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## RESEARCH REPORTS AND NOTES

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### CONTINUITY AND CHANGE IN ELECTIONS IN THE CITY OF BUENOS AIRES, 1931–1954\*

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In 1930 the first successful military coup in Argentina in the twentieth century interrupted the normal functioning of the political and electoral institutions consolidated by the Sáenz Peña Law of 1912. This statute required secret balloting by all Argentine men eighteen and older. The coup of 1930, followed by a failed attempt to achieve legitimatization at the ballot box in 1931, reversed the development of electoral politics in Argentina by reverting to open fraud and provoking the abstention of the main national political party up to that time, the Unión Cívica Radical (UCR).

These events may explain the lack of interest in electoral research on this era, for which almost no studies exist. But in the Federal Capital, at least, elections enjoyed a reasonable climate of legitimacy, a kind of escape valve in a context of high visibility.

The capital had always been an electoral mirror for the country, the place where virtually all the national political forces originated (the well-

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known exception being the Partido Demócrata Progresista, which arose in Santa Fe). The capital was also the epicenter of the struggles, currents, and emerging factions that then could spread throughout the rest of the country. This special character is attested by the greater dispersion of the vote in the capital and its being the only place with a significant socialist presence from the late nineteenth century until the emergence of Peronism in 1946. The fact that so little research exists on elections in the area least affected by fraud during the “*década infame*” of the 1930s makes the current exploration of special interest.

In periodizing our series of studies on the elections in the Federal Capital, it seemed to us appropriate to combine the period from 1930 to 1942 with the following years encompassing the rise of Peronism up to the last election before the 1955 military coup that ousted the Peronist government. This bracketing allows consideration of the transition period preceding the 1943 coup d'état that gave rise to Peronism. Beginning in 1938–1940, a dissolution of the electoral patterns in place since 1912 can be observed, along with little-noticed emergent coalitions in the presidential elections of 1937. These changes appear to have been precursors of more drastic changes in the national political scene. Hence arises our interest in combining analyses of the Peronist era with those of the *década infame*. It can also be noted that few electoral studies have focused on Peronism in the Federal Capital, which includes some of the least propitious terrain for the movement since its inception. The capital demonstrated the limits of Perón's political power in winning the votes of the Argentine majority.<sup>1</sup>

In this research, we are focusing on changes in voting patterns. We also hope to contribute to the debate over the rise of Peronism by using data limited to the Federal Capital, a limitation that gives a certain austerity to our findings. That is to say, we are inquiring into the possible existence of “deviations” from patterns previously detected, whether introduced by fraud at the national level and the abstention of the Unión Cívica Radical or by the emergence of the new party that in 1946 came to dominate the electoral scene and created an unprecedented polarization. All these developments occurred in the capital, locus of the greatest political participation in Argentina.

Little electoral research exists for the years 1931–1942 (excluding our own research), in contrast to the abundance of studies on the rise of Peronism. Only three works took the Federal Capital into account, and then in an exclusionary manner for 1940 or later: an initial study by Gino Germani (1955), that of Walter Little (1973), and those of Lars Schoultz (1973, 1983). Other studies of the capital focus on earlier phases, like those of Richard Walter (1978, 1993) and that of David Rock (1977) to a certain extent.

1. This situation explains the “gerrymandering” of 1951, which sought by arbitrary but carefully crafted geographical redistribution of the districts (*circunscripciones*) to reduce the opposition's representation in Congress.

The present study is the continuation of a similar one dedicated to the period 1912–1930 (see Canton and Jorrot 1996). The first stage (1931–1942) transpired in a global context of a serious and unexpected economic crisis. This period also witnessed the strengthening grip of Joseph Stalin in the Soviet Union and the emergence and consolidation of the Nazi and Fascist regimes in Europe, the Spanish Civil War, and the beginning of World War II. Each of these events affected the Argentine political-electoral spectrum. The second stage (1943–1954) began with the coup that made room for Peronism to emerge, in the international context of the winding down of World War II and the start of the cold war. These years also witnessed the beginning of the crisis in Argentina in import-substitution industrialization, which had significant impact on the political scene.

In our previous work (Canton and Jorrot 1996), we noted that between 1912 and 1930 a definite socio-spatial polarization existed between the two political sectors. The Partido Socialista had greater success in working-class neighborhoods, while the parties that we call “*terceras fuerzas*” (which were broadly conservative) got better results in areas with more middle-upper strata. Between the two, occupying a sliding position along the spectrum, was the Unión Cívica Radical, which lacked spatial links to the various occupational categories but was stronger in the districts dominated by the middle sectors (particularly sectors employed in nonmanual labor).

In our earlier study (1996) and two others in progress on the same subject and same geographical unit (the city of Buenos Aires), our goal has been to advance knowledge of the social bases of the political parties and their continuities, within the limits of the available data.<sup>2</sup> Because no polls exist for the period under consideration, researchers must inevitably rely on the use of aggregate secondary data. Given the intent to link socio-spatial aspects to voting, the use of ecological correlations is unavoidable. Such correlations inevitably introduce limitations on the theoretical and conceptual possibilities of our analysis.<sup>3</sup>

The fact that we are dealing here with a single district, with its particular role in the history of the country, places another limit on generalizations or historical comparisons. This research note is essentially a case study bounded temporally in the history of a capital city (1931–1954). The larger study envisioned by the authors includes a longer span of events. It begins with 1904, when Ley 4161 (approved by the Congress in December

2. Few types of data are differentiated by voting district in the Federal Capital, and the few that exist lack continuity. The data compiled by the authors for this study can be obtained from CEDOP-UBA, J. E. Uriburu 950, 6to. piso, Capital Federal 1114. E-mail address: jrjl@fsoc.uba.ar

3. We refer to the issue of “the ecological fallacy” as well as to the limitations of correlations in general.

1902) was enacted, which required enrollment of the entire male population eighteen and older and divided the city into twenty new districts. The study continues up to the designation in 1996 of the first Jefe de Gobierno popularly elected by the citizens of the capital (Canton and Jorrat 1997b, 1997c).

The larger study takes as its central focus the continuity of class-linked zones of urban ecology or socio-spatial configurations that were associated with the major political parties active in the Federal Capital. In this regard, we are also examining the various strains of *radicalismo*, which were ill-defined in socio-spatial terms due to the variability of the sectors associated with them. The continuities were so strong that even during the ban on Peronism (from 1957 to 1965), dichotomous patterns that emerged with Peronism were maintained (Canton and Jorrat 1997a).

Previous discussions have centered on identifying patterns of support and the numbers voting for the various parties. Some of these seemed to question the existence of a class vote before the Peronist era. This interpretation is suggested in the synthesis offered by Luigi Manzetti (1993), which began with studies by Gino Germani (1955) and Pedro Huerta Palau (1963). Manzetti reported that these works were later questioned by Lars Schoultz (1973, 1983). Our impression is that Manzetti did not examine in detail the findings of Schoultz or those of Huerta Palau on the city of Córdoba (see Canton 1973, 153, n. 4).<sup>4</sup> In any case, Richard Walter's (1978) work as well as our own (1996) indicate the existence of a strong tendency toward socio-spatial class voting since the beginning of the twentieth century, at least in the city of Buenos Aires. Our findings suggest that this tendency continued through the period from 1931 to 1942. Analysts who question the existence of a socio-spatial class vote prior to 1946 may have been misled by some temporary changes toward the end of the 1930s that began to be reversed beginning in 1942.

