office short and that this has an impact on informal structures, there is a surprising amount of disagreement concerning what that impact is.

Conflicting Interpretations

Perhaps the most generally accepted interpretation is that argued by Merle Fainsod. According to Fainsod, the rapid rotation of personnel has provided the central authorities not only with a means for training and screening cadres but also with the most important weapon in their struggle against “family circles.” These are the well-known mutual protection societies formed by Soviet officials and administrators in their effort to gain some measure of personal security and some degree of autonomy in their local bailiwicks. Through such groups they can conceal their shortcomings from the central authorities and gain access to scarce resources in a system characterized by a high degree of centralization, tight plans, chronic shortages of needed supplies, high rewards for success, and often severe penalties for failure.

Fainsod argued that these informal groups are endemic to the system and insofar as they enable the lower-level functionaries to distort information going to the center and to gain some latitude in the interpretation and execution of central policy, the “family circles” pose a continual real or potential threat to the control of the central leadership. For their part, the central authorities, according to Fainsod, combat these groups through public denunciations, by means of extensive indoctrination programs for officials at all levels, by a complex network of monitoring agencies, and by all the other various means familiar to students of public administration. However, Fainsod noted that the forces impelling officials and managers to enter into such arrangements are so strong that denunciations and indoctrination are not

sufficient, and all too often the local representatives of the monitoring agencies charged with combating the “family circles” are drawn into them. Therefore, the rapid rotation of personnel is an especially important weapon against these groups, which are often cemented by what Fainsod termed a kind of “local patriotism.”¹

Although he did not specify the precise relationship, Fainsod also suggested that there may be a link between the “family circles” and the other well-known informal organizational structure of the Soviet system, the patron-protégé cliques (pp. 236–37). These are associations of functionaries held together by personal loyalty to a central political figure according to whose fortunes the members of the entire group, barring timely defections, rise and fall within the Soviet hierarchy. Such cliques have been especially important in the struggle over power and policy at the highest levels of the system.

Fainsod’s interpretation of the link between turnover rates and the struggle of the central authorities against “family circles” has recently found support in David Cattell’s detailed study of local government in Leningrad. Cattell argues that the rapid rotation in office found at the middle and lower levels of the Soviet system is “planned” turnover calculated to prevent the formation of “family power groups.”² His study provides some of the best evidence to date that this “planned” turnover involves not only the local party functionaries and the chairman of the executive committee (the principal local governmental organ) but also all officers and members of the executive committee and the heads of the local governmental agencies.

Unfortunately, this line of reasoning is not without its problems. First, if there is a link between the “family circles” and the patron-protégé cliques, there is a need to specify it more precisely. Fainsod suggested that the former are being disrupted continually, whereas evidence exists that the latter are built and maintained over fairly long periods of time. What is there about the pattern of turnover that produces both consequences? Furthermore, some specialists do not accept the suggestion of such a link. Finally, although Cattell expressly argues that the turnover rates are “planned” and designed to prevent the formation of local power cliques, he also reports that one of the most important findings of his Leningrad study was the “widespread dependence on personal relations.” He says, “They are the primary means by which the mazes of organs and counterorgans achieve some unity of direction and by which disputes are settled.” He goes on to note that appeals to Moscow are “not uncommon,” but he adds that his discussion of problems of coordi-

1. Merle Fainsod returned to this topic repeatedly in *How Russia Is Ruled*, rev. ed. (Cambridge, Mass., 1963), pp. 235–37, 388–89, 213, 240, 412, 475.

2. David T. Cattell, *Leningrad: A Case Study of Soviet Urban Government* (New York, 1968), p. 156. See also p. 56.

nation with government officials made "quite clear that more reliance is placed on personal relationships not only with Moscow but within the city government than on all the coordinating committees" (p. 69). Once again, what is the pattern of turnover produced by the high "planned" rates of turnover that disrupts those personal contacts associated with "local family power groups" while leaving intact those personal relations so important to the daily operation of the system?

The question of the proper interpretation of the relation between turnover rates and informal organization only becomes further confused by the comments of Alfred Meyer.³ He characterizes the line of argument attributed here to Fainsod and Cattell as "correct," but then urges great caution. He writes:

The alleged danger of the local chiefs' acquiring too much political strength may be vastly overrated by the Western observers and by the top Party leadership. Moreover, the analysis overlooks the fact that the frequent rotation of executive personnel is a routine in many other bureaucratic structures, in which paranoid suspicion of underlings is not necessarily attributed to the top leaders. . . . In most cases it is explained less by centralist urges than by the effort to give aspirants for highest office the greatest possible variety of experience and as much chance as possible to prove their worth. It is a training and recruitment device for screening national leaders. . . . (p. 148)

In their comparative study of the American and Soviet systems, Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel Huntington present still another interpretation. They agree that the turnover rates at the middle and lower levels of the Soviet system are high; they agree that these rates are calculated to preserve the power of the central political leadership; and they admit that the central leadership frequently denounces the "family circles." However, they also suggest that the central leadership may informally tolerate the "family circles," because they facilitate better resource allocation (a point with which most specialists would agree).⁴ Brzezinski and Huntington suggest that the high turnover rates really serve to overcome two other problems, each of which is a serious potential threat to central control. First, the high rates of turnover prevent individuals from becoming so thoroughly socialized into a particular sector of the bureaucracy that they become inclined to pursue narrow sector objectives at the expense of the objectives of the central leadership. Second, turnover keeps the tenure of individual bureaucrats in particular

