Introduction

In 1973, Paul Howell, supervisor of the University of Cambridge Course on Development, noted with pride that the content of the course had recently changed. Rather than trying to teach 'what the natives need to know', it was now tailored to the real needs of its students, primarily drawn from developing countries, especially those within the Commonwealth.[1] The fact that in the preceding decade – some years after most British colonies had secured their independence – those teaching this course could still be construed as having been engaged in telling the 'natives' what they needed 'to know' reflects the complex dynamics of the British decolonization process, and the ways these played out in a domestic context. The Cambridge Course on Development was a legacy of British colonialism: a direct descendant of training courses delivered since the 1920s to young British entrants to the Colonial Administrative Service that survived into the postcolonial era to become, with modifications, a flagship element in Britain's contribution to the training of administrators in the public services of new states. In the 1950s small numbers from Britain's colonies and newly independent countries sat alongside expatriates still hoping for a career in the Colonial Service; by the early 1960s they constituted the entire intake.

The figure of the expatriate colonial officer, whether the heroic *Sanders of the River* or the more subversive depictions in the fiction of George Orwell or Somerset Maugham, has particular traction in popular ideas of empire, and few of the continuities from the colonial to the postcolonial era speak to the ambiguities of 'decolonization' as much as the presence at British universities of elites from countries newly freed from the British colonial yoke occupying desks once filled by generations of white British officers. These public servants of new Commonwealth states entering British higher education in the late 1950s and early 1960s were nonetheless only part of a much wider educational migration. Britain had a long tradition of recruiting overseas students, including from the Empire-Commonwealth, but the late colonial period saw an enormous

[1] Cambridge University Library [CUL], University Archives [UA], GBR/0265/CDEV/2/23, P. P. Howell to Dr A. F. Robertson, Dr B. Van Arkadie and Dr H. W. West, 19 October 1973.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781107707382.001 Published online by Cambridge University Press

increase in their numbers. By 1960, the year in which Macmillan's landmark 'wind of change' speech heralded an accelerated retreat from Britain's African Empire, Britain hosted over 31,000 students from British colonies and the independent Commonwealth enrolled on all kinds of training and higher education programmes.[2] Yet more striking, more than 14,000 pensionable officers were still serving in Her Majesty's Overseas Civil Service and a further 6,500 employed on contract terms still working overseas in some fifty countries.[3] In 1965 officials in Britain's new Ministry of Overseas Development, struggling to marshal sufficient resources and manpower to meet the need for technical assistance among emergent states within the Commonwealth, called for the mobilization of personnel across British society. A British 'professional career', they suggested, 'should normally include a period of work overseas in a developing country'.[4] By then the Commonwealth had been transformed from an association comprising a small number of predominantly white countries into a large multiracial community of states of diverse size and geostrategic interests.[5] Although a process of imperial retreat would continue in relation to smaller territories, most of the Empire had gone, and Britain had entered an era that many would consider 'postcolonial'. Yet even at the start of 1965 there still remained over 13,000 publicly funded Britons working in developing countries, including more than 11,000 British officials distributed across forty-one colonies and ex-colonies;[6] a number comparable to those employed in the Colonial Service at the height of Empire.[7] An on-going British involvement in emergent Commonwealth states engaged the resources of diverse British institutions and individuals, and, ensured that the formal 'end' of the British Empire not only left many legacies within Britain itself, but numerous threads and entanglements linking governments, institutions and individuals in Britain and its former colonies.

[2] Calculated from *Technical Assistance from the United Kingdom for Overseas Development (March 1961)*, PP 1960–1 (Cmnd. 1308), annex II, pp. 30–1.

[3] Ibid., para. 27.

[4] *Ministry of Overseas Development. Overseas Development: The Work of the New Ministry (August 1965)*, PP 1964–5, XXX (Cmnd. 2736), paras. 121, 123.

[5] These developments can be followed in Ronald Hyam, *Britain's Declining Empire: The Road to Decolonisation, 1918–1968* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006); John Darwin, *The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the British World System, 1830–1970* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009); and, more briefly, in Sarah Stockwell, 'Ends of Empire' in Stockwell ed. *The British Empire: Themes and Perspectives* (Wiley Blackwell, Oxford, 2008), pp. 269–93.

[6] *Overseas Development*, para. 125; table 4, p. 66. They were in countries which had entered into agreements with the British government under the auspices of the British Overseas Service Aid Scheme introduced in 1961.

[7] The Colonial Service comprised 11,000 regular officers in 1947 and 18,000 in 1954: A. H. M. Kirk-Greene, *On Crown Service: A History of H.M. Colonial and Overseas Civil Services, 1837–1997* (I. B. Tauris, London, 1999), p. 51.

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This book explores some of these aspects of the *British* end of the British Empire and Britain's transformation from a colonial power to a postcolonial one. It does so in part via a discussion of British governmental overseas civilian and military aid, but principally by means of a history of the overseas engagements of several British institutions: the Universities of Oxford and Cambridge, the Bank of England, the Royal Mint and the Royal Military Academy Sandhurst. These were all primarily domestic institutions, but had to differing extents become stakeholders in Britain's Empire, responsible for delivering or managing services to the colonies.[8] Oxford and Cambridge had many connections to Empire, including that on which this book focuses: their role in training members of the Colonial Administrative Service. This dated back to the 1920s, but after 1946 principally took the form of a year-long course attended by new Service recruits. The Bank of England's imperial role was the consequence of the City's place as the world's leading financial centre and its responsibilities to sterling as an international reserve currency. The Bank was directly involved in the dependent Empire via the management of the sterling area and its representation on some regional colonial currency boards, which, in the absence of national or central banks and independent currencies, issued and managed colonial currencies. In the course of the nineteenth century the third institution, the Royal Mint, had also taken on an increasingly international and imperial dimension when it began producing coins for other countries, including those within the British Empire. It had overseen the establishment of branches in Australia, Canada and South Africa and, although by 1945 some of these overseas branches had thrown off British control, the Mint continued to supply coins for colonial currency authorities in most British dependencies. Sandhurst's 'imperial role' channelled an important aspect of the wider imperial function of the British Army. Generations of British Army officers, trained at Sandhurst, had been deployed somewhere in Britain's Empire, principally as a result of the British Army's peacetime role garrisoning the colonies, but also in active combat in Britain's numerous nineteenth-century colonial small wars and in the global conflicts of the twentieth century. British officers were also seconded to command colonial forces. Since 1861 Sandhurst had had another more direct 'imperial' function, training British, and in the 1920s Indian, entrants to the Indian Army; after the Second World War it began admitting increasing numbers of cadets from Britain's remaining colonies and from new Commonwealth states.

[8] Elements of the argument presented in this book were first advanced in an embryonic form in Sarah Stockwell, 'Exporting Britishness: Decolonization in Africa, the British State and its Clients' in Miguel Banderia Jerónimo and António Costa Pinto eds., *The Ends of European Colonial Empires: Cases and Comparisons* (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2015), pp. 148–77.