#### ASPECTS OF THE NEW PERIOD

In the new electoral period, we distinguish two phases, 1931–1942 and 1946–1954, which exhibit different histories and a change of actors. In the first stage, the earlier pattern of socio-spatial differentiation between the Partido Socialista and the Terceras Fuerzas was broadly maintained, but only from the beginning of the decade until the mid-1930s. Then both factions lost some of their previous socio-spatial characteristics. For ex-

4. Canton indicated that the correlations of Huerta Palau for the UCR are positive with workers but negative with the independents in 1935 (Canton 1973, p. 153, n. 4). If the studies by González Esteves of the province of Córdoba are examined, data for 1940 (when the ecological correlations waned in the Federal Capital) show a definite dichotomous pattern separating the Partido Demócrata (conservative) from the UCR (a popular party), particularly in the central zone (which includes the capital of the province) and in the southern zone (see Mora y Araujo and Llorente 1980, p. 354, t. 10). The same pattern is observed in the results obtained by Schoultz for the Federal Capital in 1942 (Schoultz 1973, 53, t. 5).

ample, by 1940 the Terceras Fuerzas were showing a notable positive correlation with semi-skilled workers, while the Partido Socialista showed positive but not significant correlations with manual workers.

After its ouster, the UCR contested elections again only in 1936. It won broadly in the 1936 elections, with patterns similar to those of 1938, 1940, and 1942, although its spatial association with the worker categories was lower than in 1930. In the presidential election of 1937, much of the leftist vote (the Partido Socialista de los Trabajadores, the Partido Comunista, and the Partido Socialista) favored the radical candidate, and the consequences can be seen in correlations totally atypical of the UCR. These patterns, however, were never to be repeated.<sup>5</sup>

The period 1946–1954 is homogeneous, if rather short, in that the political-electoral confrontations crystallized as never before in the history of Argentina. The world was divided into black and white, Peronism versus anti-Peronism. Peronism dominated in the areas where the Partido Socialista and other leftist forces had attained the best results earlier. Anti-Peronist forces united the two parties that historically had fought for domination of the Federal Capital—the UCR and the PS, along with conservative sectors. In the deputy elections of 1946, the UCR showed very different socio-spatial patterns from its previous profile, more like those of the conservative forces, and it captured handily far more of the votes opposing Peronism than did the socialists in the same elections. In all respects, the PS set new patterns that differed totally from those exhibited before Peronism. In 1946 the spatial profiles of *radicalismo* and *socialismo* were very similar, except that the UCR generally showed higher positive correlations than the PS with the nonmanual sectors and higher negative correlations with the manual sectors. With the rise of Peronism, the socio-spatial bases of the UCR and the PS were radically transformed and became more alike.

#### THE FIRST PHASE, 1931–1942

Table 1 displays the percentages won by the main parties that were active in all the years under consideration. During the first phase, 1931–1942, there were eight years in which more than one election took

5. According to Puiggrós, “the Partido Comunista and the Partido Socialista Obrero launched the slogan ‘El radicalismo al poder y Alvear a la presidencia’” (1967–1968, 4:291). Meanwhile, the PS dropped from 22.9 percent in 1936 to 5.7 percent the next year. It is the flip side of what Nicolás Repetto pointed out with respect to radical voters at the beginning of the decade: “With the right to run candidates in the elections of 8 November 1931 snatched away from the radicals, many of them voted for the presidential slate of the progressive socialist-democrat alliance and for the slate of national legislators of the Partido Socialista. Thanks to this spontaneous and valuable support, our party won the two senate seats and the majority of the deputies’ benches in the Federal Capital” (Repetto 1956, 28).

TABLE 1 Percentages of Votes Obtained by the Major Argentine Political Parties from 1930 to 1954

Year	Partido Socialista	Unión Cívica Radical	Terceras Fuerzas	Partido Peronista	Blank Ballots	% of Voters
1930	24.1	24.1	31.7 <sup>a</sup>			86.1
1931	45.8		24.2 <sup>a</sup>			86.9
1934	31.8	14.1 <sup>b</sup>	9.7 <sup>c</sup>		8.9	80.3
1935	41.3	3.5 <sup>d</sup>	7.0 <sup>c</sup>			70.2
1936	22.9	41.6	2.7 <sup>a</sup>		7.8	80.3
1937	5.7	55.5	23.9 <sup>c</sup>			88.2
1938	14.6	26.9	19.0 <sup>c</sup>			77.9
1940	23.4	32.3	14.3 <sup>c</sup>			80.9
1942	26.0	22.8	16.8 <sup>c</sup>			75.5
1946	16.0	18.3	11.0 <sup>e</sup>	42.1		88.5
1948 <sup>f</sup>	16.3	18.0		43.8		83.5
1948 <sup>g</sup>		27.0		45.6	6.3	83.8
1954		40.3	0.4 <sup>h</sup>	45.1	1.2	89.7

NOTE: The percentages were calculated based on all registered voters.

<sup>a</sup> Socialismo Independiente

<sup>b</sup> UCR Talcahuano combined with UCR Avenida de Mayo

<sup>c</sup> Concordancia, which in 1940 included 0.8% of Socialismo Independiente

<sup>d</sup> Partido Radical

<sup>e</sup> Unidad y Resistencia (Democracia Progresista y Comunistas)

<sup>f</sup> Deputy elections

<sup>g</sup> Election of representatives (*constituyentes*) to modify the constitution

<sup>h</sup> Democracia Progresista

place. For these years, we chose to analyze all the elections of deputies (in 1931, 1934, 1936, 1938, 1940, and 1942), one of senators (1935), and one for the president (1937).<sup>6</sup>

### The Partido Socialista

Table 2 presents the coefficients of simple linear correlation between the vote for the PS and several sociodemographic or occupational variables. It includes for comparative purposes the correlations for the deputy elections of 1930 (see table 2).<sup>7</sup>

6. Whenever possible, we have emphasized deputy elections because of the broader dispersion of the vote and the greater frequency of this kind of election.

