

based not on clichés but on facts, and he writes with compassionate understanding of the dilemmas of the rulers and of the sufferings or frustrations of the subjects in both empires.

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RUSSIA AND KAZAN: CONQUEST AND IMPERIAL IDEOLOGY (1438–1560s). By *Jaroslav Pelenski*. Near and Middle East Monographs, no. 5. The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1974. xii, 368 pp. 90 Dglds.

Professor Pelenski here provides an extensive (and expensive, as one has come to expect in Mouton's clothing) study of the "Kazan' problem," primarily from the point of view of what he sees as the development of Muscovite imperial ideology with regard to the conquest of the Volga khanate. Three of the book's four parts are devoted to what one might call the conceptualization of the conquest in various Muscovite writings of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and one—the first—is a brief but detailed survey of diplomatic relations between the two Volga states from 1438 to 1552.

Students of the subject will find *Russia and Kazan* helpful in a number of respects. Professor Pelenski has canvassed, and cited, the relevant source material most thoroughly, and he has been particularly energetic in reviewing the scholarly literature in several languages, including many very obscure items. He puts forth a number of original interpretations and hypotheses, particularly with regard to the various forms—"legal," "historical," "dynastic," "national," "ideological"—of justification for the conquest that, in his view, were developed by Muscovite writers. He brings together a great deal of useful information not only in the text itself, but in the maps, illustrations, appendixes and even in the index. He provides three new Old Russian texts in translation (pp. 277, 278, 292–93).

Yet all of these contributions notwithstanding, one is left unconvinced that Professor Pelenski has succeeded in his objective of producing a "model of an emerging imperial ideology" (p. 20, also p. 283). One's skepticism is based upon a paradoxical sense that, while the author has without question studied the primary sources intensively, he has not analyzed them as profoundly or critically as one must, and at the same time he has "read too much into them." It seems to me with regard to the first problem, for example, that in part one, devoted to the historical narrative of Muscovite-Kazani relations, one is provided with an account that for all its detail leaves unanswered a number of the major questions about that relationship: What was the internal socioeconomic and political structure of the khanate? How did this mechanism relate to Muscovite and Crimean politics in good times and bad? Were Muscovites really always so intent upon "conquering" Kazan'? What does "conquer" mean in relations between sparsely settled trading principalities—one sedentary and the other based upon nomadic political traditions? I attempted to answer some of these questions in a dissertation to which Professor Pelenski refers; it became clear to me even before it was submitted that it could not be published without additional massive and meticulous study of Tatar genealogies, of patterns of government (if that is the word) and diplomacy, and most of all of the history of the major sources, the Muscovite chronicles. Professor Pelenski is aware of some of the inadequacies of the chronicles as sources (p. 93, n. 2; p. 139, n. 1) but still thinks that they provide "significant evidence for the attitudes and

modes of thinking of their authors and compilers" (p. 13). True enough, but the meaning of that "evidence" will be ambiguous until we get to the bottom of the question of who (if only in impersonal terms) those authors were, and when the texts appeared.

This reservation is particularly appropriate to the arguments Professor Pelenski attempts to make about "imperial ideology," since most of the evidence for such a construct must come from a close reading of chronicle and other texts whose origins remain, despite the achievements of the scholars whom Professor Pelenski cites, obscure to a degree that enjoins one to be cautious about hidden or even subtle meanings. Dealing with only one work chosen somewhat casually from many, it is possible to give several examples. Regarding the origin of the *Kazanskaia istoriia*, Professor Pelenski writes, "It is quite possible that the Russian [that is, Muscovite] court and some leading representatives of the Muscovite political establishment were dissatisfied with [the tale about Kazan' in the *Letopisets nachala tsarstva*] and felt the need for a more accomplished literary treatment of the Kazan conquest." Do we know who at court or in the political establishment in, say, 1564, owned or read such texts, let alone "felt the need for a more accomplished literary treatment"? Something is out of focus here. We have almost no evidence of traditions or institutions of education among the lay "political establishment" of Muscovy and even less idea of what they might have considered a "more accomplished literary treatment."

Nor can one accept without qualification the argument that the religious justification of the Kazan' conquest is as prominent in the *Kazanskaia istoriia* as in other Muscovite historical writings on the same subject (pp. 129–30). I am not the only one to point out that the author of the Kazan' history had rather confused ambiguous feelings about Tatars (See D. S. Likhachev, *Poetika drevnerusskoi literatury* [Leningrad, 1967], p. 107, cited by Pelenski, p. 128).

"How then," asks Professor Pelenski, do we "explain the inconsistencies, lack of . . . unity . . . anachronistic references and interpolations?" (p. 130) His answer is to propose that the work was written at different times by different people—begun in the 1560s, taken up again in the years between 1584 and 1594, and reedited in the seventeenth century "by authors with specific personal interest, who inserted words, names, and hidden allusions, often quite meaningless to contemporaries, as well as to the present reader, apparently to advance some kind of material or moral gain" (pp. 131–32).

Now all of these speculations are of course possible, but they remain no more than hypotheses as here presented, and to prove even one of them would entail major textual study. I, for one, cannot be sure when, or by whom, the work was written and find it difficult to be confident of inferences made concerning the development of "national justification" and a system of political thought which are based upon a work about whose origins we still know so little, and whose "hidden allusions" are "meaningless." One can make some tentative observations about the text itself and its *internal*, literary, system of thought, but to use it as evidence of broad trends in Muscovite political ideology seems to me questionable.

