

Introduction: The word cringe has suffered alterations in its colloquial application, with its most recent version, adopted by generation Z and millennials, as a response to embarrassment or social awkwardness by proxy. This odd emotion is interesting in that it translates a vicarious embarrassment which is elicited whenever one is in the presence of a social blunder, public failures and threats to another's social integrity.

Objectives: The authors aim to explore the novel concept of cringe, briefly discussing what is currently known about the emotional response. A potential correlation between empathy and cringe is discussed as well as the hypothesis that certain psychiatric disorders such as personality disorder may demonstrate altered cringe responses.

Methods: The authors propose a non-systematized brief literature review on works most pertinent to the topic.

Results: Formal and structured studies into the concept of cringe are far and few between, however, the literature does demonstrate that, the neural pathways of how social closeness affects our experience of cringe are starting to be explored. The concept of cringe, has also been described as a vicarious social pain. Exploration into the empathy pathways and their abnormalities, may demonstrate the underlying construct of cringe. Lack of this feeling may be present in those with empathy alterations, such as is seen in antisocial personality disorder.

Conclusions: Cringe is an uncomfortable feeling that surges when in the presence of someone suffering socially. Understanding this oddity may permit further understanding of empathy pathways as well as exploring the neural abnormalities of those who do not feel cringe.

Disclosure: No significant relationships.

Keywords: Empathy; personality trait; cringe; Theory of Mind

Philosophy and Psychiatry

EPV1005

The human brain in the transhumanist mindset. A neuroethical critique of the neuroscience paradigm.

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doi: 10.1192/j.eurpsy.2022.1723

Introduction: Neuroscience advances open the debate on improving brain functionality and human behavior. Transhumanism advocates the use of biotechnology for the betterment of man, transcending into another nature. Neuroethics marks limits of the application and experimentation in neuroscience, also proposing an interdisciplinary philosophical reflection valuing the multidimensionality of human mind.

Objectives: To analyze the transhumanist approach of dominating human nature controlling cognitive and moral functions through technique. A critique from neuroethics in an interdisciplinary key to evaluate the complexity of mental functionality and the derived issues that go beyond the scientific scope, with the help of philosophy.

Methods: A bibliographic review on neuroscience and neuroethics is carried out, finding a core consensus in the warning of the biopsychosocial complexity of the set of realities that shape the human being, facing a reductionist vision of neuroscience.

Results: Despite the advances in biotechnology and neuroscientific research, the transhumanist approach of brain enhancement transgressing human reality and reducing its nature to a mechanical question that can be controlled through psychopharmacological resources, becomes dystopian due to the lack of ontological continuity in the deconstruction of the human being in a set of neural circuits, and the lack of consideration of all the dimensions that configure the human mind and existence.

Conclusions: An interdisciplinary vision is necessary to analyze the human mind, avoiding falling into the brain reductionism of the neuroscientific paradigm, for an holistic understanding of the human mind and behaviors, beside the integration of a philosophical reflection to join neurobiology and moral dimensions, in a humanist return from transhumanism.

Disclosure: No significant relationships.

Keywords: Bioethical; Neuroscience; Phylosophy; mind

EPV1006

Limitations of Mechanistic Model of Explanation in Biological Psychiatry

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doi: 10.1192/j.eurpsy.2022.1724

Introduction: The National Institute for Mental Illness (NIMH) launched in 2008 a project based on 'precision medicine,' called Research Domain Criteria (RDoC). This precision medicine approach, novel in the context of psychiatry, proposes to identify the "fundamental components of behavior," determining their range of variations from normality to abnormality and identifying their instantiations at different levels of the biological mechanism. To achieve its goal, an essential task of the RDoC initiative has been to identify and classify psychological constructs associated with psychopathology and to cut them off at a finer degree of granularity, presumably in order to have a greater chance of finding the biological mechanisms which implement every resultant part.

Objectives: Our work aims to show the limitations that psychiatry faces when assuming the mechanistic model of explanations. We will show how, if we accept the phenomenon of multiple realization, it is not plausible to expect that the RDoC initiative will be successful in their enterprise to track single or precise causal mechanisms for every construct identified at the cognitive level.

Methods: Philosophical argumentation

Results: No results.

Conclusions: We conclude that an approach that aims to identify single functional units and to dig down at a "fundamental level" to find their neural or genetic implementation should not only be reconsidered in terms of the phenomenon of multiple realization, but also leaves a gap in our understanding of the complex structures that are found at the cognitive-functional level and whose dysfunctions would be of great explanatory relevance concerning mental disorders.

Disclosure: No significant relationships.