3. Alfred G. Meyer, *The Soviet Political System: An Interpretation* (New York, 1965), pp. 131 and 148.

4. Zbigniew Brzezinski and Samuel P. Huntington, *Political Power USA/USSR* (New York, 1963), pp. 222-23.

positions sufficiently short so that they cannot hope to frustrate the central authorities by merely outwaiting them.⁵

This interpretation also poses difficulties. First, turnover of this kind would appear to make specialization difficult. Second, this line of reasoning, if correct, raises the question what kind of turnover pattern could preserve the functional “family circles” while accomplishing the other assumed objectives. Finally, it does not find much support in the data presented by John Armstrong in his study of the career patterns of Ukrainian officials. He found, for example, that from 1939 to 1956 in the agricultural bureaucracy there existed a frequent exchange of officials both between the republic and provincial levels and between the party and governmental apparatuses.⁶ This kind of turnover pattern seems likely to give rise to the very dangers which Brzezinski and Huntington argue that the turnover rates are designed to prevent.

Armstrong’s study poses still other questions concerning the view that high turnover rates are deliberately induced to disrupt one or another kind of informal structure based on personal contacts. In his discussion of obkom (provincial party committee) first secretaries, he termed “remote” the possibility that their rapid turnover was calculated to prevent autonomous centers of power in the system (p. 52). Throughout this study he seemed to take the position that high turnover rates were important primarily because they provided an opportunity to test cadres in a variety of situations prior to promotion. All this is troublesome, because the study is based on a detailed analysis of career patterns rather than mere turnover rates. Also troublesome is his observation that holders of at least some of the offices below the rank of obkom first secretary tend to spend their careers in a single oblast (pp. 77–78).

Disagreement of this kind clearly indicates a need for more research. The various interpretations suggest rather different conclusions concerning the kinds of informal structures we should expect to find in the Soviet system, and concerning their viability and their importance in the formulation and implementation of policy. Despite the decline in turnover rates among the obkom and gorkom (city party committee) first secretaries since the fall of Khrushchev, the problem remains important.

Researching Disruptive and Nondisruptive Turnover

With the exception of Armstrong, all of these writers—including Meyer, although he does have reservations—view high turnover rates as indicating

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 173–74 and 177–80.

6. John A. Armstrong, *The Soviet Bureaucratic Elite* (New York, 1959), p. 49. See also his remarks concerning industry, pp. 50–52.

disruption of one or another kind of informal structure based on close personal relations or of the kind of socialization process associated with such structures. Such a view is, at best, questionable. Rapid turnover rates result in disruption when the persons concerned are moved from one territorial jurisdiction and/or from one functional sector of the bureaucracy to another. However, rapid turnover rates *need not* result in disruption if persons are moved from post to post within the same territorial unit—city or oblast (province)—and/or within the same functional sector of the bureaucracy. The purpose of this study is to determine which of these two patterns is more prevalent for highly urbanized areas.

The ideal way to proceed would be to examine the rates of turnover and the turnover patterns in the ten or so largest metropolitan centers and the oblasts surrounding these centers. Such a study should examine the career patterns not only of those who hold the highest party post (first secretary) and the highest governmental post (chairman of the executive committee) but also the career patterns of all the obkom and gorkom secretaries, the heads of the obkom and gorkom departments, all the executive committee officers, and the heads of all city and oblast governmental agencies. This would prevent the drawing of erroneous conclusions in the event that different turnover patterns prevailed among different categories of officials.

Unfortunately the ideal study is practically impossible. The standard biographical sources, Western and Soviet,⁷ provide information only for the first secretaries and executive committee chairmen of most oblasts and some cities. Even so, the available information is sometimes inadequate to determine whether the officials have experienced disruptive or nondisruptive turnover. The only way to gather the information needed for these cases and for the holders of the other positions is to go through the local press, page by page, over a period of fifteen or more years and piece together the required information. But even if the necessary newspapers were available outside the Soviet Union, and they are not, the time and labor required for any such undertaking make it a practical impossibility.

As the next best thing, this study will examine in detail the turnover patterns of all categories of officials serving in the metropolitan center for which the American library holdings are best. That center is Moscow. For

7. These sources would include Vladimir S. Merzalov, ed., *Biographic Directory of the USSR* (New York, 1958); Andrew Lebed, Heinrich Schulz, and Stephen Taylor, eds., *Who's Who in the USSR, 1961–1962* (New York, 1962) and *Who's Who in the USSR, 1965–1966* (New York, 1966); Edward Crowley, Andrew Lebed, and Heinrich Schulz, eds., *Prominent Personalities in USSR* (Metuchen, N.J., 1968); *Ezhgodnik Bol'shoi Sovetskoi Entsiklopedii* (Moscow, 1958–71); and *Deputaty Verkhovnogo Soveta SSSR* (Moscow), which is published every four or five years following elections to the Supreme Soviet.

