

United States, Canada, Japan, and Australia, and a description of the Soviet and East European Foreign Trade Data Bank developed at the International Development Research Center.

The user must realize that although the socialist data have been standardized, they still basically suffer from their original sin—price distortions in respect of structure, direction, and domestic relations. The degree of these distortions varied in different years. The standardized data are not disaggregated and complete enough to enable a settlement of the old problem—the extent of exploitation (if any) in intra-Comecon and East-West trade. The observation that intra-Comecon trade has been growing fastest in manufactures (p. 345) is not necessarily valid in application to the 1960s (especially between the USSR and several East European countries). However, bearing these and some other minor limitations in mind, the book will be a valuable reference for many years to come, and it should contribute to a higher standard of discussion on socialist foreign trade.

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SOVIET PLANNING AND SPATIAL EFFICIENCY: THE PREWAR CEMENT INDUSTRY. By *Alan Abouchar*. Russian and East European Series, no. 39. Bloomington and London: Indiana University Press, for the International Affairs Center, 1971. x, 134 pp. \$5.50, paper.

This modest monograph is concerned with two problems in the regional planning of the cement industry of the Soviet Union during the 1930s. The first is the economic rationality of the location of cement factories. Abouchar gives Soviet planners very low grades in this regard, finding that, as of 1940, alternative locations for these producing plants would have satisfied the existing market at one-third lower social cost. The second problem is the degree to which cement from existing factories was rationally distributed to consumers in order to avoid waste of transport. Although it was precisely this issue which most exercised the Soviet critics of the industry at the time, Abouchar finds that the waste of transport was minimal—only 7 percent during the first half of 1936 as judged by a linear programming transport model using twenty-eight regions. It is the second result, rather than the first, which surprises both Abouchar and his reader.

Judging solely by the internal evidence of the book, Abouchar's treatment of his twin problems seems excellent. He makes a strong case for the Soviet cement industry of his period being one that is peculiarly amenable to his methods of analysis. His attempt to convert the rates charged for shipping into social cost of transport is, inevitably, rather arbitrary; but he both makes a reasonable case for his approach and indicates his assumptions clearly. His treatment is careful and well argued throughout.

However, the results of a Soviet study covering 1964 cast considerable doubt on Abouchar's conclusion about the high static efficiency of cement distribution in 1936. The 1964 study shows a transport waste of 30 percent compared with Abouchar's figure of 7 percent. (See Z. I. Loginov and L. Iu. Astansky, "Skhema optimal'nogo razmeshcheniia tsementnoi promyshlennosti," in *Primenenie matematicheskikh metodov v razmeshchenii proizvodstva*, Moscow, 1968, esp. p. 15. See also Michael Ellman, *Soviet Planning Today*, Cambridge, 1971, pp. 171–78.)

Since the average length of haulage of cement in the Soviet Union was only 41 percent as great in 1964 as in the first half of 1936, it is difficult to believe that efficiency of spatial allocation of this product had so sharply diminished between those years. It seems more likely that the Soviet criticisms made during the 1930s were correct.

For this as well as other reasons, it is a pity that Abouchar has paid no attention to the work published by Soviet scholars concerning linear programming models of the cement industry during the 1960s. While his monograph seems a model of its kind when judged purely on internal evidence, such external evidence raises questions about at least his most important conclusion.

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THE MYTH OF LIBERATION: EAST-CENTRAL EUROPE IN U.S. DIPLOMACY AND POLITICS SINCE 1941. By *Bennett Kovrig*. Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. xi, 360 pp. \$11.50.

The general conclusion of this book on "liberation" as American policy is not startling. If John Foster Dulles himself ever believed it, neither he nor anyone else could reasonably have done so after the stifling of the Hungarian revolt in 1956 while America looked on. The worth of this book is not in puncturing a myth but in analyzing its place in the continuing evolution of U.S. policy on East Central Europe over a quarter century. Despite the existence of a large body of writing on the subject, there has long been a need for a cool and comprehensive account, and Bennett Kovrig has now written it. For obvious reasons much of it has to do with domestic policy.

In covering this long span he has not gone into exhaustive detail year by year but has had the good sense to tarry awhile in the critical periods and track down the evidence. One of those periods was that of World War II, when the basic decisions were made—or allowed to go by default. Here the author makes good use of a wealth of published material, and it does not lead him to give credence to the various themes espoused by the revisionists. He is more sympathetic to the charges from the other direction that Roosevelt's naïveté delivered the region into the hands of Stalin, though realist enough to know that the president never had it to give away. He reserves his severest strictures for the Roosevelt-Hull policy of trying to keep wartime strategy separate from decisions on the postwar political settlement, for it led to a fatal compromising of the principles on which the settlement was to rest. Roosevelt at Yalta, in telling Stalin that American troops would not stay in Europe and in not pushing for a strong international commission to supervise the administration of liberated areas, "implicitly sanctioned the entrenchment of Soviet power and influence in the heart of Europe." Perhaps that interpretation puts too much emphasis on what happened at Yalta. That the Western powers were satisfied with paper concessions to democratic principles, and were thereafter reduced to a policy of diplomatic protests and public declarations, was less because they negotiated badly than because they were not prepared to resort to force to change realities their Soviet ally had already created.

For the later critical periods the author did not have the classified official documents available, but he was fortunately able to consult the Dulles papers, which