by wealthy coastal areas nor from the largesse from the national government enjoyed by struggling inland areas. But Ratigan's main example of paternalism, Yunnan, feels like an awkward fit. Although she emphasizes how the province has clamped down on civil society in recent years, the fact that Yunnan experienced something of an NGO boom for a time speaks to how any given place's openness can be hard to categorize. Shen compares average pollution levels in prefectures in regions of the country that were made priority areas for SO_2 and $PM_{2.5}$ reduction versus prefectures in other regions (with various controls). But drilling down to particular provinces and cities within these regions would likely introduce some of the same complexities with which Ratigan must grapple.

Given the tightening political climate in China and heightened Sino-American tensions, fieldwork of the sort carried out by Ratigan and Shen will probably become more difficult for non-China-based academics for a while. If researchers lose the nuances that can only be acquired through direct interactions with policy makers, one alternative will be going wide rather than deep; that is, placing China in a broader context. Here, too, Ratigan and Shen are exemplars. Ratigan situates her book in a body of literature that has extended the study of the welfare state to newly industrializing countries. She argues, however, that the absence of powerful civil society groups pushing for service expansion in China also sets it apart from the developing world. Shen, meanwhile, devotes much of her final chapter to a shadow case study of Mexico, where she finds similar "political pollution waves" around gubernatorial election years and concludes that "democracies and autocracies may not be that different in providing that specific public good" (p. 105). Both books helpfully specify when China's authoritarianism does and does not matter.

An important benefit of examining subnational variation in a place like China is that, by holding a country's system constant, we shift our focus to routine politics, thereby normalizing the country. Future research, however, should bring the less "normal" periphery of the area under Chinese Communist Party rule more into the discussion of local politics. Ratigan deserves credit for making the security anxieties of officials appointed to restive regions like Tibet, Xinjiang, and Inner Mongolia an explicit part of her analysis: paternalist governments, she says, do not just behave the way they do because of the transfers they receive but also because of their fears of "ethnic unrest" (or what many people in these regions might frame instead as struggles of national self-determination). Given the extreme police state now being maintained in Xinjiang, in particular, we can no longer afford to restrict our attention only to "typical" areas of China. The same goes for other countries with similar dynamics, such as India and its policies in Kashmir.

More broadly, there is a tendency for studies of bureaucratic politics to hive the bureaucracy off from contentious politics. The two books reviewed here do not fully fit this pattern. As noted, Ratigan sees concerns about ethnic unrest as factoring into the calculations of paternalist provinces. She also notes how anger over uneven health care provision can cause unrest in poor places. According to Shen, local leaders "loosen their regulatory grip on highly polluting factories… to not only keep the economy growing but also maintain workers' jobs in order to prevent workers' protests that threaten social stability" (p. 47). Indeed, to preserve the peace, environmental protection bureaus may ease up particularly on "large factories that hire predominantly male workers" (p. 47). Insights such as these ought to inspire more robust theories connecting street politics to the politics of dusty ministries and party headquarters.

Scholars of China and other nondemocracies have been preoccupied for more than two decades with the question of authoritarian resilience. Refreshingly, neither Ratigan nor Shen are interested in turning every seeming challenge for autocrats into a secret source of strength. Instead, even as they lay out the logic of variation in local policy implementation across space and time, they highlight instances of profound dysfunction. Other scholars should extend the findings of these books by returning to a messier understanding of politics in settings like China, even in the face of rulers' attempts to project consensus and control. Although they are not always the subject of open debate, within-country differences in governance can have profound implications for the health of citizens and the health of the planet.

Sharing Power, Securing Peace? Ethnic Inclusion and Civil War. By Lars-Erik Cederman, Simon Hug, and Julian Wucherpfennig. New York: Cambridge University Press, 2022. 300p. $99.99 cloth, $34.99 paper.

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Amid recent blood-soaked conflicts in Ukraine, Ethiopia, and Sudan, it might be surprising to learn that both interstate *and* civil wars have declined since the mid-1990s. Particularly, ethnonationalist wars pitting governments against ethnically organized rebels have become less frequent. Why? Early generations of civil war scholarship emphasized political discrimination and grievances as root causes of conflict. A subsequent wave of quantitative conflict research, by contrast, tended to focus on material variables like natural resources, foreign interventions, or states' counterinsurgency capabilities. In their authoritative new book, Lars-Erik Cederman, Simon Hug, and Julian Wucherpfennig recenter grievances in the study of ethnic conflict. Their main argument is that interethnic peace stems from inclusive governance: when states share power broadly among ethnic subgroups, both present grievances and fears of future discrimination that could foment rebellion are reduced. Power-sharing

arrangements in places like Northern Ireland, Bosnia and Herzegovina, and South Africa have taken the winds out of the sails of ethnic elites who might otherwise have returned their societies to violence.

