references and notes. Experts would have welcomed precise documentation of at least such less familiar monuments as the temple and sculptures of the imperial cult of Ephesus (p. 166 ff.), the quasi-Christian copper coinage of Abgar the Great of Edessa (p. 264 ff.), and the coins with the cross of Theodora, wife of Constantine I, and of Maxentius (pp. 268-9). And the author is wrong in believing that adequate references and notes (if unobtrusively gathered together at the end of each chapter or at the end of a book) frighten off the non-expert, who, if interested and stimulated, as he surely will be by this volume, is often anxious to probe further.

The foregoing criticisms have suggested that *Christ and the Caesars* betrays certain blemishes and shortcomings. But these must not be regarded as in any sense neutralizing the fundamental merits of this powerful, bracing, and in many ways remarkable study. Its achievement is to have stressed new aspects of the history, life, and practice of the early Church, and to have offered fresh food for meditation on the minds and activities of her Apostles John and Paul and on the words and person of her Founder.

J. M. C. TOYNBEE

AESTHETICS AND LANGUAGE. Edited with an Introduction by William Elton. (Oxford: Basil Blackwell; 21s.)

This volume, offering 'a fresh, unbiassed scrutiny of the linguistic confusions of traditional aesthetics', demands a philosopher's review, which I am not competent to give it. But I cannot refrain from commenting on the conception of 'aesthetics' and of the subject-matter of 'aesthetics' which most of the contributors have in common. This conception is inadequate. None of the writers seems to be aware of the grounds for or the nature of responsible critical judgments about any work of art. They examine only the 'logical behaviour' of words commonly used in off-hand or otherwise haphazard remarks about art, literature, etc. This study is in itself quite legitimate, but it is not legitimate to assume, without discussing or even showing awareness of the assumption, that it is a study of 'aesthetics' or of criticism. We have here, then, the curious spectacle of a strenuous intellectual discipline exercised in support of conceptions of art and literature appropriate for the Beaverbrook Press—for a *milieu* in which your taste is as good as mine, whoever you are, and criticism belongs with chorus-fancying. Perhaps positivist convictions necessarily go with a guileless faith in 'the common man'—whatever *he* may be. At any rate, the contributors show themselves to be as remote as any 'traditional aesthetician' from

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the realities of art and literature and of the relevant criticism of them.

They might have done better to examine the uses of the word 'aesthetic' itself, along with the confusions and misconceptions it seems inevitably to generate (anyway, when used outside art-criticism): for instance, the misleading suggestion which it often supports that 'the arts' are a homogeneous body. But there is hardly any attempt in this book to make the distinctions, formal or otherwise, which any real consideration of terms like 'aesthetic' or 'the arts' ought to have prompted. Miss M. Macdonald does seem tentatively to offer one (p. 123): 'While a work of the plastic arts cannot, logically, be in more than one place at one time, this is not true of literary and musical works. Hence it is much more plausible to suppose that in painting and sculpture one refers simply to a physical object when talking of a work of art.' But, as the 'logically' in this context suggests, Miss Macdonald, here as in the rest of her article, is a victim of the confusions generated by 'work of art'. (*Est-elle en marbre ou non, la Vénus de Milo?*) And whether the distinction she suggests is 'plausible' or not, it does not survive much thought. That which can be said with critical relevance of a 'work of art' (*sc.* of painting or sculpture) can also be said of an exact copy—if we define 'exact' sufficiently closely. (I suppose that much needs saying about the contingent fact—if it is a fact, and, if a fact, merely contingent!—that these 'exact copies' can't, apparently, be made. But Miss Macdonald doesn't discuss this.)

Mr S. Hampshire, it is true, says (p. 164): '. . . a copy of a work of art is not a work of art'. But since 'work of art' as he uses it appears to refer primarily to works of plastic art, and since he nowhere indicates that any distinction need or can be made between the use of 'work of art' to designate a particular concrete object and its use to designate something *irréal* (to take over Sartre's word), he leaves us free to take his statement in its most obvious sense, and in that sense it is certainly not obviously true. Mr Hampshire and Miss Macdonald, like the other contributors, leave us with 'work of art' and 'aesthetic' on our hands.