7. As in our other studies on these topics, we use coefficients of simple linear correlation as descriptive summaries of various political forces and many variables. For more specific arguments, we have introduced some multiple regression equations. In a tenuous defense of use of these coefficients from severe criticism, Luskin has proposed, "When prior theory is weak enough, correlations may provide clues for subsequent models. Weathervanes and anemometers in the cities do not diminish the value of a wet finger aloft in the wilderness" (Luskin 1991, 1037). We recognize that we are dealing with "ecological correlations," that is, with associations among aggregates. Consequently, we must bear in mind the risk of com-

TABLE 2 *Coefficients of Simple Linear Correlations for Percentages of Votes Cast for the Partido Socialista from 1930 to 1942*

Variable	1930	1931	1934	1935	1936	1937	1938	1940	1942
Price of real estate									
per square meter	-.73	-.77	-.72	-.78	-.63	-.62	-.69	-.42	-.63
Illiteracy (1936)	.78	.65	.67	.52	.52	.62	.59	.16	.37
Families without servants (1936)	.71	.79	.83	.80	.77	.70	.72	.54	.67
Young women working (1936)	.63	.57	.62	.39	.58	.67	.56	.42	.46
Semi-skilled workers	.72	.49	.53	.27	.34	.44	.40	-.03	.17
Skilled workers	.83	.89	.85	.74	.78	.72	.81	.54	.74
Low nonmanual	-.43	-.51	-.50	-.19	-.36	-.38	-.42	-.05	-.24
Medium nonmanual	-.50	-.58	-.56	-.33	-.37	-.50	-.47	-.01	-.26
High nonmanual	-.88	-.80	-.82	-.87	-.72	-.72	-.76	-.43	-.64
Low professional	-.66	-.69	-.79	-.84	-.70	-.62	-.66	-.47	-.62
High professional	-.85	-.87	-.85	-.82	-.78	-.76	-.78	-.53	-.70
Manual workers	.90	.78	.78	.58	.64	.66	.69	.29	.52
Nonmanual workers	-.68	-.62	-.60	-.34	-.45	-.49	-.52	-.10	-.33
Professionals	-.90	-.85	-.88	-.89	-.79	-.75	-.78	-.54	-.71
Students	-.84	-.61	-.64	-.40	-.53	-.60	-.50	-.24	-.35
Day laborers		.68	.58	.51	.38	.45	.43	-.02	.26
Clerical workers		.28	-.27	-.03	-.16	-.13	-.24	.06	-.10
Store owners		-.54	-.54	-.34	-.36	-.45	-.42	.02	-.25
Growth in registered voters from one election to another		.47	.48	-.49	-.08	-.63	.07	-.34	-.17

Sources: Electoral data came from the *Memorias* del Ministerio del Interior. The occupational data are from Walter (1993); his occupational data were derived from the voter registry of 1934. The sociodemographic data come from the Censo Municipal of 1936, except for the price of real estate per square foot, taken from the *Anuarios Estadísticos* of the MCBA for 1926 and 1927.

NOTE: Correlations are weighted by voter registrations for each year. A value equal to or greater than .45 is statistically significant at 5 percent.

The consistency of high PS correlations over the entire period should be pointed out. This finding replicates those shown by the PS in the years 1912–1930, although with somewhat lower correlations.<sup>8</sup> This notable pattern is even more striking when compared with those of the other political parties from 1913 until 1942.

mitting the “ecological fallacy” by attributing to individuals the values of the relations among aggregates. In addition to the classic work of Robinson (1950), see Achen and Shively (1995).

8. The correlations among the percentages of socialist votes came down a bit in 1935 (the senate election) and in 1937 (the presidential election, when the socialist votes split between their own party and the radical candidate).



The independent variables used in the study were virtually all those available by district that were relevant to the proposed analysis. The categories for occupations and literacy are usually essential to exploring the socio-spatial bases of voting. The price of real estate per square meter (for 1926–1927) is the only variable characterizing the districts that does not result from the sum of individuals. It is also the only indicator of high status. The remaining sociodemographic variables, drawn from the Censo Municipal of 1936, are among the few that are specified by district. They follow illiteracy in their behavior, all of them running counter to the price of real estate. Occupations are indicators of social class (always from a socio-spatial perspective) that together with the sociodemographic variables reveal the socio-spatial level of the districts.

The correlation of the Socialist vote with the type of variables mentioned, throughout the twenty electoral districts, reveals a high negative coefficient with the indicators of higher socioeconomic level (the price of real estate per square meter) and a positive one with the lower-level indicators (illiteracy, families without servants, and homes with young women working). This pattern is repeated when analyzing the vote for the PS and the occupational categories: high negative coefficients for all the nonmanual categories (particularly professionals) and high positives with laborers, skilled as well as semi-skilled.

Halfway through the period (in 1935) and even more so by 1940, this trend began to change. Both positive and negative correlations went down, suggesting a less dichotomized pattern, although the relationship almost never reversed. In any case, toward the end of this phase, during 1940–1942, the Socialist spatial profile seems to have begun to change, anticipating the impact that it would suffer with the emergence of Peronism.

This decline in the Socialist pattern from 1940 to 1946 could have been due to the rise of a party with a popular base like *Concentración Obrera* (CO). This party had participated in deputy elections since 1931 (after the coup of 1930) and competed with the PS on its own turf. The correlations for the CO are more positive for the variables indicating poverty than those of the PS and more negative for those indicating wealth. That is to say, electoral growth of the CO and its socio-spatial profile seemed to indicate that a party with more pronounced working-class characteristics could dislodge the PS from its place of honor as the electoral choice of the working sectors. Although the CO was a small party, the 30,000 votes it received between 1940 and 1942 should not be discounted, particularly if they were mostly worker votes. These votes could have influenced the variations in pattern of other parties, particularly the PS. Alfredo Galletti described the CO as a party that became a nucleus for “elements of industrial labor” (1961, 111).<sup>9</sup> It emerged from a schism within the Partido

9. In an interview with Ruggiero Rùgilo, Corbière recorded this comment: “The majority of the Partido Comunista, especially workers, came with us. . . . The mass of affiliated unions



Comunista (PC), the result of confrontations between PC leader José Penelón and the Ghioldi-Codovilla faction in 1927 and 1928 (see Puiggrós 1967–1968, 3:97ff).<sup>10</sup>

As will be shown, the PS's weakened "popular profile" (in spatial terms) was the last profile of the party reflecting a pattern of this type. After the emergence of Peronism, the PS's spatial image approximated that of the conservative parties. Moreover, the PS never again embodied the somewhat vague profile of pre-Peronist radicalismo.<sup>11</sup> Along with emerging Peronism, the PC and the CO (although possessing fewer resources than socialismo in the capital) were the parties that expressed this traditional "popular pattern" previously characteristic of the PS.

### *The Unión Cívica Radical*

The UCR per se made its official reentry debut in 1936. In 1934 and 1935, some of the factions had competed without official endorsement. The consistency of UCR correlations from 1936 to 1942 is high, somewhat higher than those exhibited in the previous period (1912–1930), except in the presidential elections of 1937 in which radical forces received signifi-

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ended up in our party—woodworkers, construction workers, shoemakers, printers, tailors" (Corbière 1984, 79).

10. Corbière indicated that printer José Fernando Penelón "was the main protagonist of the Partido Socialista Internacional and the first steps taken by Argentine communists. He does not show up in the official histories. Nor do those who could remember those days—socialists, communists, and anarchists—include him in their books. Yet Penelón occupied a decisive place in working-class history of this century" (Corbière 1984, 7). Corbière explained in detail that as soon as Penelón separated himself from the PC, he created the Partido Comunista de la Región Argentina in about 1930. A year later, the word *Región* was replaced with *República*. Sometime after 1931, "the sector adopted the name of Concentración Obrera. . . . The name was taken from its European counterpart: Concentración Obrera Antifascista. . . . One fact to conclude this subject: Concentración Obrera opposed Perón in 1945. Penelón confronted the Peronist regime, but he was one of the few voices from the Left who condemned the Unión Democrática" (Corbière 1984, 9). Corbière's interpretation is that *penelonismo* "was a manifestation of the so-called *comunismo occidental* that inspired Nikolai Bukharin and other Soviets killed during the tragic trials in Moscow in 1936 by order of Stalin. This vein of communism is echoed to some extent in contemporary Italian, French, and Spanish 'Euro-comunism'" (Corbière 1984, 8).

