

RESEARCH ARTICLE

Contesting Master Narratives: Renderings of National History by Mainland China and Taiwan

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Abstract

The growing tension between mainland China and Taiwan has a cultural aspect closely related to national identity. We focus on recent history curriculum changes in the mainland and in Taiwan and find that education authorities on both sides have implemented master narratives for content selection in and organization of history textbooks. In mainland China, the master narrative of pluralist unity constructs a geographically consistent Chinese nation throughout history, which bolsters the state's current claim to a territorial integrity including Taiwan. In Taiwan, the master narrative of multiculturalism becomes the essence of Taiwanese identity, and weakens Sinocentrism in Taiwanese official historiography.

摘要

在文化层面，中国大陆和台湾日益紧张的关系与国家认同密切相关。本文关注大陆和台湾历史课纲最新的变化，发现两岸教育主管部门在历史教科书的内容选择和组织上都贯彻了主导叙事。在中国大陆的历史教科书中，“多元一体”的主导叙事构建了一个在历史上具有地理一致性的中华民族，这支持了中国政府目前对包括台湾在内的领土完整的主张。在台湾的历史教科书中，“多元文化主义”的主导叙事成为台湾人认同的核心要素，削弱了台湾官方史学中的中国中心主义。

Keywords: China; Taiwan; national identity; history textbooks; master narratives

关键词: 中国; 台湾; 民族认同; 历史教科书; 主导叙事

In 2019, the latest history teaching curriculum for “12-Year Basic Education” took effect in Taiwan, with new history textbooks entering into service. The most controversial feature of the new textbooks was that Chinese history was no longer presented separately, but was merged into general East Asian history. This resulted in a substantial reduction of content on Chinese history, especially ancient history – content which conservative Chinese nationalists in Taiwan saw as essential to maintaining cultural ties between mainland China and Taiwan. This change thus constitutes a significant leap toward the Taiwanization of official history – a process which, though underway for about three decades, reflected an ambiguous balance between Chinese and Taiwanese identity before the latest change. However, with a Taiwanese identity independent from Chineseness becoming pervasive in Taiwanese society,¹ and the pro-independence Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) holding a politically “complete mandate,” the Tsai Ing-wen 蔡英文 administration has pushed Taiwanese nationalist narratives forward through education materials.²

1 According to the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University, in 2020, 64.3 per cent of respondents identified as Taiwanese, 29.9 per cent as both Chinese and Taiwanese and only 2.6 per cent as Chinese. In 1992, the proportions were 17.6 per cent, 46.4 per cent and 25.5 per cent, respectively. See <https://esc.nccu.edu.tw/PageDoc/Detail?fid=7800&id=6961>.

2 The curriculum changes for “12-Year Basic Education” began before Tsai’s presidency, but changes to history and Chinese – the two subjects most closely related to national identity – were fully completed under Tsai’s watch. See Chang, Chin and Yang 2022.

Concurrently, in the mainland, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in 1992 launched the Patriotic Education Campaign, promoting nationalism to strengthen national solidarity. National reunification with Taiwan is seen as a critical element in the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.” Until the early 2010s, reunification was seen as a long-run mission, with the expectation that people on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, sharing a common ethno-cultural background, could come up with a resolution in the future. However, the 2016 Taiwanese election results favouring the DPP caused Beijing to tacitly acknowledge the maturing of Taiwanese identity and to respond by strengthening the push for reunification in the near future, while China and Taiwan still share extensive cultural ground. Expressions of national unity have become more prevalent in official People’s Republic of China (PRC) discourse on Taiwanese affairs. Education discourse has also adopted a hard-line tone towards territorial integrity. A Ministry of Education (MOE) official stated that new history textbooks “describe the historical origins of Tibet, Xinjiang, Taiwan and its affiliated islands, and the South China Sea islands, as integral parts of China’s territory, to enhance students’ awareness of safeguarding national unity and sovereignty.”³ In this way, this hard-line discourse reacts not just to Taiwanese nationalism but also to perceived challenges to Chinese territorial integrity elsewhere.

Although military coercion has deterred the formal independence of Taiwan,⁴ the growing distance between Taiwanese and Chinese national identity clearly complicates Beijing’s project of winning Taiwanese hearts over to “peaceful unification” by promoting economic and cultural ties.⁵ This study belongs to a larger Chinese-government-funded project exploring approaches to preserving a common collective memory between people on both sides of the Strait. Despite the political agenda of its funder, this research attempts to maintain a scrupulously objective stance and provide a neutral assessment of the cross-Strait discrepancy in the construction of national identity through the writing of history. Instead of making value judgments on “how history textbooks should be written” or the underlying facts of the histories they present, we compare the latest curriculums and history textbooks with their previous versions in both Taiwan and mainland China. Our qualitative analysis finds that nationalistic master narratives are more explicit in these texts compared to previous versions, providing competing answers to the “national question.”

The Patriotic Education Campaign in Mainland China

Until the late 1970s, class struggle theory dominated the writing of history in mainland China.⁶ Ethnic conflicts in ancient Chinese history were interpreted as immoral fights among the elite class across different ethnic groups, victimizing working people of various ethnicities.⁷ Wars and revolutions in modern China were also viewed in terms of class struggle,⁸ and the Kuomintang (KMT), defined as a reactionary force and class enemy, was given scant credit for fighting the Japanese during the Second World War.⁹ Indeed, in these narratives, the Anti-Japanese War (1937–1945) was overshadowed by the subsequent Chinese Civil War (1945–1949) between the KMT and the CCP.¹⁰

However, the “reform and opening up” beginning in the late 1970s brought capitalist modernization to China, rendering the class-centric narrative unpopular, especially among youth. In

3 “Jiaoyubu: putong gaozhong lishi tongbian jiaocai zongdian tuchu guojia zhuquan jiaoyu” (Ministry of Education: general high school history textbooks focus on national sovereignty education), *Renmin ribao*, 27 August 2019, <https://cn.chinadaily.com.cn/a/201908/27/WS5d6497cea31099ab995dbec0.html>. Accessed 13 February 2022.

