

ABSTRACTS FROM *INQUIRY*

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EDITORIAL STATEMENT

INSANITY AND RESPONSIBILITY

HERBERT FINGARETTE

This paper attempts to set forth, in the context of Anglo-U.S. criminal law, the meaning of the concept of insanity, its necessary relation to absence of responsibility, and its bearing on some relevant psychiatric concepts and legal controversies. Irrationality is a distinctive and necessary (but not sufficient) condition for insanity. Irrationality consists in failure even to grasp the relevance of what is 'essentially' relevant. To that extent there obviously can be no responsibility. A mental makeup which renders one (who would not normally be so) substantially incapable of rational conduct constitutes insanity, and in that respect renders the person non-responsible. Much more broadly and roughly speaking, the mind that is ill is the mind that is irrational (and hence in that respect non-responsible).

MENTAL STRUCTURE AND SELF-CONSCIOUSNESS

BRIAN O'SHAUGHNESSY

Mental health, in one awake, guarantees that person knowledge of the central phenomenon-contents of his own mind, under an adequate classificatory heading. This is the primary thesis of the paper. That knowledge is not itself a phenomenon-content, and usually is achieved in no way. Rather, it stems from the natural accessibility of mental phenomenon-contents to wakeful consciousness. More precisely, when mental normality obtains, such knowledge necessarily obtains in wakeful consciousness. This thesis conjoins a version of Cartesianism with the concepts of mental health and human nature. Demonstration of the thesis requires that we show that a particular human mental potential fails fully to be realized when such self-awareness is impaired. That potential is for consciousness of the world (w-Cs), wakefulness. W-Cs divides into consciousness of the outer world (ow-Cs), and consciousness of the inner world (iw-Cs), and we need to demonstrate an essential dependence of ow-Cs upon iw-Cs. Now w-Cs is the adoption of the correct occurrent epistemological posture to the world, and this involves free rational determination of occurrent cognitive attitudes via the internal systematized knowledge of the world, which requires adequate awareness of mental phenomenon-contents. Therefore ow-Cs needs iw-Cs. This is displayed in mental structural accounts of hypnotic, drunken, and psychotic disturbances of consciousness. (For we endorse a structural account of mental health.) We show how failures of self-consciousness entail disturbed modes of determination of cognitive attitudes by the knowledge-system, which is loss of contact with the personal yet true internal representation of the world, which is loss of contact with reality, which is a disturbance both of w-Cs and of consciousness itself.

SPINOZA AND MENTAL HEALTH

PAUL WIENPAHL

With the proviso that Spinoza's concerns were philosophical, not medical, we examine the *Ethics* with a view to bringing out those aspects of it which are of import for mental health. We find that the *Ethics* surrounds the idea that man can be egoless in the Buddhist sense of that term. This concept provides a criterion of mental health. Further, according to Spinoza's theory of the Affections, those which are passive include some which are based on pain. These he 'enumerates among the diseases'. And for them he provides, in Part V, specific 'remedies'. This in turn leads him to equate 'Mental Freedom or beatitude' with a 'healthy Mind'. We thus have in Part V additional possible criteria of mental health. Finally, there is the suggestion that philosophy for Spinoza was a kind of therapy.

TOWARDS AN ECOLOGY OF CONSCIOUSNESS

FRANK BARRON

Forms characteristic of the earth itself are inherent in the design of man. Man's being emerged out of a cosmic matrix whose morphic aspects man himself expresses. These forms and their functional interrelationships are the very conditions of consciousness. This paper proposes that the relationship between human consciousness and its complete environment should be the subject matter of an emerging discipline, the ecology of consciousness. Constructs useful in the ecology of plants and animals should be coordinated to psychological constructs. These coordinating constructs should be based upon study of the most pervasive morphic regularities at the biophysical level. An analysis of the design of man suggests many possibilities, especially when one considers the known neurophysiological and biochemical conditioners of consciousness. Educational (experiential) strategies for the transformation of consciousness should also be explored. These might include the manipulation of variables such as volume, duration, and intensity of sensory stimulation, including various combinations of modalities. A systematic effort should be made to state the fundamental problems to which a scientific ecology of consciousness might address itself. New methods must be devised. A preliminary program for an ecology of consciousness is proposed.