11. As Adelman (1992) pointed out, this conclusion does not imply causal assumptions in order to explain *populismo* by the "failure of socialismo" in Argentina—and in Latin America—to generate lasting electoral support from the working class for an alternative to democratic socialism. Adelman explained, "Moreover, the concern to explain the success of populism by pointing to the failure of socialism presumes that socialism would have made inroads among the working classes if they had promoted a prototype of what later would emerge as a populist discourse. The assumption implies that the masses, whoever they were, were ready for mobilization and provided the natural political space for a progressive movement" (Adelman 1992, 212). From our perspective, these discussions ignore the notable worker support that the Partido Socialista seems to have relied on in elections in the capital, particularly before 1930.

cant support from the Left. The unofficial groupings that ran in 1934 and 1935 show a less-defined pattern, the faction called the Partido Radical coming the closest in 1935 to the earlier official pattern of the UCR, even though the PR reaped few votes. Another grouping that came close to the official pattern was the UCR Talcahuano in 1934, given that the UCR Avenida de Mayo in that same year showed negative correlations with almost all the radical forces in all elections analyzed.

Table 3 lists the correlations for the official UCR and the unofficial groupings of 1934 and 1935, with sociodemographic variables. The official UCR, from 1936 onward, repeated the patterns faintly established in the years 1912–1930, suggesting a party encouraged by various sectors without being preeminent among any of them. The UCR won almost all these elections, except that in 1942. Its correlations are low and not significant, the signs changing in some cases from one election to the next. The exception already pointed out is the presidential election of 1937, in which the UCR presented a profile similar to the one exhibited up to that point by the PS.<sup>12</sup>

### *The Terceras Fuerzas*

In this era, the Partido Socialista Independiente stood out only twice, in 1931 and in 1936. Although it competed in 1940, its participation was negligible. In reality, the PSI practically disappeared after the elections of 1931, at the beginning of the period, when it achieved 24.2 percent of the votes, falling in 1936 to 2.7 percent and in 1940 to 0.8 percent. Concordancia, which reached its highest percentage of votes in 1937 (24.0 percent), maintained an appreciable presence in the elections of 1934, 1935, 1937, 1938, 1940, and 1942.<sup>13</sup> These third-party forces, which were conser-

12. The unofficial radicalismo of 1934 and 1935 is somewhat less defined in its socio-spatial profile (compared with oficialismo after 1935) and exhibited at times a different profile, one apparently somewhat more "popular."

13. Regarding the birth of this movement, Tussie and Federman (1973) reported: "The conservatives, who had reappeared after 6 September, decided to launch themselves in the political arena under a new name—and thus was born the party named Demócrata Nacional. This new party, together with anti-personalist radicalismo and independent socialismo, promoted the candidacy of [Agustín P.] Justo, a decision foreseeable several months in advance. The collusion was officially baptized and the name of Concordancia was coined" (Tussie and Federman 1973, 37–38). In a technical report on the conservative forces, Jorge Ossona noted: "The so-called '*fraude patriótico*' and the radical abstention facilitated the triumph of this coalition. In 1937 Concordancia ran the Ortiz-Castillo slate, which won again by virtue of fraud" (Ossona 1983, 50). Tussie and Federman observed about these elections, "by means of a switch of ballot boxes in the mail, Justo guaranteed the triumph of the oficialista candidate. One feature of these elections was the popular conviction that nothing could be done about the fraud. It was an open secret that Ortiz would be elected even though the majority of the electorate voted for Alvear. The consequence of this belief was the increased number of abstentions" (Tussie and Federman 1973, 39).

TABLE 3 *Coefficients of Simple Linear Correlation for Percentages of Votes for the Unión Cívica Radical from 1930 to 1942*

Variable	UCR <sup>a</sup> 1930	TALC <sup>b</sup> 1934	MAYO <sup>c</sup> 1934	PRAD <sup>d</sup> 1935	UCR 1936	UCR 1937	UCR 1938	UCR 1940	UCR 1942
Price of real estate per square meter	-.42	-.46	-.25	-.52	-.41	-.74	-.41	-.39	-.40
Illiteracy (1936)	.28	.08	.55	.15	-.21	.49	-.26	-.14	-.00
Families without servants (1936)	.52	.15	.36	.25	.13	.66	.03	.10	.33
Young women working (1936)	.33	-.22	.27	-.18	-.28	.33	-.36	-.25	-.06
Semi-skilled workers	.28	.08	.47	.07	-.32	.35	-.35	-.22	-.15
Skilled workers	.13	.39	.28	.41	.15	.74	.17	.08	.20
Low nonmanual	.38	-.27	-.32	-.15	.27	-.39	.21	.25	.18
Middle nonmanual	-.01	-.21	-.27	-.19	.13	-.42	.12	.08	.11
High nonmanual	-.45	-.39	-.35	-.46	-.21	-.71	-.21	-.22	-.37
Low professional	-.29	.02	-.35	-.29	-.08	-.53	.00	-.11	-.28
High professional	-.49	-.27	-.43	-.33	-.23	-.75	-.16	-.20	-.34
Manual workers	.19	.26	.42	.27	-.09	.62	-.09	-.08	.04
Nonmanual workers	.14	-.30	-.34	-.22	.20	-.48	.15	.17	.11
Professionals	-.50	-.15	-.42	-.33	-.18	-.69	-.09	-.17	-.33
Students	-.37	-.01	-.40	.04	.18	-.47	.32	.17	-.02
Day laborers		.35	.15	.44	.28	.75	.20	.36	.43
Clerical workers		-.31	-.23	-.20	.28	-.19	.12	.25	.25
Store owners		-.20	-.26	-.25	.08	-.41	.06	-.04	.05
Growth in registrations from one election to another		.56	-.28	-.09	.28	-.24	-.15	.49	.15

Sources: See table 2.

NOTE: Correlations are weighted by voter registrations for each year. A value equal or superior to .45 is statistically significant at 5 percent. The UCR ran officially only since 1936. In 1934 various slates presented themselves, of which we have emphasized the two main ones (the correlation between them is  $-.32$ ). In 1935, we took the only radical slate that competed.

<sup>a</sup> Unión Cívica Radical

<sup>b</sup> Unión Cívica Radical Talcahuano

<sup>c</sup> Unión Cívica Radical Avenida de Mayo

<sup>d</sup> Partido Radical

vative in nature, showed high correlations among themselves until 1938, although they went down a little that year. These groups suffered a significant decline in 1940, showing negative correlations. This election seems to have been somewhat atypical, given the positive correlations regained in 1942, which attained levels higher than those of 1938. Perhaps

part of this was due to the presence of more than one conservative force in the elections of 1938 and 1940, which would have tended to blur their patterns on diversifying the channels for the vote among these groups.

A reading of table 4 shows, as the most general pattern, a positive high association until 1937 of the various conservative forces with the variables indicating a higher socioeconomic level and a high negative association with the indicators of lower status (see table 4). This panorama changed in 1938 and even more in 1940 but reverted to the earlier patterns to a certain extent in 1942.