4 Schreer 2017.

5 Rigger 2018.

6 Yu 2013.

7 Lu 2017.

8 Wang 2008.

9 Coble 2007.

10 Ibid.

addition, the Tiananmen Movement in 1989 prompted the Party to address the “belief crisis” threatening the legitimacy of communist rule. In 1992, the nationwide Patriotic Education Campaign was introduced, marking the shift from socialism to nationalism as the dominant ideology promoted by the state to heal the rifts in national solidarity. The narrative of “national humiliation,”¹¹ having existed in the early twentieth century but which was abandoned in the Maoist era,¹² superseded *class struggle* as the dominant master narrative for modern Chinese history. It was reconstructed to provide a convincing nationalist story: China, an ancient civilization with a superior cultural tradition, fell behind in the modern era, resulting in her defeat in successive wars (starting with the First Opium War of 1839–1842) against Western imperialism (including Japan), leading to loss of sovereignty at foreign hands through “unequal treaties” and military occupations. In this narrative, the CCP was the nation’s saviour, defeating the reactionary forces, establishing the PRC, and ending “one hundred years of national humiliation.”

Youth were the most important target of patriotic education. Patriotic materials such as the “national conditions” (*guoqing* 国情) series of readers¹³ and the *Never Forget National Humiliation* (*Wuwang guochi* 勿忘国耻) reader¹⁴ were published for pupils. Existing school textbooks were also extensively revised to convey the nationalist narrative. Stories of the victimization of China were more emphasized than before,¹⁵ as the national independence struggle replaced class struggle as the purported central axis of modern history. Although still portrayed as a reactionary force, the KMT was given credit for leadership on the centre-stage battlefield during the Anti-Japanese War.¹⁶

The national humiliation narrative spectacularizes the anti-foreign aspect of Chinese nationalism, and the literature on the Patriotic Education Campaign has focused on how its constructed post-Opium War history justifies hostility against Western countries.¹⁷ However, Zhao Suisheng has also mentioned “national unity...against ethnic nationalism”¹⁸ as an important aspect of the campaign, suggesting that Chinese nationalism has an inward-looking dimension aimed at managing the controversy between national unity and ethnic diversity. As the Party struggles to find historical roots for multi-ethnic solidarity to meet present needs, how pre-1840 China is defined in historiography deserves more attention.

That this question has suffered scholarly neglect is understandable. Since the twentieth century, efforts to define the Chinese nation have been haunted by the political need for unity and the reality of multi-ethnic diversity.¹⁹ The contradiction between unity and diversity was exposed by the ideological transition from socialism to patriotism.²⁰ The contemporary claim to multi-ethnic solidarity and the state’s ostensive recognition of the autonomy of ethnic minorities must face the historical burden of Han dominance and inter-ethnic conflicts. This is probably why the national humiliation narrative, though it renders territorial integrity sacred in public culture, cannot project back effectively into premodern history. History textbooks on premodern China in the 1990s and 2000s indicated oscillation between multi-ethnicity and Han-centrism,²¹ despite the narrative of “ethnic integration” (*minzu ronghe* 民族融合).²² A fully convincing historical story of multi-ethnic solidarity would have been difficult to forge; additionally, the prevailing narrative of national humiliation

11 Wang 2008.

12 Callahan 2006.

13 Doughty 2009.

14 Liu and Ma 2018.

15 Gu 2021.

16 Wang 2008.

17 Callahan 2006; Doughty 2009.

18 Zhao 2004, 234–238.

19 Lyu 2021.

20 Vickers 2007.

21 Yan and Vickers 2019.

22 Lu 2017.

rendered pre-1840 history somewhat disregarded. Besides, curriculum reform in the early 2000s highlighted the scientific, objective aspects of history, the analytical process, and the importance of nurturing students' thinking skills.²³ As modern history has taken the role of spreading patriotism, premodern history (along with world history) has remained relatively objective, but the unresolved tension between ethno-national unity and diversity has not been viewed as an urgent problem within the state project of ideological education.

However, the "national problem" has increasingly challenged the party-state since the 1980s. Although the state's efforts to strengthen national unity with economically preferential policies contributed to socioeconomic progress in ethnic minority regions,²⁴ many minorities found themselves labelled incompetent in the meritocratic system and marginalized in the market economy.²⁵ Besides economic inequality along ethnic boundaries,²⁶ state governance over Xinjiang and Tibet was undermined by an ill-designed segregation policy in education, restriction on religious practices, mutual distrust between Han and non-Han and lack of inter-ethnic communication ability among local Han cadres.²⁷ These factors fuelled ethnic discontent, ethnocentricity and subsequently the ethnic riots in Lhasa in March 2008 and in Ürümqi in July 2009.

Perceiving ethnic conflicts as an imminent threat to the state, policy-makers and intellectuals sought to reconfigure the official discourse regarding the "national problem."²⁸ Some scholars with connections to the Party and state demanded education reform. They challenged the incumbent discourse emphasizing ethnic identification, on which ethnic policy was built, and advocated "depoliticization" and "attenuation" of ethnic identities in defining the Chinese nation, using national security as the selling point and editing textbooks in Xinjiang accordingly. This discursive transition from ethnic diversity to ethnic integration and national unity was adopted nationally by the Party in 2010,²⁹ and the idea of territorial integrity was correspondingly strengthened in junior high school textbooks under the banner of "sovereignty education" promoted by the Xi Jinping 习近平 administration.³⁰ By analysing the latest history textbooks for senior high school students, this paper shows how materials propagandizing ethnic integrity and national unity are integrated into a narrative of "pluralist unity" (*duoyuan yiti* 多元一体) and how the Patriotic Education Campaign has affected writing on premodern Chinese history for the increasingly ideological education system.³¹

The Taiwanization of History Education in Taiwan

After fleeing the mainland in 1949, the KMT government forbade most research on Taiwan's autonomous history, to repress Taiwanese consciousness. Official historiography in Taiwan expressed Chinese nationalism, like its mainland counterpart, and barred views on the Communist Revolution that opposed the KMT party line (e.g. positive views). National humiliation was again a theme.³² Premodern history emphasized the Chinese nation's cultural roots as "a singular, timeless, and undifferentiated entity"³³ in which non-Han ethnic groups were assimilated by the dominant Han culture. Indigenous and diverse local cultures in Taiwan were marginalized or stigmatized in official discourse.³⁴

