

When Il'ia Ehrenburg's memoirs appeared, they were at best treated guardedly in the West: "inadequate," too much left out. Since then, however, nothing has appeared in print officially in the USSR that has "put more in." But outside the Gutenberg galaxy, in *samizdat*, there has been a remarkably sustained outpouring of memoirs and personal histories, collections of unpublished facts and "impermissible" life experiences, the overwhelming preponderance of which has its psychic center as well as its concrete locale in the *Gulag Archipelago*. Solzhenitsyn's three volume work, with the vast scope of its inquiry and the great organizing power of its metaphors, seems to be increasingly central, the sun around which more and more planets have fallen into orbit.

Pamiat' (Memory), a miscellany of reminiscences, accounts, analyses, documents, and reviews, moves in such an orbit and orients itself both to Solzhenitsyn's *Gulag* and to the *Chronicle of Current Events*. It is concerned with "what actually happened," with documentation and "setting the record straight" (whoever may be keeping it, in whatever place), with remembering and reexperiencing lives the integrity of which was shattered by arbitrary political intrusion, and not least, with justice and accountability—emergence from the bedazzlement of legend, propaganda, and amnesia.

Factuality and authenticity are exalted values in this book, which begins with four reminiscences of arrest and imprisonment, ranging from an ordinary, if well-educated, Russian woman who was a lawyer and journalist in Harbin at the time of the Soviet occupation in 1945 to a stalwartly loyal party member who served eight years in Vorkuta before emigrating to Israel. Four essays recount incidents and "cases" drawn from the entire Soviet period, the most interesting of which (to this reviewer) is the *Kolokol* case, the first large-scale political trial of the post-Khrushchev era which immediately preceded the arrest of Sinyavsky and Daniel. Four letters written in a peculiar Soviet genre that the editors identify as "intercessory" show signs of a common style. These include letters from Nadezhda Mandelstam to Molotov, from Voloshin to Kamenev, and from Lili Brik to Stalin. A book published abroad, Abraham Shifrin's *The Fourth Dimension*, is measured as scrupulously against known facts as official publications. *Pamiat'* contains an analysis of the professional editing of photographs of Lenin as well as a study of the Academy of Science's jubilee volume that lists (presumably) all its past members.

These are the highlights; there is more. And this miscellany is declared to be only part one of what promises to be a long series—"if!" I hope the editors succeed, for their work is in the service of that memory which is mother of the Muses, of the integrity of personality and political rationality as well.

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MOSKOVSKJE GODINE 1956/1958. By *Veljko Mićunović*. Monografije, Biografije, Dokumenti, no. 6. Zagreb: "Liber," 1977. 530 pp. Illus.

There are two kinds of books that describe and analyze internal and external policies of the Soviet Union: those written by Western observers (the outsiders) and those written by Communist or ex-Communist participants (the insiders). The former are numerous, speculative, and often based upon guesswork, since information is hard to get from closed societies. The latter are scarce and often full of propaganda and purposeful misinformation, leaving the Western reader more confused than enlightened about what is actually going on in the Soviet Union. Very seldom do we find an objective study about the USSR written by an insider. Many Soviet dissidents have written true accounts of the internal life of the USSR, but few have held any position of importance which would enable them to describe the foreign policy process. Thus, we must rely upon the memory of Mićunović, Yugoslav ambassador to Moscow from

1956 to 1958 and again from 1969 to 1971, for an expert and objective view of Soviet global policy and Soviet policy vis-à-vis Yugoslavia.

Two underlying themes of Mićunović's diplomatic logbook (*Moscow Years, 1956/1958*) are Soviet duplicity in dealing with Tito's Yugoslavia and the systematic long-range plan for undermining American-West European unity based on trust and cooperation. Mićunović also makes many observations on the varied relations between the USSR and its East European satellites, on the emerging conflict with China since the first Sino-Soviet breach was made evident during Mao Tse-tung's Moscow speech of May 17, 1957, and on the growing Soviet aggressiveness resulting from Soviet mastery of ICBMs capable of delivering nuclear warheads anywhere in the world.

A large portion of the book contains insightful commentary about Soviet internal policy, Khrushchev as a person and as a statesman, and hidden Soviet strengths and weaknesses. Mićunović also offers an overall assessment of the Khrushchev era (pp. 511–14). He draws his most useful and disturbing conclusion from analysis of a dilemma that the West, especially the United States, faces when negotiating agreements with the USSR: Can one trust the Russians and will they keep their agreements (for example, SALT I or SALT II) in the future? Mićunović's unpleasant answer, based upon Yugoslav dealings with post-Stalinist Russia, is a firm "no!" Soviet untrustworthiness and arrogance demand that the West pursue much more careful and painful negotiation with the USSR and demand more precise daily verification of Soviet commitments. Mićunović reveals just why Soviet post-Stalinist leaders cannot be trusted: "We view the *Belgrade Declaration* [of 1955] as a kind of socialist Magna Carta which should be the foundation of Soviet-Yugoslav relations and even a model for relations with other socialist countries. . . . The Russians . . . think that the *Belgrade Declaration* is a weak document, because it is of 'governmental' and not of 'party' character, and that it should be supplemented as soon as possible with a new and better document, which will be written in Moscow, by Soviet hands. . . . They signed it, because they did not want to return to Moscow empty-handed. It is significant that Khrushchev as the head of the Soviet delegation refused to sign it. Bulganin signed it instead" (pp. 22–23).

When the Russians and Yugoslavs signed the Moscow Declaration, or the "party" document, on June 26, 1956 (to which Khrushchev affixed his signature), they agreed upon a principle of "equality, independence, and mutual respect" between them. Mićunović notes that two days later, after the dismantling of the Cominform, Khrushchev "wanted to make it plain to the leaders of the Soviet bloc nations that the document they signed with Tito was not relevant to Soviet policy toward countries or parties of the Soviet bloc" (p. 93). To reinforce that view, observes Mićunović, a "secret letter by the Presidium of the CPSU" was sent to all party organizations in the USSR asserting that the Moscow Declaration treated Yugoslavia as "the object of Soviet foreign policy, and not as an independent and equal partner of the USSR . . ." (p. 130).

In addition, according to Mićunović, "the membership of the CPSU is warned that the document should be viewed as a specific diplomatic gesture of the USSR and not the platform for the relations between Communist parties . . ." (p. 130). "The major point of all disputes between the Soviet Union and our country up to now seems to aim at limitation of Yugoslav autonomy in internal affairs and Yugoslav independence in foreign affairs. This will probably continue to be so in the future. Yet, this does not mean that disagreements between our two countries in regard to this or that question will always be in the condition of an acute conflict" (p. 342).

Mićunović's diary is not only a unique diplomatic logbook but also a rare historic document.

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