A common denominator among the various forces—socialismo, radicalismo, and parties of a more conservative stripe—was that the electoral volatility seen between 1938 and 1942, compared with the patterns recognized up to 1936 or perhaps 1937, began to affect the patterns or socio-spatial profiles of the parties, as if to presage the drastic changes to come in the electoral spectrum in 1946. A party with working-class traits like the CO held fast from 1938 to 1940 (duplicating its votes) and even grew some in 1942 (receiving 6 percent).

Meanwhile, the PS lost more than 30,000 votes between 1936 and 1938, perhaps to Socialismo Obrero (or to Concentración Obrera). Socialismo Obrero grew in 1938 (receiving 26,500 votes) as an offshoot of the official trunk of the PS, then disappeared in 1940 only to reappear in 1942, although with a meager total (4,000 votes). Socialismo Obrero was thus an ephemeral offshoot that was almost consumed in the experience of 1938. Galletti (1961) pointed out that this party, “with a fleeting trajectory . . . , went on to enlarge the Communist ranks” (1961, 111).<sup>14</sup> In contrast, the CO (originally an offshoot of the PC) tended to consolidate electorally toward the end of these years (1940–1942) but then lost its support drastically following the rise of Peronism. In 1940 the PS recaptured and expanded its following (garnering more than 47,000 votes), apparently retaking some of the votes that Socialismo Obrero had captured in 1938. In 1942 the PS improved a bit over 1940, although it remained far from its sources of support when the UCR did not run candidates in the elections. In general, considering the possible resources more its own, the PS represented in that period one-quarter of the electorate of Buenos Aires in the election of deputies.

Radicalismo meanwhile lost almost 55,000 votes between 1936 and 1938 but recovered more than 30,000 between 1938 and 1940, perhaps some of those that Concordancia had snatched away in 1938. In 1942 the

14. Jáuregui and Fernández observed, “in 1936 another ailing limb had been pruned from the socialist trunk: the Partido Socialista Obrero, which backed the candidacy of [Marcelo de] Alvear. This gave rise to a lengthy verbal confrontation with the PS that echoed audibly in the campaign. . . . The adherence of working-class socialismo to the radical candidate occasioned laughable situations, such as the placement of a large portrait of Alvear next to one of Marx at each of their very colorful functions” (Jáuregui and Fernández 1983, 87–88).

TABLE 4 *Coefficients of Simple Linear Correlation for Percentages of Votes Cast for the Terceras Fuerzas from 1930 to 1942*

Variable	PSI 1930	PSI 1931	CONC 1934	CONC 1935	PSI 1936	CONC 1937	CONC 1938	CONC 1940	CONC 1942
Price of real estate per square meter	.60	.71	.72	.74	.59	.70	.44	.09	.43
Illiteracy (1936)	-.90	-.77	-.79	-.49	-.74	-.67	-.02	.34	-.29
Families without servants (1936)	-.70	-.86	-.89	-.82	-.78	-.78	-.47	-.22	-.65
Young women working (1936)	-.77	-.71	-.69	-.55	-.74	-.59	-.22	-.10	-.53
Semi-skilled workers	-.84	-.64	-.65	-.32	-.61	-.54	.13	.44	-.10
Skilled workers	-.67	-.84	-.82	-.79	-.71	-.78	-.44	-.04	-.50
Low nonmanual	.33	.55	.54	.34	.51	.51	-.06	-.36	.09
Middle nonmanual	.48	.63	.58	.36	.54	.52	.07	-.38	.11
High nonmanual	.74	.83	.85	.77	.71	.76	.42	.02	.50
Low professional	.83	.76	.77	.65	.65	.63	.34	.11	.47
High professional	.71	.90	.93	.85	.79	.82	.46	.12	.60
Manual workers Nonmanual workers	-.80	-.84	-.83	-.63	-.74	-.75	-.18	.22	-.34
Professionals	.57	.67	.64	.44	.59	.60	.03	-.35	.16
Students	.83	.90	.92	.81	.78	.78	.44	.12	.58
Day laborers	.79	.79	.80	.61	.78	.70	.23	-.02	.48
Clerical workers		-.73	-.69	-.68	-.70	-.80	-.38	-.12	-.51
Store owners		.25	.23	.06	.18	.22	-.25	-.49	-.19
Growth in registra- tions from one elec- tion to the next		.57	.52	.33	.47	.47	.00	-.38	.09
		-.42	-.45	.02	.01	.28	-.08	-.00	-.18

Sources: See table 2.

NOTE: Correlations are weighted by enrollments for each year. A value equal to or greater than .45 is statistically significant at 5 percent. The PSI refers to the Partido Socialista Independiente; CONC is short for Concordancia.

UCR obtained almost 10 percent less than it had received in 1930. Alberto Ciria commented, "Radicalismo, after 6 September, went into a slide from which it never recovered for the entire decade" (Ciria 1975, 28). Yet that trend did not translate at the electoral level, at least in the Federal Capital. When the UCR could or did run candidates again in 1936 and 1937, it won these elections by a wide margin. The party won again in 1938 and 1940, although by a narrow margin and with a smaller following, losing only in 1942.

#### THE SECOND PHASE, 1946–1954

After the rise of Peronism, the votes for each party were highly correlated with the votes for the same party in successive elections. Similarly,

the socio-spatial profiles that emerged in 1946, more clearly defined than ever, continued almost unchanged until 1954.<sup>15</sup>

Peronism now showed a clearly “popular profile,” one typical of socialismo before 1930 (see table 5). The UCR represented the other side of the coin, with very high positive correlations with sociodemographic variables or occupational indicators of wealth and negative correlations with those indicating poverty. The PS profile was similar to that of the UCR, although somewhat less pronounced. As it turned out, the PC and the CO were the parties that displayed socio-spatial patterns similar to those of Peronism.<sup>16</sup> These results of simple linear correlations for the Federal Capital coincide with those of Germani (1955) and Little (1973). But the occupational data differ from those of Germani and for certain years from those of Little, who worked also with other units (circuits) in the capital.<sup>17</sup> (For electoral purposes, the city of Buenos Aires was divided into 20 *circunscripciones* or sections and 209 *circuitos* or precincts.) As will be discussed, this socio-spatial polarized pattern of the occupational categories yields gradations when certain multiple regression equations are considered.

15. We are not considering here the elections of 1951, given the handling of geographical redistribution of the districts in the Federal Capital by oficialismo, which made comparisons impossible. We were unable to obtain the results by circuits of that date, which would have allowed us to reconstruct the traditional districts.

16. One example would be the elections of Constituyentes in 1948, when the CO as well as the PC ran: the CO had a correlation of .77 with manual workers,  $-.68$  with nonmanual workers, and  $-.75$  with professionals. The PC had one of .78 with manual workers,  $-.67$  with nonmanual workers, and  $-.79$  with professionals.