23 Jones 2005.

24 Lai 2009.

25 Zang 2010; Zhang and McGhee, 2014.

26 Wu and Song, 2014.

27 Yee 2003; Zhang and McGhee, 2014.

28 Sun 2019.

29 Zhao and Tok 2021.

30 Xu 2021.

31 Yan et al. 2021.

32 Wang 2008.

33 Liu, Hung and Vickers 2005, 113.

34 Liu, Hung and Vickers 2005; Wu 2017; Sung 2020.

Democratization in the late 1980s radically changed Taiwan's cultural and political landscape. Indigenous cultural narratives, formerly suppressed, were recovered and promoted. Professional historians such as Ts'ao Yung-ho 曹永和 (who developed the concept of "Taiwan Island history" [*Taiwan dao shi* 台湾岛史]) contributed to the consolidation of this new Taiwan-centred paradigm. The DPP quickly became a political and cultural stronghold for the Taiwan independence movement. Under the presidency of Lee Teng-hui 李登輝 (a KMT leader who "defected" to the pro-independence camp), a new textbook series for senior high school, titled *Understanding Taiwan* (*Renshi Taiwan* 认识台湾), was adopted. Periodizing "400 years of Taiwanese history" into periods of Chinese, Dutch and Japanese rule, sequentially juxtaposed,³⁵ the history textbook in this series presented an independent national history not subordinate to Chinese history, stirring vehement protest from Chinese nationalist conservatives in Taiwan.³⁶ However, until around 2000, changing Taiwan's national identity in textbooks was still too sensitive to be a political priority. During the 2000 presidential election, DPP candidate Chen Shui-bian 陳水扁 downplayed the issue of national identity and promoted a "new middle road" catering to moderate voters. His victory led to the first change of governing party in Taiwan's history.³⁷

During his presidency, however, Chen increasingly found it difficult to satisfy moderate voters. Mediocre performance in the 2002 mid-term election prompted him to abandon the "new middle road" and embrace sociocultural Taiwanization, to mobilize pro-independence voters. Opposition parties in turn formed an anti-independence coalition. Since then, national/ethnic identity has become arguably the most salient topic in Taiwan elections. Both the KMT and the DPP have found identity cleavage an effective tool for mass mobilization.³⁸ History curriculum revision became an identity battleground. In a 2003 proposal, Taiwan history, previously embedded within Chinese history, became its own subject in high school, with separate textbooks. The proportion of Chinese history was reduced, and modern Chinese history was integrated into world history. The KMT and other pro-unification forces condemned the proposal for its implicit promotion of Taiwanese independence, leading to suspension of the revision. However, the appointment of Tu Cheng-sheng 杜正勝, a compiler of the *Understanding Taiwan* textbook, as minister of education in 2004 gave the Taiwanization of national historiography a strong boost. Under Tu's leadership, a temporary curriculum³⁹ was implemented in 2006 that, besides treating Taiwan history separately, employed some "rectification" of terminology to dilute Taiwan's Chinese identity. For instance, Sun Yat-sen, the founder of the Republic of China, was no longer referred to as the "father of our nation" (*guofu* 國父), but instead only by his name. The "Japanese occupation" (*Riju* 日據) of Taiwan was changed to "Japanese governance" (*Rizhi* 日治): no longer implying that Taiwan was a Chinese territory taken by the Japanese.⁴⁰

The escalation of partisan conflicts along the identity cleavage did not aid the DPP in the 2008 presidential election. The party was badly hurt by Chen Shui-bian's corruption scandal. The KMT, led by Ma Ying-jeou 馬英九, won the election with an absolute majority in the legislature. Its supporters perceived the imbalance of power favouring the KMT as an opportunity to reverse the Taiwanization of history education, consistent with the KMT's "one-China policy" and its platform of improving cross-strait economic connections.⁴¹ A new round of curriculum revision started in 2010, with pro-unification activist Wang Xiaobo 王曉波 convening the history curriculum committee, which increased the amount of Chinese history taught in senior high school.⁴² This curriculum was implemented in 2013.

35 Yeh 2016.

36 Yang 2021.

37 Kwok 2017.

38 Ibid.

39 "Temporary" because it did not complete administrative evaluation before the abovementioned suspension.

40 Kwok 2017.

41 Chang, Chin and Yang 2022.

42 Kwok 2017.

While this revision kept Taiwan history separate from Chinese history and did not attempt to reverse Taiwanization,⁴³ the traditional framework of Chinese history, composed of different dynastic periods and represented by the dominant Han culture, remained largely intact.⁴⁴ Taiwanese and Chinese histories were both taught in senior high school, suggesting that both were equal carriers of national identity. Therefore, despite political polarization along the national identity cleavage, history textbooks retained a strategic ambiguity and refrained from taking sides, as did textbooks in other school subjects.⁴⁵

This “balance of nationalisms” was compromised from 2012, when pro-unification activists demanded that some “improper” terms and descriptions be replaced with those suggesting historical connection between the mainland and Taiwan. In October 2013, the MOE organized a special committee for “fine-tuning” (*weitia* 微調) the curriculums of history and three other subjects; however, pro-independence activists lobbied DPP-controlled local governments to boycott the fine-tuned textbooks. Student activists, inspired by the 2014 Sunflower Movement (*taiyanghua yundong* 太陽花運動) against liberalization of trade relations with China, spearheaded protests targeting the top-down curriculum review procedure. In May 2015, under the banner of “opposition to black box curriculums” (*fan heixiang kegang* 反黑箱課綱) or democratized curriculum reform, students across Taiwan demanded reversion of fine-tuning and democratization of curriculum revision. Facing escalating public opposition, the Executive Yuan and the MOE, while still endorsing the fine-tuned curriculums, made them optional for teachers.⁴⁶

The protest against fine-tuning, a product of Taiwanization, fed DPP political momentum in the 2016 presidential election, where it won a majority of legislative seats. Once in office, the Tsai Ing-wen administration abolished all four fine-tuned curriculums. The new DPP-dominated history curriculum committee included student representatives.

The new curriculum of 2019 is a landmark of Taiwanese nationalism, dissolving the homogeneity of Chinese history and adopting a master narrative of Taiwanese *multiculturalism*. Both political parties in Taiwan have promoted multiculturalism in discourse and education policy since the 1990s, alongside the liberalization of immigration policies. The *Understanding Taiwan* series proposed that Taiwanese society comprised four ethnic groups: indigenous people (*yuanzhumin* 原住民), Hokkien (*minnanren* 閩南人), Hakka (*kejiaren* 客家人) and mainlanders (*waishengren* 外省人).⁴⁷ In the 2000s, school textbooks increased coverage of ethnic minorities and diversity issues.⁴⁸ The Sinocentric narrative was challenged,⁴⁹ but the integrity of Chinese history remained intact, and the master narrative of multiculturalism did not define the national community. However, in the latest curriculum, with Chinese history narrated “from a regional and intercultural perspective within the East Asian context,”⁵⁰ the multiculturalism narrative has gained hegemony.