SCHIZOPHRENIA AND PERCEPTION:
A CRITIQUE OF THE LIBERAL THEORY OF EXTERNALITY

JAMES M. GLASS

It is argued that a link prevails between the phenomenology of externality present in classical liberal theory and the state of mind known as schizophrenia. To escape the social reality of possessive individualism, especially the conception of consequences, ends, habits, routine, the schizophrenic individual 'withdraws' or regresses into a psychic universe that contains a dimension unrelated to the consciousness and values of externality: the pursuit of wealth and things, the calculated regard of the other as an instrument for enriching the self. The schizophrenic is incapable of adapting his 'ego' to the necessities of the social environment; he cannot defend himself in 'conventional' or 'normal' ways from the demands of living in a social milieu where the expectations and judgments of others impose intolerable pressures on consciousness. Instead the individual undergoing the painful process of withdrawal constructs a set of psychic defenses that from the standpoint of the external world appear to be 'strange', 'odd', 'bizarre', or 'demented'. The 'mode of Being' of the schizophrenic has nothing in common with the lifestyle of the acquisitive, status-conscious society. Some consideration is given to the political implications and meaning of the schizophrenic's withdrawal.

THE VALIDITY OF PSYCHOTHERAPY

B. A. FARRELL

How good is psychotherapy as a tool of research into human nature? There is an orthodox defence of it as a research tool, which relies on showing that interpretations are true of the patient when they satisfy certain criteria. This defence is examined and rejected. The reply is considered that an interpretation which 'keeps things moving' is true, or an approximation to the truth. This reply is rejected by comparing and contrasting an interpretation in psychotherapy with one from brainwashing sessions. Two suppositions about psychotherapy (which weaken its discovery powers) are deliberately adopted—the suppositions that the material produced is 'perspective' and 'method' dependent. An unorthodox defence of psychotherapy is then offered—by means of a watery sense of 'discover'. This enables us to outline a weak sense in which psychotherapy is a valid enterprise, but one which is still strong enough for research purposes.

REVIEW DISCUSSIONS:

I. WOLLHEIM ON FREUD

Richard Wollheim, *Freud*, FRANK CIOFFI.

II. THE POLITICS OF MENTAL ILLNESS

Thomas S. Szasz, *The Manufacture of Madness*, RONALD DE SOUSA.

III. ILLNESS AND PRACTICAL REASONING

David Robinson, *The Process of Becoming Ill*, MAURICE ROCHE.

IV. MENTAL ILLNESS AND THE *LEBENSWELT*

Erwin W. Straus, Maurice Natanson, and Henri Ey, *Psychiatry and Philosophy*, ed. by Maurice Natanson, ALASTAIR HANNAY.

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MARX, POPPER, AND 'HISTORICISM'

W. A. SUCHTING

According to Sir Karl Popper, there is a harmful approach to the social sciences called 'historicism'. This takes their principal aim to be historical prediction of an unconditional sort and the chief means to this the discovery of laws of historical development. The chief exemplar is held to be Marx. This paper distinguishes two possible sorts of laws of historical development. Popper's arguments against each are rejected. Which sort it is most plausible to ascribe to Marx is considered. Four models of historical determinism are distinguished and the question of Marx's view or views on the question is discussed in terms of them.

WITTGENSTEIN'S BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS
(PART ONE)

PAUL WIENPAHL

The thesis of my article, 'Wittgenstein and the Naming Relation' (*Inquiry*, Vol. 7 [1964], No. 4), was that Wittgenstein solved some early problems with a picture theory of language. The solution assumed that the units of language are words which are names of simple objects. Its undesirable consequences are exposed in my 'Wittgenstein's Notebooks 1914-1916' (*Inquiry*, Vol. 12 [1969], No. 3). Because of these consequences Wittgenstein was led to analyze the idea of a name. This analysis, together with a new philosophic method, was developed in *The Blue and Brown Books* and the *Investigations*. The present article concerns this development and supports a theme of the first article that there was a central tendency in all Wittgenstein's work: radical empiricism.

DISCUSSIONS:

I. OF WORDS, TOOLS, AND ACTIONS

SAMUEL PAGEE

The author rejects Leon Galis's claim (*Inquiry*, Vol. 11, No. 2) that in 'Of Words and Tools' (*Inquiry*, Vol. 10, No. 2) he attacks a form of the 'use' theory of meaning that no one has held. Galis's other claim, that the author criticizes a needlessly weak form of the theory, is found to be justified, but the author argues that his procedure was adequate, and parallel to that of Galis's own reconstruction of the 'use' theory in terms of 'goal-directed action'. Difficulties in this reconstruction are pointed out, and some meta-semantic issues about theories of meaning raised.

II. PRE-EMPTIVE VIOLENCE: A REPLY TO GAUTHIER

F. S. McNEILLY

The topic is some aspects of a Hobbesian argument about the state of nature—the ‘SN’-argument. The SN-argument runs thus: Two men in the state of nature will, if they act rationally, each adopt violence towards the other in anticipation of the other’s possible violence; hence a war of all against all is generated. McNeilly had claimed that the SN-argument was valid. Gauthier (*Inquiry*, Vol. 12, No. 4) applied techniques of games-theory to show that it was invalid.