that city American libraries hold both a morning and evening newspaper and the bulletin of the city executive committee,⁸ which is valuable for tracing the career patterns of governmental agency heads. Moscow is not an entirely happy choice. It is the largest city, the capital of the nation, and the capital of the largest and most important union republic, the RSFSR. Of all the major metropolitan centers, it is the one most likely to be atypical. To provide some kind of check on this possibility, I will (1) present such comparable data as has been reported in other studies concerning the length of terms served by and the turnover rates of Soviet officials, and (2) present data, gathered from the standard biographical sources, on the turnover patterns characteristic of the first secretaries and executive committee chairmen who served between 1965 and 1970 in the eleven next largest metropolitan centers, in the oblasts surrounding them, and in the Moscow Oblast. The data for the city of Moscow will cover the careers of all gorkom secretaries, gorkom department heads, executive committee officers, and governmental agency heads serving between 1950 and 1971 insofar as these can be determined from available sources.

The presentation of the Moscow data is divided into two periods: 1950 to the spring of 1953; and the spring of 1953 to the summer of 1971. The shorter period deserves special consideration because in December 1949 Nikita Khrushchev became the first secretary of the Moscow Obkom following a long tour of duty in the Ukraine. He arrived at the center as the major counterheir to Georgii Malenkov, who had become the prospective successor to the aging Stalin following the death of Malenkov's long-time rival, Andrei Zhdanov. During this period and up to the establishment of the sovnarkhoz system in 1957, the Moscow city party apparatus was a subordinate part of the oblast party apparatus. When he arrived in the Moscow Oblast, Khrushchev removed, transferred, and demoted a large number of officials who had served under his predecessor, G. M. Popov, who was at least indirectly linked to the deceased Zhdanov.⁹ Therefore, the 1950 to 1953 period was atypical, being marked by a purge, although compared with Malenkov's purge of Zhdanov supporters in Leningrad, it was quiet, gradual, and nonviolent. The years following 1953 were marked by a more routine rotation of personnel, even though in the summer of 1967 the city's first secretary and long-time Moscow apparatchik, N. G. Egorychev, suddenly fell from power and was replaced by V. V. Grishin, who had formerly headed the nation's trade unions.

8. *Moskovskaia pravda* (before 1950 it was *Moskovskii Bolshevik*) and *Vecherniaia Moskva*; and *Biulletin' ispolnitel'nogo komiteta Moskovskogo gorodskogo Soveta deputatov trudiashchikhsia*, which is published bimonthly.

9. Robert Conquest, *Power and Policy in the U.S.S.R.* (Torchbook ed.; New York, 1967), p. 100.

One should note the criteria used to classify persons as having been appointed from within the Moscow organization rather than from outside it. From 1953 to 1957 "within the Moscow organization" indicates at least five years' service in at least two posts in either the city or oblast, provided such service was not interrupted by a consecutive period of five or more years' service outside the oblast. From 1957 to 1971 the same criteria are used except that, because the city party apparatus became separate from and coequal to the oblast apparatus in 1957, all service in the oblast after 1957 is classified as "outside" service. Nearly all those classified as having been appointed from within the city far exceed the requirements imposed by these criteria, and in the earlier period nobody is classified as having been recruited from within the city solely as a result of service in the oblast. Instead, the criteria force the classification of a few persons as having been appointed from "outside" on largely technical grounds. For example, service in the central or republic apparatuses, which enables an individual to remain a resident of the city, is regarded as outside service because it takes place outside the city's own party and governmental apparatuses.

The criteria used for classification in the earlier period, 1950 to 1953, are less rigorous. Because the base year for the systematic gathering of data from the local press is 1947, the imposition of the five-year criterion is impossible. Those transferred from an immediately previous post within the city or oblast or who were reappointed to their previous posts following Khrushchev's arrival are classified as having been recruited from within the city. However, a check of standard biographical sources and of election biographies published in the local press indicates that nearly all of the gorkom secretaries and officers of the executive committee and a number of gorkom department heads and heads of city governmental agencies would qualify under the five-year criterion. Once again, none is classified as having been appointed from within the ranks of existing local cadres solely on the basis of oblast as against city service.

Turnover Rates and Length of Terms

The question whether Moscow's turnover patterns are atypical cannot be settled until the full presentation of the data. However, the question whether the Moscow rates of turnover and the length of terms served by Moscow officials are atypical must be confronted immediately. Existing studies indicate that over the past thirty or so years the mean term of office for obkom first secretaries has ranged from under three years to about four. Between 1950 and 1971 the mean number of years served by Moscow gorkom first secretaries was just over three. Armstrong reports that the mean term for Ukrainian oblast executive committee chairmen between 1939 and 1956 was

Table 1. *Turnover of Top Government Personnel for Moscow and Leningrad, 1948 to 1965 (in percentage)*

Term	Moscow	Leningrad
1948-51	60	90
1951-53	55	34
1953-55	42	40
1955-57	30	24
1957-59	31	29
1959-61	46	42
1961-63	30	32
1963-65	24	32

Sources: Figures for Leningrad are from David T. Cattell, *Leningrad: A Case Study of Soviet Urban Government* (New York, 1968), p. 55. Figures for Moscow were compiled by the author.

about three years.¹⁰ During the period covered by this study the mean term for Moscow executive committee chairmen was just over five years. This is substantially greater. However, other researchers have reported, for later periods, longer terms of office for obkom secretaries than those reported by Armstrong.¹¹ Perhaps terms of office for executive committee chairmen also increased in the 1960s.

