

indeed, is God really good. Professor Lovejoy discovers this same antinomy in St. Thomas, and supports his thesis by quotation. Dr. Pegis proceeds to resolve the antinomy by showing that it proceeds from a failure to recognize that Plato, or Avicenna, are, as thinkers, inhabitants of different worlds from St. Thomas; that St. Thomas recognized this; and that he was at pains to warn his contemporaries, less critical than he, precisely of the danger of regarding the two worlds as one. 'The Avicennian God acts necessarily, determinately and mediately. The Thomistic God acts intelligently, freely and immediately.' 'Far from conceding that the Greeks or that Avicenna had a doctrine of creation, St. Thomas Aquinas implies that their philosophical views are parts of a coherent total view which is precisely *not* a doctrine of creation. If we call this second doctrine necessitarianism, then we may say that for St. Thomas Aquinas, far from being explanations of the same world, necessitarianism and creationism are really explanations of different worlds.' Hence the thesis of Professor Lovejoy falls to the ground, because 'Professor Lovejoy thinks that the doctrine of creation is common to ancient Greek and medieval Christian thinkers.' There was indeed a real contradiction among some of St. Thomas's contemporaries: the contradiction of thinking that 'they could describe their own world and what went on in it in the way in which the Greeks and the Arabs had described theirs'; St. Thomas, so far from falling into it himself, did his utmost to save his contemporaries from it.

The thesis of Professor Lovejoy is a useful peg; the author's argument is of general, and permanent, value.

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L'HUMANISME POLITIQUE DE SAINT THOMAS. By Louis Lachance, O.P. Two vols. (Recueil Sirey, Paris; Éditions du Levrier, Ottawa; n.p.)

This long exposé of political theory covers a very big field. One special interest lies in the author's hostility to the widely accepted personalist theory, according to which man in so far as he is a person transcends the social order, and in so far as he is an individual of a species, is subject to it. It is here urged that this theory neglects the essential character of political philosophy as a practical rather than a speculative science, and from a purely speculative and abstract starting point carves up the concrete reality in such a way that the authority of the body politic must in effect be stultified. It is the person that is individuated, and actions proceed from the person; hence it is ar-

gued that a system which emancipates the person from the domination of society, thereby emancipates the whole man entirely. If such indeed be the outcome, P. Lachance clearly does right to react against this extreme of liberalism. He reacts in fact so far as to maintain, consonantly with his foregoing argument, that the person is wholly subject to the State, and is indeed precisely the correlative part to the political whole. This is not, however, at all a theory of State absolutism, for the relations of the parts to the whole are governed by the exigencies of their due ends, natural and supernatural, private and common. Nor does the subordination of the end of the State to the end of the supernatural society which is the Church leave us with the rule of a thinly veiled theocracy. The State is a perfect society, and has direct management of its own order.

Perhaps this system and that of a moderate carefully stated personalism are not so exclusive of one another as P. Lachance maintains. Though it is true that the whole man is individuated, and that the members of society certainly are persons, it does not seem that the imperfections which demand the tutelage, training and benefits provided by society are implied by personality as such. No more is it exactly in virtue of their being intelligent that men stand in need of social help to attain a perfect knowledge of God, but rather because of their constitution in that particular grade of intelligence called rationality. To say so much is only to mark off some formalities, and does not amount to setting a 'radical opposition between these two terms.' At the same time, human imperfections do require—i.e. the person, though not *as such*, does require—the aid of his fellows in society to achieve his end. Hence there may be no reason against accepting both the system of subordinated ends advanced by P. Lachance, as well as the notion that the peculiar dignity of personality which he describes and admits so eloquently, has a special claim on the respect and reverence of the State.

A too diffuse treatment is liable to impede one's following of the line of thought, but such a comprehensive scheme and the detailed knowledge of the works of St. Thomas which is shown, must be of considerable use to all students of the subject. The constant presentation of social activity as a normal and basic natural function ordained to the common good, and so to be embraced, and where necessary redeemed, rather than to be put up with, or, where that is impossible, destroyed, is much to be commended.

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