

the ISB might have prevented the war; but it could not even speak a few words in the name of the entire International that might have given some pause to the chancelleries.

When they mounted large and impressive demonstrations over the Balkan Wars, the socialists thought they had some power—that the antiwar movement was on solid footing. They foolishly forgot that governments pick the sideshows that interest them and ignore the others. Kautsky believed in July 1914 that the International had never been stronger or more united. Jaurès and his “ethical idealism” (Haupt’s term) loomed as a tower of reason and restraint. True, the German and French parties (not to mention the Russian) had split on the question of a general strike against war; but gradually German opposition began to soften, and there was reason to hope that the 1914 Vienna Congress would produce an effective compromise.

Great events overwhelmed the preparations for that meeting, which became another, minor victim of madness unleashed. With Jaurès dead, the SPD voting war credits in lockstep, Frenchmen rushing to the colors in part because they feared the consequences of staying home, and Lenin hammering out the first drafts of his plan to transform the very nature of the war—with all this going on, the International died an ignominious and unmourned death. It had neglected to propagandize the armies, had passively and senselessly accepted the respectability thrust upon it by calculating governments, had squabbled over minutiae, and had in the end done all it could to commit suicide. It succeeded. And history repeated itself as tragedy.

Georges Haupt has given us yet another version of the story in this long introduction to the sixteen-page record of the July 29–30, 1914, Brussels session of the ISB. There are changes in this version, but they do not render it substantially different from the 1965 French original, *Le Congrès manqué*. Haupt brings his unique knowledge of the International to bear in effective fashion. But still many tormenting questions remain, and one turns again to Roger Martin du Gard.

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LENIN: THE EXILE RETURNS. By *Kenneth F. and Heloise P. Mailloux*. Princeton, Philadelphia, New York, London: Auerbach Publishers, 1971. Published simultaneously in Canada by Book Center, Inc. ix, 150 pp. \$5.95.

This is a semipopular biography of Lenin, published in the Auerbach series, Great Events in World History. It is hard to say what audience it is really aimed at, for it tells nothing of significance to one who has read any serious biography of Lenin, yet it is not dramatic enough nor popular enough for a general audience. Its modest bibliography suggests a fair amount of reading but no serious checking of moot points. Its system of footnoting is sporadic, and when we really want to know the source of a statement attributed to Lenin, such as “The worse, the better” or “One who has been whipped is worth two who have not,” there is no source given at all.

The book contains much that is interesting and unexceptionable, but nothing that suggests original research or turns up new material. In one respect at least it is gravely misleading. On page 11 the authors, writing of Lenin’s “unreasoning admiration for the peasantry,” say: “He thought that peasants were basically more

honest and trustworthy than people on higher rungs of the social ladder. This bias stayed with him all his life; his trust in Stalin was, for example, colored by Stalin's peasant background." They say this of the man who wrote the famous memorandum to the other members of the editorial board of *Iskra*: "We should show every kindness to the peasantry, but not yield an inch in our maximum program. If the peasants do not accept socialism when the dictatorship comes, we shall say to them, 'It's no use wasting words when you have got to use force.'" As for Stalin, he was no peasant, but the son of a cobbler, who studied to be a priest, worked in a subordinate capacity in an astronomical observatory, and when in power put into concentration camps and killed more millions of peasants than any other ruler in history.

In short, as a popularization the book is neither sound enough nor popular enough, and as a serious study it is lacking in scholarship.

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LENIN. By *M. C. Morgan*. Athens: Ohio University Press, 1971. xii, 236 pp. \$8.75.

Although the title implies a biography, this is an unpretentious study, organized chronologically for the most part, which focuses on Lenin's ideology and politics. The narrative is leavened by occasional asides depicting the informal Lenin, and a sketchy biographical framework is provided. The author uses no sources in the Russian language and relies heavily on the forty-volume English edition of Lenin's *Collected Works* (Moscow, 1960–68), which is drawn largely from the unsatisfactory fourth Russian edition. His other sources are chiefly secondary, but he has used (or appears to be familiar with) a wide range of scholarly Leniniana and related material on Russian history. Much of the book is rather conventional, presenting a textbookish summation of various topics that have little or no relation to Lenin or to the Bolsheviks. The chapters on 1917 are based to a considerable extent on Trotsky and Sukhanov, and Mr. Morgan would have been well advised to make better use of the recent work of Alexander Rabinowitch on the July Days and Robert V. Daniels on the October Revolution. The final chapters are concerned with Soviet domestic issues and hardly more than touch on foreign relations or Comintern affairs. The tone is scrupulously objective, though one detects a certain sympathy, if not admiration, for Lenin the man. The style is simple, generally lucid, and free from pedantry ("workmanlike" as book reviewers used to say) but not compelling or "popular" enough to attract any large segment of the general public.

When compared with Harold Shukman's *Lenin and the Russian Revolution* (New York, 1967), a somewhat similar treatment in short compass, Morgan's work does not appear to the best advantage. The two books illustrate the difference between the informed nonspecialist and the experienced professional in command of the primary sources. Though it may seem more than a bit redundant, *Lenin* is nevertheless a skillful synthesis and useful reading for undergraduates. And on a number of matters (e.g., Lenin's philosophical views, the Red terror) it has something reasonably original to say.

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