Mr Hampshire, furthermore, is a victim of the word 'aesthetic'. He assimilates all choices made on 'aesthetic' grounds to the type of those choices made in the laboratory for which the chooser cannot give his reasons (these are, it is true, known as 'aesthetic choices'). His essay does not convince me that his consequent rehabilitation of Taste (as a critical concept) is desirable, nor his invoking of the 'aesthetic/moral' opposition commonly associated with it. He considers 'aesthetic judgments', i.e. the only relevant kinds of critical utterance, to be characteristically gratuitous, arbitrary, and irresponsible.

Professor W. B. Gallie proposes for the philosopher the modest

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role of 'journeyman aesthetician'—clarifying, for critics' benefit, the conceptual confusions into which they are apt to fall. We would be more convinced of the philosopher's usefulness in this role if he showed more insight into the nature of great literature, and of criticism, than Professor Gallie. That great literature only exists, in any important sense of 'exists', in the consciousness of civilized individuals capable of personal response and first-hand judgment, Professor Gallie, like the other writers, ignores; for him, literature is 'out there' and we all know what it is—always accessible to you as literature, whether you are a literary critic (that is, an approximation to the ideal reader) or not. The philosopher whose respect for literature rests only on this honourable convention is unlikely to clarify anything for the critic. But Professor Gallie, in fact, goes beyond his self-prescribed limits and becomes a generalizing theoretician (p. 33): 'The relevant point about abstraction, as used in mathematics, say, is that in abstracting we seem at first to be simply omitting certain facts from consideration, and yet as a result of this we are enabled to see an immense number of further, and usually more general, facts. Up to a point the effects of abstraction in poetry are analogous. There is, however, the all-important difference, that while the "new truths" gained by the geometer's abstractions are explicit, definable, and deducible, those gained by the poet's abstractions are inevitably vague and indefinite in their range. And that is a most important feature of them; indeed, it is responsible for the peculiar pleasure of the imagination to which they give rise.' I will not comment on the questions raised by this free-and-easy use of 'the poet', 'poetry', and 'abstraction' (as a critical term), but I cannot help noting the association of that use with a very familiar, and inveterately troublesome, conception of the 'vague and indefinite' pleasures of poetry. 'Vague': Professor Whitehead, I remember, used to tell us that 'the poets tell us' something which Professor Whitehead could formulate with more precision.

It is true that in the passage quoted Professor Gallie purports merely to be clarifying some of Wordsworth's 'thought'. But Wordsworth's thought is *Wordsworth's* thought. Wordsworth matters as a thinker (if at all) because he matters as a poet, and the philosopher is not likely to do much even with Wordsworth's 'thought' unless he shows himself to have some first-hand kind of awareness of why Wordsworth matters as a poet. (He must not, for instance, ignore the relation between the passages of Wordsworth's prose quoted by Professor Gallie and other passages treating of the moral and emotional discipline which, Wordsworth believed, was engaged in his composing of verse.)

However, to be really fair to Professor Gallie we must wait until the 'new and more penetrating philosophical methods, highly relevant

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to aesthetic problems', which 'may be produced at any moment' (p. 35), have been produced.

Mr J. A. Passmore's subject is 'The Dreariness of Aesthetics', but his only suggestion for alleviating this is that we should restrict the use of the word 'literature', applying it only to Shakespeare, etc., and disallowing it for Gibbon, etc. His article, I should add in fairness, is unique in the volume in recognising the distinction, where criticism is concerned, between the πεπαιδεμένος and ὁ τύχων.