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These and other institutions provided the frames in which many lives were lived out across the Empire,[9] or through which even those who never left British shores might nevertheless be participants in the enterprise of empire. As Tamson Pietsch argues in her discussion of academic networks before the Second World War, institutions created opportunities for global interactions and exchanges, while also regulating and directing them.[10] They helped forge professional linkages that connected the different worlds of the British Empire, and that constituted what Gary Magee and Andrew Thompson describe for an earlier period as the 'software of empire'.[11] In the 1940s, 1950s and 1960s, as the structures of imperial rule were rolled back, such institutional and professional connections beyond the state became more, not less, important. By building these domestic institutions into a history of decolonization, this book contributes to the furthering of discussion of the processes of decolonization below the level of Westminster policymaking and above the level of the individual, the two themes around which many other accounts are constructed.

The decision to approach the history of colonial-political change from the perspective of these particular domestic institutions derives from my long-standing interest in two areas: the history of decolonization as it affected British organizations beyond the state; and secondly, processes of institution-building in new states accompanying the creation of Westminster-style parliamentary systems. These interests led to an earlier book on British business and the end of Empire in Ghana, which, together with others' research, helped illuminate the ways in which decolonization affected British firms operating within the Empire. This work explored the firms' attempts to influence both imperial policymaking and colonial-political outcomes,[12] and my own investigation of the establishment of a Ghanaian central bank sparked an interest in the Bank of England as well as in the Royal Mint.[13] More recently, this engagement with

[9] See, esp., D. Lambert and Alan Lester eds., *Colonial Lives Across the British Empire: Imperial Careering in the Nineteenth Century* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006).

[10] Tamson Pietsch, *Empire of Scholars: Universities, Networks and the British Academic World 1850–1939* (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2013), esp. p. 4.

[11] Gary Magee and Andrew Thompson, *Empire and Globalisation: Networks of People, Goods and Capital in the British World, c. 1850–1914* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2012), p. 16.

[12] S. E. Stockwell, 'The Political Strategies of British Business during Decolonization: The Case of the Gold Coast/Ghana, 1945–1957', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 23(1995), pp. 277–300; S. E. Stockwell, *The Business of British Business Strategies in the Gold Coast* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2000); Nicholas J. White, *Business, Government and the End of Empire: Malaya, 1942–1957* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1996); R. L. Tignor, *Capitalism and Nationalism at the End of Empire* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1998); M. Misra, *Business, Race and Politics in British India* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1999); L. J. Butler, *Copper Empire: Mining and the Colonial State in Northern Rhodesia, 1930–1964* (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2007).

[13] S. E. Stockwell, 'Instilling the "Sterling Tradition": Decolonization and the Creation of a Central Bank in Ghana', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 26 (1998), pp. 100–19.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781107707382.001 Published online by Cambridge University Press

how the end of Empire reverberated beyond the state has led me to explore its impact on the domestic Church of England.[14]

Like the Established Church, but unlike British businesses, the institutions discussed in what follows lay on the boundaries of the 'state' narrowly defined, which for these purposes we can describe as the Westminster and Whitehall policymaking centre. They were part of the interface between the state and civil society. They had their own lines of dialogue with the state, and were in some cases formally part of it. They could invoke the state more easily than, for example, most British companies were able to do (although some of the latter, especially where their activities bore directly on Britain's strategic interests, naturally had considerable leverage in Whitehall). In our period, the universities had the weakest ties to the state. Even so, they relied on state funding, including support for their role in delivering the Colonial Service training courses, and there was individual career mobility between departments of governments and the universities, with academics appointed to government committees serving as bridgeheads between these interconnected and porous worlds.

The British polity, however, was pluralistic in character and these institutions had acquired or been given a sense of agency, reflecting the distinctive nature of British political culture. They could not operate entirely independently of the state, but, even if subject in principle to ministerial control, still acted with considerable autonomy. As Patrick Joyce argues, the British state, as it developed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, was a 'liberal' one, not only because it was based on principles of political liberty, but also because it was one which permitted persons, places or institutions, which Joyce describes as 'designated governed entities', to operate 'ostensibly on their own, without outside interference'.[15] What is more these might be perceived as distinct from the British state, and their separate identities would be important in their ability to negotiate a changing overseas landscape brought about by decolonization. Within the British system institutions beyond the state also contributed to the business of governance, as Oxford and Cambridge did by training Britain's imperial administrators. Further, within British political culture there was a consensus even among public servants (in

[14] Sarah Stockwell, '"Splendidly Leading the Way?" Archbishop Fisher and Decolonisation in British Colonial Africa' in Robert Holland and Sarah Stockwell eds., *Ambiguities of Empire: Essays in Honour of Andrew Porter* (Routledge, London, 2009), pp. 199–218; Sarah Stockwell, '"Improper and Even Unconstitutional": The Involvement of the Church of England in the Politics of End of Empire in Cyprus' in S. Taylor ed., *From the Reformation to the Permissive Society: A Miscellany in Celebration of the the 400th Anniversary of Lambeth Palace Library* (Boydell, Woodbridge, 2010), pp. 583–655; Sarah Stockwell, 'Anglicanism in an Era of Decolonization' in Jeremy Morris ed. *The Oxford History of the Anglican Church. Volume 4: The Twentieth Century: Global Western Anglicanism, c. 1910 to the Present* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2017), pp. 160–85.

[15] Patrick Joyce, *The State of Freedom: A Social History of the British State since 1800* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013), pp. 3, 17–24, 188–93.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781107707382.001 Published online by Cambridge University Press

the British case generally Oxbridge-educated rather than professionally trained) about the desirability of limiting central state power, that reflected the particular cultural capital of institutions such as Britain's oldest universities.

At different times, these institutions had all been more independent of the state and had evolved their own institutional cultures. Established in 1694, the Bank of England became banker and creditor to the government. At its inception those who subscribed to a loan to the state were incorporated as the 'Governor and Company of the Bank of England'. Over time, the Bank assumed responsibility for managing Britain's gold and currency reserves and for holding the reserves of Britain's other banks; acquired monopoly control over the note issue in England and Wales; and helped manage government borrowing, serving as the ultimate source of credit or as lender of last resort. By the end of the nineteenth century it had largely ceased to operate as a commercial bank and become in effect a public institution serving the national interest, acting as advisor to the Treasury. Yet the Bank was also part of the financial service nexus of the City, with most of its governors drawn from City institutions and companies, and it continued to be owned and controlled by private shareholders until nationalization in 1946.[16] Even then, although nationalization transferred responsibility for the appointment of its most senior figures to the government, the Bank continued to operate relatively free from ministerial control. Rather than diminishing its independent culture, nationalization seems initially to have encouraged the Bank as far as possible to maintain its autonomy from the Treasury. For its part, the Treasury generally continued to respect the Bank's position as an independent source of expertise. It was not until the 1960s that the Bank became a more integral part of government policymaking structures, with a corresponding erosion of its standing as a voice articulating City interests.[17]

The Mint occupied a similarly indeterminate position between 'state' and 'society'. By far the oldest of the institutions discussed, its origins go back to c. 650 and the foundation of a London mint. Until Henry VIII's closure of the last remaining ecclesiastical mints concentrated all coin production at the Tower of London, it was just one of many mints in southern England. The Mint operated independently by Royal prerogative, but in 1688 was brought under the control of the Treasury.[18] In 1870 a new constitution made the Chancellor

[16] Alec Cairncross, 'The Bank of England and the British Economy' in Richard Roberts and David Kynaston eds., *The Bank of England: Money Power and Influence, 1694–1994* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995), pp. 56–82.

