

## CHILE SINCE 1973: HISTORICAL AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES

*A GENERATION OF DESTINY.* By ENRIQUE CAMPOS MENÉNDEZ. (Tempe: Center for Latin American Studies, Arizona State University, Alberdi-Sarmiento Award Lecture, 1974. Pp. 18.)

*NUUESTRO CAMINO.* By ARTURO FONTAINE A. ET AL. (Santiago: Ediciones Encina, 1976. Pp. 259.)

*PENSAMIENTO NACIONALISTA.* Edited by ENRIQUE CAMPOS MENÉNDEZ. (Santiago: Editora Gabriela Mistral, 1976. Pp. 331.)

*CHILE: THE BALANCED VIEW.* Edited by FRANCISCO ORREGO VICUÑA. (Santiago: Institute of International Studies, University of Chile, 1975. Pp. 297.)

*CHILE: ANÁLISIS DE UN AÑO DE GOBIERNO MILITAR.* By PABLO SANTILLANA. (Buenos Aires: Prensa Latinoamericana, 1976. Pp. 194.)

*CUADERNOS DEL INSTITUTO DE CIENCIA POLÍTICA.* (Santiago: Universidad Católica de Chile. Nos. 1–12, 1976–77.)

*DECLARACIÓN DE PRINCIPIOS DEL GOBIERNO DE CHILE.* (Santiago, 1974. Pp. 91.)

Chilean military leaders had few goals in mind when they moved against Salvador Allende in 1973. Unlike their Brazilian and Peruvian counterparts, who have been in power respectively since 1964 and 1968, and unlike Argentine officers, who have maintained a symbiotic relationship with national affairs for over thirty years, Chilean officers rely more heavily on civilian counsel in order to formulate as well as implement policy. The junta headed by General Augusto Pinochet Ugarte is dependent on a specific group of academics, technocrats, and theoreticians in its campaign to justify its actions and create popular support for its policies. As several works discussed herein indicate, this campaign is characterized by a conscious blending of history and politics in order to prove the legitimacy of authoritarian solutions to problems created in a liberal democratic system.

A deliberate effort to found a “new democracy” has been underway since late 1973, and its earliest expression is the *Declaración de principios*. Simultaneously, the government has sought to promote a new civic culture with which to fortify the new democracy. Foundation and inculcation by fiat and maintenance by force characterize much of recent efforts to erase the 1970–73 experience from the Chilean past. Since the publication of the *Declaración*, civilian cooperation with the government has been based on its dicta. Certainly our view of all this will broaden with time, but there is already ample material on which to base some tentative conclusions.

Published in March 1974, just six months after the ouster of Allende and his Unidad Popular (UP) coalition, the *Declaración* purports to proclaim the establishment and signal the beginning of a “new era in [Chile’s] history by planning a creative and stable political system.” It “contains the essence of the

philosophy which [inspires] the actions of the Junta." Thus the reader is confronted at the outset with vague yet firm plans for a political system based on a philosophy derived from statist and corporatist principles—despite the fact that proponents disavow these, owing to their totalitarian associations, preferring the term *gremialismo*, guildism.

These principles, to which military leaders subscribe but which are by no means idiopathic to their own ethos, emanate from the following: rejection of both the totalitarian statism of Marxism and the "consumerism" (!), materialism, and political freedom of developed western societies, because they are antagonistic to Chile's traditional, Christian, and Hispanic heritage; the function of the state as guarantor of "the general common good" and individual "personal fulfillment," attainable through "restraint, poise, consideration, the positive and genuine respect for the well-being of others," and "conditional supervision"; and the regeneration of Chilean nationalism, characterized by "spiritual integration," "national planning," "authoritarian, impersonal and just government" and "functional decentralization." This is an ingeniously paradoxical and highly euphemistic document, for it fuses what we have come to call corporative decentralization with classic statist and geopolitical theory. It assures Chileans of human rights, freedom, dignity, democracy, individualism, law and order, and progress, while clearly espousing authoritarianism as the means to such ends.<sup>1</sup> It must be read to be believed, and it should not be considered to consist solely of professional military views. Its blend of military and civilian thought has provoked a spate of works, useful in assessing things Chilean.