Both the Taiwanization of education and the mainland’s Patriotic Education Campaign have responded to a difficult “national question”: For mainland China, the controversy between national unity and ethnic diversity; for Taiwan, the uneasy coexistence between Chinese national identity and incipiently national Taiwanese identity. By analysing recent history curriculum/textbook changes on both sides of the Strait, this paper demonstrates the two sides’ symbolic solutions to their respective “national problems.”

43 Stolojan 2017.

44 Sung and Chen 2015.

45 Hung 2016.

46 Kwok 2017.

47 Cheng and Fell 2014.

48 Wu 2017.

49 Heylen 2010.

50 Sung 2020, 687.

Research Method

Curriculum guidelines play a significant role in textbook writing on both sides of the Strait. The latest guideline on the mainland is the *History Curriculum Standard in General High Schools* (2017 version) (*Putong gaozhong lishi kecheng biao zhun* 普通高中历史课程标准, hereinafter HCS2017), implemented nationwide from autumn 2019. Under these guidelines, the two-volume textbook *Outlines of Chinese and Foreign History* (*Zhong wai lishi gangyao* 中外历史纲要, hereinafter OCFH) is mandatory for all students. HCS2017 and the first volume of OCFH (hereinafter, OCFH1) about Chinese history are the main mainland documents considered here. For Taiwan, the “Curriculum Guidelines for the 12-Year Basic Education Curriculum for Elementary, Junior High and General Senior High Schools: Social Studies” (*Shiernian guomin jiben jiaoyu kecheng gangyao: guomin zhongxiaoxue ji putongxing gaoji zhongdeng xuexiao-shehui lingyu* 十二年国民基本教育课程纲要——国民中小学暨普通型高级中等学校: 社会领域), implemented in 2019, provide general stipulations for high school social studies; we consider the specific guidelines for history modules therein (hereinafter TBEH108⁵¹). For textbook analysis, we chose the popular, government-approved *History* (*Lishi* 历史) textbook published by Hanlin 翰林 (hereinafter NHH), written under the new guidelines, with one volume each for Taiwan, East Asia and world history; we analyse the first two volumes.

Additionally, to highlight the explicitness of the master narratives and the intensified cross-Strait divergence on national history in the new curriculums and textbooks, we compare them to their predecessors. For the mainland, we acquired the *History Curriculum Standard in General High Schools* (2003 version) (hereinafter HCS2003) and the three-volume *Compulsory History* (*Lishi bixiu* 历史必修, hereinafter CH), written under HCS2003. For Taiwan, TBEH108 is compared to the “General High School Curriculum Outline for History” (*Putong gaoji zhongxue kecheng gangyao - lishi kecheng gangyao* 普通高级中学课程纲要——历史课程纲要, hereinafter HCO101), which preceded the reform, and NHH is compared to the older Hanlin *History* textbook (hereinafter, OHH).

This study does not generally consider the different roles of textbooks in mainland and Taiwanese classrooms. However, we acknowledge the agency of teachers and students (in Taiwan and to a much smaller extent in the mainland), and believe this content-based research can illuminate how “imagined communities”⁵² are pursued differently by intellectuals and educators on both sides. We are also aware that the degree of state interference in textbook content is lower in Taiwan than on the mainland. Under the “one guideline and multiple versions” (*yigang duoben* 一网多本) policy, different history textbooks compete for market share in Taiwan. Hanlin textbooks may not be representative of all textbooks in terms of specific descriptions of history. However, all government-approved textbooks must cover the key points stipulated by the curriculum guideline, by which the overarching multiculturalism narrative is implemented. Hanlin has been a major player in Taiwanese high school textbooks for two decades, which allows us to compare its textbooks from before and after the reform. We choose Hanlin textbooks also because they are accessible through internet for researchers outside Taiwan. However, we admit that our inability to cover all versions is a limitation of this study.

To circumvent this limitation and improve the reliability of our results, our analysis focuses more on the master narratives in the texts than on specific descriptions, because the former is applied to all textbooks. Conceptualizing and providing logical coherence, master narratives “offer the authoritative account of some particular segment of history.”⁵³ Nationalist master narratives are products of the modern nation-state, defining nations with a monolithic thesis, based on which textbook

51 Here, “108” stands for this curriculum’s implementation year – the 108th year since the founding of the Republic of China (Taiwan), 2019. Likewise, “101” below means 2012.

52 Anderson 2006 [1983].

53 Megill 1995, 152.

authors cherry-pick materials to construct a national storyline. By careful reading of curriculums and textbooks, we (1) identify abstract remarks and conclusive/synoptic sentences⁵⁴ about diversity-related issues as expressing master narratives, and (2) label relevant descriptions of historical events as corresponding materials. We present two cases of master narratives becoming stronger: history textbooks in mainland China and their counterparts in Taiwan.

Findings

The Master Narrative of “Pluralist Unity” in Mainland China

HCS2017 highlights the ideological core of the history curriculum at the high school level. In a section on the “fundamental philosophy” of history, it argues that “we should strengthen students’ sense of historical mission and...identification with the great motherland, the Chinese nation [and] Chinese culture.”⁵⁵ HCS2017 defines the Chinese nation in terms of the thesis of “pluralist unity,” and the history course aims to help students “understand the historical development trend of the pluralist unity of the Chinese nation.”⁵⁶ Invented by prominent Chinese sociologist Fei Xiaotong 费孝通, this catchphrase encapsulates the imagined process of gradual integration and fusion among different ethnic groups for thousands of years, generating an indivisible pluralistic unity of the Chinese nation.⁵⁷ HCS2017 is the first curriculum that uses this term.

Pluralistic unity became the master narrative to manage diversity in China’s national history. In the outline of the course content, HCS2017 says students should “deepen their understanding of the development trend of the pluralist unity of the Chinese nation.”⁵⁸ The outline organizes the content of Chinese history chronologically, and the pluralist unity thesis is adopted for most designated historical periods, by which the following analyses are organized.