[17] Elizabeth Hennessy, 'The Governors, Directors, and Management' in Roberts and Kynaston eds., *The Bank of England*, pp. 185–216; David Kynaston, 'The Bank and the Government' in ibid., pp. 19–55.

[18] Sir John Craig, *The Mint: A History of the London Mint from AD 287 to 1948* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1953), p. xvii.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781107707382.001 Published online by Cambridge University Press

of the Exchequer titular head, or Master, of the Mint, and overall management of the mint was vested in a Deputy Master and Comptroller, appointed by the Treasury. Staffs were recruited from other government departments or through the Civil Service Commission. The Mint nevertheless had a more distant relationship with the Treasury than the formal arrangements might indicate,[19] and it occupied an anomalous position within the public sector, engaging in commercial sales as well as discharging its primary responsibility to manufacture coin for domestic circulation. Beginning with changes in 1975 this commercial role was rationalized, culminating in 2010 with the Mint's transformation into a limited company, albeit one wholly owned by the government. It is a parastatal commercial organization of a kind that has received relatively little attention from historians.

On a spectrum from 'state' to 'nonstate' the universities of Oxford and Cambridge, while from their medieval foundation intended to serve the twin needs of church and state, were in some respects more obviously at the periphery, although from the mid-nineteenth century they became subject to greater state regulation. Legislation in 1854 and 1856 intervened to make them less religiously exclusive, which together with the Northcote-Trevelyan civil service reforms, aimed at the creation of a public service class. Further legislation in 1877 stipulated that research and teaching should be among the aims of the universities, while governments also had patronage over some key university appointments. The establishment of the University Grants Committee (UGC) in 1919 and introduction of state funding, in 1923 to Oxbridge, but earlier elsewhere, represented a further development in the relationship of universities to the state with the new Committee instituting quinquennial university reviews. The universities nonetheless retained considerable independence from the state, with government funding accounting for only a proportion of university income and the UGC not inclined towards intervention.[20]

In contrast, in our period Sandhurst was more subordinate to Whitehall. The Academy was re-opened by the War Office in 1947, when the Royal Military College Sandhurst, established at the turn of the nineteenth century, merged with the Royal Military Academy Woolwich. The latter's origins lay in 1741, when an academy had been opened on the site of the workshops of the Royal Arsenal to train recruits to the army's technical branches. Historically the RMC had had a fluctuating relationship to the state. It was built during the Napoleonic Wars with government money, but the return to European peace

[19] *Fifth Report from the Estimates Committee, 1967–8: The Royal Mint*, PP 1967–8, IX (Cmnd. 364), para. 3; ibid., Minutes of Evidence Taken before Sub-Committee D of the Estimates Committee, paras. 136–9.

[20] Robert Anderson, *British Universities: Past and Present* (Hambledon, London, 2006), pp. 4, 35–6, 45, 116–18, 131.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781107707382.001 Published online by Cambridge University Press

saw a steep decline in military spending,[21] and for a period the loss of all state support. Government funding was provided again after the Crimean War, and by 1878 all infantry and cavalry officer cadets of the British Army, as well as entrants to the Indian Army, attended either Sandhurst or Woolwich.[22] Sandhurst had its own distinct institutional culture, but it lacked the capacity for independent initiatives that characterized some of the other institutions. In particular, it did not operate independently of the Army, although the latter was itself not unpolitical, and constituted another 'player' within Britain's pluralistic system, competing for resources within Whitehall as a whole and in relation to Britain's other services, the RAF and Navy.[23] Sandhurst was run by officers in the British Army, appointed to the Academy for relatively short periods, and responsible through the Army's executive, the Army Council, to the Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the Secretary of State for War.

Situated on the margins of the state or beyond, each of these institutions had assumed some form of imperial role and constituted part of the apparatus of the British imperial system. Together they reflect how within that system power was dispersed across the 'state' and 'society'. Insufficient attention has perhaps been paid to this – for all that the pluralistic nature of British imperialism is well established,[24] and postcolonial studies and the 'new imperial history' have illuminated the different forms which 'power' assumed within colonial contexts and the variety of sources from which it emanated.[25] The mixed economy of the British imperial system continued into the twentieth century and was even reinforced by the mid-century expansion of the state, not least because of the development in this period of social sciences and increased reliance on the 'expert'. In British colonial administration, as in other spheres of public life, numerous specialists were appointed to advisory bodies and investigatory commissions,[26] continuing and extending the plurality of the British system. As I will argue, while these experts and institutions were

[21] David French, *The British Way in Warfare, 1688–2000* (Unwin Hyman, London, 1990), pp. 226–7, 232.

[22] Hugh Thomas, *The Story of Sandhurst* (Hutchinson, London, 1961), pp. 53, 97, 121–31; Alan Sheppard, *Sandhurst: The Royal Military Academy Sandhurst and Its Predecessors* (Country Life Books, London, 1980), p. 92; Christopher Pugsley and Angela Holdsworth, *Sandhurst: A Tradition of Leadership* (Third Millennium Publishing, London, 2005), p. 35.

[23] Huw Strachan, *The Politics of the British Army* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997).

[24] Best captured in John Darwin's characterization of the ramshackle collection of overseas British interests and dependencies as a 'world system', held together by a powerful British centre, India, the 'hinterland of the City of London', a "commercial republic"', and the white self-governing colonies: Darwin, *The Empire Project,* pp. 9–12.

[25] On the 'new imperial history' see esp., Kathleen Wilson ed., *A New Imperial History: Culture, Identity, and Modernity in Britain and the Empire, 1660–1840* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2004).

[26] Joseph Hodge*, Triumph of the Expert: Agrarian Doctrines of Development* (Ohio University Press, Athens, OH, 2007).

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781107707382.001 Published online by Cambridge University Press

bound to the state in multifarious ways, their knowledge gave them 'power' of a semi-independent form. Conversely the co-option of experts and institutions within structures of imperial administration provided the context in which they acquired new expertise – 'knowledge' – which was sometimes thereafter the platform from which they might make their own interventions in the decolonization process. In these and other ways the plurality of the British system gave rise to a multiplicity of sites at which power was articulated, and generated distinct institutional cultures and dynamics. As we will see, the priorities of the Bank of England were not simply those of the Treasury, or the objectives of the academics delivering courses at Oxford and Cambridge those of the Colonial Office. Rather these domestic institutions could possess a form of corporate vocation, an ethos or sense of purpose, which could itself require adjustment in adapting to decolonization and the emergence of a postcolonial world.

As repositories of the knowledge useful to building the governmental and institutional structures deemed essential to independent nation-states, these different institutions utilized their expertise at the end of Empire by developing or becoming involved in delivering new programmes of technical education, and through diasporas of British personnel acting in an advisory capacity or seconded to senior roles within the new Commonwealth states. New states had an urgent and compelling need for assistance and had entered independence woefully ill-prepared, a legacy of colonialism and the speed with which they attained independence, unanticipated by many at the time. Postcolonial states were, Robert Jackson contends, 'quasi-states'. Constitutional decolonization created 'territorial jurisdictions' recognized by the international community as sovereign states, but which lacked established institutions and the personnel to staff them.[27] As we shall see, initiatives on the part of domestic institutions that had become stakeholders in Empire became part and parcel of Britain's package of 'technical assistance' to new states.