III. KANTIAN INTUITIONS

JAAKKO HINTIKKA

By way of a reply to Charles Parsons’s paper in the Nagel *Festschrift*, Kant’s notion of intuition (*Anschauung*) is examined. It is argued that for Kant the immediate relation which an intuition has to its object is a mere corollary to its singularity. It does not presuppose (as Parsons suggests) any presence of the object to the mind. This is shown, e.g., by the *Prolegomena* §8, where the objects of intuitions *a priori* are denied by Kant to be so present. They yield knowledge, not in virtue of their immediacy but in virtue of their ideality.

REVIEW DISCUSSIONS:

I. ONTOLOGY WITHOUT TASTE

Richard Wollheim, *Art and its Objects*, PRICE CHARLSON.

II. NOTES ON THE ANALYSIS OF STRUCTURE AND STRUCTURALIST IDEOLOGIES

A FACET OF CURRENT FRENCH PHILOSOPHY

Jeanne Parain-Vial, *Le Sens du présent. Essai sur la rupture de l’unité originelle; De l’Etre musical; Gabriel Marcel ou les niveaux de l’expérience; La Nature du Fait dans les Sciences humaines; Analyses structurales et idéologies structuralistes*, ANDRÉ MERCIER.

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THEORY OF SCIENCE IN THE LIGHT OF GOETHE’S SCIENCE OF NATURE

HJALMAR HEGGE

J. W. Goethe is well known as one of the world’s greatest poets. Some are also aware that throughout his long and active life Goethe devoted much of this time to natural science. His theory of colour and studies in the morphology of plants are acknowledged contributions in their fields. What is much less known is that in his scientific work Goethe was attempting to elaborate and justify a new basic methodology for the natural sciences. He opposed and wished to refute the one-sided quantitative-mechanistic method which had been dominant since Galileo and Newton (and in principle still prevails today) and to set up against it a qualitative method. An essential characteristic of this qualitative method, according to Goethe, is that it is immune to a Humean reduction of the status of ‘natural laws’ to mere hypotheses. This claim makes Goethe’s view directly relevant for current discussion of such questions as the status of scientific ‘laws’ and the correct method of theory construction. The present essay tries to show the fruitfulness of Goethe’s view for such discussions, partly by means of an exposition of the view—drawn from various works—and partly by drawing consequences from it which bring it into direct contact with contemporary discussions in philosophy of science.

BELIEF AND SELF-DECEPTION

AMELIE OKSENBERG RORTY

In Part I, I consider the normal contexts of assertions of belief and declarations of intentions, arguing that many action-guiding beliefs are accepted uncritically and even pre-consciously. I analyze the function of avowals as expressions of attempts at self-transformation. It is because assertions of beliefs are used to perform a wide range of speech acts besides that of speaking the truth, and because there is a large area of indeterminacy in such assertions, that self-deception is possible. In Part II, I analyze the conditions of self-deception, and discuss the grounds on which it is regarded as irrational, even when particular instances may be beneficial. I consider some of the classical analyses of the motives for self-deception, and attempt to give an account of the occasions in which it is likely to occur. In the final section, I discuss the complex organization of the self that is presupposed by the phenomena of self-deception.

HUMAN BEHAVIOR IN DEDUCTIVE SOCIAL THEORY:
THE EXAMPLE OF ECONOMICS

ROBERT G. FABIAN

Economists, in stressing the prescriptive implications of their analysis, typically have ignored the potential contributions of their theorems and methodological principles to the understanding of human behavior as an end in itself. The purpose of the paper is to establish the principle, by detailed reference to the literature of economics, that the 'deductive pattern of explanation' constitutes a valid approach to the general study of human behavior. As such, it is a potentially useful method of analysis in the other social sciences. Literature from the philosophy of social science bearing on the applicability of deductive theory to the study of human behavior is subjected to detailed critical analysis.

WITTGENSTEIN'S BLUE AND BROWN BOOKS
(PART TWO)

PAUL WIENPAHL

DISCUSSION:

WHAT IS PITCH?

A NOTE ON THE DISSOCIATION OF LANGUAGE AND NATURE

KARL ASCHENBRENNER

Terms for the pitch of tones, such as 'high-low' do not describe pitch and can interfere with our apprehending such data for what they are in their sensuous uniqueness. Very different alternatives such as 'narrow-broad' or French *aigu-grave* serve equally well. In listening to music the first requisite is the apprehension of 'uncategorized' tones, the words for them serving only as a way of marking the fact of their differences. This must lead us to reaffirm what was said by Gorgias about what language can and cannot do in respect of such data.

REVIEW DISCUSSION:

PHILOSOPHICAL KEYS TO THE SOCIAL SCIENCES

A. Ryan [Ed.], *The Philosophy of the Social Sciences*, D. Emmet and A. MacIntyre [Eds.], *Sociological Theory and Philosophical Analysis*, B. Wilson [Ed.], *Rationality*, EILEEN BARKER.