The textbook presents the origin of Chinese civilization through archaeological materials. According to the outline, students are required to know about “the representative cultural relics of the stone age within China’s territory” and to “recognize their relationship with the origin of Chinese civilization.”⁵⁹ These cultural relics, across scattered locations, together form the common origin of China. The textbook’s introductory remark explicates the master narrative: “The Chinese civilization is a pluralist unity...that demonstrates the unique charm of its own path of development.”⁶⁰ This abstract narrative encompasses the presentation of materials on specific topics in the textbook. Two maps showing the locations of palaeolithic and neolithic sites are congruent with the official map of the PRC,⁶¹ which overlays the prehistoric cultures with the modern multi-ethnic state. Students are instructed to observe the archaeological records of prehistoric sites, particularly their geographical distribution, and to “discuss their understanding of the problem of multiple origins and unity of the Chinese nation.”⁶²

The section on the Spring and Autumn and Warring States (*Chunqiu Zhanguo* 春秋战国) periods concludes with a remark about ethnic relations:

The countries in the Central Plains called themselves “Huaxia” 华夏 because their social development was more advanced than that of their neighbouring barbarians. After the Warring

54 For example, the introduction to OCFH1 says, “The Chinese civilization has a long history and is an integrated and diverse civilization, demonstrating the unique charm of its own path of development.”

55 HCS2017, 2.

56 Ibid., 7.

57 Fei 1999.

58 HCS2017, 12–13.

59 Ibid., 13.

60 OCFH1, 1.

61 Ibid., 2–3.

62 Ibid.

States period began, the barbarians gradually merged into the Huaxia. The Huaxia then absorbed much new blood, making it more stable and more widely distributed.⁶³

“Huaxia” is the ancient name for the Chinese nation, designated in the textbook as a “political and cultural entity” and “identified by surrounding ethnic groups during the Spring and Autumn period and the Warring States period.” It was an era when “the idea that different groups came from the same ancestor was developing.”⁶⁴ Although the catchphrase “pluralist unity” does not appear in the texts, it is suggested by the term “common ancestor” (*tongyuan gongzu* 同源共祖) and the description of how the political-cultural Huaxia “nation” absorbed various ethnic groups. These periods are designated the beginning of the formation of a unified Chinese identity from multiple sources.

The outline of the Qin 秦 and Han 汉 dynasties requires students to “understand the significance of the establishment and consolidation of the unified multi-ethnic feudal state in Chinese history.”⁶⁵ After elaborating on Qin unifying measures, the textbook stresses that “the unprecedentedly unified feudal state promoted the exchanges between and integration of various ethnic groups and promoted the political, economic and social development of the unified multi-ethnic state.”⁶⁶ For the Han, the textbook describes measures to stabilize the borderlands and expand Han territory, including the establishment of the Protectorate of the Western Regions (*Xiyu duhufu* 西域都护府), and the management of ethnic minority areas on the south-east and south-west frontiers. These details conclude with the argument that “the unified multi-ethnic feudal state was consolidated and strengthened.”⁶⁷ The master narrative of pluralist unity, while paraphrased, thus explains the multi-ethnicity of both dynasties.

The period of the “Three Kingdoms to the Western and Eastern Jin and the Southern and Northern Dynasties” (*Sanguo Liang Jin Nan-Bei Chao* 三国两晋南北朝) is characterized by “ethnic integration,” a synonym for “pluralist unity.” The section on ethnic relations concludes: “From conflicts to peaceful communication, the Han and the ethnic groups who immigrated from the borderlands to the interior gradually moved towards integration, which promoted the development of the unified multi-ethnic feudal state.”⁶⁸ Correspondingly, the textbook downplays ethnic conflicts during this mass immigration. This incursion by non-Han powers is portrayed as the beginning of ethnic-minority participation in China’s political changes. The northern regions, occupied by non-Han rulers, are depicted as a site of ethnic integration. The textbook elaborates on measures taken to promote assimilation of the Xianbei 鲜卑 people into the Han during the time of Emperor Xiaowen 孝文 of the Xianbei-founded Northern Wei (*Beiwei* 北魏) dynasty. These measures are positively evaluated, as they “conformed to the historical trend of the communication and integration among the northern ethnic groups, and greatly alleviated the ethnic discords.”⁶⁹ Han people, originating from the Central Plain (*Zhongyuan* 中原), were pushed south by wars in the north. However, the textbook highlights the positive aspects of the story to build a theme of historical unity: “In the course of the development south of the Yangtze River (*jiangnan* 江南), many ethnic minorities in mountainous areas gradually merged with the Han.”⁷⁰ With occasional mention of the Han integrating minority components,⁷¹ the narrative suggests mutual ethnic integration with political and cultural communication.

63 Ibid., 10.

64 Ibid.

65 HCS2017, 13.

66 OCFH1, 15.

67 Ibid., 21.

68 Ibid., 25.

69 Ibid., 30.

70 Ibid., 28.

71 Ibid., 31.

The idea that China during the Tang 唐 dynasty became a unified multi-ethnic nation is supported by Tang's victory over Tujue 突厥, the establishment of the Anxi 安西 and Beiting 北庭 protectorates, the friendship between Tang and Tubo 吐蕃, and the relationship between Tang and Mohe 靺鞨. Although these ethnic powers were not all directly under Tang rule, the regimes they established "around the Tang dynasty made positive contributions to the development of our motherland's border areas."⁷² Recognizing these "regimes" emphasizes the political status of non-Han people in Chinese history, suggesting pluralist unity rather than loss of China's territory.

Similarly, Liao 辽 (founded by the Khitan 契丹), Western Xia 西夏 (founded by the Tanguts 党项) and Jin 金 (founded by the Jurchen 女真) were contemporaneous with the Song 宋 and the Mongol Yuan 元 dynasties that followed the Tang, and are considered parts of China in this history. The outline requires students to "acknowledge the important role of the northern minority regimes in developing the unified multi-ethnic feudal state."⁷³ Correspondingly, the textbook only briefly mentions the wars among these regimes, and emphasizes how the non-Han established political and administrative systems (under Han intellectual guidance) to strengthen their rule. Special significance is attributed to Yuan measures to fortify unification; for instance, the system of administrative provinces is described as the "beginning of the provincial system of our nation, and it facilitated the political, economic and cultural development of minority regions on the frontier."⁷⁴ The ethnic minorities who established regimes are depicted as important participants in developing a "pluralistically unified" Chinese nation.