17. Germani used unpublished occupational data from the Census of 1947. Little worked with occupational data listed in the voter registry (*padrón*), as we did except that ours correspond to 1934 while his came from the Peronist era (circa 1950). Moreover, Little calculated rank-order correlations (as did Germani) based on the occupations of a group of six precincts (*circuitos*). We have continued to use the occupational data listed in the voter registry of 1934 because we consider them much closer to the electoral data. The correlations for comparable categories among the occupational data of the census lists of 1934 with those of the Census of 1947 (t. 41, unpublished) for the Federal Capital are very high (positive): for workers in general .89, industrial workers (1947) with skilled workers (1934) .92, clerical workers .73, and professionals .94. The lowest correlation (but still positive and statistically significant) is that of clerical workers, the category most difficult to compare. Similarly, we used the last available value for the price of real estate per square meter from the year 1926–1927, even for correlations with voting data from 1946 to 1954. We did so because it is the only nonoccupational indicator of middle-upper and upper class that exhibits a notable consistency in significant positive correlations since the beginning of the twentieth century, such as 1904 with 1926–1927, .94; and 1909 with 1926–1927, .98. In addition, this variable exhibits coherent correlations with occupations in 1934 (which in turn shows very high correlations with equivalents of 1947). All this is consistent with the relative constancy of relationships among the twenty traditional districts throughout the twentieth century. Two examples will suffice: the correlation between illiteracy of those listed in the voter registry of 1916 and illiteracy of the economically active population (fourteen and older) in the census of 1960 is .86, while the correlation between the number of persons per room in 1904 (*Censo municipal*) and in 1991 (*Censo nacional*) is .62.

ELECTIONS IN BUENOS AIRES, 1931-1954

TABLE 5 *Coefficients of Simple Linear Correlation for Percentages of Votes Cast for Peronism, the Unión Cívica Radical, and the Partido Socialista from 1946 to 1954*

Variable	PLAB <sup>a</sup>	UCR <sup>b</sup>	PS <sup>c</sup>	PP <sup>d</sup>	UCR <sup>b</sup>	PS <sup>c</sup>	PP <sup>d</sup>	UCR <sup>b</sup>	PP <sup>d</sup>	UCR <sup>b</sup>
	1946	1946	1946	1948a	1948a	1948a	1948b	1948b	1954	1954
Price of real estate per square meter	-.69	.65	.42	-.60	.46	.21	-.57	.45	-.54	.39
Illiteracy (1936)	.88	-.86	-.79	.80	-.88	-.64	.77	-.92	.82	-.84
Families without servants (1936)	.89-	.94-	.78	.85	-.87	-.58	.85	-.86	.84	-.79
Young women working (1936)	.63	-.74	-.62	.50	-.77	-.50	.51	-.78	.55	-.65
Semi-skilled workers	.75	-.73	-.70	.66	-.80	-.58	.63	-.83	.70	-.76
Skilled workers	.80	-.84	-.55	.72	-.70	-.34	.71	-.68	.67	-.55
Low nonmanual	-.64	.65	.56	-.56	.68	.45	-.56	.70	-.57	.60
Middle nonmanual	-.63	.58	.46	-.51	.59	.29	-.47	.58	-.49	.46
High nonmanual	-.86	.85	.65	-.79	.72	.42	-.76	.70	-.77	.65
Low professional	-.78	.83	.67	-.75	.74	.54	-.75	.75	-.78	.74
High professional	-.89	.90	.66	-.81	.77	.41	-.77	.75	-.75	.64
Manual workers	.86	-.87	-.70	.76	-.83	-.51	.74	-.84	.75	-.72
Nonmanual workers	-.73	.72	.60-	.63	.72	.45	-.62	.73	-.63	.62
Professionals	.90	.93	.71	-.84	.81	.50	-.81	.81	-.82	.73
Students	-.83	.86	.82	-.77	.95	.62	-.75	.93	-.76	.81
Day laborers	.87	-.72	-.85	.83	-.70	-.77	.84	-.80	.87	-.82
Clerical workers	-.34	.35	.25	-.28	.33	.22	-.29	.37	-.30	.32
Store owners	-.60	.54	.43	-.48	.51	.29	-.45	.54	-.44	.40
Growth in registrations from one election to the next	.62	-.50	-.67	.66	-.34	-.76	.68	-.46	.61	-.51

Sources: Voting data, from Canton (1968) and the daily *La Prensa*; the occupational data were taken from Walter (1993), and the sociodemographic from the Censo Municipal of 1936, except for the price of real estate, from the *Anuarios Estadísticos de la MCBA* for 1926 and 1927.

NOTE: Coefficients are weighted by enrollments of each year. A value equal to or greater than .45 is significant at 5 percent. The elections in 1946 and 1948a were for deputies; those labeled 1948b were for Constituyentes; those for 1954 for vice president (men only).

<sup>a</sup> Partido Laborista (later Partido Peronista)

<sup>b</sup> Unión Cívica Radical

<sup>c</sup> Partido Socialista

<sup>d</sup> Partido Peronista



Finally, within the boundaries of the capital, the emergence of Peronism seems to have lagged disproportionately in the same districts where the PS, the PC, and the CO had earlier obtained their best electoral results. This interpretation can be inferred from the value of the positive significant correlations between these forces in the years before Peronism and the laborista vote of 1946. It may be that the same sectors that supported these leftist groups became inclined toward the labor movement. That is to say, former voters for the Partido Socialista, the Partido Comunista, and Concentración Obrera joined the ranks of the new party in 1946.

#### A DEBATED ISSUE

One theme that has stimulated debate is the role played by internal migrants in worker presence in the rise of Peronism.<sup>18</sup> The main topics discussed have been the role and weight of the workers with and without an electoral political tradition, the role of migrants, and the role of other occupational or class sectors as possibly relevant components of Peronist support in February 1946. The orthodox interpretation was advanced by Germani, who attributed a preponderant weight in the rise of Peronism to recent migrants, particularly less-skilled workers who had no electoral political tradition or one tied to the populist *caudillismo* of the provinces. Subsequently, Hiroshi Matsushita asserted, "from the empirical perspective with which we wish to analyze worker participation in the origins of Peronism, the orthodox interpretation [of Germani] has a serious defect: it is impossible to document the support of this migrant mass for Perón in the period 1943–1946" (Matsushita 1983, 14). Approximations have been attempted nevertheless to distinguish between the effect of workers and that of migrants. Within the limits of our data for the Federal Capital, the main effect on the Peronist vote (in socio-spatial terms) seems to correspond to worker presence, whereas the effect added by the presence of "migrants" to that of workers appears minimal. To reach this conclusion, we used as an approximation of "migrants" the growth from 1942 to 1946 in the voter registrations in the censuses of the capital (that is why we put "migrants" in quotation marks). A significant increase occurred, which was due neither to natural growth nor to massive acquisition of citizenship by resident foreigners.<sup>19</sup>

18. See Germani (1973), Smith (1974), Halperin Donghi (1975), Kenworthy (1975), and Ranis (1975).

19. In a compilation of studies of the development of the Argentine population, Lattes and Lattes found that for the period 1935–1945, 100 percent of the growth in the population of the city of Buenos Aires reflected migration, basically by natives (Lattes and Lattes 1975, p. 131, t. 5.7). The study also emphasized this era as the last period of great growth in the population of the city, approaching a rate of 20 percent. From the perspective of the changes in

