

are not being guided by his scholarly judgment? Again, both to silence his right-wing adversaries and to open further theological dialogue, surely an ecumenical study such as this might well have grasped the nettle of Vatican II's assertion of the 'historical' character of the four Gospels, which has so many implications when we discuss biblical and theological matters?

There is much that is good in this book, particularly in the article on the Papacy in the modern world, and in the value of

Mary as *symbol*, which represent the best in biblical studies as applied to ecumenism. But, at the end, one was looking forward very much to Raymond Brown's finishing his projected long commentary on the Infancy Narratives, because there, in biblical commentary, he is indisputably a master; here, in ecumenical dialogue, as no doubt he would be the first to admit, he joins the rest of us as very much an apprentice.

JOHN M. REDFORD

**THE RELEVANCE OF NATURAL SCIENCE TO THEOLOGY**, by William H. Austin.  
*The Macmillan Press Ltd. London and Basingstoke, 1976. 132 pp. £7.95*

This book sets out the ways that natural science could conceivably affect theology, and illustrates them by discussing the works of a number of contemporary and recent philosophers of religion. In a field where precision and clarity are often lacking, this systematic discussion is welcome.

The specific question tackled is: 'In what ways (if any) is it in order for theologians, in doing their theological work, to take account of the discoveries and theories of natural science?' The author lists the possible types of relevance:

1. *Direct Relevance.* 'A set S of scientific statements bears directly on a theological doctrine d if d or its negation can be inferred from S.'
2. *Quasi-direct Relevance.* 'A situation in which theologians and scientists offer alternative, and apparently competing, explanations of the same data.'
3. *Indirect Relevance:*
  - (a) *By way of Metaphysics.* This possibility 'arises if metaphysics is understood as a discipline which attempts to provide a conceptual scheme in terms of which the leading results of every special discipline can be expressed.'
  - (b) *By way of Methodology.* 'If the methodology employed by the theologian is conceived by analogy with the methods of natural science, then we have another indirect way in which science bears on the theologian's work.'
  - (c) *Heuristically.* Science may be heuristically suggestive for theologians.

There are also several types of arguments for the irrelevance of science to theology:

1. *Instrumentalist.* These deny that scientific or religious statements make assertions about what is the case.

2. *Two-realm.* These admit that both scientific and religious statements are assertions, but they are said to be about such entirely different things that they can neither support nor conflict with each other.

In the following chapters the arguments for irrelevance are discussed in detail. The instrumentalist argument is perhaps the oldest, going back to Bellarmine, who suggested that astronomical theories cannot bear on theology because they are merely devices for the classification and prediction of phenomena, not assertions about real causes. Duhem developed this argument, but made significant concessions to realism, allowing scientific statements to bear directly on theology except for those of theoretical physics, and even these are allowed indirect relevance by way of metaphysics.

There are also instrumentalist theories of theology. Thus Braithwaite considers religious discourse as just a psychological aid to a way of life, and W.T Stace treats doctrines as instruments for the evocation of mystical experiences. Austin shows that these are both unreasonable interpretations of religious belief, and that even if they were correct they would still leave open an important way in which science would bear on the work of the theologian.

Two-realms arguments take many forms. Crude versions that, for example, assign the material to science and the spiritual to theology break down because religious doctrine includes beliefs about the relation between God and the physical world. More sophisticated theories assign different aspects of reality to science and theology. Among these Austin considers

the views of Karl Heim and D. M. MacKay. Heim leaves the crucial notion of 'spaces' too unclear to function effectively as an argument for the claim that science is irrelevant to theology. MacKay uses the logical relation of complementarity, defined as existing between two statements only if they are made from mutually exclusive standpoints. This could occur if religion and science are regarded as belonging to different 'language games', or if religious statements are made from a standpoint of personal commitment whereas scientific statements require a posture of detachment and objectivity. Austin argues that these differences in standpoint are not sufficient to support the claim that scientific statements are irrelevant to theology.

Austin believes, but does not prove, that these arguments for the irrelevance of science to theology represent all the main types, and since none of them can be sustained he concludes that science does in principle bear on theology and so cannot be ignored by theologians. A more positive

approach would be to consider in detail the examples he gives to illustrate the types of relevance, but he does not do this.

The theological doctrine most likely to be affected by science is that of divine providence, and in his final chapter Austin considers how a theologian could take account of scientific results when formulating this doctrine in a contemporary way. He does so with explicit reference to each of the major arguments of the preceding chapters, thus showing how they can be applied in particular instances.

This is an important contribution to a field requiring more systematic treatment. A major defect is the lack of ontological reference: Austin does not say what he believes about scientific and religious truth and its relation to reality. Thus an essentially metaphysical problem is treated in terms of logical analysis; but both natural science and theology are irrelevant if their relevance to being and existence are made irrelevant.

P. E. HODGSON.

**PROSPECTS FOR THE SOUL, SOUNDINGS IN JUNGIAN PSYCHOLOGY AND RELIGION, by Vera von der Heydt. Darton, Longman & Todd. London, 1976 £2**

It has always seemed odd that the Church should try to swallow such camels as Freud and Marx, yet strain at the Jungian gnat. To Freud, after all, as Baroness von der Heydt points out:

"religion was an illusion, the religious man a neurotic; to him the 'Father in Heaven' was nothing but a projected image of the personal parental figures of a psyche which had remained infantile. The aim of his therapy is to release man from this bondage. . . thereby freeing him also from the delusion of a transpersonal, transcendent being."

Jung, on the other hand, was a profoundly religious man who did much to make Christianity accessible and meaningful to "modern man in search of a soul." With a few exceptions, theologians have, however, ignored Jung's insights or rebuffed them with a firm "non tali auxilio."

One difficulty was that Jung seemed to value precisely those elements in the Catholic tradition which the Church itself was on the point of discarding. He stressed the importance of the Church's role as the guardian of myth and ritual, in the full spring tide of reductive demythologiza-

tion. The new consensus that was arising, collectivist, materialist and utopian, had little sympathy with any approach that might be deemed mystical or individualistic. His enthusiastic acceptance of the dogma of the Assumption as proof of the Church's openness to archetypal developments can, for instance, have won him few friends in progressive seminaries over the past quarter of a century.

Yet it seemed at one time that a bridge might be built between Rome and Zurich, and its chief architect was Fr. Victor White O.P., supported by a small group of colleagues in the English Dominican Province. His work is continued—from both sides—in "Prospects for the Soul" by one who practises both as a Catholic and an analyst and knew Victor White and his circle, as well as Jung, during the time of their friendship and collaboration. She attributes her success in conjoining what to many people are irreconcilable opposites to the fact that in Jungian terms she is not a thinking type. This does not prevent her work from being a small triumph of lucidity and simplicity, both as an exposition of Analytical Psychology and, as a