The Ming 明 and Qing 清 periods are construed as the final stage of this development. The outline requires that students learn how the Ming and Qing unified the country and administered the borderlands, and "acknowledge that the islands in the South China Sea, and Taiwan along with its affiliated islands including the Diaoyu Islands 钓鱼岛, belong to China, and understand the significance of the establishment of the unified multi-ethnic state territory in this period."⁷⁵ The argument about the established multi-ethnic territory appears on the introductory page for this chapter⁷⁶ and shapes the presentation of historical events in the texts. The relationship between the Ming dynasty and Mongol powers in the north and the former's management of Tibet and the Jurchen tribes in the north-east are described. Depicting the Qing as the apotheosis of the territorial evolution of pre-modern China, the textbook discusses the annexation of Taiwan, the settlement of the border with Tsarist Russia, victory over the Mongolian tribes, the administration of Xinjiang and Tibet and the bureaucratization of native officers of the minority regions in the south-west. Conflicts are downplayed and the integrative aspects of inter-ethnic relations emphasized, to resonate with the master narrative of pluralist unity.

The master narrative symbolically orchestrates the selection and presentation of historical evidence in textbooks, including illustrations. For example, although Tibet, Inner Mongolia and today's north-eastern region were not under dynastic reign at that time, they appear on the map of the Western Han dynasty (in a different colour), facilitating correspondence with the current official map of China. Most maps for other periods also reflect current boundaries. Guided by the master narrative, the textbooks symbolically constitute a multi-ethnic Chinese nation with a historically consistent territory, with anomalies absent or downplayed. In sum, the master narrative of pluralist unity is constantly evident; by keeping the specific narratives congruent, the master narrative constructs a unified multi-ethnic nation with a sacred territory transcending historical changes.

The HCS2003 and CH textbooks also mention the importance of ideology in history, and view inculcating the love of the Chinese nation as a critical purpose of history education. However, the

72 Ibid., 35.

73 HCS2017, 13.

74 OCFH1, 57.

75 HCS2017, 13–14.

76 OCFH1, 71.

master narrative of pluralist unity is not rendered as explicitly as in the current curriculum and textbooks. HCS2003 is organized by theme, with national history and foreign history fragmented and presented according to the same themes; this arrangement makes it harder to convey the nation's historical continuity. In the CH series, inter-ethnic relationships in Chinese history were not a designated topic but were briefly mentioned in the unit on the "political system of ancient China" as an incidental aspect of the centralization of political authority. After introducing the strengthening of absolute monarchy during the Ming and Qing dynasties, the textbook briefly asserted the evolution of the unified multi-ethnic nation;⁷⁷ however, this appeared isolated from the rest of the text, with few concrete descriptions of specific historical events to support the abstract argument. Therefore, although the HCS2003 and CH textbooks had a similar pluralist unity master narrative to HCS2017 and OCFH1, it was weaker and less specific.

The Master Narrative of Multiculturalism in Taiwan

The most recent curriculum change in Taiwan has intensified de-Sinicization. For the first time, Chinese history has lost independent status and been integrated into East Asian history. Our analysis finds that the master narrative of multiculturalism plays a leading role.

TBEH108 requires teachers to "consider the diverse life experiences of students from diverse backgrounds."⁷⁸ The "key competencies" emphasize that students should acquire the ability "to respect and acknowledge plural cultures."⁷⁹ Correspondingly, the history course reifies multiculturalism, stating that students should "understand and respect the uniqueness and subjectivity of the historical development of diverse cultures, religions, ethnicities, races and genders."⁸⁰ By "reflecting on the multiple aspects of historical development," students can learn to "cherish the social system that integrates multiple ethnicities and cultures and to cherish the value of human rights."⁸¹

Multiculturalism serves as an ideological framework for Taiwanese history. The outline categorizes Taiwanese history into themes, including the formation of a multi-ethnic society (Theme B), economic and cultural diversity (Theme C) and the shape of the modern state.⁸²

Theme B begins with the history of indigenous people in Taiwan. The textbook requires students to "understand the changing historical status of the indigenous peoples, to understand their cultural characteristics, and to respect the diversity of different ethnic groups."⁸³ It expounds on the social cultures of different tribes, concluding that "it was this rich and diverse appearance that formed the source of Taiwan's diverse culture."⁸⁴ The textbook also highlights the victimization of indigenous peoples, who lost their land and culture under the oppressive rule of successive immigrant groups. Events such as indigenous protests and current policies to protect indigenous rights and cultures are said to underpin multiculturalism.

Another component of Theme B is the "formation of immigrant society."⁸⁵ Following the outline, the textbook has a chapter describing the history of immigration in Taiwan. After the early immigrants from the mainland's south-eastern coastal area, the textbook demonstrates the history and distinctive local cultures of the Han people who migrated from mainland China during the Qing dynasty: "Han immigrants during the Qing dynasty were diverse in their ancestors and ethnic groups. [They had] different languages and customs. [This diversity] formed the basis of multi-

77 Ibid., 18.

78 TBEH108, 1.

79 Ibid., 5.

80 Ibid.

81 Ibid.

82 Ibid., 20.

83 NHH, Vol. 1, 14.

84 Ibid., 20.

85 TBEH108, 20.

ethnicity and multiple cultures in Taiwan.”⁸⁶ The textbook also mentions both discord and collaboration between Hokkien and Hakka people (both Han groups) and between Han and indigenous people. Han society is presented as a component or components of multiculturalism, rather than a monolithic, dominant Chinese culture.

The Qing ceded Taiwan to Japan after defeat in the Sino-Japanese War (1894–1895). The Japanese colonial period is presented as significant in the formation of Taiwan’s multicultural society. The textbook discusses Japanese immigrants to Taiwan, colonial rule, industrialization, Japanese agriculture and fishery, and “immigration villages.” The textbook does acknowledge the repressive nature of Japanese rule, but weakens the national humiliation narrative by conceiving the Japanese as another immigrant group whose legacy has shaped Taiwanese culture.

After losing the mainland to the communists, the Republic of China (ROC) regime, that is, the KMT, moved to Taiwan, accompanied by numerous soldiers and civilians. The textbook comments that these immigrants “came from various provinces in mainland China, which deepened Taiwan’s multi-ethnic and multicultural nature.”⁸⁷ This statement overshadows the common-sense (and factually correct⁸⁸) understanding that post-war immigrants were identified as mainlanders. Beginning in the 1980s, “new residents” (spouses from mainland China and Southeast Asia) and international migrant workers represent another wave of immigration and a new stage in the pluralistic society. The new residents “infused new vitality into Taiwan and had a huge impact on the development of Taiwan’s history and culture.”⁸⁹ International migrant workers “brought more cultural diversity to Taiwan.”⁹⁰ Therefore, learning how to “respect diverse cultures and ethnic groups, so that international migrant workers receive the attention they deserve, is a subject that the public should ponder and face.”⁹¹ In short, NHH portrays diversity as fundamental to Taiwan’s “immigrant society,” imparting the value of multiculturalism.