*Nuestro camino* and *Pensamiento nacionalista* are products of contemporary adherents to the Pinochet government and figures of the past whose ideas may pertain to the present. As in all Chilean political crises, historical justification is a necessity for the incoming government. Enrique Campos Menéndez, cultural affairs adviser to the government, compiled *Pensamiento*, an early example of the "regeneration process" directed from above. Twelve writers deal with nationalism—Chilean, European, historical, telluric, and contemporary—to buttress the argument that what happened on 11 September 1973 was a "magical phenomenon," that the armed forces are the "genuine expression of the nation," and that the movement was inspired by the *pueblo* and, by inference, not from outside.

Selections from works by the likes of Nicolás Palacios (1854–1911), author of the controversial *Raza chilena* (Santiago, 1904); Francisco Antonio Encina (1874–1965), distinguished historian and author of the perceptive *Nuestra inferioridad económica* (Santiago, 1910); and Jorge Prat Echaurren (1918–71), the National Socialist party leader, are juxtaposed with pieces by Sergio Miranda Carrington, a fervent anti-Marxist and advocate of military-backed corporatism; Arturo Fontaine A., associate editor of the Allende-baiting *El Mercurio*; and Sergio Onofre Jarpa, former National party leader and staunch foe of Marxism.<sup>2</sup> Politics makes for some strange alliances and the appeal to historical bedfellows for spiritual support provides the scholar with a unique vantage point from which to view continuity in Chilean political and social thought, and an opportunity to examine history as propaganda.

Clearly Campos Menéndez has sought to provide historical, nationalist justifications for military rule, authoritarianism, anti-Marxism, and an antipolitics mentality.<sup>3</sup> *Pensamiento* is in keeping with the efforts of previous administrations to find their legitimacy in Chile's past.

*Nuestro camino* appeared in print as a direct result of the need to justify policies established in the *Declaración*. Introduced by Arturo Fontaine, this anthology is divided into three sections: principles, policies, and anti-Marxism. In the first section, Gonzalo Ibáñez Santa María and Juan C. Ossandón V. argue that human rights and individualism and "the general common good" are not dichotomous. National security, education, and economic development are shown to be interdependent—in a geopolitical sense—in essays by Colonel Gerardo Cortés Rencoret, Rafael Hernández, and Carlos Cáceres, comprising the second section. Mario Arnello, Tomás MacHale, and Juraj Domic deal with the struggle against Marxism at home and abroad in section 3, much as the latter two did in *Fuerzas armadas y seguridad nacional*, written in the hopes of provoking a *golpe de estado* in 1973.<sup>4</sup> *Nuestro camino* cleverly, though bluntly, rationalizes the Pinochet government's policies by indicating how they are inspired by the *Declaración*. The effect is to legitimize the *Declaración* by pointing out the necessity of its policies for Chile's well-being. This is a little like justifying the actions and policies of the Mexican government by saying that they are inspired by *La Revolución*, thus legitimizing *La Revolución* by praising the accomplishments of the government! As with *Pensamiento nacionalista*, *Nuestro camino* is a fusion of history and politics, of cause and effect.

It should not be perplexing that the Pinochet government and its supporters propose a regeneration, a new democracy—a new order. The *vía chilena*, after all, had similar ends. As the bulk of the literature on the 1970–73 years attests, the Allende administration, through its various constituent parts, sought to create social and cultural changes as well as political and economic transformations propitious to the foundation of a socialist system. Propaganda, consciousness raising, labor (re)organization, stimulation of popular creative arts—all these had a revolutionary cast. Negative views of these phenomena were often considered at best cynical and conservative, at worst conspiratorial or reactionary.<sup>5</sup> It is owing in no small part to the trauma of the 1970–73 experience that the present administration seeks to erase and reorient. Most materials published since 1973 are devoted to this *kulturkampf*, Chilean style.