In his study of Leningrad, Cattell reports that 29 percent of the leading governmental officials in both Leningrad and Moscow were elected to more than two terms and that the average number of terms served in Leningrad between 1948 and 1962 was 1.87 and in Moscow was 1.99.¹² Table 1 compares the rate of turnover of top governmental personnel reported by Cattell for Leningrad with the rates of turnover for Moscow. With the exception of the 1948 to 1951 period, when Leningrad was subjected to Malenkov's notorious purge, the figures are comparable. Furthermore, the turnover rates for Moscow in the 1948 to 1951 and the 1951 to 1953 periods are also high, reflecting the already noted more prolonged and quieter Moscow purge. In any case, insofar as existing data permit comparisons, Moscow's turnover rates and terms of office do not seem to be atypical.

Turnover: 1950 to 1953

Data for the following sections were drawn from the local sources cited in note 8. Whenever possible, these data were supplemented by data from the various standard sources listed in note 7. The use of the latter made it possible to fill in gaps resulting from the use of the local sources. The local sources

10. Armstrong, *Soviet Bureaucratic Elite*, p. 55.

11. Fainsod, *How Russia Is Ruled*, p. 226.

12. Cattell, *Leningrad*, p. 54. The terms were two-year terms.

provided more detailed and specific information on the early careers of city officials and served to fill in omissions and to correct errors in the standard sources.

Within a year of Khrushchev's appointment as first secretary of the Moscow Obkom, there was a 100 percent turnover of gorkom secretaries and a 90 percent turnover among gorkom department heads. Before the end of this period most of the executive committee officers and governmental agency heads also had been replaced or transferred to other posts. Table 2 provides a summary of the data for the period. For no category of officials does the proportion of demonstrably externally recruited appointees reach 13 percent. Overall, out of a total of ninety-seven appointments, over 86 percent were filled by internal recruits. Even if all those whose previous careers are unknown are assumed to be outsiders, and this does not seem likely, outside recruits would still account for less than 15 percent of the total. Clearly, these data do not lend much support to the disruptive turnover hypothesis.

At least as important as the overall figures was Khrushchev's clear preference for local recruits to fill the most important city posts. The man first appointed to fill the post of first secretary of the gorkom was I. I. Rumiantsev, who had been born and educated in the Moscow Oblast. By the time of his appointment he had worked in the city for more than twenty years and was serving as first secretary of one of the city's raikoms (ward party committees). Khrushchev's executive committee chairman for the city was M. A. Iasnov, who was also a native of the oblast and who had worked in the city since the 1920s. Other appointees to leading positions with long experience in the city organization included the second man to fill the post of city first secretary, I. V. Kapitonov; the city's second secretary under Khrushchev, E. A. Furtseva; and the first deputy chairman of the city executive committee, N. I. Bobrovnikov, who eventually replaced Iasnov as chairman.¹³

Table 3 summarizes the backgrounds of all internally recruited appointees, about which I should make two points. First, the inclusion of a large number of holdovers obscures the full impact of the Khrushchev purges. Most of them were removed before Khrushchev's period as first secretary of the obkom ended, and the higher the post the earlier the removal.¹⁴ Second, the

13. Detailed accounts of the careers of all three of these officials may be found in the standard sources cited in note 7.

14. Both of the gorkom secretaries who were holdovers served for less than six months following Khrushchev's arrival. Of the eight executive committee officers who were holdovers, three served for six months or less following Khrushchev's arrival and another two were re-elected in December 1950 but were no longer serving by early 1953. Of those remaining, P. I. Lionov continued as the committee's secretary until 1953, when he became a deputy chairman, a post he held until 1958. N. I. Bobrovnikov had served under Popov as a deputy chairman. Khrushchev promoted him to first deputy chairman

Table 2. *Sources of Recruits, 1950 to 1953 (in percentage)*

	Gorkom Secretaries	Gorkom Department Heads	Executive Committee Officers	Government Agency Heads
Intra-City	87.5	69.0	85.0	83.0
Extra-City	12.5	6.0	5.0	0.0
Unknown	0.0	25.0	10.0	17.0
N	(8)	(16)	(20)	(53)

Table 3. *Background of Internally Recruited Appointees*

Previous Position	Gorkom Secretaries	Gorkom Department Heads	Executive Committee Officers	Government Agency Heads
Gorkom secretaries	0	0	1	1
Gorkom departments	1	2	0	2
Executive committee officers	0	0	0	6
Government agencies	0	0	2	11
Raikom secretaries	4	5	2	2
Raion executive committees	0	1	3	4
Holdovers	2	1	8	18
Other	0	2 ^a	1 ^b	0
TOTALS	7	11	17	44

^a Exact previous posts are unknown. As early as 1947 one was a full member and the other a candidate member of the gorkom.