A linear combination of both variables, manual laborers and “migrants,” accounts for 78 percent of the variability in the Peronist vote ( $R^2$  corrected equals .78), as always in socio-spatial terms.<sup>20</sup> The two variables enter significantly—more workers—in a regression equation (standardized variables), with the laborista vote as a dependent variable,<sup>21</sup> for the twenty districts of the capital. The simple linear correlations with the laborista vote of manual workers (.83) and that of “migrants” (.48) are both significant, the coefficient of the first (.768) being relevantly higher than the second (.347). One way of getting closer to specifying the effects of each one is to distinguish the direct effect of workers on the laborista vote (.768) while keeping “migrants” constant, that is, the indirect effect of these workers given the presence of migrants in that vote (.061), which together total the generalized effect of workers on the laborista vote (.830). The added effect of the presence of “migrants” approaches 8 percent on considering the effect of the presence of workers.<sup>22</sup> This outcome recurs when considering separately the equation for semi-skilled workers as well as skilled workers and “migrants.”<sup>23</sup> That is to say, the effect of the “mi-

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the electoral lists in the Federal Capital, registrations grew from 1935 to 1946 by 215,261 persons (a 50 percent increase over the number in 1935). Except for an important spurt from 1937 to 1938, the greatest growth took place in the years 1942–1946. Of the 100 percent increase between 1935 and 1946, 48.1 percent occurred from 1942 to 1946, and the remaining 51.9 percent between 1935 and 1942. We have chosen to consider the growth in registrations in 1942–1946 rather than that of 1935–1946 because the shorter period promised to distinguish better the new “migrant workers” supposedly lacking a political or voting tradition, according to Germani. By any measure, the correlation between one growth spurt and the other is very high and positive, .90. At the same time, we recognize that our approximation of “migrants” could be subject to the criticism that Germani made with respect to the “contamination” introduced by the practice of the census offices of considering as migration moves from the suburban areas to the Capital (and vice versa), given our definition of “migrants.” We do not know the extent of the movement from the suburbs in comparison with that from the interior provinces toward the Capital. Our unit of analysis is the Federal Capital itself, not the metropolitan area of Buenos Aires. Finally, we note that the simple linear correlation (not weighted by registrations) of “migrants” with workers is .18; migrants with semi-skilled workers is .07; and migrants with skilled workers is .23—none of them significant. On the contrary, the correlation with day laborers is positive and significant at .52, although few are found in the voter registry of the Federal Capital.

20. One should keep in mind the caveats raised by authors like Achen (1982) about treating  $R$ -square as the percentage of variance explained.

21. To allow comparison, we standardized the presidential vote, calculated as Germani did on the sum of votes cast.

22. The same is expressed by the coefficient of partial correlation between the laborista vote and that of manual workers, controlling for “migrants,” which reaches .864, when the coefficient of simple linear correlation between the first two was already showing a value of .830.

23. The direct effect of semi-skilled workers on the laborista vote, keeping “migrants” constant, is .643; the indirect, given the presence of “migrants,” is .030, which yields a generalized effect of semi-skilled workers on the laborista vote of .673. The equivalent values for skilled workers are .688, .075, and .763. As can be seen, the variation in the behavior of the

grants" is small when added to the effect that the workers have on their own, skilled or not. In the multiple regression equation of the laborista vote among semi-skilled, skilled, clerical workers, and "migrants," the following weights (regression coefficients) are observed for each of these variables, all statistically significant: .780, .659, .636, and .102.

A linear combination of these four variables explains some 89 percent of the variation in the laborista vote ( $R^2$  corrected equals .89; standard error of regression equals .020).<sup>24</sup> Although statistically significant, the "migrants" explain much less of the variance than the rest. Moreover, according to this equation, the laborista movement is linked more closely with the districts with more workers, skilled or not, and more clerical workers. This finding suggests that in the capital, the rise of Peronism rested primarily on the support of skilled, semi-skilled, and clerical workers, bolstered to a minor degree by the presence of the "migrants." Germani's statements regarding a strong presence of new migrant (less-skilled) laborers in the Peronist camp are not supported for the Federal Capital, given that the increase in the effect of workers, skilled or not, on the laborista vote, when the presence of "migrants" is taken into account, is very small.<sup>25</sup>

Inclusion of the "migrants" has a greater impact when equations are calculated with independent variables having high correlations among themselves (multicollinearity), which affects the estimates. This outcome occurs with our data as well as with those of Germani, although his data referred to a broader geographic area and to other units. Our equation employing practically the same variables that he considered on analyzing 144 departments shows similar tendencies, setting aside the problems of multicollinearity.<sup>26</sup>

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various categories of workers in the presence of migrants is small, repeating what was seen for manual laborers as a whole.

24. We have eliminated professionals from our estimates because of their high negative correlation with skilled workers (-.80). The category of professionals is also the independent variable that demonstrates a higher  $R^2$  (.912) when it is figured into a multiple regression equation as a dependent variable while keeping the rest as independent variables. Running the same equation but taking the other independent variables in turn as dependent, the decreasing values of  $R^2$  are skilled workers .904, clerical workers .858, semi-skilled workers .710, and "migrants" .204. When including professionals, the values of the coefficients are semi-skilled workers .622, skilled workers .299, clerical workers .308, professionals -.605, and "migrants" .099. Semi-skilled workers and "migrants" are statistically significant.  $R^2$  corrected equals .90.

25. See the introduction by Juan Carlos Torre to his compilation (1988) for a synthesis of inquiries in line with these results for the Federal Capital, but usually based on the metropolitan area of Buenos Aires or the place of origin of the migrants.

26. The values of the regression coefficients in our equation ( $R^2$  corrected equals .91) are illiteracy (1936) 3.657, "migrants" .080, clerical workers .403, professionals -.231, semi-skilled workers .252, and skilled workers .342, none of them statistically significant. Germani's coefficients were illiteracy (1947) -.160, migrants .214, clerical urban workers .118, clerical rural

Going beyond discussion of the role of the “migrants,” we referred earlier to the positive presence of clerical workers. Table 5 reveals that the simple linear correlation—weighted by registrations—of the percentage of the laborista vote with the percentage of clerical workers was negative (–.34, going to –.14 for unweighted data) although not significant. When their weight is considered in multiple regression equations, it tends to be positive and usually significant. That is to say, when the presence of some other variables is kept constant, clerical workers have a positive weight in the laborista vote. One way of trying to specify this influence is to explore the direct and indirect effects of these clerical workers, controlling for example for literacy under the supposition that the lowest levels of routine clerical workers could have been integrated into labor support in the capital in 1946. In the multiple regression equation of the laborista vote for president on literacy and clerical workers, we found a negative regression coefficient (–1.037) for literacy and a positive one (.349) for being in a clerical job, both significant. That is to say, the direct effect of clerical workers when keeping literacy constant is .349. Its indirect effect when literacy is taken into account is –.490, which yields a generalized negative effect of –.141 of the percentage of clerical workers on the percentage of the labor movement throughout the twenty districts of the capital.<sup>27</sup>

Thus Germani’s hypothesis proposing the decisive role of less-skilled workers, recently arrived native “migrants” with little political-electoral tradition or different one, is not supported by our data for the capital.<sup>28</sup> Moreover, in this district it is “the laborers” who are generally

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workers .153, urban employers –.296, rural employers –.133, rural laborers .607, urban laborers .600, and industrial size .112. Regrettably, the statistically significant values of each coefficient are not indicated (their  $R^2$  is .44). But both equations have problems of “multicollinearity.” In our case, it was necessary to eliminate the variables for illiteracy and professionals. Regarding Germani’s data, a text explaining regression analysis mentions one of Germani’s equations as an example of the problems of multicollinearity (Lewis-Beck 1980, 62–63). It points out the necessity of eliminating the variable rural laborers, which raises questions about the importance of the migration variable in explaining the rise of Peronism, contrary to what Germani showed in his equations. The equation that is reproduced in this work (data provided by Peter Snow to Lewis-Beck) does not appear in the original Germani text of 1973, and thus we do not know if they are elaborations of Snow’s ultimately attributed to Germani. For this new equation that Snow gave to Lewis-Beck, the values were urban manual workers .28, urban nonmanual workers –.47, rural nonmanual workers –3.07, and internal migrants .30, all of them significant ( $R^2$  equals .24). If the category of urban nonmanual workers were made up only of clerical workers, then these results would be different from ours because of the positive weight that the clerical workers exhibited in the Capital, according to our equation.