The Pablo Santillana anthology, *Chile: Análisis de un año de gobierno militar*, is no exception, save that its scope is somewhat wider. Santillana has utilized government documents and periodicals and clandestine and exile opposition position papers. This harshly critical view of the junta, therefore, has a sounder ring to it than other post-1973 excoriations. If it is tedious and repetitive in places, it is, nevertheless, a source of documentation as well as opinion. Access to information is far more difficult for the opposition since 1973 than it was during the preceding three years; this is even more to Santillana's credit.

Three important topics form the core of this book: the early political and economic directions of the government, and its repressive nature; the plight of the Christian Democratic party; and the fate of the UP parties and factions.

Socialist Santillana makes no pretense of objectivity, but his subjective approach is so thorough that he has amassed a very useful set of documents and provided stimulating commentary. A critical theme is the necessity for restoration of democracy based on the cooperation of all parties save the rightist Nationals. Time and again one is reminded of the Popular Frontists of the 1930s. Santillana's appeal for Christian Democratic/UP cooperation in opposition to the Junta within and without Chile stirs memories of the right-center-left schemes to oust General Ibáñez between 1927 and 1931.

Santillana is particularly perceptive in his analysis of the Pinochet government, i.e., the assessment of the mutual relationships of its parts. Military and civilian adherents are correctly portrayed as not always in agreement on policy (pp. 82–88, 177–90). The role of *El Mercurio* as early press ally (sans complaints about censorship or press controls after so many attacks on Allende for his obvious menacing of the opposition press),<sup>6</sup> is also pointed out (pp. 131–40).

Christian Democrat documents and open letters illustrate the deep splits in the party over the authoritarianism–democracy issue. The overthrow of Allende may signal the decline of Christian Democracy as a viable force in Chile and it is clear that a wing of the party sees restoration of the democratic system as sine qua non for its resurrection, while another wing fears the party's ultimate defeat at the hands of the left in the event of a return to the politics of the past. Banned in early 1977, the party finds itself in a position curiously analogous to that of the *peronistas* in Argentina: blamed for the *patria's* ills by the right and left, yet divided internally; and accused of having sold out to the military, yet also of having allowed Allende to take power. This brief section provides food for thought on the "democratic left" and its relations with Marxists and the military.

A long section is devoted to official party and labor position papers on the overthrow and the subsequent twelve months of military rule. There appears also a long essay by Carlos Altamirano, the controversial (some would say nefarious) former secretary general of the Socialist party, on the revolutionary process in Chile. Santillana has done an admirable job in assembling Chilean materials. One wishes others critical of the Pinochet government would work as assiduously, for it would provide more *Chilean* substantiation for the opposition case than does the tiresome repetition of North American press and U.S. Congress "revelations."<sup>7</sup>

The Catholic University *Cuadernos* founded in 1976 are an additional source for the study of the foundation of a "new democracy" and inculcation of a new civic culture—for the justification of authoritarian rule on both historical and political grounds. In terms similar to those employed by apologists for National Socialism and Falangism; for Hitler, Mussolini, Franco, Salazar et al.; for Action Française and Charles Maurras; and for the contemporary governments in Argentina, Brazil, and Peru (not to mention Cuba, China, and the USSR), Chilean authors propagate the faith in *Cuadernos*.<sup>8</sup>

Of eleven issues published in 1976, nine are representative of military-civilian collaboration in support of authoritarianism. Two of the authors, Gerardo Cortés and Ricardo Cox, contributed to works mentioned above. Enrique

Ortúzar has presided over the committee responsible for the *Actas constitucionales* promulgated 11 September 1976. His "La nueva institucionalidad chilena" (*Cuaderno*, no. 1) shows the influence of the *Declaración de principios* and presages the *Actas*. Cortés' "Introducción a la seguridad nacional" (no. 2) is a reprint of his essay noted above. His fusion of internal security and economic development may establish him as the Edgardo Mercado Jarrín of Chile, i.e., chief spokesman/theorist for the military.

