discusses the first conflicts with Rome, describes his contacts with a wide range of modernists, particularly his friendships with Loisy and Tyrrell, and presents the *denouement*, 'thunderbolts from Rome' and the 'triumph of Vatican policy'. He could perhaps have acknowledged more explicitly the perverse accuracy of *Pascendi*, but that is a relatively minor detail. He concludes his study by emphasizing the consistency of the Baron's views to the end of his life. This judgment has, of course, been disputed.

Some say that von Hügel flagged once Tyrrell was dead. His letter to Maude Petre in 1918, in which he distinguished two kinds of modernism, is regarded as illustrating the change in his views. But Barmann quotes it (p. 243f.) in support of the Baron's consistency. Surprisingly he makes no reference to the contrary opinion. Had he done so, however, he would not have been forced to alter his judgment.

It is clear from his account that von Hügel always sought the truth. Furthermore, he recognized that its attainment involved sound critical scholarship. Whether it was a matter of Anglican Orders or a question of biblical interpretation, he was for ever anxious that it should be approached correctly. For example, Barmann writes: 'Whether or not Anglican Orders were valid by Roman criteria of validity von Hügel did not know. What he did know was that the question was primarily posed as an historical one rather than a theological one, and that consequently it must be determined by historical methods, without *a priori* determinations from scholastic theology' (p. 55). The Holy Office decree on 1 John 5, 7 (cf. AAS. 29. (1896-97) p. 637) illustrates what happens when sound scholarship is ignored (cf. pp. 64-68).

At the same time, he realized that scholars make mistakes, in fact that only by risking mistakes could worthwhile research be carried out at all. Consequently he saw that it was vital to treat scholars with a large degree of tolerance. This explains the energy he put into his defence of Loisy and Tyrrell. He did not think that they were always right in their conclusions, but he saw the need within the Roman Catholic Church for an official tolerance of intellectual horizons broader than scholasticism. He regarded the autonomy of the scholar as part of the whole process of seeking the truth. The whole was safeguarded by 'reverent ecclesiastical attachment'. And it was this attitude combined with 'sound critical scholarship' that he especially prized (cf. p. 31).

Barmann shows, therefore, that scholarly freedom was the fundamental issue for von Hügel, not the particular rights and wrongs of Loisy's or Tyrrell's ideas. Only when this freedom is guaranteed can there be any right or wrong at all. Thus the lesson to be learnt from this book is an important one, and one which some of us still need to take to heart: it is not neo-modernism to ask a serious critical question; it is the service of truth. From the sad turmoil of the modernist years, von Hügel emerges as our surest guide in that service. RODERICK STRANGE

## THE SPANISH CHURCH AND THE PAPACY IN THE THIRTEENTH CENTURY, by Peter Linehan. *Cambridge University Press.* Cambridge, 1971. 389 pp. £6.20.

The absence of serious treatment of the Spanish Church in the thirteenth century has long been one of the most serious difficulties facing anyone hoping to make a convincing statement about what the Western Church was really achieving at a time when its visible influence seems to have been very great. We must look to Dr Linehan's book to find out what effect the Lateran reforms had in a country very different in its political and social organization from the England described by Gibbs and Long (Bishops and Reform, 1215-1272, Oxford, 1934). The relationship between the leaders of the Church, both in Rome and in Spain, and the Spanish government was complicated by the fact that the Christian kingdoms there were more obviously working to expand the Christian Church than their contemporaries elsewhere in

Europe. Dr Linehan argues that the state was the beneficiary of this alliance and continued to exploit an endowment which had originally supported the bishops and clergy of Spain long after there was any scrious military activity on the Moorish frontier to justify such as re-allocation of resources. The ineffectiveness of papal efforts to rouse the Church in Spain to resist action by governments it thought morally or politically unsound would seem to follow from this earlier defeat.

In his discussion of these questions, Dr Linehan is concerned mainly with the bishops. This is a wholly reasonable limitation in the scope of a book which sets out to cover an eventful century in two very different political societies. However, it must mean that any political conclusions we are tempted to draw

from what he says must be qualified. It has, for instance, been argued most recently by J. L. Sniedman, The Rise of the Aragonese-Catalan Empire, New York, 1970; cf. F. Soldevila, Els primers temps de Jaume I, Barcelona, 1968 that the survival of the Aragonese federation after Peter II was killed at the battle of Muret in 1213 was due to the determination of Rome that James I should succeed his father and the fact that the Pope could rely on the military resources and political ingenuity of the Temple, and the Hospital to make his will a reality. Nearly a century later, the policy of James II at the Council of Vienna was largely concerned with securing that this position of power should not be wrested from the Papacy by Philip IV. If anyone was to be Innocent III's successor in Aragon, he was determined that it should be the Crown. To ignore the military orders in Aragon as Dr Linehan largely does. does not invalidate his conclusions about the implementation of reform or the political independence of the bishops. It does, however, limit the significance of these conclusions.

The book has a hero and a villain: in the first half it points the contrast between two Archbishops. Pedro de Albalat of Tarragona (1239-1251) and Rodrigo Ximenez de Rada of Toledo (1210-1247) treated demands for reform and the task of plugging the gaps in the ministry over which they presided in very different ways. By appointing an enthusiastic bench of suffragans and establishing the habit of co-operation between them both in legislation and in dealing with the Crown, Albalat not only provided conditions in which the Church could offer lay society coherent guidance but also made it possible for them to resist any attempt to treat their co-operation with the Crown in its enterprises as an automatic duty. Archbishop Rodrigo's determination to play politics and his indifference to the efforts of successive legates to tidy up the management of his province, left the Castilian Church ineffective both as a moral and as a political force. The second half of the book describes the poverty and weakness of Castilian bishops in the latter part of the century and Dr Linehan has no hesitation in denouncing Ferdinand III and Alfonso X for embezzling the endowments of the Church. Clearly the bishops in the north had a grievance: they continued to subsidize the Crown long after the crusades in the South which justified the arrangement had ceased to be a major expense. They got none of the spoils. It is not, however, possible to exclude the endowment of the restored sees in the South from the calculation. Toledo would have to be very substantially impoverished to outweigh Seville (unlike the lands assigned to the military orders. the endowment of the Archbishop there and his cathedral was made of notoriously productive land (see J. Gonzalez, El Repartimients de Sevilla, Madrid, 1951). Although the Catalan bishops lost ground financially, the new see of Valencia was extremely wealthy from the start (R. I. Burns, Crusader Kingdom of Valencia, Harvard, 1967). In neither case was the independence this gave qualified by an exceptional need for military protection after the great Moorish revolts of the thirteenth century.

The end of the century saw a head-on clash between Rome and the royal governments in England and France, in which a decisive factor was the decision the bishops made on where their loyalty lay. The Sicilian Vespers led to a complete breach between the King of Aragon and the Pope in which it can hardly be claimed that the tradition of Pedro de Albalat enabled the bishops to assert themselves: in Castile, the period was one of political confusion in which individual bishops, but not the bench as a group, took a prominent part. In a sense, this was within the pattern set by Archbishop Rodrigo but it would be difficult to maintain that the pattern was created by him or that the impoverishment of the episcopal endowment really was more debilitating than it was annoying.

We are left therefore with a situation in which neither Castile nor Aragon stands out from other European countries. The evidence Dr Linehan has assembled is the more valuable to us for that.

## PETER RYCRAFT