^b M. A. Iasnov, who for a few months before his appointment as chairman had served in the central governmental apparatus.

exclusion of these holdovers from table 2 does not substantially change the results reported above (compare tables 2 and 4).

Nevertheless, in one important respect the rapid turnover that occurred during this period was disruptive. It destroyed the Popov machine by decapitating it, and any number of personal relations and informal channels of communications must have been disrupted. However, and this is equally important, the data suggest that the turnover pattern was of a kind calculated to establish a new machine attached to the person of the new obkom first secretary, Khrushchev, who sank roots as rapidly as possible into his new bailiwick by promoting existing city cadres rather than bringing in large numbers of outsiders already beholden to him.¹⁵

and he served in that post until 1956, when he replaced Iasnov as chairman. The last holdover was V. F. Promyslov, who is currently chairman of the committee. Of the eighteen city agency heads who were holdovers, only four were serving in their former positions by March 1953.

15. In view of the coming power struggle, which all leading Soviet officials surely must have foreseen by this time, this made considerable sense. Khrushchev's relatively moderate purge of the Moscow apparatus must have made an impression on party

Table 4. Comparison of Sources of Recruits for January 1950 to February 1953^a and March 1953 to June 1971 (in percentage)

	Gorkom Secretaries		Gorkom Department Heads		Executive Committee Officers		Government Agency Heads	
	1950-53	1953-71	1950-53	1953-71	1950-53	1953-71	1950-53	1953-71
Intra-City	83	86	66	78	77	88	74	75
Extra-City	17	14	7	0	8	6	0	0
Unknown	0	0	27	22	15	6	26	25
N	(6)	(28)	(15)	(41)	(13)	(32)	(35)	(108)

^a The 1950 to 1953 figures exclude holdovers from the Popov period.

Finally, this examination of recruitment patterns in Moscow lends some support to Fainsod's suggestion that a link may exist between territorially based organizations and the patron-protégé groups. The failure of some analysts to find clear territorial and organizational foundations for these groups may be because the patron-protégé cliques are very complex coalitions of territorially and organizationally based groups. This is especially likely because certain territorial organizations, such as Moscow and Leningrad, and some of the larger republics, such as the Ukraine, may provide a disproportionate number of recruits for posts in the central party and governmental bureaucracies and for posts in the less important or less populous oblasts.

Turnover: 1953 to 1971

The 1950 to 1953 period may not have been typical. Khrushchev's standing in the system and his possible desire to consolidate rapidly his hold over the important Moscow organization before the power struggle began may have contributed to an atypical turnover pattern. However, an examination of the career patterns of city officials does not support this view. In the original analysis of the data I divided the 1953 to 1971 period into various shorter periods. However, no system of periodization revealed any significant variations. Therefore, in order to avoid needless repetition, I will treat the entire eighteen years as a single period for the purpose of data presentation. The patterns of intra-city and extra-city recruitment for this and the earlier period were remarkably similar. Over the eighteen-year period there were a total of 208 new appointments. Of these appointees, 78 percent came from within the city organization, 4 percent came from outside the city organization, and the

functionaries who had sufficient information to compare it with Malenkov's notorious Leningrad Affair. It is also worth noting that shortly after Khrushchev arrived in Moscow, the local press began to run articles, supported with appropriate quotations from Lenin and Stalin, on the virtues of collegial leadership in local party and governmental organs.

careers of 18 percent are unknown. Intra-city recruits formed the vast majority of recruits for all four categories of officials, and the percentages for the categories were remarkably like those for the earlier period.

The data once again reveal a pattern of recruitment inconsistent with the disruptive turnover hypothesis. The data also make possible a number of statements about the career patterns of city officials. First, the figures in the table obscure a marked shift in career patterns among executive committee officers. In the 1950 to 1953 period, 69 percent of the officers, who were not holdovers, came from governmental positions and only 31 percent from party positions. In the 1953 to 1971 period the proportions were almost exactly reversed. Any effort to explain this shift must be somewhat speculative. However, it appears that Khrushchev's purge of the city party apparatus forced him to turn to the ranks of governmental officials to fill the vacancies this purge created within the ranks of executive committee officers.

For the gorkom secretaries and the heads of gorkom departments, there was little difference between the two periods with respect to the positions held just before appointment. There is some evidence suggesting that recruitment to these party departments involves functional specialization, although generalizations in this area must be regarded as tentative, because the local press all too often reports the names of departmental heads without reporting the particular departments they run. Nevertheless, a few observations seem worth making. First, insofar as I can determine, the heads of the Party Organs Department came from the ranks of first or second raikom secretaries. The heads of the Department for Construction and the Department for Municipal Economy often came from the ranks of governmental officials. At least two of the heads of the Department for Schools were former Komsomol secretaries who therefore had experience working with institutions related to youth. Fourth, at least one of those who served as head of the Propaganda and Agitation Department had held the same position at the raion level. Fifth, two of those who headed industrial departments had subsequent careers in industrial administration. Finally, most of the department heads who subsequently became gorkom secretaries or executive committee officers continued to have in those posts supervisory responsibilities over functional areas that had come under the jurisdiction of or were closely related to the functional area of their former gorkom department. This, of course, provides some evidence of previous specialization for gorkom secretaries and executive committee officers.¹⁶