Cox's monograph, "En torno al tema de la democracia" (no. 8) and others by the Argentine Álvaro Alsogaray, Gustavo Cuevas Farren (director of the Instituto de Ciencia Política and series editor), José Luis Cea Egaña, Alejandro Silva Bascuñan, and Julio von Muhlenbrock, plus the first issue of 1977 written by Pablo Rodríguez Grez defend authoritarianism and corporatism, brand liberal democracy as inapplicable to Chile, and seek, through numerous historical allusions, to show that Chileans have sought a reincarnation of the Portalian ideals and yearned for functional representation for over a century.

Neither Allende, Frei, nor Pinochet, nor any of their support groups are solely or collectively responsible for Chile's recent crisis and tragedy. To believe so is unscholarly, ahistorical folly. The *Cuadernos* illustrate two facets of Chilean sociopolitical development that merit scholarly attention: antiliberal, antidemocratic attitudes are nothing new in Chile, and politics has played an extremely important role in determining how the country's history is interpreted. What happened between 1970 and 1973 and what is happening now confirm these conclusions.

If one were to read only materials published since 1973, for example, the impression would be that Diego Portales and Bernardo O'Higgins are *the* national heroes. A decade ago this would not be so. They had competition then; but today they epitomize discipline, responsibility, probity, and authority, the very values the government extols. Portales, O'Higgins, and Carlos Ibáñez are the models best suited to the government's purposes. To paraphrase Lévi-Strauss, "Chileans are still in focus in so far as la via chilena is concerned, but so they had been in relation to liberal democracy." The government seeks to create a new "focus," one that bears the stamp of history as well as politics.<sup>9</sup> In a recent article, Leonard Krieger discusses the concept of authority based on power and that of authority as the capacity to dominate—legitimate and legitimized.<sup>10</sup> What the publications discussed to this point show is that the Pinochet government hopes to legitimize its position by action as well as words. The restructuring of the state is coexistent with the establishment of new heroes, models, and values; one wonders to what degree they are coterminal in the event of collapse.

There is a danger to scholars in relying on a limited "focus" and restrictive concepts of legitimate authority in their quest for an understanding of Latin America. Chilean political leaders of the pre-1973 era suffered from comparably narrow approaches, and many suffer the consequences today. This is intended as a suggestion that research reflect vigorous objectivity and thoughtfulness, for Chile now provides both a classic Latin American confrontation between authoritarianism and liberalism in re approaches to sociopolitical organization, and

a situation in which “contemporary history really is history,”<sup>11</sup> to answer the question posed by H. Stuart Hughes.

Had he been so inclined, Campos Menéndez could have revealed much under the title *A Generation of Destiny*. This address by the 1974 recipient of the Alberdi-Sarmiento Award for achievement in Latin American journalism is, in itself, really an inconsequential subject for a review essay. The introduction and presentation combined are longer than the address itself (6, 3, and 7 pages, respectively). Campos merely reiterates arguments made in *Pensamiento nacionalista*, emphasizing cultural regeneration as a necessity. His every word is in keeping with his role as cultural affairs adviser and in line with the *Declaración*, nowhere more plainly than in the statements:

It is a fact that cultural manifestations are spontaneously expressed and appear independently of the political administration of a country; but it is also true that the internal motivation of an individual or a social group is very closely tied to the philosophical orientation that the government espouses. It is important that we be aware that the exaggeration of any official directive is in danger of becoming the sole guiding factor of the cultural manifestations of a people. Those manifestations would [then] drown in a morass of totalitarian control.