The exploration of these initiatives will demonstrate an on-going sense of 'imperial mission' – or perhaps more accurately 'Commonwealth mission' – in a variety of different institutions enduring across the era of decolonization. In private, British officials were realistic about the political difficulties inherent in the translation of the 'old' Commonwealth into the 'new', a process that began with the admission of India and Pakistan, and in which India especially became a significant player and source of influence among decolonizing African states.[28] Nevertheless, this sense of mission reflects the purchase that a Commonwealth ideal attained in public discourse and consciousness after

[27] Robert Jackson, *Quasi-States: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990), pp. 5, 22.

[28] See, e.g., Gerard McCann, 'From Diaspora to Third Worldism and the UN: India and the Politics of Decolonising Africa', *Past and Present* 218 (2013), Suppl. 8, pp. 258–80; Mélanie Torrent, 'A "New" Commonwealth for Britain? Negotiating Ghana's Pan-African and Asian

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781107707382.001 Published online by Cambridge University Press

the war, not least because, as Richard Toye argues, Labour and Conservative politicians 'recruited' the Commonwealth concept into political debate for their own purposes and, in this rhetorical process, the Commonwealth idea was created as a 'public phenomenon'.[29] That a common sense of mission can be identified across quite different institutions within and beyond the state also reflects the values common to British elites, a product of their shared academic and social background.

Individuals were highly significant in fashioning these institutional cultures and practices. This was notably the case at the Bank of England, where institutional cultural norms were shaped by one governor of longstanding tenure. The case study of the Mint similarly shows the importance of individual, dynamic leadership at a potentially destabilizing moment, and illustrates, as others observe, not only that institutions are 'remarkably durable', but how for institutions crises can 'create opportunities of breakthrough'.[30] Appointment and promotion policies allowed values to be cascaded down institutional hierarchies and reproduced, ensuring that they continued to shape institutional cultures. Where British officials were seconded or transferred to emergent Commonwealth states, their return saw their experience fed back into the institutions, sometimes helping sustain interest in the Commonwealth. Equally, institutional lobbying, as those within institutions acted to preserve and perpetuate their own activities, also resulted in their values and distinct, institutionally informed, perspectives percolating up within the British system, feeding into wider assessments and shaping broader policy outcomes.

This consideration of the history of a range of important British institutions – some of which were not principally 'imperial' – will hence be revealed as being as eloquent of the prevalence and development of cultures of imperialism (and the supposedly 'post-imperial') as perhaps more obvious conjunctions and sources, such as the press and other media, or debates around immigration. In particular, it will be argued that British institutions exercised their own 'imperialism' at the end of Empire as they sought to substitute new roles for their established ones within the imperial system.

Whether to advance commercial interests or from a more disinterested sense of responsibility and service, British actors and institutions aimed to embed specifically *British* practices and customs rather than advance less specific

Connections at the End of Empire (1951–8)', *International History Review*, 38 (2016), pp. 573–613.

[29] Richard Toye, 'Words of Change: The Rhetoric of Commonwealth, Common Market and Cold War, 1961–3' in L. J. Butler and Sarah Stockwell eds., *The Wind of Change: Harold Macmillan and British Decolonization* (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2013), pp. 140–58, esp. 154.

[30] A. Born and T. Christensen, 'The Development of Public Institutions: Reconsidering the Role of Leadership', *Administration and Society*, 40 (2008), pp. 271–97, quotation 289. I owe this reference to Véronique Dimier.

https://doi.org/10.1017/9781107707382.001 Published online by Cambridge University Press

'Anglo-American' western values, in ways that correspond to Harshan Kumarasingham's conclusions about a British commitment to exporting the Westminster parliamentary model and to Simon Potter's account of the BBC's role in the development of overseas broadcasting services and its efforts to disseminate a British model of public-service broadcasting.[31] Individuals within British institutions attempted to instil what they perceived as best practice, reflecting their own ideas of good governance. In particular, as they engaged in a process of institution-building, individuals within these institutions acted in ways that, rather than being simply a pragmatic strategy to secure economic interests or institutional advantage, were partly determined by British ideas of the state, and in particular of state power. Ideas of the distinctively liberal identity of the British state and its relations with civil society helped shape the policies and responses of a range of British institutions to the decolonization process. That is, Britons focused on the political neutrality of parastatal institutions and the independence from the state of institutions and organizations within civil society, in several cases by actively seeking to nurture an emergent African, professional, middle class.

In reality there were considerable gulfs between both British perceptions of a liberal and benevolent imperial mission and the often brutal nature of colonialism on the ground, *and* the power the British imagined they possessed to shape developments overseas and their actual ability to do so. They often struggled to exercise the control they wished, and their plans were frequently frustrated. Even so, in the twilight years of Empire individuals within institutions were able to exploit the last elements of Britain's imperial power structures as they sought to inscribe their practices and to advance their interests in a world in which there were influences in all directions, but where the power and force of currents was distinctly unequal. Domestic institutions beyond or on the margins of the state such as the Bank of England used their established connections to the Colonial Office, Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO), or representation on advisory bodies to exercise as much oversight over new Commonwealth institutions as possible. Equally the presence of British officials overseas both in colonial administrations and the CRO, the British Crown

[31] Harshan Kumarasingham, *A Political Legacy of the British Empire: Power and the Parliamentary System in Post-Colonial India and Sri Lanka* (I. B. Tauris, London, 2013); Simon Potter, *Broadcasting Empire: The BBC and the British World, 1922–1970* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012), ch. 5. See also Georgina Sinclair, *At the End of the Line: Colonial Policing and the Imperial Endgame, 1945–1980* (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2006), esp. ch. 3. In contrast British officials were 'cautious about the feasibility or indeed the desirability of exporting their culture, or their political institutions', with British officials worried that the adoption of the Queen as head of state in new Commonwealth states might drag her into murky local political disputes: Philip Murphy, *Monarchy and the End of Empire: The House of Windsor, the British Government and the Postwar Commonwealth* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013), p. 14.

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Agents – who had a key role in appointing personnel and in procurement – and, after independence, networks of legacy personnel who remained in post, gave a strategic advantage to British institutions. Emergent states could, and did, however, exercise their new sovereignty. They sourced aid multilaterally, including from other powers and institutions equally convinced of the value of their own expertise and models for postcolonial modernizing projects. In the 1950s and 1960s these alternative sources included other countries in the 'South' as well as the West, while transnational communities of experts and development agencies also played a key part.[32] The two superpowers, the United States and the Soviet Union, were in particular potentially valuable sources of material assistance, as well as of alternative and competing models of development.[33] Nor did local elites in emergent states simply accept uncritically British or other external models; rather they reimagined western ideas and developmental models, appropriating and deploying them in different ways and to their own ends within their own societies.[34] Inevitably the British focus of this book precludes full analysis of these dynamics. Our primary purpose is an investigation of *British* initiatives and of their legacies in Britain itself. Nonetheless, to gain some insight into African responses to the activities and technical assistance programmes developed by the British state and British institutions, I draw on Ghanaian and Zambian sources, as well as those of some international organizations that became alternative, and sometimes competing, sources of expertise to the British.