In much of his interpretation of this work, Professor Pelenski seems to impose the modernizing terms of reference that are so characteristic of scholarship on this poorly understood period. He states: "*Kazanskaia istoriia* was written with propagandistic intent. Since the dissemination of political propaganda was directed by the court and the ecclesiastical circles, it is highly improbable that a

lesser government official would have made a decision to write or compile such a work; he could only have been its executor. Therefore, the work in question should be viewed as an official or at least a semi-official treatise" (p. 134). What does "propagandistic intent" mean in a territory with no proper schools and only scattered literacy with regard to a literary work written in a complex style in a language (Slavonic) not easily read by the overwhelming majority of the population? What meaning does "dissemination" of "political propaganda" have here? How does the notion of an "executor" relate to the previous speculations about the three stages of composition? Were there many authors ("author, or authors"), as Professor Pelenski seems to imply, or one "author/compiler" (p. 134)? How can we view it as an "official treatise" when it is a highly literary work of unknown date and authorship and, for that matter, purpose?

The *Kazanskaia istoriia*, while a major source of Professor Pelenski's conclusions in this section, is only one of many mysterious sources with which he deals. In each case he surveys the literature carefully, reads the text intensely, and comes up with evidence for the existence of rather developed legal notions—"investiture theory," "national justification," "law of conquest," and so forth. Leaving aside for the moment the serious matter of whether one can deal in such terms with a state that seems to have left no record of developed secular legal thought to speak of, one questions whether sources like the writings of Peresvetov, Kurbskii or "Makarii" are sufficiently well established to support such close readings. Professor Pelenski speaks of "laymen of divergent backgrounds, such as . . . Peresvetov and . . . Kurbskii (p. 291); what indeed does anyone know of the intellectual "backgrounds" (a word rich in connotations for the modern reader) that is not derived from imaginative readings of works loosely attributed to them? I have already expressed some doubts about Kurbskii's writings; the mysteries of Peresvetov's legacy cannot be enumerated in a review (but they *are* mysteries). About the "Nikon Chronicle" (which contains the bulk of Makarii's writings on this subject) let me add only an example of the difficulties one has with Professor Pelenski's analysis.

Part three of *Russia and Kazan* deals with the theory of Bulgaro-Kazani "continuity," a notion which, in the author's view, legitimized Muscovite claims to conquered territory in the Volga region by establishing the "continuity" of political development from Bulgar times to the fall of Kazan'. This is an interesting idea, and Professor Pelenski is to my knowledge the first to develop it so fully. But upon what is it based?

Having pointed out that the editors of the "Nikon Chronicle" quite systematically replace the term "Bolgary" and its derivatives, archaic by their time, with the *Tatar*, and so forth, and that the city of Bolgary "is Kazan," Professor Pelenski terms this editorial change a "significant idea of Muscovite imperial ideology" (p. 149). He goes on to say that "such innovations and 'modernizations' in onomastic terminology convincingly prove the authors' intentions to impose upon their readers a historical viewpoint which mirrored the present rather than the past" (p. 154). One need not argue with this statement in its more general sense but may express reservations with regard to the specific conclusion—that the substitution of the (probably ancient but vernacular) "Kazan'" for the archaic (and literary) "Bolgary" was intended as a subtle means of justifying the conquest of Kazan' by linking it with earlier conquests of Bolgary by non-Muscovite princes of the House of Rurik. First, as I have mentioned, the texts known as the "Nikon Chronicle"

present unsolved problems of dating and attribution. Second, in an "official" (granting for the moment that designation) chronicle of a powerful but not very subtle government, why such delicacy? And finally—a nagging question throughout—in whose eyes is this literature "justifying" the conquest? Before which court of law or public opinion did it need to be "legitimized"? Doubtless an occasional churchly scribe might praise his prince after the fact and rejoice in the victory of the Cross over the Crescent, but I find it a long jump from these scattered comments and exultations to an "imperial ideology."

In sum one must commend (and not only *pro forma*) Professor Pelenski for a truly impressive scholarly labor whose fruits will be of considerable usefulness to scholars for some time to come, while remaining unconvinced that Muscovy in the sixteenth century was consciously developing a systematic or abstract theory of legitimization or justification of its conquests. Moscow's political system was pragmatic and brutally efficient; its "political establishment" in the sixteenth century was building an empire, not an ideology.

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A FORGOTTEN EMPRESS: ANNA IVANOVNA AND HER ERA, 1730–1740. By *Mina Curtiss*. New York: Frederick Ungar, 1974. xvi, 335 pp. \$12.50.

Mina Curtiss makes a spirited effort to recall Empress Anne and her reign from a long lapse of professional interest. Historians indeed too often pass by the 1730s with a sneer. As Curtiss rightly points out, Anne's reign was in some respects a seminal one and deserves greater attention than it normally receives. The cause is a good one, the execution less so. The book suffers from the usual defects of amateur, anecdotal history. Dates and other facts frequently get twisted, and there is a heavy reliance on outmoded and ill-founded interpretations. Much material is simply lifted with little sifting from the contemporary accounts of Rondeau, Manstein, and Algarotti, and also from Waliszewski's well-known survey.

Still, the work contains some sparkling descriptions of court life and manners. Connoisseurs of such things will relish the lengthy catalogues of ceremony and attire, not to mention an entire chapter on the famous Ice Palace. Finally, without hiding the blemishes, Curtiss presents a sympathetic portrait of Empress Anne and brings to our attention some forgotten minor characters of the 1730s.

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MODERNIZATION OF RUSSIA UNDER PETER I AND CATHERINE II.

Edited by *Basil Dmytryshyn*. Major Issues in History. New York and Toronto: John Wiley & Sons, 1974. xi, 157 pp. Paper.

Designed for use in a freshman-sophomore survey course, this book of readings combines the necessary brevity with some depth and some variation of interpretation. Parallel sections on Peter I and Catherine II contain a sample of each ruler's handiwork, observations by contemporaries, discussions by eighteenth and nine-