The state, in short, must play some role in the generation of culture, for “*the moral values that inspire individuals as well as the goals of the national community [must] be directed toward those great ideals that the government has chosen for the benefit of the entire nation.*”<sup>12</sup> Whether or not destiny smiles upon the generation(s) of Chileans who would now lead and follow, let us hope that “great ideals” do indeed benefit the entire nation.

There are as yet no peers of Thucydides or Francesco Guicciardini commenting on Chile’s recent and current traumas with the thoughtful, dignified involvement and concern discussed by Hughes. The lines are still sharply drawn, the wounds still open, the “friend or foe” definitions still rigid, detachment extremely difficult. We need to know more about the contemporaries and co-evals who are responsible for the “great ideals” in order to ascertain whether they are beneficial or injurious to the entire nation. A prosopographical study of certain groups—military, academic, journalistic, technocratic, bureaucratic, economic—would be most informative to those interested in Chile. The involvement of the state in cultural regeneration, no matter how restrained and no matter how lofty the inspiration, necessitates the kind of cooperation and coordination found only in authoritarian systems steeped in a country’s national tradition and committed to permanence. Knowing more about those definable groups or organizations openly supportive of the Pinochet government would be useful.

A major flaw of many studies of recent Chilean politics and history—those by neophytes and experts alike—is that the golpe of 1973 is seen as a direct result of official and private U.S. involvement in internal affairs. The debate is continued in the pages of books, periodicals, and professional journals; in lecture halls and public forums; and by David Frost and Richard Nixon on national

television (25 May 1977). Just as the friend or foe definitions are still important for Chileans, so they seem for scholars and others close to the questions. There is no doubt that interference from abroad affected Chilean internal affairs between 1970 and 1973, for years before Allende for that matter; but too often the *domestic* aspects of opposition to Allende are shrugged aside. Again, we await a more comprehensive treatment.

*Chile: The Balanced View* is an attempt to clear the air, to balance the outside world's view, that is, of the Chilean experience. It consists of twenty-one selections and excerpts published elsewhere. All are in English, for the book was designed for consumption abroad. As soon as it was published it became a period piece; such is the fate of treatments of current events, and Francisco Orrego Vicuña, the editor, frankly admitted the advisability of a follow-up soon after *The Balanced View* was published. Admittedly, too, some of the contributors to this critique of Allende and UP are biased a priori; Edward Korry and William F. Buckley could not be suspected of a friendly stance toward Allende, for example. Yet reprints of pieces by the likes of Harold Blakemore, Paul Sigmund, and others make it quite plain that there was dynamic internal opposition to the Allende administration and that Chile's economic woes were the result of historic, national causes as well as hard-line tactics on the part of multinational corporations and United States government agencies. As time goes on *The Balanced View* may appear more acceptable; perspective may even make it less a period piece.

Conclusions on Marxism, democracy, the Christian Democrats, the military, economic development, and the need for regeneration—topics dealt with in *Cuadernos*, *Pensamiento nacionalista* and *Nuestro camino*, and, yes, in *Chile: Análisis de un año de gobierno militar*—may appear more palatable in *The Balanced View* because of the mix of authors, scholarly credentials, the distinctive international flavor, and the detachment of some contributors (thirteen selections are by foreigners, eight by Chileans), but they are, nevertheless, essentially the same conclusions, conclusions that should have been foregone in 1970. In Chile a firmly rooted hostility to Marxism spread rapidly, long-term economic problems were exacerbated, and serious doubts as to the viability of liberal democracy convinced many of its expendability. Evidence presented in the pages of *The Balanced View* must be taken into account when judging the policies and actions of the Pinochet government. Better than most works discussed above it provides both historical and political perspectives on Chile since 1970, and it is a step in the direction of a truly balanced view of Chile since 1973.