27. The literacy variable seemed the most appropriate for approximating the possible distinctions of levels within the category of the employed. Both are positively correlated at .47, which is significant.

28. According to Germani, his category of “urban laborers” (one of the few with positive significant weight that were important in his equation for large cities, including Greater Buenos Aires) would be composed mainly of this type of migrants. We do not know to what

those linked (socio-spatially) to the initial labor vote. Going beyond the debate between Eldon Kenworthy (1975) and Germani over the specifics of the labor sectors in Peronist support in 1946, our table 5 shows that journeymen as well as semi-skilled or skilled workers all exhibit high positive correlations with the labor vote, and therefore the high correlation for manual workers applies to all types of such workers.

We can agree partially with Peter Smith (1972, 1974) when he asserted that in the large urban centers, the older industrial workers had a significant weight greater than that of migrants. His equation for the big cities is the same as Germani's for towns of fifty thousand inhabitants and more. It also equals our results when we calculate similar regressions, although the positive presence of clerical workers did not emerge in Smith's analysis. Our results are similar to those that Germani obtained for all the departments, including Greater Buenos Aires (1973, 445), even though we eliminated some variables because of problems of "multicollinearity." That is to say, in the capital (with 20 districts) as well as in all the departments studied by Germani (144 cases), it seems that the Partido Laborista fared better in the districts with greater worker presence (skilled or not) or clerical workers (probably those with lower educational levels) or migrants.<sup>29</sup> This outcome raises doubts regarding the relative weight that Smith awarded to industrial workers in the big cities, although our skilled workers as well as semi-skilled and journeymen as a separate group show higher correlations with the industrial workers of the 1947 census than with the workers in the primary sector of the same census.<sup>30</sup> In our study as in those of Germani and Smith, the migrants have a positive weight lower than the other variables.

## CONCLUSION

If the explanatory capacity of the "social class" variable is evaluated, as indicated by the occupation declared in the voter registry, it provides a reasonable explanation of the vote, in socio-spatial terms, during the first half (1931–1936) of the era of the *de facto* or fraudulent govern-

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extent Germani attributed this characteristic to the workers of Greater Buenos Aires and to what extent to those of the Federal Capital.

29. In the equation closest to ours, that for Greater Buenos Aires, Germani indicated that clerical workers were not considered in the regression. His other equations suggest that clerical workers had a positive weight when the smaller localities are taken into account and a negative one when the larger ones are considered. Our results for the Capital would contradict such an assertion.

30. If we estimate using Smith's equation for large cities (see Mora y Araujo and Llorente 1980, 67, t. 3) but for the twenty districts of the Capital—with skilled workers instead of industrial workers—our results are similar to his. We obtain the same results if we replace skilled workers with manual laborers as a whole. Smith mentioned that the working class did not enter into his regression equation.

ments from 1931 to 1943. For the years 1912 to 1938, a three-way pattern emerges: socialismo obtained the best results in the districts with the largest concentrations of workers; the *terceras fuerzas* (basically conservative factions) did best in the districts containing more middle to upper sectors (professionals and the like); while radicalismo was somewhat undifferentiated socio-spatially, suggesting that it drew on varying sources of social support. That pattern continued until 1936.

At that point, a moment of flux was induced by an unprecedented conjuncture of leftists and radical forces in the style of the popular fronts so fashionable in Europe the time. This moment was like that produced in the presidential election of 1937, in opposition to the conservative forces then dominating the political scene.

This political effect faded after 1937. In 1938, 1940, and 1942, neither *Concordancia* nor the UCR registered significant correlations with the disjunction between manual and nonmanual workers that we have emphasized in our analysis. The PS showed differences until 1940, with only one significant value among four. That finding suggests that in 1942, the preexisting tendencies began to recur.

With slight variations, the sociodemographic variables such as the price per square meter of real estate and illiteracy tend to support the patterns detected according to occupation. The price of real estate is systematically negative with voting for the PS, almost always significant, and positive with illiteracy, although with correlations that get lower during the last two elections of the period before Peronism. *Concordancia Obrera* shows an inverse pattern to that of *Socialismo*, weakening in a certain sense in 1938 but recovering in 1942. The UCR offered a more varied pattern, negative in relation to the price of real estate, positive with illiteracy, with correlations rarely significant until 1935. From 1936 on (but excluding the election of 1937), the correlations are negative with both variables, although the negativity with illiteracy tends to disappear toward the end of the era.

In sum, we found patterns similar to those of 1912–1930 in the first half of the 1930s, a surprising conjunction between radicals and leftists in the presidential election of 1937, and subsequently generalized blurring of the earlier and most characteristic profiles of the parties between 1938 and 1942, although the last year witnessed a restoration of the previous patterns. These conclusions clearly contradict certain observations in the literature to the effect that socio-spatial class patterns began to emerge only in 1946 among *Porteño* voters. We are thus asserting that a relevant class vote did not begin in Argentina with the rise of Peronism.

Politico-social alignments changed drastically with the arrival of Peronism, which unified into a single oppositional alliance all the parties that had vied earlier for primacy in the electoral arena, except for some minor defections. Peronism took on the traditional pattern of socialismo,



while after 1948 the UCR gave up its separate identity in order to unite under its leadership the vote opposing Peronist *oficialismo*.<sup>31</sup> In the elections for deputies, the leftist forces like the PS and the PC ran separately, showing patterns similar to that of radicalismo, although somewhat weaker. They seemed to end up being more parties of the middle class, given Perón's seizure of the popular vote. Beyond this black-and-white pattern indicated by the simple correlations, the regression analysis leads to questions about the weight of new migrant workers in the Peronist vote in the Federal Capital. Our analysis indicates instead that Peronism tended to be more closely linked with the districts with a greater presence of workers, skilled or not, and low-level clerical employees, making the contribution of migrants relatively minor.

31. Given the opposition's continued criticisms of the Peronista governments as subjugating or disregarding the rules of the democratic game as mere formalities, popular support at the ballot box was fundamental for the government. As an example, see the title of an official publication of the time issued by the Ministerio del Interior, with the voting results of the presidential reelection of 1951. This publication was called *Confirmación electoral de la voluntad justicialista del pueblo argentino*. It bore the same propagandistic title as an earlier publication of similar intent, dedicated to recording the history of the elections from the passage of the Sáenz Peña law until 1946: *Las Fuerzas Armadas restituyen el imperio de la soberanía popular*.



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