

meaning—geared to the old system of beliefs about the winnability of war—but also an emergent meaning, which is sacramental rather than moral: they show up our world for what it really is—a world “structured by violence and fear” in such a way that it is *radically* unstable, because it is founded on a self-contradiction.’ Cameron’s fascinating essay on Autobiography sets this whole genre—implying the uniqueness of the self and its value and interest as such to others—in its context in the history of culture, as nourished, if not made possible, by the Christian esteem for the individual and its history, where alone the drama of redemption is played out.

Among the theological essays, Fergus Kerr shows how St. Thomas, after doing his commentary on Aristotle’s *Ethics*, refocusses his whole discussion of the supernatural virtue of charity in the *Summa Theologiae* around the notion of friendship, drawn from Aristotle. This is a daring and original move, shifting the emphasis from man’s absorption in God as his good to friendship as a relation between equals—God has made us His equals in a sense by the elevation of sanctifying grace that makes us His adopted sons and daughters. This friendship relation is based on mutual love and esteem for the intrinsic goodness of each, which means not only that we let God be himself, but God lets us be ourselves. The author feels that later Christian theology and spirituality have left this rich vein in St. Thomas largely unexploited, which I think is true. Simon Tugwell shows well how Aquinas defends without apology the meaningfulness of petitionary prayer as the original and still basic form of prayer.

In the scriptural section, Margaret Davies insightfully compares Matthew’s Gospel with the contemporary literary genre of biographies of heroes, noting both the similarities and the differences. Timothy Radcliffe shows how Mark’s Gospel can be looked at as in part ‘a subversion of the apocalyptic imagination’, i.e., an indirect answer to the crisis produced by the failure of the apocalyptic predictions about the end of the world to come true. Hugo Meynell, in another example of his always refreshing, critical-minded common sense, insists that no sophisticated theories of literary genres or special ‘Gospel truth’ can get us off the hook of facing the challenge that either the Gospels contain substantial historical truth, which could be falsified, or else anything like traditional Christian faith cannot reasonably be maintained.

The final piece, by Enda McDonagh, on Prayer, Poetry and Politics, is a creative and stimulating exploration of the relations between these three basic forms of human activity in nourishing the critical technical work of the theologian. Prayer is the basic contact of man with God; poetry (and art in general) is concerned with giving adequate symbolic expression to the lived mysteries of man and his cosmos, and in the end ‘must self-transcend to the ultimate, or self-destruct’; and politics expresses our necessary concern, to be fully human and Christian, with the wider human community. The would-be theologian neglects any one of the three at his peril. A fitting conclusion to an unusually stimulating collection in honour of an unusually stimulating thinker.

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GOD IN HIMSELF: AQUINAS’ DOCTRINE OF GOD AS EXPOUNDED IN THE *SUMMA THEOLOGIAE*, by W.J. Hankey. Oxford University Press, 1987. Pp. x + 196. £20.

Since St. Thomas was the heir of a rich platonist tradition, a great deal of his thought remains untouched if he is read only in terms of Latin translations of Aristotle and his Greek and Islamic commentators. As Prof. Hankey intends, in his scholarly, reflected and courteous book, to survey the Neoplatonist element in Thomas’s *Summa Theologiae* 1a, 1–45, it is a work of importance.

The Neoplatonism which, above all, he wishes to exhibit in Thomas is that of Proclus’s *Elementatio Theologica* (cf. pp. 8–9, 25, 68, etc.). But this is scholarly wilfulness to the degree of indiscipline: the whole of the 1a pars of the *Summa* was written between

October 1266 and July 1268, and the Latin translation of the Proclus text was only finished on 17th May, 1268. (v. L. Boyle, O.P., *The Setting of the Summa Theologiae of Saint Thomas*, Toronto, 1982, p. 14, and H. Boese, *Wilhelm von Moerbeke als Übersetzer der Stoeicheiosis theologike des Proclus*, Heidelberg, 1985, pp. 20 and 48). Prof. Hankey thereby neglects Neoplatonists closer to Thomas: St. Augustine, Pseudo-Dionysius, and, above all, St. Albert. Yet at the *end* of his book (p. 150), he gives the dating for the Proclus translation, and acknowledges the variety of forms of Neoplatonism known to Thomas (p. 145); which enhances the impression of confusion conveyed by his text. From the outset he should have drawn a clear distinction between Proclus and himself and (what I have called elsewhere) 'crypto-Proclean' thinkers.

Within the limits of a short review, let me draw attention to some thematically representative texts which suggest how the excessively procleanized interpretation might be corrected.

(1) Thomas's teaching on the 'logic of self-relation' in the divine essence and the divine powers (cf. pp. 95, 113, 116, 117, 127, 130, 131) is almost certainly drawn from Augustine's *de Trinitate* X, 11, 18. Here, as a model of the divine essence, the human 'vita ... mens ... essentia' are said to be 'ad se ipsa'; and, as a model of the divine Persons, the three human powers, 'memoria, intellegentia, voluntas', are both identified with it (in being self-related), and distinguished from it (in being related to their objects). Thomas was able to use the model from a *single* human person of *mens, intellectus, voluntas* for the *three* divine Persons, because 'in Deo idem sit esse, intelligere et velle' (*de Potentia*, 9, 9 corp.). The Augustine text is not used in the questions which Prof. Hankey interprets, but it is used in 1a, 87, 3 and 4, as also throughout in *I Sent.* D. 3, q. 4. In view of this identity of powers and essence, found in man and attributed to God, expressions like 'God must divide and unite himself' (p. 113), 'the interpretation of essence and person', by which the essence is 'modified' (p. 126), 'a greater difference between subject and object of these self-relations' (p. 130), need to be reconsidered. He has only the facility of 'equality' (p. 125) to bring the theodicy back to unity.