The idea that power sharing yields peace is intuitive, yet few hypotheses have attracted more vociferous debate among conflict scholars. Skeptics argue that ethnic power sharing is at best a superficial remedy to conflict and at worst an arrangement that dangerously crystallizes social divisions—as purportedly illustrated by the failure of ethnic inclusion in places like Rwanda, Afghanistan, and South Sudan. But it would be misleading to draw sweeping conclusions from such extreme examples. After all, just because hospitalized people are more ill on average than the nonhospitalized does not mean hospitals do not improve health. To understand the effects of power sharing one must study both peaceable and war-torn societies —Switzerland as well as Syria.

Enter Cederman, Hug, and Wucherpfennig's volume, an empirical tour de force that aims to dispel doubts about the pacifying effects of power sharing.

Synthesizing over a decade of the authors' past research on civil conflict, the book advances several arguments. Ethnic groups that enjoy access to central government power are less likely to rebel than excluded ethnic groups. Territorial power sharing (e.g., decentralization) also reduces conflict, particularly when paired with governmental power sharing. The *practice* of power sharing is crucial; formal institutions matter only insofar as they shape the actual distribution of power. Finally, power sharing is strategically adopted by governments to co-opt threatening challengers. In other words, power sharing occurs in "hard cases." Naïve comparisons of cases with and without power sharing thus underestimate the effects of inclusion.

After developing these theoretical propositions, the authors present their evidence across eight chapters that quantitatively analyze the relationship between power sharing and ethnic conflict. The well-known Ethnic Power Relations (EPR) project serves as the book's workhorse dataset, providing country- and group-level measures of ethnic groups' de facto access to state power since World War II. Chapter 4 establishes the book's empirical baseline with a straightforward model of intrastate conflict between a government and ethnic groups that choose to rebel or not, conditional on their access to political power and other variables that shape their expected payoffs. These models reveal that while government power-sharing practices are associated with a decline in conflict probability, the evidence for territorial power sharing is mixed. Formal power-sharing institutions (as expressed in constitutions or peace agreements) also appear to have no effect on conflict. The interplay between formal institutions and practices is taken up in further detail in chapter 5. Employing mediation analysis, the authors show that the "work" of governmental power sharing occurs mainly through

behavioral practice, raising questions about the validity of research with an exclusive focus on formal institutions.

Perhaps the thorniest problem in past studies of power sharing is the endogenous relationship between institutions and conflict. If governments share power with ethnic groups with an eye toward future rebellion, then the causal arrow may run from conflict to power sharing rather than the reverse. Cederman, Hug, and Wucherpfennig tackle this endogeneity problem head-on in chapters 6 through 9. First, the authors leverage differences between the colonial state-building strategies of France and the United Kingdom that shaped ethnic groups' early access to state power in Africa and Asia. Whereas French tenets of centralization and assimilation undermined the influence of peripheral colonial subjects, the British reliance on existing customary institutions empowered the elites of peripheral groups (for example, the Hausa-Fulani in Nigeria). The authors thus use the interaction between colonizer identity and groups' distance from the coast to instrument for power access and recover estimates of the (positive) effect of both governmental and territorial power sharing on peace. Second, the authors employ strategic interaction analyses that directly model the initial selection of power-sharing institutions by governments depending on the threat posed by challengers, the credibility of government commitments, and a degree of random error. Essentially, the models recover counterfactual estimates of how groups might have behaved under alternative choices by the government. Overall, these chapters— which are the most technical of the book—provide novel and convincing evidence for the inclusion-peace thesis.

Having established a firm link between power sharing and peace, chapter 10 zooms out to explore the diffusion of power sharing since 1945. Power sharing has become more prevalent globally, a trend driven by the spread of norms concerning minority group rights and the political influence of regional actors like the European Union (in Eastern Europe) and South Africa (in Sub-Saharan Africa). Chapter 11 examines the importance of accommodative institutions relative to other causes of peace like democratization and peacekeeping. Strikingly, the authors demonstrate that rising ethnic inclusion is arguably *the* critical variable explaining the decline of global conflict since the mid-1990s.