Nevertheless, a few of the appointees during this period are identifiable outsiders, and these include both gorkom secretaries and executive committee

16. This point is further supported by the fact that the same observation may be made concerning city governmental agency heads promoted to the position of executive committee officer.

officers. Does a closer examination of these exceptions provide at least some support for the disruptive turnover hypothesis? The answer is no. Four of the seven might be termed "technical" outsiders. These are individuals who previously held city posts and who were not strangers to local functionaries at the time of their appointment. However, because of the five-year criterion already mentioned, I am forced to classify them as outsiders. Of the remaining three, one is the current first secretary, Grishin. Although clearly an outsider, he was no stranger to city officials. In his post as head of the nation's trade unions, he often participated in plenary sessions of the gorkom and in meetings of the city's trade union organization. Furthermore, at one time he had held posts in the Moscow Oblast. The other two classified as outsiders served as officers of the executive committee. The tour of duty of each was less than two years. Equally important, all of the outsiders moved into a situation where the overwhelming majority of the leading functionaries were locals.¹⁷

Career Associations

The long years of service in the city which characterized the vast majority of leading Moscow functionaries resulted in the interweaving of career lines and the formation of a close network of personal contacts. The permanent or temporary transfer of many of these individuals to the republic and central levels did not, as Cattell has argued was the case in Leningrad,¹⁸ deprive the city of necessary talent. There was always a large pool of qualified cadres from which replacements could be drawn. Even more important, the transfers to higher levels provided the Moscow network with links to republic and central ministries and to the secretariat of the Central Committee.

17. This last point deserves emphasis. For gorkom secretaries appointed from within the ranks of existing city cadres, the mean number of years of service in the city before that appointment is over nine years with a median of ten and a range of from five to eighteen years. The figures for executive committee officers are a mean of ten years, a median of nine, and a range of from five to twenty years. It should be noted that these figures exclude any short periods of service outside the city organization. Furthermore, the figures actually understate length of service in the city, because the base year for this study is 1947 and any service before that date is excluded from the calculations.

Those heading city governmental agencies also have long records of service in the city. For example, of all those agency heads appointed or reappointed in 1971, nearly 60 percent had served in the city as early as 1961, and just over a third of them had held city posts at least as early as 1950. This, of course, serves to point up the danger of assuming that the short term of office for particular categories of officials is evidence of disruptive turnover. The average length of time a given category of posts is occupied by a given set of officials has nothing to do with the average length of time these persons spend in a given territorial jurisdiction or, and this is even more important, with the length of time these persons spend in particular functional areas, such as construction, in that jurisdiction.

18. Cattell, *Leningrad*, p. 156.

Table 5. *Gorkom Secretary Careers, 1966–71*

	V. V. Grishin	N. G. Egorychev	V. Ia. Pavlov	L. A. Borisov	A. M. Kalashnikov	A. P. Shaposhnikov	R. F. Dementieva
Summer 1967 to Jan. 1971	gorkom first secretary	dismissed (1967)	gorkom second secretary	gorkom secretary	gorkom secretary	gorkom secretary	gorkom secretary
1966 to Summer 1967	head, national trade unions	gorkom first secretary	gorkom second secretary	gorkom secretary (1966)	gorkom secretary	gorkom secretary (1966)	gorkom secretary
1960–65	head, national trade unions	gorkom first secretary and member of city executive committee (1962); second gorkom secretary (1961); first secretary of raikom and gorkom member (1957–61)	gorkom second secretary (1963); first secretary, Dzerzhinsky raikom; gorkom bureau member (1961–63)	first secretary, Kiev raikom and gorkom bureau member (1963–64); secretary, Kiev raikom (1960–63)	gorkom secretary (1964); first deputy chairman, city executive committee and gorkom member (1961–64); first secretary, Zhdanov raikom (1959–63)	first secretary, Zhdanov raikom and gorkom member (1964–66); secretary, Zhdanov raikom (1959–63)	gorkom secretary (1961); first secretary, Lenin raikom and gorkom member (1960)
1955–59	head, national trade unions (1956); Moskow obkom secretary (1955–56)	first secretary, Bauman raikom and gorkom member (1957–61); secretary, Bauman raikom (1955, 1956)	department head and head of gorkom department of administrative organs (1956–60); secretary, city komsomol committee (1955, 1956)	secretary, Kiev raikom (1959)	first secretary, Zhdanov raikom and gorkom member (1958, 1959); head, gorkom department (1956–58)	secretary, Zhdanov raikom; head, Zhdanov raikom, agitprop department	factory p.p.o. secretary
1950–54	Moscow obkom secretary (1952); head, Moscow obkom department	secretary, Bauman raikom (1954); p.p.o. secretary, technical institute, Bauman raion	secretary, city komsomol committee (1953, 1954); secretary, Dzerzhinsky raion	secretary of Kiev raion, komsomol committee	position unknown		
1947–49	secretary, Serpukhov gorkom in Moscow Oblast	komsomol secretary of technical institute, Bauman raion	raion komsomol committee; komsomol secretary of technical institute in Dzerzhinsky raion		executive committee		

Space limitations preclude any effort to describe fully the network that developed as a result of the crisscrossing of career lines. However, table 5, which summarizes the careers of gorkom secretaries serving between 1966 and 1971, provides the reader with a portion of the total picture. An examination of the careers of executive committee officers serving during the same period reveals a similar interweaving of careers among the officers themselves and between them and the gorkom secretaries.