To focus discussion, the following chapters principally explore the institutions in relation to political change in former British Africa from the 1950s. However, of necessity they ground the discussion of African decolonization within a broader geographical framework, since the institutions themselves did not necessarily differentiate between Africa and other areas of the remaining

[32] See, e.g., McCann, 'From Diaspora to Third Worldism'; Corinna Unger, 'Industrialization vs. Agrarian Reform: West German Modernization Policies in India in the 1950s and 1960s', Abou B. Bamba, 'Triangulating a Modernization Experiment: The United States, France, and the Making of the Kossou Project in Central Ivory Coast', Constantin Katsakioris, 'Soviet Lessons for Arab Modernization. Soviet Educational Aid towards Arab Countries after 1956' all in Andreas Eckert, Stephen Malinowski, and Corinna Unger eds., *Modernizing Missions: Approaches to 'Developing' the Non-Western World after 1945*, special issue of *Journal of Modern European History*, 8 (2010).

[33] There is a large literature on American modernization theory especially, as discussed on p. 74. Additionally there are numerous case studies both old and new that explore the relations between new states and the United States and Soviet Union: see, as an excellent example of an older historiography, W. Scott Thompson, *Ghana's Foreign Policy, 1957–1966* (Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1969), and more recently the introduction and essays in Leslie James and Elizabeth Leake, *Decolonization and the Cold War: Negotiating Independence* (Bloomsbury Academic, London, 2015).

[34] See some of the contributions to C. A. Bayly, Vijayendra Rao, Simon Szreter, Michael Woodcock eds, *History, Historians and Development Policy: A Necessary Dialogue* (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2011).

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Empire, or even the remnants of an 'informal' Empire in the Middle East. Moreover, to understand the different experiences and perspectives of some of the institutions in the 1950s, we need also to take account of their earlier involvement in the 'old' Commonwealth and India, since this informed their approaches to African decolonization. Many of those who occupied senior posts within the institutions after the war had risen through the ranks in the interwar era, their mindsets shaped by their experience in dealing with the former white settlement colonies of Canada, New Zealand, Australia and South Africa, or with India. In particular, the Bank of England's involvement with the new Commonwealth in the 1950s and 1960s can only be fully understood with reference to its previous engagement in the older Commonwealth states. Despite a historiographical shift to include the dominions in post-war histories of decolonization,[35] they remain relatively marginal to accounts organized around the theme of 'Empire's end'. Once we broaden our focus away from the state, narrowly defined, to incorporate other institutions that had assumed imperial roles in the pluralistic British system, the extent to which (for all the real differences in forms of rule and sovereignty across different locations within the British formal and informal empires) some contemporaries perceived developments in the dependent Empire in the 1950s within the same frame as those of an earlier era comes more firmly into view in a fashion that may be obscured by ways of 'seeing' the Empire derived from Britain's own Whitehall administrative division into 'colonial', 'Indian', 'dominion' and 'foreign'.

The account that follows traces developments relating to the four institutions through to the 1980s. British decolonization was protracted, continuing in the late 1960s in relation to the southern African high-commission territories, and during the 1970s in relation to smaller island dependencies. It is impossible to understand either the 'British end' of the British Empire or the ways in which the British state and British institutions reconfigured their activities for a 'postcolonial' era without taking account of this drawn-out nature of British decolonization. It will be suggested that this is because the British state was 'Janus-faced': one part of it was focused on the still-functioning Empire, and the other half was adapting to a new post-imperial phase. What is more, the structures and legacies within these British institutions left by centuries of involvement with Britain's Empire at some point evolved to become distinctively different from those of the imperial era, ceasing to be simply 'imperial hangovers'. The changes were nevertheless incremental rather than revolutionary, and to understand the full effects of empire and of British decolonization we need to adopt a long perspective.

[35] On which, see esp. A. G. Hopkins. 'Rethinking Decolonization', *Past and Present*, 200 (2008), pp. 211–47.

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Recent years have seen an enormous, and fruitful, expansion in the historiography of decolonization. We are now accustomed to thinking of it as something that involves much more than simply constitutional change and instead that affected and engaged a wide set of organizations and individuals within the former colonial empires, and had an impact 'at home' as well as overseas. Indeed whereas once historians treated decolonization as something of little bearing on British domestic history, and the domain of historians of empire, a wealth of new studies, building on several decades of scholarship concerning the ways in which imperialism shaped metropolitan society and culture in earlier periods,[36] has exposed the limitations of what historian Stuart Ward dubs a 'minimal impact' interpretation of the British experience of the end of Empire.[37] They range from considerations of imperial issues in post-war party politics to studies of British race relations and immigration, and analyses of culture and media.[38] Alongside significant contributions by Wendy Webster and Stephen Howe,[39] Ward himself opened up study of the cultural

[36] Associated esp. with the pioneering work of John Mackenzie and the Manchester University Press 'Studies in Imperialism' series that for many years he also edited, as well as with scholars such as Catherine Hall, Kathleen Wilson and Antoinette Burton: see, e.g., among many, John Mackenzie ed., *Imperialism and Popular Culture* (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 1986), Catherine Hall and Sonya Rose eds., *At Home with the Empire: Metropolitan Culture and the Imperial World* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2006), *The Sense of the People: Politics, Culture and Imperialism in England, 1715–1785* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1998), Antoinette Burton, *Burdens of History: British Feminists, Indian Women, and Imperial Culture, 1865–1915* (University of North Carolina Press, Chapel Hill, NC, 1994). For a more critical view that questions the depth and breadth of imperial impact, see: Bernard Porter, *The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society and Culture in Britain* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004); Bernard Porter, 'Further thoughts on Imperial Absent-Mindedness', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 36 (2008), pp. 101–17.

[37] Stuart Ward, 'Introduction' in Stuart Ward ed., *British Culture and the End of Empire* (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2001), p. 4.

[38] On politics, among many, see, Stephen Howe, *Anti-colonialism in British Politics: The Left and the End of Empire 1918–1964* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1993); Philip Murphy, *Party Politics and Decolonization: The Conservative Party and British Colonial Policy in Tropical Africa, 1951–1964* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1995); Nicholas J. Owen, *The British Left and India: Metropolitan Anti-imperialism, 1885–1947* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 2007). On ideas of race and immigration, see esp., Camilla Schofield, *Enoch Powell and the Making of Postcolonial Britain* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013), and Peter Brooke, 'Duncan Sandys and the Informal Politics of Decolonisation' (PhD thesis, King's College London, 2016); on culture and society, see further references below and also e.g. Lee Grieveson and C. MacCabe eds., *Film and the End of Empire* (Palgrave Macmillan with the British Film Institute, London, 2011). The essays in Andrew Thompson ed., *Britain's Experience of Empire in the Twentieth Century* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011) offer an excellent starting point for exploring these different themes.

