

literature," and lists some forty-three participants with whom he conversed or corresponded.

The substantive questions to which Roberts addresses himself are: Did the Chetniks fight the enemy or collaborate? Was Tito a Soviet agent or a Yugoslav revolutionary? Was Churchill's concern for Yugoslav affairs mainly military or political? Did the Soviet Union deliberately set about to make Yugoslavia into a Soviet satellite? Did Roosevelt's pro-Serb feelings affect U.S. policy? Briefly, he answers that the Chetniks both fought and collaborated, that Tito was more Yugoslav revolutionary than Soviet agent, that Churchill's concern was at first military and only belatedly political, that the Soviet Union saw its chance to nullify Western postwar influence in Yugoslavia and took it, and that Roosevelt's pro-Serb feelings had no effect on U.S. policy because the United States consciously refrained from having a Yugoslav policy. Although Roberts does not verbalize it, the manner of his answer to the last question hints at a belief that the only hope of making a reality of the Churchill-Stalin fifty-fifty formula for Yugoslavia would have been a more positive American attitude.

The source on which Roberts draws most frequently and effectively is the published series of documents, *Foreign Relations of the United States*. The unpublished documents which he quotes—mostly from the F. D. Roosevelt Library and British Foreign Office files—do not, for the most part, materially affect his judgment of the reasons why things went the way they did, though they throw additional light on certain points, particularly intra-American and Anglo-American differences during the latter part of the war. While Roberts was doing his work and since then, other scholars (American, Canadian, British, and Yugoslav) have trawled the German, Italian, British, and American archives more thoroughly or have drawn on the memories of survivors to produce detailed investigations of various aspects of the war in Yugoslavia and of Allied policy making. One major publication of memoirs, Djilas's *Wartime*, has confirmed and supplemented Roberts's account of a controversial episode, the Partisan-German contacts in March 1943. (Roberts does not, as has been suggested, put this episode in the same category as systematic Chetnik collaboration with the enemy, although his distinction between the Chetniks' active collaboration with the Italians and stand-off agreements with the Germans cannot, in view of subsequently published documents, be sustained without qualification.)

These are, however, partial studies—some of them in more than one sense—and, although they correct or supplement Roberts's work in particular, *Tito, Mihailović and the Allies* has not been superseded as an overall account of how the Western Allies, uncertain of their priorities and at odds among themselves, lost even the slender chance of influence which they might have gained by a firm and united policy.

RICHARD KINDERSLEY  
St. Antony's College

PRINOS KŪM ISTORIATA NA SOTSIALIZMA V BŪLGARIIA. 4th ed. By  
Dimitŭr Blagoev. Sofia: Partizdat, 1976. 558 pp.

To commemorate the one-hundred-twentieth anniversary of the birth of the father of Bulgarian socialism, Dimitŭr Blagoev (1856–1925), the Bulgarian Communist Party released the fourth edition of his *Prinos kŭm istoriata na sotsializma v Bŭlgariia* (*A Contribution to the History of Socialism in Bulgaria*). Blagoev wrote *Prinos* in 1906, when factionalism was still plaguing the Bulgarian Social Democratic Labor Party (BRSDP), which had split into the Narrow Socialist and Broad Socialist parties in 1903. As leader of the Narrow Socialist Party, Blagoev argues against the Broad Socialists throughout the book, justifying his party's claims to be the vanguard of the Bulgarian Socialist movement (the Narrow Party became the Bulgarian Communist Party in 1919). *Prinos*, therefore, is not an objective history of Bulgarian

socialism. Nevertheless, it deserves attention, since it is still the only comprehensive work on Bulgarian prewar social democracy.

*Prinos* is a rich storehouse of information, revealing the complex nature of the Broad-Narrow conflict which engulfed every aspect of the Bulgarian Socialist movement up to 1919. It includes extensive quotes from Bulgarian Socialist journals and newspapers that are unavailable outside of Bulgaria. In a sense the book is unique, because, unlike all modern Bulgarian histories of the Bulgarian Socialist movement, it does not depict Bulgarian socialism as merely following in the wake of the Russian Revolutionary movement and destined to merge with it in 1919. In fact, as Blagoev depicts it, Bulgarian socialism was eclectic: it was formed not only under the influence of the Russian Revolutionary movement, but also under several West European and indigenous strains of Bulgarian socialism. In general, Blagoev is too anti-Russian for present-day Bulgarian tastes, judging from the editors' revisions of his interpretations of the Russian role in the liberation of Bulgaria in 1878 and Russia's part in the Congress of Berlin. Despite the editors' pro-Russian bias, however, their notes, which cover the entire period of Bulgarian socialism up to 1919, offer valuable and detailed information that would be difficult to find on one's own.

It is instructive to compare this edition of *Prinos* with its three earlier versions. The two that appeared in 1949 and 1954 are virtually identical, but differ considerably from the editions of 1960 and 1976. In the first two editions, there is no attempt to revise or explain Blagoev's anti-Russian attitude, nor do the explanatory notes continue Blagoev's anti-Broad polemics. Moreover, the introduction is lifted from one of Georgi Dimitrov's speeches and is a surprisingly frank analysis of the Broad-Narrow schism, negating any Russian influence on the Narrow Party before 1919. There is more concern in the earlier volumes with exposing "Trotskyites" and "traitors," references that are completely absent in the 1960 and 1976 editions. In addition, the latest versions omit Dimitrov's introduction and replace it with one that centers on correcting Blagoev's anti-Russian interpretations of Bulgarian history. The scholarship and organization of the earlier editions are superior: aside from the explanatory notes, there is a separate list at the end which contains detailed information on journals and newspapers mentioned in the text, and another list that focuses on important figures in Bulgarian Socialist history. The 1960 and 1976 editions cram this information into one list and entirely omit the informative biographical and bibliographical notes on important West European Socialists. On the whole, *Prinos* is treated more fully and objectively in its 1949 version than in the present edition.

These differences undoubtedly reflect changing ideological emphases in the leadership of the Bulgarian Communist Party, which in turn patterns itself on the Kremlin. Thus, a study of *Prinos* is useful not only to the historian but to the political scientist on the lookout for changes within the closed arena of Bulgarian or Soviet politics.

SINA MARIA DUBOWOJ

*University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign*

DAS RUMÄNISCHES FÜRSTENTUM MOLDAU UND DIE OSTSLAVEN IM  
15. BIS 17. JAHRHUNDERT. By *Ekkehard Völkl*. Veröffentlichungen des  
Osteuropa-Institutes München, vol. 42. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz in  
Kommission, 1975. 123 pp. DM 32, paper.

Ekkehard Völkl's study focuses primarily upon what he sees as Moldavia's special role in the world of Orthodox Christianity between the Turkish conquest of Byzantium and the emergence of a powerful Muscovite tsardom. Initially, Völkl contends, Moldavia served as the bulwark of Orthodoxy, preserving the Byzantine-