A chapter on Taiwan’s diverse culture fulfils Theme C’s requirement to present the “mountain and sea culture.”⁹² The master narrative of multiculturalism is evident in the abstract:

Taiwan’s religion and culture have absorbed various elements...[including] cultural exchanges among the indigenous ethnic groups...By the time of Japanese rule...various new cultural and literary concepts were introduced, as Taiwan was gradually influenced by Japanese and Western culture. After the Second World War, Taiwan society experienced another cultural impact...Taiwan is now entering a new developmental phase [in which] the cultural diversity has been stirred up [again].⁹³

This chapter starts with the history of Taiwan’s religions, devoting equal attention to Han religions and Christianity. It elaborates on the expansion of temple fairs, the evolution of Buddhism, and the advent of Islam and new-born religious groups that enriched the multicultural picture. Taiwan’s achievements in literature, fine arts, folk culture and architecture also exemplify how diverse groups contribute to the culture.

The master narrative of multiculturalism is also prevalent in the East Asian history module, where students are asked to contemplate the question “From what perspective could we discuss Chinese history?”⁹⁴ Accordingly, the introduction chapter problematizes the concept of “China,”

86 NHH, Vol. 1, 41.

87 *Ibid.*, 52.

88 Yang 2021.

89 NHH, Vol. 1, 56.

90 *Ibid.*, 57.

91 *Ibid.*

92 TBEH108, 26.

93 NHH, Vol. 1, 94–95.

94 TBEH108, 20.

suggesting that it has evolved over history depending on changing political realities in East Asia.⁹⁵ The view of China is nuanced and includes perspectives of China's neighbours, and the introduction pledges to "discuss the interaction and development between China and East Asia in the past several thousand years from multiple perspectives, dynamic domains and the people's opinions, [and thus] break West-centrism or Sinocentrism in the past."⁹⁶

The thematic organization of course content also supports the multiculturalist narrative. The history of China is scattered across various themes, alongside content about other regions in East Asia. For example, the chapter "The Governance of States," which introduces ancient political history, is divided into three sections: The first introduces the political system of premodern China; the second discusses political systems in other parts of East Asia; and the third considers population management and land systems in China, Japan, Korea and Vietnam.⁹⁷ This arrangement equalizes the historical significance of China and other regions in East Asia.

Additionally, the textbook uses two chapters (out of six) to describe the movement of human beings in premodern and modern times, addressing Theme H (mobilization and communication of human groups). From a multiculturalist perspective, substantial aspects of political history – conflicts and communication among regimes – are reinterpreted as results or causes of human migration, traditionally a marginal angle in school textbooks.

The multicultural master narrative guides the selection and discussion of historical materials in the textbooks. Taiwan's history is defined to a significant extent as a history of immigration. Chinese culture is not regarded as the trunk of Taiwanese culture, but one of several branches that people can identify with (or not). Multiculturalism creates distance from the Sinocentric view of Taiwanese history, promoting Taiwanese nationalism. Furthermore, it legitimizes the expansion of the geographical range of storytelling from China to East Asia, diminishing the historical significance of China in East Asia.

Multiculturalism has underpinned the de-Sinification movement in historical studies of Taiwan since the 1990s. However, until the adoption of HCO101, the reforms did not weaken the homogeneous view of the Chinese nation. HCO101 stipulated that ancient China should be chronologically presented as a nation with a continuous dynastic history. It stressed the importance of students understanding Chinese history as a source of Taiwan's traditional culture.⁹⁸ OHH does not promote multiculturalism as progressively as NHH. Ethnic relations in Taiwan during the Qing are briefly mentioned in relation to economic development, without using terms like "multicultural." Regarding the Han culture in Taiwan after migration, OHH acknowledges (1) the "localization" (*zaidihua* 在地化) thesis that Han culture in Taiwan had unique features distinct from those of the mainland, and (2) the "mainlandization" (*neidihua* 内地化) explanation that Taiwanese culture imitated mainland Chinese culture in its evolution. In contrast, NHH removes the second explanation, downplaying the influence of China in Taiwanese history. OHH does not adopt multiculturalism as a master narrative for the Japanese colonial period. Although the economic contribution of the Japanese is recognized, they are identified more as colonizers and oppressors than innocent immigrants. Cultural diversity is recognized as a feature of contemporary Taiwanese society, but not in the pre-ROC time. Additionally, modern Taiwan is praised for its inheritance and innovation of Chinese culture.⁹⁹ The second volume of OHH covers all designated dynastic periods of China.¹⁰⁰ The first half of the third volume of OHH addresses the Republican period of mainland China (1912–1949) and the subsequent communist rule. Thus, HCO101 and OHH present a Taiwanese-Chinese dual identity while foregrounding Taiwan's history.

95 NHH, Vol. 2.

96 Ibid., 15.

97 Ibid.

98 HCO101.

99 OHH, Vol. 1.

100 OHH, Vol. 2.

Discussion

The latest changes in the Taiwanese history curriculum and textbooks received a mixed reaction among intellectuals and the public. Most criticisms were political. Some conservative commentators questioned students' eligibility to participate in curriculum revision.¹⁰¹ Shortly after the new textbooks appeared, the KMT accused the governing DPP of de-Sinicization, inducing people to "forget their own origin" and exacerbating the identity crisis for the next generation.¹⁰² Other conservative associations expressed similar criticisms.¹⁰³ The controversy over de-Sinicization also drew attention from state media and state bodies in mainland China. The Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council condemned the DPP for "implementing a curriculum full of the ideas about 'de-Sinification' and 'Taiwan independence' that can only poison the young generation in Taiwan, but also further damages cross-strait relations and intensifies the confrontation between the two sides."¹⁰⁴

The Taiwanese MOE denied these accusations by arguing that the new curriculum was aimed at enhancing students' capability for comprehensive thinking/problem solving and multicultural/global knowledge. The new curriculum was described as encouraging students to build a multifaceted perspective that understands how Taiwanese, Chinese and world history are interconnected. The MOE also stressed the democratic nature of the curriculum formulation process, implying that no single political force could dictate history teaching.¹⁰⁵ Mau-kuei Chang 張茂桂, a well-known professor who drafted the multiculturalism policy White Paper for the DPP,¹⁰⁶ also defended the latest reform in history education by emphasizing the transparent, democratic reform procedure. He and his colleagues argued that the new history curriculum did not prioritise "de-Sinification" but focused on "life-long learning" and citizenship development.¹⁰⁷