[39] Ward ed., *British Culture;* Wendy Webster, '"There'll Always Be an England": Representations of Colonial Wars and Immigration, 1948–68', *Journal of British Studies* 40 (2001), pp. 557–84; Wendy Webster, *Englishness and Empire 1939–1965* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2005); Stephen Howe, 'Internal Decolonization? British Politics since Thatcher as Post-Colonial Trauma', *Twentieth Century British History* 14 (2003), pp. 286–304; Stephen Howe, 'When If Ever Did Empire End? Internal Decolonization in British Culture

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dimensions of decolonization in Britain in a pioneering edited collection of essays. Such work was richly suggestive of a post-war ‘culture of Empire’, but showed that this might take many forms: an enduring popular imperial culture, albeit one in which a ‘shift’ was occurring as a more unreconstructed imperial culture absorbed and reflected the post-war rhetorics of development and the Commonwealth; the cultural resonance of ‘decline’ itself; the ‘Empire coming home’, especially in the form of post-war Commonwealth immigration; and nostalgia for an Empire lost, as well as the struggle for ‘post-imperial’ national identity and purpose. Through analysis of cultures of Britishness at the Empire’s end, including of how imperial retreat has stimulated devolution within the British union, Ward has subsequently explored other dimensions of the metropolitan effects of decolonization.[40] Jordanna Bailkin’s discussion of the post-war domestic welfare state has also shown the complex and varied ways in which imperialism and its afterlives shaped Britain itself, and Bill Schwarz how imperial constructions of race were of lasting significance in shaping white British identities.[41] Race and immigration are similarly prominent in Elizabeth Buettner’s richly textured and highly engaging account of Britain and other former European colonial powers ‘after Empire’. With a view to showing how Europe was ‘*recreated* once its territorial expanse receded’, she focuses especially on movements of people in the form of both returning settlers and Asian, African and Caribbean immigrants to Europe, as well as on multiculturalism and memories of Empire in former European imperial metropoles.[42] A similarly comparative European approach also underpins Ruth Craggs and Claire Wintle’s edited collection exploring transnational cultures of decolonization. Among other things, they turn a spotlight on institutions of a cultural kind, such as museums, architectural practices and artists’ groups, and showcase research demonstrating how these provided a platform for ‘new artworks, displays and styles that promoted decolonization’.[43]

since the 1950s’ in Martin Lynn ed., *The British Empire in the 1950s: Retreat or Revival?* (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2006).

[40] As part of his *Embers of Empire* project. See, e.g., Jimmi Nielsen and Stuart Ward, ‘“Cramped and restricted at home?” Scottish separatism at empire’s end’, *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, 25 (2015), pp. 159–85; see also an impressive debut by another member of this project: Ezequiel Mercau, ‘Empire Redux. The Falklands and the End of Greater Britain’ (University of Copenhagen PhD, 2016).

[41] Jordanna Bailkin, *The Afterlife of Empire* (University of California Press, Berkeley, CA, 2012); and Bill Schwarz, *The White Man’s World* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2011).

[42] Elizabeth Buettner, *Europe after Empire: Decolonization, Society and Culture* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2016), quotation, p. 9; see also, Elizabeth Buettner, *Empire Families: Britons and Late Imperial India* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2004).

[43] Ruth Craggs and Claire Wintle eds. *Cultures of Decolonisation* (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2015), p. 11.

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The history of domestic British institutions more generally at the end of Empire has, however, attracted little attention.[44] Yet, as I have suggested, domestic institutions like the Bank of England can be as revealing of cultures of imperialism as other more obvious sources. Moreover, by focusing on the four institutional case studies we can obtain a new perspective offering a clearer picture of the richly textured, complex and sometimes even contradictory cultures shaped by Britain's involvement in empire in all its different manifestations. These include ideas of race and class and also of imperial power, but were far from exclusively constituted by them, and these were imbricated with many others derived from far different sources or aspects of the imperial project in determining the imperial and 'post-imperial' cultures with which we are concerned.

In this respect, this book thus plugs a significant gap in our understanding both of decolonization and of the history of the institutions covered. The Mint and Sandhurst, the subject of Chapters 5 and 6, respectively, figure rarely, if at all, in existing accounts of the end of Empire, save for Catherine Eagleton's account of the design of coinage for Africa.[45] Indeed, neither institution has hitherto attracted much attention from modern historians more generally excepting those commissioned to produce institutional histories or in-house historians. Of the two, the Mint is the better served;[46] accounts of Sandhurst were either published some time ago and concentrate on its more distant past,[47] or have been produced for a general rather than an academic audience.[48] There are several excellent histories of the British Army, in particular for our period by David French, but these offer only limited discussion of training and of Sandhurst specifically.[49] Nor, despite literatures on colonial armed forces, on British counter-insurgency at the end of Empire, and British defence policy and decolonization,[50] has much been written about British military assistance to new African states, and the training of overseas cadets at British military train-

[44] Simon Potter's excellent history of the BBC is one notable exception; however, his principal focus is on the period before the Second World War, and he concentrates on the old Commonwealth rather than the new. Potter, *Broadcasting Empire*.

[45] Catherine Eagleton, 'Designing Change: Coins and the Creation of New National Identities' in Craggs and Wintle eds., *Cultures of Decolonisation*, pp. 222–44.

[46] C. E. Challis ed., *A New History of the Royal Mint* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1992).

[47] The best is Sheppard, *Sandhurst.*

[48] Holdsworth and Pugsley, *Sandhurst*.

[49] David French, *Army, Empire and Cold War: The British Army and Military Policy, 1945–71* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2012); see, also, Strachan, *Politics.*

[50] In relation to Africa, the best are: Timothy Parsons, *The African Rank and File: Social Implications of Colonial Military Service in the King's African Rifles, 1902–1964* (I. B. Tauris, Westport, CT & London, 1999); David Killingray, *Fighting for Britain: African Soldiers and the Second World War* (James Currey, Woodbridge, 2010); David Percox, *Britain, Kenya and the Cold War: Imperial Defence, Colonial Security and Decolonisation* (I. B. Tauris, London, 2004).

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ing establishments, a key focus in the discussion of Sandhurst in Chapter 6, although the rise of the military in politics in new Commonwealth states, especially in Africa, did lead to some investigation in the 1960s and 1970s of the 'Sandhurst effect'.[51]

There is similarly little that directly engages with the theme of Oxford and Cambridge and Britain's late colonial Empire,[52] discussed in Chapter 3, although there are extensive and growing literatures on the ways in which academic disciplines, notably the social sciences, were shaped by and shaped Britain's involvement in Empire, on academic networks across the British world, and on overseas students studying in Britain.[53] Because this book addresses Oxford and Cambridge's involvement in Colonial Service training, Chapter 3 is as much about the Colonial Service as it is about the universities. The Service

[51] On the latter see, e.g., William Gutteridge, 'A Commonwealth Military Culture? Soldiers in the British Mould', *Round Table*, 60 (1970), pp. 327–37; William Gutteridge, *Military Institutions and Power in the New States* (Pall Mall Press, London and Dunmow, 1964); William Gutteridge, *The Military in African Politics* (Methuen and Co Ltd., London, 1969); and Robin Luckham, *The Nigerian Military: A Sociological Analysis of Authority and Revolt 1960–1967* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1971). See also Anthony Clayton, 'The Military Relations between Great Britain and Commonwealth Countries, with particular reference to the African Commonwealth Nations' in W. H. Morris-Jones and Georges Fischer eds., *Decolonisation and After: The British and French Experience* (Routledge, London, 1980), pp. 193–223. For more recent, regionally specific examples, see Timothy Parsons, *The 1964 Army Mutinies and the Making of Modern East Africa* (Praeger, Westport, CT, 2003); Tim Stapleton, *African Police and Soldiers in Colonial Zimbabwe, 1923–1980* (Rochester, NY, 2011); Marco Myss, 'A Post-Imperial Cold War Paradox: The Anglo-Nigerian Defence Agreement 1958–1962', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 44 (2016), pp. 976–1000; Poppy Cullen, '"Kenya is No Doubt a Special Place": British Policy towards Kenya, 1960–1980' (University of Durham, PhD, 2015). On long-term British–African defence links see also A. Jackson, 'British-African defence and security connections', *Defence Studies*, 6 (2006), pp. 351–76; Ashley Jackson, 'Empire and Beyond: The Pursuit of Overseas National Interests in the Late Twentieth Century', *English Historical Review,* 122 (2007), pp. 1350–66.

