

His critical appraisal of Communist writers such as the poets Geo Milev and Nikolai Vaptsarov and the prose writers Liudmil Stoianov and Georgi Karaslavov remains objective. He also does not neglect the literary scholarship and criticism of those years. It is understandable that his extensive eighteen-page bibliography cites primarily Bulgarian works, since relatively little of merit has been written on Bulgarian literature by Western authors (though one would question the omission of approximately a dozen articles published in German over the past forty years). It includes general histories of the periods discussed, as well as monographs on individual Bulgarian writers.

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SYMPOSIUM

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CONTENTS: Imre Boba, "Przyczynek do dyskusji na temat śladów działalności świętego Metodego w krajach nad Wisłą." Jarosław Pelenski, "The Incorporation of the Ukrainian Lands of Old Rus' into Crown Poland (1569) (Socio-Material Interest and Ideology—A Reexamination)." Bickford O'Brien, "Russo-Polish Relations in the Second Half of the Seventeenth Century." Edward C. Thaden, "Nationality Policy in the Western Borderlands of the Russian Empire, 1881-1914." Joseph F. Zacek, "Slovakia and the Czech National Revival: Introduction to a Case Study." Philip Shashko, "Greece and the Intellectual Bases of the Bulgarian Renaissance." Gale Stokes, "The European Sources of Nineteenth Century Thought and the National Liberation Movement in Serbia." Peter J. Georgeoff, "Educational and Religious Rivalries in European Turkey Before the Balkan Wars." John J. Kulczycki, "The School Strike of 1906-1907 in the Province of Poznań." Edward D. Wynot, Jr., "The Polish and Czech Struggles for Silesia and Their Impact on the Unity and Consciousness of the Slavic World in the Years 1918-1921." Victor R. Greene, "Slavic American Nationalism, 1870-1918."

LETTERS

TO THE EDITOR:

Professor Orest Subtelny's reassessment of "Peter I's Testament" (December 1974, pp. 663-78) is a curious piece of history, which seems to stand facts on their head in order to prove Hungarian complicity in the creation of a myth of Petrine imperialism. His thesis is based on the claim that in 1706 the leader of the Hungarian War of Liberation, Ferenc Rákóczi II, aimed at fomenting a Russo-Turkish war in order to take Habsburg pressure off Hungary. The author speculates that the "Hungarian Prototype" of the testament was expected to provoke the Turks and force Austria to go to the aid of Muscovy, "an old and tried ally of the Habsburgs" (p. 665).

The assessment of Habsburg-Romanov relations on which Dr. Subtelny's thesis is based is contradicted by standard interpretations. In 1699 the Austrians signed the Peace of Karlowitz without the consultation of their Russian ally,

which led to a lasting rift between Peter and the Habsburgs. As late as 1711 Peter still complained that the Habsburgs took "no more notice of him than a dog," and that he would "never forget what they have done to me" (B. H. Sumner, *Peter the Great and the Ottoman Empire*, Hamden, 1965, p. 20).

In 1706 Peter had even feared Austria, suspecting that it might meddle in the Great Northern War by joining a combination hostile to Russian interests. To keep Austria out of northern affairs, Peter's ambassador to the Porte urged the Turks to renew war against Austria (Sumner, p. 35). While P. A. Tolstoy was calling for war in Constantinople, in Vienna the carrot replaced the stick as the means to restrain Austria. Thus in November 1706, Peter's envoy offered the Habsburg court troops to fight the Hungarian rebels. See Béla Köpeczi, *A Rákóczi-Szabadságharc és Franciaország (The Rákóczi War of Liberation and France)* (Budapest, 1966), p. 120.

In the spring of 1707, however, in a shift of policy, Peter proposed and signed an alliance between Russia and Hungary. Contrary to Professor Subtelny's claims, ties between Peter and Rákóczi began in 1707, not 1708, and were initiated by Peter and not by Rákóczi. Moreover, their friendship was long lasting and did not cool down by 1710 (p. 668). See Sándor Márki, *Nagy Péter Czár és II. Rákóczi Ferenc szövetsége 1707-ben (Tsar Peter the Great and Ferenc Rákóczi's Alliance in 1707)* (Budapest, 1913), p. 210.

Peter hoped that through the alliance, Rákóczi could urge the French to mediate the differences between Russia and Sweden (Márki, pp. 26–29). Also, he wanted to put pressure on the Habsburg Holy Roman Emperor to grant him the imperial title, *pro Imperatore Magnae Russiae Augustissimi*, in return for his offer to mediate between Austria and Hungary. See *Rákóczi Ferenc válogatott levelei (The Selected Letters of Ferenc Rákóczi)* (Budapest, 1958), pp. 215–16.