There is little doubt that Cederman, Hug, and Wucherpfennig have written a landmark study in the power-sharing and conflict literature. The sheer volume of empirical evidence in the book is astonishing and sets the standard for cross-national research on civil war. Scholars, students, and policy makers interested in ethnic politics, war, and conflict resolution will all benefit from reading it —especially those inclined to skepticism of power sharing (as this reviewer was). I would also recommend the book to anybody working with observational evidence subject to selection issues, as the authors provide an exemplary model for rigorous and transparent analysis of cross-national data.

Will this book be the last word on power sharing? Surely not. Power sharing within military institutions receives little attention in the book, despite the frequent use of these arrangements in postconflict countries. I suspect this form of power sharing may yield less impressive peace dividends, due to the special commitment problems that arise when rival armed forces (who, until recently, were shooting and bombing each other) are asked to forfeit their autonomy and merge under a unified command. It is also unclear to me whether governments co-opt challengers with military power sharing in the way proposed by Cederman, Hug, and Wucherpfennig, or whether governments prefer to exclude rivals from sensitive positions in the security apparatus (perhaps while compensating with political or territorial power sharing). The complex interaction between these varieties of power sharing deserves further study.

Another question the authors touch on only briefly is the relationship between power sharing and the recent global surge of populism and democratic backsliding. Will the diffusion of nativist attitudes and hostility toward multiculturalism hollow out accommodative institutions that currently keep the peace in many divided societies? Perhaps the challenge for proponents of power sharing today is not merely to sustain tolerant attitudes, but also to bolster institutions (e.g., courts, parties, etc.) that can constrain executive power and keep promises of inclusion credible. Investigating these questions is urgent for students and practitioners of power sharing.

Localized Bargaining: The Political Economy of China's High-Speed Railway Program. By Xiao Ma. New York: Oxford University Press, 2022. 248p. $99.00 cloth, $29.95 paper.

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Broadly speaking, this is a book about the distribution of infrastructure resources in the absence of democracy. Although existing studies on distributive politics typically focus on policy makers, Xiao Ma's research examines how the local bureaucracy contributes to the uneven development of China's high-speed railway program. He argues that local governments, as intermediary policy recipients, actively negotiate policy details with policy makers and influence the distribution of policy benefits in a process Ma refers to as "localized bargaining." Localities are categorized into "cardinal" and "cleric" localities, drawing on terminology from the congressional politics literature. These two types of localities differ in terms of their resources, bargaining power, and strategies used to secure their share of infrastructure investments.

The arguments developed in *Localized Bargaining* are supported by ample evidence and meticulous analysis. The data include interviews with government officials and experts, government documents, an original dataset on the construction of railways, and a survey of local officials. The author demonstrates strong methodological skills and uses a variety of research techniques, such as qualitative evidence to examine unique cases and analyze bargaining dynamics, regression analysis to draw broadly generalizable inferences about railway investment allocation, and survey experiments to mitigate social desirability bias when soliciting answers to sensitive questions from local officials.

The book contends that a fragmented central bureaucracy lacks the ability to impose decisions unilaterally and creates opportunities for local governments to engage in bottom-up bargaining. Key players in this process are the Beijing offices of localities, which serve as "domestic embassies" connecting local authorities with the central government. These offices facilitate reporting of local progress to Beijing, soliciting benefits for their localities, coordinating efforts, and building networks.

However, the presence of Beijing offices is not random: higher-level local governments and economically prosperous localities are more likely to have them. This raises questions about the allocation of railway investments between localities with and without Beijing offices. Is there a systematic difference in this allocation? If so, does it result from successful lobbying by Beijing offices, or is it merely coincidental that localities ineligible (such as due to population size or terrain) to apply for the high-speed railway program also tend to be less affluent and unable to afford Beijing offices? Furthermore, the book shows that some subprovincial governments have their Beijing offices. How could they bypass administrative level(s) to directly lobby Beijing under a hierarchical administration system? Or how do they coordinate authorities that are administratively above them?

Ma argues that the bargaining power of localities is influenced by their positions within the party–state hierarchy. Cardinal localities possess institutionalized bargaining power due to "dual appointment" or "concurrent appointment" through which their leaders concurrently hold positions in both local governments and higher-level party or government institutions. These appointments create an uneven playing field in competition for resource allocation among localities, because they provide cardinal localities with easier access to information, opportunities to articulate demands in closed-door meetings, and direct participation in decision-making processes.

Using an original dataset, Ma finds that municipalities whose leaders hold dual appointments at the provincial level received more favorable policy treatment; these results remain robust after controlling for various socioeconomic variables. Here, it is worth highlighting the author's novel approach to measure policy bargaining, much of which involves under-the-table deals. Ma examines provincial Five-Year Plans (FYPs), which are publicly