Though not entitled to pass judgement on this debate, we find it helpful to consider it from two aspects. On the one hand, such ambitious reform and drastic curriculum change would have been unlikely without the DPP's political dominance. Also, even if "de-Sinification" is not its priority, the curriculum reform aims at distancing history education in Taiwan from top-down Chinese nationalism, which inevitably leads to a reduction of content on Chinese ancient history and the de-essentialization of Chinese identity.¹⁰⁸ Furthermore, although the curriculum does not declare Taiwan an independent nation, the master narrative constitutes the multicultural framework of a Taiwanese nation-in-the-making. This education reform could then be seen as another culmination of the DPP's campaign for multicultural nationalism, alongside the indigenization of Taiwanese culture.¹⁰⁹

101 Huang Yinglian, "Xuesheng canyu keshen hua tianxia zhi daji" (Student participation in curriculum revision is ridiculous), *Viewpoint Taiwan*, 28 July 2016, <https://www.viewpointtaiwan.com/focus/%E5%AD%B8%E7%94%9F%E5%8F%83%E8%88%87%E8%AA%B2%E5%AF%A9%E6%BB%91%E5%A4%A9%E4%B8%8B%E4%B9%8B%E5%A4%A7%E7%A8%BD/>. Accessed 13 February 2022.

102 Pan Weiting, "Pi xin lishi keben lie Taiwan diwei weidinglun, buti wei'anfu; lanwei hong: Cai Yingwen xuan na guo zongtong?" (Review of new history textbooks lists Taiwan's status as inconclusive, and no mention of the comfort women; KMT law-makers speak out: for which nation does Tsai Ing-wen run for president?), *The Storm Media*, 5 September 2019, <https://www.storm.mg/article/1674906>. Accessed 13 February 2022.

103 Huang 2020.

104 Liu Yeting and Mu Yang, "Tai dangju tui 'qu Zhongguohua' xin kegang; guotaiban: daoxing nishi, shudian wangzhu" (Taiwan authorities push for new curriculum for "de-Sinicization"; Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council: retrogressive practices forget our ancestors). *People.cn*, 11 September 2019, <http://tw.people.com.cn/n1/2019/0911/c14657-31349224.html>. Accessed 13 February 2022.

105 Ministry of Education, "Zhendui Zhongshi shelun lunshu shiernian guojiao gaozhong lishi kegang zhi huiying" (A response to the *China Times* editorial on the high school history curriculum of the 12-year Basic Education), 6 February 2019, https://www.edu.tw/News_Content.aspx?n=9E7AC85F1954DDA8&s=C8E61188A89F3286. Accessed 15 July 2022.

106 DPP 1993.

107 Chang, Chin and Yang 2022.

108 Ibid.

109 Wang 2004; Wilson 2009.

On the other hand, it would be biased to assert that the multiculturalist presentation of history is the result of manipulation by a single political force. The DPP is not the only advocate of multiculturalism. Considering the democratic procedure of curriculum formulation, it is fair to say that the master narrative of multiculturalism reflects the Taiwanese consciousness in the public which has been developing for the past four decades. Moreover, by advocating the deconstruction of identity boundaries,¹¹⁰ the curriculum opens a path to accommodate the fluidity of Taiwanese identity, which is contextualised in Taiwan's unique political/cultural status in East Asia.

The fluidity of Taiwanese identity stands in sharp contrast to the increasingly crystallised Chinese identity in the mainland curriculum and textbooks. Whereas territorial unity and cross-Strait cultural-historical connection are increasingly problematised in Taiwan, they are enshrined in the mainland's official discourse. Whereas Taiwanese policy-makers attempt to abandon the imperial, Han-centric narrative that was long promoted by the KMT, their mainland counterparts retain it in a subtle way: though direct acknowledgement of Han superiority is avoided, the linear narrative from the standpoint of the perceived political/cultural centre precludes alternative interpretations from ethnic and political minorities, including Taiwanese.¹¹¹ The rigid definition of the Chinese nation promoted by the CCP does not have the flexibility to accommodate the multi-faceted elaboration of Taiwan history, making it impossible to construct a common collective memory between young people on both sides of the Strait. However, the party-state may find hard-line nationalism useful in diverting the public's attention from exacerbated socioeconomic and ethnic tension.¹¹² The master narratives of pluralist unity on one side and multiculturalism on the other have polarized positions and left little room for cross-Strait reconciliation. With the political status quo maintained, the mainland and Taiwan will likely continue to go separate ways regarding views of history.

Acknowledgements. This research is funded by the National Social Science Foundation of China (16BXW007).

Conflicts of interest. None.

Abbreviations

CH: *Lishi bixiu (Compulsory History)*. 3 Vols. Beijing: Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe, 2007.

HCO101: "Putong gaoji zhongxue kecheng gangyao – lishi kecheng gangyao" (General high school curriculum outline for history). Ministry of Education of the PRC, 2011.

HCS2003: *Putong gaozhong lishi kecheng biao zhun (History Curriculum Standard in General High Schools)*. Beijing: Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe, 2003.

HCS2017: *Putong gaozhong lishi kecheng biao zhun (History Curriculum Standard in General High Schools)*. Beijing: Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe, 2018.

NHH: *Lishi (History)*. 3 Vols. Taipei: Hanlin chubanshe, 2019.

OCFH1: *Zhong wai lishi gangyao (Outlines of Chinese and Foreign History)*. Vol. 1. Beijing: Renmin jiaoyu chubanshe, 2019

OHH: *Lishi (History)*. 3 Vols. Taipei: Hanlin chubanshe, 2010.

TBEH108: "Shiernian guomin jiben jiaoyu kecheng gangyao: guomin zhongxiaoxue ji putongxing gaoji zhongdeng xuexiao-shehui lingyu" (Curriculum guidelines of the 12-Year Basic Education curriculum for elementary, junior high and general senior high schools: social studies). Ministry of Education of the PRC, October 2018.

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110 Chang, Chin and Yang 2022.

111 Vickers 2021.

112 Solt 2011; Vickers 2022.

- Chang, Mau-kuei, Shih-ch'i Chin and Hsiu-chin Yang.** 2022. "The reorientation of history teaching in Taiwan's 12-year Basic Education." In Gunter Schubert and Chun-yi Lee (eds.), *Taiwan During the First Administration of Tsai Ing-wen: Navigating in Stormy Waters*. London: Routledge, 180–208.
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