(2) With regard to 'the continuing specific difficulty for Thomas is how the content of what is known of God from the finite can be attributed to him, if its mode is simplified' (p. 113, cf. pp. 147–8), it should be said that 'una et eadem res simpliciter' of 1a, 13, 12 is not in tension with the 'rationes diversae unius rei' of 1a, 13, 4 ad 1, because a virtual synonymy is not found in the human method of conceiving and naming which refers to them. This corresponds to the position of *in I Sent.* D. 2, q. 1, a. 3 ad 3, whose objection shows that the text of Ibn Rushd (far from Proclus!) was in mind (Great *Commentary* on *Metaph.* XII, comma 39). So there is not the 'incoherence' which Prof. Hankey finds (p. 159), with 'the modes of finite composition ... carried into the divine' (p. 114).

(3) For Thomas's syncretism of Aristotelianism and (primarily) pseudo-Dionysian Platonism, a most suggestive text is in his commentary on *de Divinis Nominibus*: Pera edn. 228 (cf. 626 and 901–2, with their texts). Because God is *total* cause of everything, and it is impossible factually to make a distinction between what comes only from Him and what comes only through secondary causality, it is possible to regard things truly in two ways: with His presence, communicating *esse* to everything; or without it, and with things enjoying a quasi-independence. The first way would include the intelligible substrates, reaching to God Himself, in the Neoplatonists' conceptions; the second way is empirical, and corresponds to the view of Aristotle. This at a macro-textual level; at a micro-textual level there are innumerable analyses bringing Aristotelian categories together with others. So it is not true that 'the way up (to God) is the way down (to creatures)' (p. 137; cf. p. 96). Without transforming it into itself, pseudo-Dionysian ontology had sufficiently fortified the few hints of a metaphysics of being in Aristotle for there to be a continuity in the conception of *esse* between the two ontologies, so brought together in a wholesale reconciliation by Thomas, that neither was disturbed.

Prof. Hankey's finding of 'tension', 'incongruity', imperfect success, and so on, in Thomas's reconciliation (cf. pp. 91, 113, 134, 144, 147, 149, 156, 157) is a hermeneutical problem of his own making, caused by his precipitately imposing a proclean interpretation on a resisting text: a figure centred on self-knowing (ambiguously entailing some kind of intellectual movement) on a metaphysics of being. Whatever references Thomas may have made to 'rediens in essentiam suam' (p. 142; but cf. 1a 14, 2 ad 1—not quoted!—on this as a 'modum loquendi'), he saw it as a way of expressing subsistence in being: Thomas's authentic conception is that of *ipsum esse subsistens*. The use of Proclus's *Elementatio* which Prof. Hankey finds in Thomas's *Summa* is in the *Expositio* of it by Berthold of Moosburg, presently being edited by L. Sturlese. A. de Libera has written that 'Berthold conceived of the *Elementatio* as a true living organism, capable of assimilating, interpreting, filtering all the texts and all the teachings of tradition' (*Introduction à la mystique rhénane d'Albert à Maître Eckhart*, Paris, 1984, p. 338).

Yet there are sign-posts indicating the right direction: to a 'neoplatonized Aristotle' (pp. 144–5), and to a Neoplatonism that needs modifying in its Christian use (p. 30, and cf. p. 153). And the argument achieves some plausibility by evoking resonances from thinkers closer to Thomas: all, in their different Neoplatonisms, having a discernable family likeness.

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PERSONS AND PERSONALITY, edited by Arthur Peacocke and Grant Gillett. *Basil Blackwell*, Oxford. 1987. Pp viii + 222. £19.50.

The papers in this volume come from the Ian Ramsey Centre, which was established to foster 'interdisciplinary study of both ethical problems arising from scientific and medical research and practice and the underlying philosophical and theological issues'—matters of much interest and concern to the late Bishop Ian Ramsey especially during the time he was Nolloth Professor at Oriel College, Oxford. Some of the papers, given at a 24-hour workshop on 'Person and Values', are accompanied by abbreviated versions of ensuing discussions; the others, given at open seminars at the centre, stand alone. The collection contains much to interest philosophers, psychologists and theologians, but also reaches out to areas of medical, legal and literary concern. It deserves to enjoy a wide readership.

Two questions, as old as Aristotle, may be raised about any kind of thing. First, what is it made of? Putting it roughly, we want to know about the materials and, maybe, the construction. Secondly, what is it to be that sort of thing—what makes a thing the kind of thing it is? I may tell you that a clock is made of bits of metal formed into little cog wheels geared together, without your being any the wiser as to what it is for such construction to be a clock. The latter question is addressed when I explain that a clock is an artifice for telling the time, and of course that does not tell you much about the stuff and structure of clocks.

Some of the central issues raised in the early chapters of this volume could be helpfully viewed in the light of these two questions applied to the case of persons. Peter Atkins's paper on 'Purposeless People' centres very much on issues primarily relevant to the first type of question; we are told about the stuff and structure of the sorts of individuals that we recognise as persons. A person is a body, an organised collection of limbs and organs, which are themselves made of cells, molecules, atoms, and so on. For an explanation of the way things work we should turn to the various relevant disciplines—biology, biochemistry, chemistry and physics. Thus we are offered a boldly materialist account of the origin and make-up of persons.

But what of the second type of question—the question as to what it is for a given individual to be a person? Atkins does not seem to recognise this as a distinct question. In his view everything of interest will be fully explained in the particular sciences. The second question merges with the first, with the result that his materialist account of the stuff and structure of bodies appears in the guise of an austere materialist account of what it is to be a