

very senior religious wrote to me, "a butress of the Faith,"

Her chapter on alchemy is the clearest and most convincing brief account, in the literature, of the relevance of this arcane and ancient art to the practice of modern depth psychology. She has valuable new insights to offer on the subject of the parent archetype and on that important but little understood concept, the animus. She draws widely from her own experience and does not hesitate to disagree with Jung when this tells her he is wrong, as in the treatment of Catholic patients.

In her practical assertion of the supremacy of individual experience over orthodoxy, Vera von der Heydt is thoroughly Jungian, but is this attitude equally Catholic? To ignore this question is to ignore an important difference of emphasis between Jung's psychology and the traditional teachings of the Church. There are other differences. Jung's insistence on the reality of evil and the necessity of integrating the personal shadow has proved hard to reconcile with the doctrine of *privatio boni* and the quest for perfection. Is the wet, winding, circumambulatory way of individuation with its aim of completeness through the experience of all sides of oneself compatible with the

straight and narrow path? Does Jung's interior ethic, informed by a close attention to the movements of the unconscious, especially as revealed in dreams, tally with conventional Christian morality?

There are, of course, no answers to such questions outside the lives of those individuals who experience them as a reality, but I think they account for some of the reserve and suspicion with which the Church has approached Jung's psychology. It is as though Jung touches the collective psyche of Catholicism on an old complex, dating back to the trauma of its struggle with Gnosticism, and exacerbated by the splitting-off of Protestantism. But complexes are not healed through repression, and it may be that in trying to understand and come to terms with Jung the Church could redeem and integrate precious values that were lost in the old battle for survival, in which both parties fell into one-sidedness. For Jung is no gnostic guru or systematizer, but one who always sought to hold the tension between the opposites. It is one of the chief virtues of "Prospects for the Soul" that it shows how this can be possible.

E. I. MARIANOS BEGG

THE SEEING EYE, THE SEEING I, by Renee Haynes, Hutchinson & Co. London, 1976. 224 pp.

£4.75

The tension implicit in the visual dissection of the title pun (a characteristic of our literate, analytic culture) adequately conveys the effort in Miss Haynes' book to narrow the gap between the transcendental ego and the empirical 'subject', between experience and experiment. Far more than an essay in "Perception, Sensory and Extra-Sensory", *The Seeing Eye/I* is a philosophical investigation of the range of human perception, containing incisive criticisms of both technical and amateur approaches to experience, particularly in the area of para-psychology. This the author is well qualified to do, as the secretary of the Society for Psychical Research and author of previous studies in the same area. While largely based on anecdotal material, Miss Haynes' account draws heavily—and critically—from the wells of laboratory investigation, the literature of which she is thoroughly acquainted with. The anecdotal

material is well authenticated in most instances.

Philosophically in the van of William James, Miss Haynes attempts (and, in my opinion, successfully) to illuminate the meaning of human experience by a descriptive analysis of both ordinary and extraordinary events which reveal the abilities and power of the psyche. Rather than turning either to a minute analysis of the meaning of sentences or to the equally minute dissection of specimens of laboratory behaviour, Miss Haynes, like James and Husserl, prefers to explore the larger structures of 'lived experience'. Hence, in the realm of parapsychology, Miss Haynes must be ranked among the younger, more 'radical' generation of investigators who, dissatisfied with forty years of wearisome laboratory exercises in card-guessing and dice-tossing, have returned to the methods of earlier researchers, armed, however,

with critical weapons unavailable to the pioneers of the preceding century. Miss Haynes in particular is by no means anti-scientific.

While the experiential and experimental findings in *The Seeing Eye/I* are fascinating and in themselves strongly suggestive of the presence of the 'psi-factor' in most human persons and in many animals, Miss Haynes' thesis remains philosophical (or pre-theological)—that the investigation of perception, both normal and paranormal, points to the reality of an abiding self, the I who perceives in every perception, the individual identity which transcends the space-time limitations of mortal existence, sometimes consciously in this life.

Students of phenomenology may find the logic of Miss Haynes' investigation indicative of lines of further research if not themselves compelling evidence. For the results of such an inquiry are necessarily limited by the nature of the cases studied; being exceptional and anecdotal, the reports of paranormal experiences convey indirect support for the existence of the meta-empirical self. But piled in stacks, such reports gain credibility to the extent that their reliability can be ascertained. It is here that Miss Haynes' critical eye proves valuable.

In the midst of a field of legitimate inquiry surrounded by enthusiasts, quacks and madmen, the presence of a prudent critic is not only welcome but essential. Miss Haynes happily devotes nearly a third of her book to a discussion of the

illicit uses of psychical research. Her chapter of the usurpation of language by cultists is particularly acute. She also levels some heavy artillery of logic and common sense against proponents who exalt the irrational and intuitive aspects of the human psyche above mere reason, thus undermining the foundation of scientific, philosophical and theological understanding of an important if uncommon aspect of human life. Her most incisive and pointed critique concerns the unwarranted conclusions proposed by students of reincarnation theory. Here, Miss Haynes scoringly reiterates an earlier criticism of the un-sparing use of "Occam's Razor", the simple-minded application of which has surely effected as much harm as good in the history of scientific investigation into areas where multiple causality is at work. A simple explanation is not thereby a true one.

The Seeing Eye/I should be of some interest to theologians and religious writers — at least those not gone wholly over to sentence-diagramming. For the avenues of research into the *experience* of God, immortality and freedom which Miss Haynes identifies promise to be of considerable importance. It is perhaps regrettable that she did not pursue these avenues further herself—her theological asides are often provocative, but not obtrusive. That, however, would (and should) warrant another book.

RICHARD WOODS, O.P.

FELLOW TEACHERS, by Philip Rieff. *Faber and Faber, London, 1975. 243 pp. £3.75*

The genesis of this book lies in "a personal exchange" between the author and two university teachers at Skidmore College, U.S.A. and at a public interview at that college when he answered questions, from staff and students, arising from his two previous books and possible "misunderstanding" (p. 1) about them. Although *Fellow Teachers* is not a direct transcript of "our Skidmore show" (p. 114), it bears many marks of a credo prepared for spoken public statement, filled out into a book by numerous footnotes. These often tend to engulf the whole page, so that the foot dominates the rest of the body, e.g. pages 180 and 181 each

have three lines of text and 37 lines which are part of a footnote starting on p. 179 and extending to p. 182.

One sympathises with his student "who scarcely understood a word I said or wrote"—she probably lost the thread of the argument. The reader of this book has a similar problem in hacking through the undergrowth of footnotes to penetrate to the core.

Another difficulty lies in his use of sociological jargon, e.g. "culture articulates interditory-transgressive polarities". A keyword in his philosophy is "therapeutic" which is used not in its everyday sense but "describes the social procedure of release