Miss Beryl Lake disposes of Croce and Clive Bell by showing that their statements about art are analytic and non-empirical. Without wishing to defend Croce or Clive Bell (but thinking of the performances of the philosophically-minded with, say, Arnold's 'criticism of life' formula) I will remark that Miss Lake perhaps does not consider enough what determines the *appropriateness* of criteria for judging the generalizing statements of critics. I say 'critics', since 'aestheticians' seem to me to stand or fall by their performance as critics—whatever may be the exact distinction between an aesthetician's status as an aesthetician and his status as a critic. (If a man cannot talk sense about any particular works of literature, how can he talk sense about literature in general?) However, generalities without a context in critical practice may, no doubt, be handed over to the philosopher's analysis without much ado.

Professor G. Ryle's characteristic contribution, on 'Feelings', has no very obvious relevance to the alleged theme of the volume. Professor Arnold Isenberg's paper on 'Critical Communication' discusses interestingly the relation between criticism and psychology (with special reference to art-criticism), disposing of Ducasse's view that a critic is 'a specialist in the explanation of his own responses', but he also seems to lack a positive idea of what good critical practice is. Professor O. K. Bouwsma, though he writes in a tiresomely jocose manner, has some valuable points to make about the 'Expression' theory of art; he discusses, for example, what underlies saying that such-and-such an emotion is 'in' a piece of music. Dr Helen Knight, in a discussion of the use of 'good' in aesthetic judgments, argues that 'the guarantee of a criterion' lies in its being used as a criterion. She notes that this prompts the obvious question 'Used by whom?' but does not go into this question—so that her essay only pushes one stage back the problem of how criteria can be said to be 'fixed', and by whom, and with what kinds of reservation, their relevance is acknowledged. Dr Paul Ziff discusses statements like 'X's picture has depth' (are they metaphorical, or not?), and the status of 'the object of art': part of his conclusions may be quoted: 'There aren't two things being referred to when we say in the carpenter's shop, "The painting

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is flat", and when we say in the gallery, "The painting has great depth". There is just one, and it is the painting. There are two descriptions, not two objects.' I do not think that Dr Ziff has settled all the problems connected with 'the object of art', but his article seems to me a good example of philosophical tidying-up.

The volume, then, contains some interesting things. But it does not fulfil the claims made for it by the editor: it is, as a whole, a scheme based on insufficient resources. It is a collection of essays produced without collaboration between the contributors or collective responsibility (they often contradict each other, or repeat each other's arguments). Worse still, they do not seem able to handle the raw material of 'aesthetics', that is, they are not aware enough of the kinds of practical problem that confront the serious critic, or the kind of critical or 'aesthetic' principle in which he is interested.

W. W. ROBSON

ESSAYS IN CHRISTIAN UNITY. By Henry St John, O.P. (Blackfriars Publications; 12s. 6d.)

The Dominicans of the English Province have now for a great number of years done wonderful work in the cause of Christian unity and among them one of the most zealous has been Fr Henry St John. He has laboured more especially for a better understanding with Anglicans and it would be hard to find a non-Anglican who has a greater knowledge than he of the Church of England or a more sympathetic appreciation of her virtues and her weaknesses.

These essays have been written during a period covering over a quarter of a century and are therefore not so co-ordinated as if they had been written as a single book. There is also a certain amount of repetition, though, when it is a question of good things, *repetita juvant*. The author is often very bold in his statements, and he may well be so for they are generally irrefutable.

The great Ecumenical Movement is dealt with very thoroughly, for Fr St John has followed it up very carefully from its beginning, but it is our relations with Anglicanism which he examines more particularly. He makes an eloquent appeal for the suppression of 'war psychology'. We must learn to consider Anglicans as fellow human beings and even as brother Christians, rather than as *the* enemy. We are united with them by 'the highest bond that can unite human beings', that is to say 'a common allegiance to our Lord as God made man' and by our 'common experience of the need of redemption and salvation through him'.

Perhaps the most interesting portion of this book is the last appendix on the Membership of the Church. Theologians have ever maintained the principle of *Extra Ecclesiam nulla salus*, and at the same time they

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