Keywords: biological psychiatry; mechanistic model of explanation; RDoC; multiple realization

EPV1007

Specifics of attitudes towards traditional Chinese medicine in dental students

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doi: 10.1192/j.eurpsy.2022.1725

Introduction: Traditional Chinese medicine (TCM), conceived in the womb of Chinese culture, is gaining more and more popularity in the world. What views on its possibilities do dentists studying in Russia have?

Objectives: Our goal is to establish the peculiarities of the attitude to TCM that are characteristic of dental students and correlate them with their psychosocial qualities.

Methods: We surveyed anonymously 106 dental students of Ulianov Chuvash State University using the Attitude to TCM Survey (E. Nikolaev) and the Sociocultural Health Questionnaire (E. Nikolaev). To analyze the interrelations, we used a correlation analysis.

Results: More than two thirds of the respondents (72.6%) know about TCM, 20.8% consider it more effective than conventional medicine. Respondents with a higher level of stress show more interest in TCM ($r=.27$, $p<.05$), those who smoke hookah have less interest ($r=-.25$, $p<.05$). Students who less often work out in a gym are ready to turn to TCM ($r=.23$, $p<.05$). Students who are less often engaged in sports are more inclined to go to China for TCM treatment ($r=.19$, $p<.05$). They also less often agree that TCM can help Russian people ($r=-.22$, $p<.05$). Stronger belief in the possibilities of TCM correlates with deeper trust in private medicine ($r=.22$, $p<.05$). We did not find any correlations with the level of health.

Conclusions: A more positive attitude to TCM in dental students is correlated with less physical activity, higher stress, as well as deeper trust in private medicine.

Disclosure: No significant relationships.

Keywords: Traditional Chinese medicine; dental students; attitudes

EPV1008

The concept of Evil in Psychiatry: Philosophy, neurobiology and clinical implications

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doi: 10.1192/j.eurpsy.2022.1726

Introduction: Although difficult to define, the concept of evil is widely used and implicitly influences psychiatric judgements and diagnosis. Most definitions of evil rely on classical philosophical concepts, but it remains controversial if evil is a concept by itself or rather a dysfunction on the ability to experience goodness. Also, it is unclear if there is a neurobiological basis for evil or if it is entirely dependent on socio-cultural beliefs.

Objectives: In this work, we intend to systematize evidence on the philosophical definitions and neurobiological correlates of evil, and reflect on its implications in clinical psychiatry.

Methods: Literature review.

Results: The concept of evil has been a theme of debate since the ancient Greek, where Plato argued that evil was a result of ignorance and Aristoteles saw morality as a guide for education and politics. Nietzsche claimed that evil was a dangerous concept that was created by the church, while Hannah Arendt underlined the banality of evil by highlighting “thoughtlessness” that frequently justify evil acts. From a neurobiological perspective, studies assessing individuals with neuro-psychiatric conditions associated with evil-related behavioral abnormalities have been suggesting a potential role of frontal and limbic structures, as well as of the serotonergic system. However, several of these studies assessed presumed correlates of evil, such as antisocial personality disorder or impulsive-aggressive behavior.

Conclusions: Despite the polemic frontier between neurosciences and morality, a conceptual insight over the definition of evil is vital to guide comprehensiveness and clinical approach when dealing with deviant evil-like behaviors.

Disclosure: No significant relationships.

Keywords: Evil; Neurobiology; Antisocial Personality disorder; philosophy

EPV1009

Understanding Generalized Anxiety: Contributions from Phenomenology and Philosophy

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doi: 10.1192/j.eurpsy.2022.1727

Introduction: Anxiety is an ambiguous term, meaning an emotional state, a clinical symptom, a disorder, or a group of disorders. Anxiety is a normal feeling that arises when a person believes he is in danger from a threat or unidentified danger, ensuing with a state of alertness, arousal, and exploratory attention. Its distinction from neighbouring concepts, such as anguish, fear, worry, anxiety, panic, or uneasiness, is valuable but controversial.

Objectives: Review and synthesize various contributions from phenomenology and philosophy to the understanding of what it is like to experience generalized anxiety.

Methods: Selective review of the most prominent literature regarding anxiety psychopathology, namely that of Jaspers, Heidegger, López-Ibor, Sims, Berrios, Femi Oyebode, Pio Abreu, James Aho, Picazo Zappino and Gerrit Glas.

Results: Jaspers described free-float anxiety as common and painful, floating and detached, as a feeling of misunderstood genesis, imposing despite the inapparent object, driving an inescapable need to provide some content to it, but also susceptible to insight by those who experience it. It can take a vitalized or primarily psychic form. Anxiety is closely related to the limits of the human being and to (hopelessness). For Heidegger, angst is the expression of authentic existence. López-Ibor considered anxiety and anguish nuances of the same experience, in both of which there is