[52] The main exception is the relevant section of Richard Symonds, *Oxford and Empire: The Long Lost Cause?* (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1986); see also F. Madden and D. K. Fieldhouse eds., *Oxford and the Idea of Commonwealth: Essays Presented to Sir Edgar Williams* (Croon Helm, London, 1982), and the essays by Ronald Hyam on imperial history at Oxford and Cambridge in Ronald Hyam, *Understanding the British Empire* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010). There are useful chapters in the standard histories of the Universities: J. G. Darwin, 'A World University' in Brian Harrison ed., *The History of the University of Oxford*: *Volume VIII. The Twentieth Century* (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1994), pp. 607–38; Christopher Brooke, *A History of the University of Cambridge: Volume IV 1870–1990* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1993).

[53] Esp., Pietsch, *Empire of Scholars*; Brett M. Bennett and Joseph Hodge eds., *Science and Empire: Knowledge and Networks of Science Across the British Empire, 1800–1970* (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2011); Helen Tilley and Robert J. Gordon eds., *Ordering Africa: Anthropology, European Imperialism, and the Politics of Knowledge* (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2007); Hilary Perraton, *A History of Foreign Students in Britain* (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2014); A. J. Stockwell, 'Leaders, Dissidents and the Disappointed: Colonial Students in Britain as Empire Ended', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History,* 36 (2008), pp. 487–507.

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of course has its own historiography,[54] but one that focuses more on the interwar and immediate post-war years than on the last years of African decolonization and that does not take up the issues addressed below.[55]

Of all the institutions represented in this book, the Bank, the subject of Chapter 4, has attracted most attention, not only in histories of the Bank and the City,[56] but more specifically from historians of empire, most prominently P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins in their sweeping analysis of 'gentlemanly capitalism' and British imperialism, as well as in Catherine Schenk and Gerold Krozewski's important and more focused accounts of the Empire and the post-war sterling area.[57] Chibuike Uche and Catherine Schenk have joined me in examining the development of central banking in Commonwealth states.[58]

[54] Kirk-Greene, *On Crown Service*; Christopher Prior, *Exporting Empire: Africa, Colonial Officials and the Construction of the Imperial State, 1900–39* (Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2013); Véronique Dimier, *Le gouvernement des colonies, regards croisés franco-britannique* (Presses Universitaire de Bruxelles, Brussels, 2004); Véronique Dimier, 'Three Universities and the British Elite: A Science of Colonial Administration in the UK', *Public Administration*, 84 (2006), pp. 337–66; Robert Heussler, *Yesterday's Rulers: The Making of the British Colonial Service* (Oxford University Press for Syracuse University Press, London, 1963). Nile Gardiner, '"Sentinels of Empire". The British Colonial Administrative Service, 1919–1954' (University of Yale, PhD, 1998).

[55] Kirk-Greene, *On Crown Service*, Sabine Clarke, 'A Technocratic Imperial State? The Colonial Office and Scientific Research, 1940–60', *Twentieth Century British History* 18 (2007), pp. 453–80; Richard Rathbone, 'The Colonial Service and the Transfer of Power in Ghana' in John Smith ed., *Administering Empire: The British Colonial Service in Retrospect* (University of London Press, London, 1999), pp. 149–66; Martin Lynn, 'Nigerian Complications: The Colonial Office, the Colonial Service and the 1953 Crisis in Nigeria' in John Smith ed., *Administering Empire*, pp. 181–205; Chris Jeppesen, 'Sanders of the River. Still the Best Job for a British Boy': Recruitment to the Colonial Administrative Service at the End of Empire', *Historical Journal*, 59 (2016), pp. 469–508. Of very many published memoirs, see, e.g., David Le Breton ed., *I Remember It Well: Fifty Years of Colonial Service Personnel Reminiscences* (published for the Overseas Service Pensioners' Association, Kinloss, 2010).

[56] Esp., Forrest Capie, *The Bank of England 1950s to 1979* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010); Roberts and Kynaston eds., *The Bank of England*: David Kynaston, *Till Time's Last Sand. A History of the Bank of England 1694–2013* (Bloomsbury Publishing, London, 2017) was published too late to take proper account of it in this book. Although Kynaston acknowledges the perceived importance of the Empire-Commonwealth within the Bank, he devotes little space to it.

[57] P. J. Cain and A. G. Hopkins, *British Imperialism, 1688–2016* (Harlow, 1st pub., 1993; 3rd edn., 2016); Catherine Schenk, *Britain and the Sterling Area: From Devaluation to Convertibility in the 1950s* (Routledge, London, 1994); *The Decline of Sterling: Managing the Retreat of an International Currency 1945–1992* (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2010); Gerold Krozewski, *Money and the End of Empire: British International Economic Policy and the Colonies, 1947–1958* (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2001).

[58] Catherine Schenk, 'The Origins of a Central Bank in Malaya and the Transition to Independence, 1954–1959', *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History*, 21 (1993), pp. 409–31; C. U. Uche, 'From Currency Board to Central Banking: The Politics of Change in Sierra Leone', *African Economic History* 24 (1996), pp. 147–58; C. U. Uche, 'Bank of England vs the IBRD: Did the Nigerian Colony Deserve a Central Bank?', *Explorations in Economic History* 34 (1997), pp. 220–41; C. U. Uche, 'From Currency Board to Central Banking: The Gold Coast Experience', *South African Journal of Economic History*, 10 (1995), pp. 80–94.

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But Chapter 4 highlights aspects of the Bank's involvement in post-war decolonization and in the development of Commonwealth central banking, which have not been explored before, and which can underpin a new interpretation of the Bank of England's role.

Elsewhere in the historiography there has been significant discussion of postcolonial African states that were, as Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, put it, not 'properly institutionalized' – lacking independent bureaucracies free from the control of those who hold political power, staffed by civil servants who regarded 'public employment as a private resource'.[59] Yet institutional development – the second theme of this book, alongside the exploration of the domestic workings out of decolonization – has attracted little attention in broad histories of decolonization, and generated only limited scholarship more generally, and this mostly in relation to defence, policing and intelligence.[60] As we broaden our understanding of decolonization, to incorporate much more than the high politics of imperial policymaking and constitutional independence, this neglect of accompanying and secondary processes of decolonization is all the more striking. The theme featured in some of the scholarship of the late 1960s and early 1970s, when focused studies of the fashioning of new institutions appeared for different regions and sectors, most numerous in relation to African armed forces,[61] and was addressed most directly in Richard Symonds, *The British and their Successors*.[62] But while perceptive and informative, these accounts were mostly written without access to the relevant primary sources, instead analysing near-contemporaneous developments the authors saw unfolding around them. Indeed, many of those writing on the theme of institutional development and transfer were themselves involved in the very processes they sought to analyse, including some on the academic staff at Sandhurst or

[59] Patrick Chabal and Jean-Pascal Daloz, *Africa Works: Disorder as Political Instrument* (James Currey, Oxford, 1999), esp. pp. 4–7.