Rákóczi's support of the alliance was based on the prospect that it would lead to Russia's attack on the Ottoman Empire in the south, to be followed by a push of Rákóczi's forces in the Balkans. His goal was to occupy Wallachia and Moldavia and unite them with Transylvania under his rule. See *Rákóczi Ferenc Emlékiratai (The Memoirs of Ferenc Rákóczi)* (Budapest, 1951), p. 167; Márki, p. 32; Köpeczi, p. 165.

This discussion should make clear that Hungary's interest in a Russo-Turkish war was not in order to make Peter an enemy but an ally who could help Rákóczi achieve his Rumanian ambitions. Although the expectations of the two were not fulfilled, there was no crack in Russo-Hungarian friendship in 1710, as claimed by Dr. Subtelny. Rather, the break between the Porte and Peter, and increasing difficulties with the Habsburgs, drew Rákóczi closer to Peter. In October 1710, Rákóczi ordered his commander of the armies, General Sándor Károlyi, to "concentrate only on getting aid from Moscow." See Imre Lukinich, ed., *Rákóczi Emlékkönyv, Halálának kétszázadik évfordulójára (Rákóczi Festschrift for the Two Hundredth Anniversary of His Death)* (Budapest, 1935), p. 69. For this same vital purpose, Rákóczi arranged a personal meeting with the tsar in Poland (May 12, 1711). During Rákóczi's absence from home, however, Károlyi signed the Peace of Szatmár with the Austrians. Although Rákóczi was offered amnesty, he chose exile. As a sign of friendship, Peter I offered his erstwhile ally land and refuge near Kharkov. This magnanimous gesture was turned down by Rákóczi (Lukinich, p. 199). Nevertheless, the offer indicates how wrong Professor Subtelny is in his evaluation of the relationship.

In sum, the article's claim that the "Hungarian prototype" of "Peter I's Testament" was the product of consistent Hungarian maneuvering between 1706 and 1710 is false. At best, Dr. Subtelny could make a case for the "individual creativeness" of such an adventurer as Talaba, a possibility he nevertheless rejects in the conclusion of his essay.

PETER PASTOR
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PROFESSOR SUBTELNY REPLIES:

Although Professor Pastor's remarks are quite informative, they do not come to grips with two basic, well-documented, and incontestable facts: (1) In 1706, Ferenc Rákóczi himself ordered two of his diplomats, János Pápai and Ferenc Horváth, to spread anti-Muscovite propaganda. (2) In 1710, another Hungarian diplomat, Máté Talaba, probably on his own initiative, not only continued to spread such propaganda but even implicated Peter I in it. My goal was to present these little-known facts in connection with the growth of the myth of Peter I's "testament"; it was not my purpose to analyze Habsburg-Russian-Hungarian relations in the early eighteenth century. If these facts do not sit well with "standard interpretations," it is no fault of mine.

Furthermore, had Dr. Pastor read my article more carefully, he would have noticed that I did not say that Hungarian-Russian relations had been initiated by Rákóczi in 1708; rather, that in that year, Rákóczi, in order to improve his relations with Peter I, sent Talaba as his resident to the tsar's court. Nor did I say that in 1710 relations between Peter I and Rákóczi "cracked," but rather, that they had cooled. (For copious archival citations to this effect see A. V. Florovsky, *От Полтавы до Пруты*, Prague, 1971, pp. 55–57.) Incidentally, Rákóczi did not accept the Ukrainian lands that were offered to him and his followers, because, "not trusting the tsar all too much," he feared that this would "entice" him too deeply into Peter I's territory and that his men would be enserfed ("Sclaven würden sein") by the Russians (Imre Lukinich, ed., *A Szatmári béke története és okirat-tára*, Budapest, 1925, p. 495).

In conclusion, it would be worthwhile to recall how Józef Feldman, an outstanding Polish historian of the eighteenth century, characterized the leading East European political figures of the period: "They and their actions were blurred by a reluctance to follow a consistent political path and by a more or less general recourse to the mask of hypocrisy and intrigue."

TO THE EDITOR:

As an interested party, I would like to be permitted to use the pages of your prestigious journal to comment on certain statements made by Professor Waugh in his review of *The Galician-Volynian Chronicle: An Annotated Translation* (December 1974, pp. 769–71) and to add certain observations of my own concerning the translation of the chronicle itself.

1. It is a well-known truism that there is no such thing as a perfect book, whether it be a scientific inquiry, a literary work, or, as in this case, a translation.