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## NOTES

1. All citations from the *Declaración* are from pp. 25–40 (pp. 1–19, Spanish text). See the recent article by Leonard Krieger, "The Idea of Authority in the West," *American Historical Review* 82, no. 2 (Apr. 1977): 249–70, wherein Krieger notes Benito Mussolini's interpretation of the compatibility of authority and liberty (p. 255). Much of the *Declaración* is couched in similar terms. So are all declarations, manifestos, plans, and

- such issued by military leaders during critical times in Chile since World War I.
2. Palacios' "Decadencia del espíritu de nacionalidad" was written in 1908. Encina's "Causas de la decadencia del sentimiento de la nacionalidad" is from *Nuestra inferioridad económica*. Prat's "Pensamiento nacionalista" consists of selections from the pages of *Estanquero*, the neofascist weekly that appeared between 1949 and 1954. It is no coincidence that the support group of Diego Portales was also called *Los Estanqueros*.
  3. This is not far removed from the justifications for state involvement in the definition of what the long-range course and content of politics should be, as discussed in Carl Schmitt, *The Concept of the Political* (New Brunswick, 1976), originally published in monograph form as *Der Begriff des Politischen* (Munich, 1932).
  4. Instituto de Estudios Generales, *Fuerzas armadas y seguridad nacional* (Santiago, 1973).
  5. Recent literature is reviewed in Arturo Valenzuela and J. Samuel Valenzuela, "Visions of Chile," *LARR* 10, no. 3 (Fall 1975): 155–75; and Paul E. Sigmund, "U.S. Policy Towards Chile," *LARR* 11, no. 3 (Fall 1976): 121–27.
  6. *El Mercurio* staffers who denounced Allende's anti-free-press inclinations have less to say concerning the Pinochet government's restrictive policy towards media freedoms. On freedom of speech in Allende's Chile see *El Mercurio* associate editor Tomás P. MacHale, *El frente de la libertad de expresión, 1970–1972* (Santiago, 1972).
  7. Comparable recent studies of the 1970–73 years from the left are Stefan de Vylder, *Allende's Chile: The Political Economy of the Rise and Fall of the Unidad Popular* (Cambridge and New York, 1976); and Ian Roxborough, Phil O'Brien and Jackie Roddick, *Chile: The State and Revolution* (New York, 1977).
  8. The reviewer's own "El profesionalismo militar chileno en el siglo XX: pensamiento y autopercepción de la clase de oficiales" became no. 3 in this series. Apparently the theme of the paper, that army officers have been historically hostile towards liberal democracy, Marxism, and party politics, justified its inclusion in *Cuadernos*. The following is a list of the rest of the titles, as of January 1977: Álvaro Alsogaray, "La democracia de masas y la crisis en países del mundo libre," 4 (May 1976); Gustavo Cuevas Farren, "Cuando la rebelión es un derecho: el caso de Chile durante la U.P.," 5 (June 1976); José Luis Cea Egaña, "Teoría de la libertad de opinión," 6 (July 1976); Carlos Naudón de la Sota, "La proliferación nuclear: ensayo sobre la diseminación de la muerte," 7 (Aug. 1976); José Luis Cea Egaña, "La representación funcional en la historia constitucional de Chile," 9 (Oct. 1976); Alejandro Silva Bascuñán, "En torno al porvenir político de Chile," 10 (Nov. 1976); Julio von Muhlenbrock, "La concepción de una nueva democracia para Chile," 11 (Dec. 1976); and Pablo Rodríguez Grez, "¿Democracia liberal o democracia orgánica?," 12 (Jan. 1977).
  9. "We are still 'in focus' so far as the French Revolution is concerned, but so we should have been in relation to the Fronde had we lived earlier." See Claude Lévi-Strauss, *The Savage Mind* (Chicago, 1969), esp. chap. 9, "History and Dialectic," pp. 245–69.
  10. Krieger, "The Idea of Authority," esp. pp. 249–57.
  11. See H. Stuart Hughes, *History as Art and as Science* (New York, 1964), chap. 5, "Is Contemporary History Really History?," pp. 89–107.
  12. Cited material is from p. 16; reviewer's emphasis.