Moreover, a similar pattern exists within particular functional sectors, such as construction. In 1971 the gorkom secretary supervising construction was A. M. Kalashnikov, whose involvement in the city's construction industry dates back to at least the late 1940s. The first deputy chairman of the executive committee supervising construction, a post earlier held by Kalashnikov, was N. E. Pashchenko, who had previously headed the city's Main Administration for Housing and Civil Construction, and whose career of over twenty years in the city's construction industry had also included the post of deputy head of that agency. Other important functionaries in the construction sector included E. N. Sidorov, who had served as Pashchenko's deputy head of the city's construction agency and who followed him as head; M. V. Posokhin, head of the Main Administration for Architecture; G. A. Golodov, head of the Main Administration for Construction Engineering; and N. P. Dudorov, head of the Main Administration for Building Materials and Components Industries. All of these men had held various posts in the city's construction industry since at least 1953. With the exception of Dudorov, the service of none had been interrupted by a tour of duty of five or more years outside the city. Furthermore, all of them had worked for nearly two decades with the executive committee's chairman, V. F. Promyslov, whose own career in the city apparatus and construction industry dates back to the 1920s, and who has held such posts as head of the city's construction agency and first deputy chairman of the executive committee with responsibilities for supervising construction. Although turnover in city construction posts has been rapid over the last twenty years, the result has not been disruptive turnover but something more akin to a game of musical chairs.

Career Patterns in Other Localities

The data presented thus far are inconsistent with the disruptive turnover hypothesis. Left unanswered is the question whether we may generalize from the Moscow findings. For reasons already given, it is not practical to replicate this study for other cities or oblasts. However, biographical information on the executive committee chairmen and the first secretaries of a few cities and most oblasts is available in the standard biographical sources (see note 7). In

Table 6. *Classification of Executive Committee Chairmen and First Secretaries by Career Pattern, 1965-70*

	City and Oblast Chairmen ^a		City and Oblast Secretaries ^b	
	Inside	Outside	Inside	Outside
Moscow	2	0	2	2
Leningrad	2	0	2	0
Donetsk-Makeevka	1	0	2	0
Gorky	1	0	1	1
Kiev	2	1	2	1
Kharkov	2	0	1	0
Baku ^c	0	0	2	0
Tashkent	1	0	1	1
Dnepropetrovsk	1	0	1	0
Kuibyshev	2	0	2	0
Novosibirsk	1	0	0	1
Sverdlovsk	1	0	1	0
TOTALS	16	1	17	6
Percent	94%	6%	74%	26%

^a Service in the oblast was counted as outside service for all chairmen from cities of republic subordination. Cities of republic subordination are Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev, Baku, and Tashkent. Adequate information was available for city chairmen only for Moscow, Leningrad, and Kiev.

^b Service inside the city and in the oblast was regarded as intraorganizational service for all cities except Moscow on the grounds that only the Moscow city party organization was coequal to that of the surrounding oblast.

^c No oblast unit exists.

table 6, I have classified those who held these two offices during the 1965 to 1970 period in other major urban centers and their surrounding oblasts according to whether the officeholders had spent most of their careers inside or outside their respective cities and oblasts.

The results are clear. Of the forty persons classified, over 82 percent were internally recruited. The figures do indicate that executive committee chairmen were more frequently internally recruited than the first secretaries. However, the difference is not statistically significant.¹⁹ These data, of course, do not prove that a similar pattern exists in jurisdictions that are less comparable to Moscow. Furthermore, they do not prove that a pattern of internal recruitment exists for posts below the level of first secretary and executive committee chairman in those jurisdictions included in table 6. However, the existence in those jurisdictions of a recruitment pattern for lower posts that is consistent with the disruptive turnover hypothesis seems unlikely for two reasons.

In the first place, the fact that the holders of the two highest posts were internally recruited is itself evidence that at least some of the lower posts—

19. Adjusted Chi Square, $p > .20$.

those that had been held by these same persons—had been filled through local recruitment. Second, the disruptive turnover hypothesis holds that the purpose of external recruitment is to facilitate central control through the disruption of local personal contacts. Although it might be possible to attain this end by filling the lower level posts with outsiders while filling the two most important posts with local persons, this would appear to be a needlessly awkward and difficult way to proceed.²⁰

Conclusions and Further Speculation

Because this is a case study, the conclusions are limited and require careful statement. Clearly, rapid rotation in office in Moscow over the past twenty years has not produced a pattern of recruitment that could be viewed as disruptive of the establishment and maintenance of a network of close personal associations. Furthermore, an admittedly limited body of data provides no reason to believe that the Moscow findings may not hold for comparable jurisdictions. Equally important, this study points to the dangers involved in using a statistic often computed by area specialists, namely, turnover rate.