[60] Parsons, *The 1964 Army*; Stapleton, *African Police and Soldiers*; David Killingray, *The British Military Presence in West Africa* (Oxford Development Records Project, Report 3, 1983); Sinclair, *At the End of the Line.* See also the University of the West of England's major archival project on the Rhodesian army: 'Wars of Liberation, Wars of Decolonisation. The Rhodesian Army Archive Project': http://gtr.ukri.org/projects?ref=AH%2FD002001%2F1, accessed 4 April 2018. On intelligence see, esp. Philip Murphy, 'Creating a Commonwealth Intelligence Culture: The View from Central Africa, 1945–1965', *Intelligence and National Security*, 17 (2002), pp. 131–62; Calder Walton, *Empire of Secrets: British Intelligence, the Cold War and the Twilight of Empire* (William Collins, London, 2012).

[61] See, in addition to the works by Gutteridge and Luckham cited above, also Michael Lee, *African Armies and Civil Order* (Chatto and Windus, London, 1969); Chester Arthur Crocker, 'The Military Transfer of Power in Africa: A Comparative Study of Change in the British and French Systems of Order' (Johns Hopkins University, PhD, 1969); Norman J. Miners, *The Nigerian Army, 1956–1966* (Methuen, London, 1971). Lee was granted access to the primary sources but was not permitted to reference them.

[62] Richard Symonds, *The British and their Successors: A Study of the Government Services in the New States* (Faber, London, 1966).

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Oxford.[63] This flowering of contemporaneous studies of different aspects of state-building was itself a product of some of the same dynamics that underpinned the initiatives discussed in this book: another manifestation of a British liberalism that revolved around particular ideas of the nature of the state.

The process of 'decolonizing' colonial institutions and of developing institutions in new states is now beginning to attract renewed scholarly attention.[64] But there remain many gaps in our appreciation of the historical development of institutions in new states at the end of Empire. Moreover, most existing studies of institutional transfer and development have been written about specific regions or sectors, most often the preserve of specialists in military or financial history, or of political scientists. This book therefore attempts for the first time since there has been access to the relevant primary sources for British decolonization to bring together empirical analysis across *different* sectors – administration, finance and defence.[65] By assembling in one volume analysis of institutions normally discussed in quite separate historiographies this book brings into sharper focus the similarities across sectors and institutions. Poppy Cullen has recently shown in her impressive study of British relations with postcolonial Kenya that, although there was no 'single dominant British interest' in the country, a 'combination of different aims and opportunities' nevertheless made Kenya 'particularly significant' to Britain.[66] In comparable ways this book hopes to show that the 'whole' is more than the sum of the parts, demonstrating just how comprehensively, and in mutually reinforcing ways, British officials and institutions, within and outside the British state, engaged in state- and institution-building processes in emergent Commonwealth nations.

In order to contextualize the later considerations of British civil and military technical assistance, Chapter 2, which focuses principally on the British state, explains why little consideration was given to, and little progress made with, institutional transfer, development and Africanization before the 1950s. It also identifies the dynamics and character of policies of technical assistance as an aspect of British international aid, including military assistance, essential for understanding the discussion of Sandhurst in Chapter 6.

Through this discussion – and that in subsequent chapters of the ways in which institutions discussed here delivered forms of technical assistance to new states – this book contributes to growing conversations about Britain's

63 Including William Gutteridge and Richard Symonds.
64 See, esp. Ellen Feingold, 'Decolonising Justice: A History of the High Court of Tanganyika, c. 1920–71' (University of Oxford, D.Phil., 2011); for an innovative approach to the development of African universities, see, Tim Livsey, 'Suitable Lodgings for Students: Modern Space, Colonial Development and Decolonization in Nigeria', *Urban History*, 41 (2014), pp. 1–22.
65 But see, Stockwell, 'Exporting Britishness'.
66 Cullen, 'Kenya is No Doubt a Special Place', p. 26.

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relations with postcolonial African states,[67] international educational and technical aid,[68] and of the colonial roots of the postcolonial development industry. Scholars were once slow to acknowledge the colonial lineage of modern development – perhaps as Uma Kothari suggests, because there was a 'political imperative to distance the international aid industry from the colonial encounter'[69] – but we now have more evidence of their interconnection. As Marc Frey and Sönke Kunkel argue, 'at the moment the much heralded "development era" crystallized, there was already in place a European knowledge-power complex which consisted of hundreds, or thousands, of experts, administrators, scientists, bureaucracies and financial resources that, due to the ending of colonial wars and control, could now be disbursed as grants and loans to the "underdeveloped world"'.[70] Joseph Hodge and Véronique Dimier show that in the 1960s and 1970s people formerly associated with European colonial development went on to work in new roles in development bodies. Hodge shows how the postcolonial re-employment of former British personnel in such organizations contributed to a globalization of colonial development practice.[71] Dimier similarly demonstrates that former French colonial officials 'recycled their imperial expertise' through their re-employment in the European Commission's Directorate General for Development and Cooperation. Their interaction with an African elite corresponded, she suggests, to that of the colonial era, for example in systems of indirect rule.[72] My own book reveals other important colonial roots of postcolonial development practice and studies, as well as striking continuities between the colonial and the postcolonial eras. It also shows just how much the nature of British technical assistance reflected institutional priorities and agendas.

Before this we should begin, however, with a discussion of the 'imperial' roles of the domestic British institutions under consideration. This shows how the Mint and the universities had developed a vested interest in the perpetuation of their 'imperial' roles into the post-imperial era, and how the Bank of England – which had overseen the development of central banking

[67] Ibid.; see also, e.g., Brooke, 'Duncan Sandys'.

[68] For example, Corinna Unger, 'The United States, Decolonization, and the Education of Third World Elites' in Jost Dülffer and Marc Frey eds., *Elites and Decolonization in the Twentieth Century* (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2011), pp. 241–61.

[69] Uma Kothari, 'From Colonial Administration to Development Studies: A Postcolonial Critique of the History of Development Studies' in Uma Kothari, *A Radical History of Development Studies: Individuals, Institutions, and Ideologies* (Zed Books, London, 2005), pp. 46–66, quotation at 51.

[70] Marc Frey and Sönke Kunkel, 'Writing the History of Development: A Review of the Recent Literature', *Contemporary European History*, 20 (2011), pp. 215–32 [quote from 223].

[71] On which see, e.g., Joseph Hodge, 'British Colonial Expertise, Post-Colonial Careering and the Early History of International Development', in Eckert, Malinowski, and Unger eds., *Modernizing Missions*, pp. 24–44.

[72] Véronique Dimier, *The Invention of a European Development Aid Bureaucracy. Recycling Empire* (Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke, 2014), p. 2.

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in the dominions and India in the interwar period – developed a distinctive culture that equated Britishness with 'good practice', premised on a sense of British entitlement, as well as responsibility, to shape developments in the new Commonwealth. In this way it offers a point of departure for my wider project by showing that the decolonization process commenced at a point at which these British institutions were in varying degrees and ways more closely engaged in the Empire than ever before.

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