

insurrection broke out in April 1821 (p. 234): "For the last four years of his reign, Alexander wanted peace, not war" (p. 244). But Nichols himself notes the tsar's attempts in May–July 1821 to get an offensive alliance with France. And in 1822, even without an ally, Russia was ready, as Strangford warned, to fall upon the Porte with a "huge army" if the Russian demands were not met. Nichols also notes Alexander's eagerness to send a corps to Spain or, if he could not get allied consent for that, to send them to Piedmont. The author dismisses Strangford's reports of the tsar's belligerency toward Turkey in 1825 as "mere legend" (p. 235), for the tsar had lost interest in foreign affairs.

But it is the latter which is mere legend. It was not only Strangford who believed that Alexander was preparing for war, but also the Austrian and Prussian envoys. And after Alexander's death his successor confirmed that his brother had been preparing to "finish the matter." When Alexander went to the Crimea, he took his chief of staff with him, and his armies were already concentrated in positions that Canning knew meant war on the Danube in the spring.

ALLEN MCCONNELL
Queens College

AN INTRODUCTION TO NINETEENTH-CENTURY RUSSIAN SLAVOPHILISM: A STUDY IN IDEAS. Vol. 2: I. V. KIREEVSKIJ. By *Peter K. Christoff*. Slavistic Printings and Reprintings, no. 23/2. The Hague and Paris: Mouton, 1972. xiii, 406 pp. 68 Dglds.

A comparison with a recent study of Kireevsky by Abbott Gleason underscores the significance of this book's contribution to our understanding of Slavophilism. Gleason, a historian, scrutinizes the imprint of Nicholaevan repression on Kireevsky's mind, stressing the origin rather than the import of his ideas. Professor Christoff, writing with evident sympathy from within the philosophical tradition of Lossky and Zenkovsky, presents the Slavophile doctrine as a major, uniquely Russian contribution to the theory of knowledge. Ivan Kireevsky, who is the subject of the second volume of his Slavophile series (the first one was about Khomiakov), is viewed as the theoretician of the movement.

After following young Kireevsky's sporadic forays into the arena of literary criticism and cultural history, Christoff concentrates, in the second and by far the more valuable part of the book, on Kireevsky's mature contribution to Slavophile ideology. The maximum importance is given to the last two epistemological essays, one of which ("On the Necessity and Possibility of New Principles in Philosophy") is reproduced in the appendix. The most controversial aspect of part 1 is Christoff's systematic attempt to disparage Peter Chaadaev as a thinker and mover of men. He argues that the famous comparison between the civilizations of Western Europe and Russia was being developed by young Kireevsky in the late twenties, in the same terms as Chaadaev's and independently of him. Thus deprived of much of his originality, Chaadaev is not even credited with consistency, as Christoff singles out, somewhat maliciously, all the discrepancies between the private letters and the public pronouncements. Kireevsky, on the other hand, gains in substance and emerges as an "inspirer of Moscow Slavophilism," with a faith in Russian genius dredged from the depths of folk poetry and wisdom.

Christoff sees the Slavophiles as authentic philosophers of Orthodoxy, and this leads him to minimize their debt to German Idealism. His case is well served

by his thorough knowledge of Eastern patristic philosophy and Russian monasticism. Unlike Masaryk and other skeptics, he avoids all speculation about the psychodynamics of Kireevsky's religious experience, concentrating instead on the intellectual content of his relationship with Optyn' (Optina Monastery). Each patristic text that Kireevsky read is taken up separately, its possible influence detailed with admirable precision. One can only wish Christoff had done the same for the Germans, Schelling in particular, whose contribution he discusses only in general terms. But the conclusion—that for Kireevsky, as for the Orthodox Fathers, knowledge was an accompaniment of faith—is unexceptionable. Like Kierkegaard in the West, Kireevsky never tired of warning against the perils of Hegelian reason. Christoff draws an apt parallel between these two existentialists. Moreover, his emphasis on Kireevsky's diagnosis of alienation as the fatal disease of Western intellect suggests an affinity between Slavophile epistemology and Dostoevsky's vision of the dreamers of reason who inevitably engender monsters. While Christoff falls short of exploring this link, he deserves much credit for all his other numerous allusions and explorations. His text and notes reach out into germane areas of Russian thought, always in pursuit of that religious strain in the blood which nourished the imagination of so many Russian novelists and poets.

MARIA BANERJEE
Smith College

THE CRIMEAN WAR: A REAPPRAISAL. By *Philip Warner*. New York: Taplinger Publishing Co., 1973. vi, 232 pp. \$9.95.

Mr. Warner, in trying to correct some of the common errors about the Crimean War, has not been entirely successful, especially in his treatment of the diplomacy. The treatment of the campaigns is better. He certainly shows the British lack of planning and organization that proved so costly.

The narrative is on the whole accurate. It covers the landing and the Battle of the Alma, where the British did well, and then the march around Sevastopol to the shore south of it, while the Russians hastily threw up earthworks to protect the port. The initial bombardment failed, and the Russians counterattacked at Balaklava and then at Inkerman, where they almost destroyed the British army and won the war. The winter storms caused further havoc. But a remnant of British survived, and, with the large French force, continued the siege. Under Todleben, however, the Russians improved their defenses so much that the allies could do little until July 1855. In June a general assault on the fortress failed, with terrible casualties.

The siege went on, and allied superiority in resources turned the tide. Although the Russians had plenty of cannon, they did not have the huge mortars that the allies used, and—the author to the contrary—they often lacked gunpowder, bombs, and shells. Most of their army was in Poland, the Baltic area, and the Caucasus.

Warner also emphasizes the Russian siege of Kars, but largely disregards the allied raids elsewhere. In summing up, he gives top credit to the French, and warmly praises Todleben and the Russians. The British, who did poorly in 1855 and failed dismally in the final assault, lost much prestige. The Turks made a miserable showing. On the whole, an accurate judgment.

JOHN SHELTON CURTISS
Duke University