A low turnover rate may provide evidence of the absence of the kind of rotation in office likely to disrupt local groups based on long personal contact. Unfortunately a high rate of turnover may be consistent with either disruptive or nondisruptive turnover. A "turnover rate" figure, as it is calculated by students of Soviet politics, really measures the number of times a particular office or category of offices changes hands in a particular jurisdiction. It is, in other words, a measure of rotation in office. It is *not* a measure of the rotation of persons into and out of a particular territorial jurisdiction or a particular functional sector or a particular agency within a given territorial jurisdiction. However, it is geographic or sector mobility that must be measured in order to determine whether or not a given case of rapid rotation in office leads to a disruptive or nondisruptive pattern of turnover. This is an important point. Insofar as the arguments of the advocates of the disruptive turnover hypothesis rest on turnover rates, they rest on no relevant data at all.

The review of the literature noted four inconsistencies arising out of the

20. It is also worth noting that although his use of the republic press rather than the local press enabled Armstrong to gather, as he himself notes, only limited data on the careers of lower-level oblast officials, such data as he does present suggest that these posts were filled by local people more often than the two highest oblast posts. See Armstrong, *Soviet Bureaucratic Elite*, pp. 77–78. Admittedly Cattell, making use of the local press in his study of Leningrad, argues a case for disruptive turnover among lower-level city officials. However, his conclusion rests not on career data but on turnover-rate data. The point of this study is that turnover data can establish only rates of turnover, not the pattern of turnover. Therefore, Cattell's conclusion is open to question.

disruptive turnover hypothesis: (1) Why are “family circles” a continuing problem even though the various control mechanisms (indoctrination programs, incentive systems, and monitoring agencies) are re-enforced by a deliberate policy of rapid turnover designed to disrupt routinely networks of personal contacts at the local and middle levels of the system? (2) How are the personal contacts that are so essential to the daily operation of the system maintained in the face of “planned” turnover calculated to break up local “power groups” based on long-standing personal associations? (3) How can the continually disrupted local groups serve as building blocks for the larger and more stable patron-protégé cliques? (4) How are “family circles,” which are functional for the system, maintained in the face of a central personnel policy designed to maintain central control by keeping cadres in sufficient flux to prevent narrow organizational loyalties and lengthy tenure?

The nondisruptive turnover hypothesis offers an answer to each of these questions. In the case of the first one it suggests that the pattern of recruitment resulting from the rapid turnover actually promotes networks of long-standing personal contacts at the local level. Therefore, it does not re-enforce the various control mechanisms in the assumed manner. It may actually counter their effects. In the case of the second and third questions, the nondisruptive turnover hypothesis suggests that the rapid rotation in office does not disrupt the local networks.

Regarding the fourth question, matters are somewhat more complex. In the first place, local or middle level groups based on long-standing personal associations may not be viewed by the central authorities as threatening so long as they contribute to the operation of the system without seriously or obviously reducing central control. The central authorities may apply the label of “family group” to and deliberately break up only those local groups involved in serious failures or scandals. In fact, Brzezinski and Huntington argue along these very lines.²¹ In the second place, the nondisruptive turnover hypothesis suggests that insofar as the central authorities do succeed in preventing narrow organizational loyalties and bureaucratic obstruction through delay—and their success is far from perfect—their results may not be obtained through a policy of keeping their cadres circulating so fast that they do not remain in a given organization long enough to develop narrow loyalties or to resort to such tactics. Instead their success may be the result of the control mechanisms already mentioned: indoctrination programs designed to instill more general loyalties, the use of various incentive systems, and the establishment of an extensive network of monitoring agencies.

Whether the nondisruptive turnover hypothesis will actually contribute

21. Brzezinski and Huntington, *Political Power*, pp. 222–23.

to the resolution of these inconsistencies is a matter that can be settled by further research. Nevertheless, until the research is done, the hypothesis that avoids them would appear to be more reasonable than the one that gives rise to them. This is especially true considering that the latter rests on a questionable data base.

Finally, I must conclude on a note of caution concerning the use of career-pattern data. These data are useful in determining whether rapid rotation in office in any particular instance disrupts those long-standing personal connections which are so important for (1) the establishment and maintenance of the kinds of interpersonal cooperation that Cattell found to be so important for the operation of the Soviet system and (2) the establishment and maintenance of the "family circles" the central authorities find so objectionable. However, neither kind of cooperative activity necessarily follows from the existence of long-standing personal associations. Instead the result may be conflict. Moscow provides a good example. I have already reported the long personal associations of those involved in the city's construction industry. A reading of the press reports of gorkom plenary sessions clearly reveals that this long-term association was marked by conflict during most of the 1950s and 1960s. In fact, the conflict reached such proportions that one participant in a gorkom plenary session was quoted in the press as charging that it had seriously hampered efforts to fulfill the city's housing construction program.²²

22. *Vecherniaia Moskva*, June 23, 1965, p. 1.